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NOMINATION OF KENNETH L. ADELMAN

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

NOMINATION OF HON. KENNETH L. ADELMAN, TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

JANUARY 27, FEBRUARY 3, 16, AND 24, 1983

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NOMINATION OF HON. KENNETH L. ADELMAN

THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 1983

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Murkowski, Pell, Zorinsky, Tsongas, and Cranston.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has had a number of requests from Senators to make opening statements. To the extent that we can accommodate Senators at the outset of the hearing to make such statements that they would like, we will do so. The procedure that we would like to follow would then be to have my own statement, Senator Peil's statement, and then other Senators, and then an introduction by Senator Warner.

Does your time permit you to stay?

Senator WARNER. Yes, indeed, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The purpose of this morning's hearing is to receive testimony from Ambassador Kenneth Adelman on his nomination to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Dr. Adelman has served with the rank of Ambassador this past year and a half as Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations. As Deputy U.N. Representative he has headed the U.S. Delegation to the U.N.'s Disarmament Committee, coordinated the U.S. Delegation for the Second Special Session on Disarmament, and represented Ambassador Kirkpatrick in National Security Council meetings on START and INF.

Before going to the U.N., Dr. Adelman served in various capacities in the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce and worked as a political analyst at the Stanford Research Institute.

Given Dr. Adelman's record of Government service and his prior confirmation before the Senate for his important post at the U.N., I do not believe that there is a serious question as to whether he is qualified to serve this administration in a high-level Government position.

However, the question which must be responsibly addressed by this committee as our duty and responsibility with respect to this or any other nomination for the position of ACDA Director is whether the nominee possesses the specific experience, capabilities, and commitment to arms control envisioned by Congress when it created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

I consider the Director of ACDA to be one of the key appointments of any administration and have said for 17 years now, publicly—and I have said so privately to you, sir—that the nuclear issue is the paramount issue facing mankind. Therefore, this particular Agency has a unique responsibility and this is and will be one of the most important decisions the President can make, one of the most important decisions that this committee and the Senate of the United States can make.

Given the staggering number of nuclear weapons now deployed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and other major powers, it has never before been so crucial that statesmen of all nations undertake the moral, political, and intellectual struggle to devise a means to prevent nuclear holocaust.

In the United States, the Director of ACDA, by law, plays a leading role in that struggle. In this context, the hearing today will appropriately focus on two crucial questions. First, does the nominee possess the requisite experience and intellectual prowess that will be needed to contribute constructively to the formulation of arms control policies which will further the cause of peace and security? Second, does the nominee believe with genuine conviction that the struggle to control arms is one that can and must be waged?

We do not need a weapons expert for the post of ACDA Director. Though a knowledge of weapons is important in this office, we have thousands of weapons experts in other agencies of the Government. Nor do we necessarily need an expert in politics, law, or economics in this post. These qualities, though again important to the position, are also abundant throughout the Government.

Rather, the one quality which should most distinguish the individual who fills this office is the determination to aggressively represent the cause of arms control at the highest levels of decisionmaking in our Government. That is why Congress created ACDA. That is why we have maintained ACDA ever since. And that is why we no less today than before care who really heads this important Agency.

We look forward to your testimony. I would like to say that I was more reassured by the conversations, extended conversations, we have had as to your positions, but I think it is very important that your positions be stated publicly, particularly in light of the fact that you have authored and written articles on these subjects in the past.

Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join you in welcoming Ambassador Adelman here. He has been nominated for a very important post, as you point out. By statute, the Director of the ACDA is second only to the Secretary of State when it comes to responsibility for charting peaceful alternatives to nuclear war.

That is a big responsibility, and I know I am concerned about the fact that Ambassador Adelman would not appear to bring as much experience as I would like in arms control to an administration already very thin in that area. Perhaps Ambassador Adelman will convince us otherwise during these hearings.

There really is no more urgent task before us than to prevent nuclear war, and negotiating arms control agreements with the

Soviet Union is essential if peace, which is obviously the first requirement, is to be preserved. We have experienced negotiating teams in Geneva now, but it is even more important to have someone in Washington who will exercise the kind of leadership necessary to insure that our negotiators in the field will have the kind of instructions and, most importantly, the latitude and the backing necessary to conclude agreements.

I participated in the enactment of the legislation creating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In fact, with Senators Humphrey and Clark we persuaded Arthur Schlesinger and, through him, President Kennedy, to make it a statutory Agency and not one set up by Executive order.

It might be useful to point out now that what we intended 22 years ago was for ACDA to play the role of an advocate for arms control as a complement tc and sometimes as a substitute for arms programs as a way to enhance our national security. We wanted, in other words, an agency that would more often than not counterbalance what was coming out of the Pentagon. The last thing that we wanted was for ACDA to be an echo chamber for policies developed in the Pentagon.

I would hope that the nominee shares that view of ACDA's mandate. Because despite the President's effort in his recent press conference, the perception at home and abroad is that this administration's arms control policy is in disarray. In fact, a growing number of Americans and Europeans are concluding that this administration really does not have a commitment to arms control and would seem to prefer to engage in an arms race with the Soviets under the mistaken belief that such a race can be won.

Certainly all of the talk about preparations for a protracted nuclear war and the notion of prevailing in a nuclear conflict is, I believe, scaring the daylights out of people all over the world. Ambassador Adelman, if you are confirmed, you would have to do something to try to get the administration back on track on arms control.

Frankly, you would also have to put ACDA back on sound footing or truly be derelict in your duty.

In the last 2 years, the Director of ACDA has had to operate with only one of the five confirmed assistants he is authorized by statute to have. There has been an unsettling and morale-breaking turnover in management, coupled with the departure of numerous skilled professionals.

The Agency's personnel levels and budget have been slashed. The absurdity of the plight of the Agency that you are nominated to head can be seen in the spending for such an unessential defense activity as military bands. Last year, this figure was booted around at the time, that the Pentagon spent about six times as much—$90 million—as the administration spends on ACDA.

But more interesting, I think, is that there are about two-thirds as many military bands in toto—trumpeters, drummers, and all—as there will be people permanently assigned to ACDA this year, in other words, almost as many bands as there are people at ACDA. Unless something is done quickly, I believe ACDA may well be beyond redemption as a major player in national security affairs.

I have got nothing against military bands. I think they are fine for patriotic fervor and should be encouraged. I am just saying you should be encouraged equally.

There are tremendous challenges which can only be met if you have the requisite personal commitment and backing from the administration. But your own commitment is necessary and also adequate backing. I hope, Mr. Ambassador, that you can reassure me on these points.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

Senator Boschwitz, do you have an opening statement?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I yield at the moment to Senator Pressler.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, today we are in the midst of an important debate on the future direction of U.S. arms control policy and who is best equipped to make the key decisions in this process. Some have characterized this debate as disarray or, even worse, reflective of a lack of serious U.S. interest in arms control.

I cannot disagree more strongly with such an assessment. Disputes and disagreements are a healthy sign that officials in government are seriously concerned with making progress in negotiations. Only by raising the important questions can we hope to improve the chances for arms control accords and thereby begin to rid the world of the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.

To me what is unhealthy and unproductive is the so-called clear and coherent perspective offered by the Soviet Union and its allies. Such coherence in the East Bloc has demanded a high price. In Moscow, a small group of antinuclear activists who dared to criticize the nuclear arsenals on both sides—not just nuclear weapons in the West—have been harrassed and jailed. In East Berlin, a Protestant pastor who dared to offer a church resolution on the arms race has been imprisoned for so-called anti-Socialist activities.

The appearance of strength and policy coherence bought at such price is, in my view, not worth the consequences. It is, therefore, important that we as Senators ask the key questions. Only then are we fulfilling our responsibility under the Constitution to the American people.

Today we receive testimony from Ken Adelman, nominated to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In the role of ACDA Director, he would be this Nation's chief spokesman and manager of our arms control policy. This is an awesome responsibility that no one can assume lightly, and we as Senators cannot confirm without thorough examination.

The American people and our allies abroad demand a serious and responsible effort toward significant and verifiable arms reductions. In meeting our end of this bargain with our citizens and our friends overseas, we must have at the head of our arms control effort an individual with a deep understanding of the issues and a profound commitment to find points of agreement and thereby achieve significant negotiated results.

Let me note that we are 2 years into the Reagan administration. The U.S. arms control effort is in midstream. While I believe that this administration has come a long way toward achieving arms control agreements, it has a serious proposal on the table in

Geneva in talks on intermediate-range missiles and in Vienna at the conventional arms talks, we have a long way to go.

It is my view that 1983 will be the critical year if we are to succeed, given the fact that this is the year for missile deployments in Europe and 1984 will be dominated by the Presidential election campaign. We must make the most of this significant opportunity to reach significant and verifiable arms control agreements.

Our distinguished chairman, Senator Charles Percy, last Saturday delivered an important arms control address which highlighted the situation. In that speech, Senator Percy noted that conditions are ripe for the administration to accomplish what its predecessors could not. It could gain ratification of four arms control agreements. Given flexibility by the United States and the Soviet Union, the President can reach agreement and gain ratification of START and INF accords.

In addition, there are two important signed treaties that should be presented to the Senate for ratification—the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. To this list of four accords I would add a fifth. I believe that it is vitally important that we prevent a race in space weapons before it seriously gets under way.

In this regard, the United States and the Soviet Union must immediately return to antisatellite negotiations. It is in our Nation's interest to do so.

In conclusion, the Director of ACDA must be a person with the wisdom to grasp these facts. In dealing with a potentially hostile and nuclear-armed Soviet Union, he must, in my view, display both realism and foresight—realism in recognizing that the Soviet Union is not a nation that shares our values, and foresight in recognizing that, despite this fact, the future of mankind rests upon reducing the risk of nuclear war to the lowest possible level.

As ACDA Director, Gene Rostow demonstrated both these qualities and he was responsive to the need for flexibility in finding solutions to the world's security dilemma. His successor will have to demonstrate the same wisdom.

I, and other members of this committee, intend to question Mr. Adelman closely and carefully on these and other important issues. We as Senators must be assured that we have provided our citizens with the most capable person for this serious task.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Senator Pressler, when I first came on the committee I selected the Arms Control Subcommittee as the most important single subcommittee that I could be ranking on and you have served 2 years as the distinguished chairman of that subcommittee. We appreciate it. And now the ranking minority member who heads that very important subcommittee, Senator Cranston.

Senator **CRANSTON**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This committee of the Senate meets today to fulfill its constitutional responsibility to act upon the nomination of a man to what many consider the most important noncabinet post in the executive branch—that of Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

I believe that Congress meant what it said in 1961 when it created ACDA with the express goal of "creating a new agency of peace." I share the commitment of those who founded ACDA to meeting the great need for an agency to provide expertise on and advocacy of negotiated arms control.

I believe arms control should not be left exclusively to the so-called experts. But there is special reason today for serious bipartisan concern that there should be a seasoned expert to advocate arms control within the senior councils of the Reagan administration, because the fact is that this administration is led by a man with no background in foreign or strategic affairs, advised by a national security aide who lacks any international experience, and supported by secretaries of State and Defense who have no previous professional experience on strategic arms issues.

For ACDA to function effectively, it must be led by an experienced arms control advocate who will press relentlessly for negotiated strategic arms reductions. He must be able to allay the understandable institutional biases of the Pentagon, and he must be a champion of the cause which has activated millions of Americans most concerned about the threat nuclear weapons pose to the survival of our fragile planet.

For the first 20 years of ACDA's existence, Republican and Democratic Presidents alike have nominated men of such caliber, distinguished bipartisan experts in strategic arms affairs such as Gerard Smith, Fred Ikle and Ralph Earle. The nomination of Kenneth Adelman represents a radical departure from this bipartisan tradition.

No Senator questions Mr. Adelman's intelligence, his patriotism or his abilities in other fields. But he is clearly scornful of past strategic arms limitation efforts, scornful of arms control advocates, scornful of public opinion on nuclear issues, and he lacks the professional experience necessary to qualify him for this important post.

It is traditional for Senators to reserve judgment on nominees until after they have been given a hearing. I would be less than frank if I maintained that anything Mr. Adelman could say today would convince me to support his nomination.

I fully expect that he will maintain that his brief role as a speechmaker in a U.N. subcommittee of dubius relevance has prepared him to fight for arms contol with expert grounding. And I fully expect that several weeks of cramming in Foggy Bottom will allow a man of his intelligence to field many of the technical questions with which my colleagues will want to press him.

But Mr. Adelman is not an experienced advocate of arms control. To the contrary, in his obstreperous writings, Mr. Adelman has made clear his scorn for the arms control process pursued by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter.

What does Mr. Adelman think of the nuclear arms debate which has activated people around the world? "Surely no more boring a topic is lavished with such press fanfare as the nits and nats of strategic affairs," Mr. Adelman writes.

What does Mr. Adelman think of the hunger of the American people for a reduction in the nuclear threat? "Few people care a whit about foreign affairs, let alone about SALT," Mr. Adelman declares.

What respect does Mr. Adelman have for our Nation's tradition of informed citizen activism? "Because they care little, people read little and know little," Mr. Adelman scornfully states in reference to the arms control issue.

What does Mr. Adelman think of those who work for arms control? Adelman dismisses men of such stature as Clark Clifford, Charles Yost, and Father Hesburg as misguided "luminaries of the social register."

What does he think of his predecessors at ACDA and their aides, who have advanced the cause of arms control through informed advocacy? He derides their "hysteria," claims they are "obsessed," pegs one ACDA director "hapless," and mocks generally arms controllers' efforts to "stave off Armageddon, with visions of mushroom clouds dancing in their heads."

What, in the final analysis, does Adelman think of the entire SALT process which has brought us the limited test ban, the hot line, the SALT I Treaty, the ABM restrictions and the unratified but nevertheless adhered to SALT II—a process which has produced modest but significant gains while holding the promise of greater progress on curbing the nuclear peril?

"SALT has not saved money for either the Americans or the Soviets and is unlikely ever to do so, has not reduced the destructive power of either side and is unlikely ever to do so, and has not enhanced strategic stability—quite the contrary—and is unlikely ever to do so," Mr. Adelman believes.

Mr. Chairman, the issue before us is too serious for any partisan posturing. I take seriously the advice and consent responsibility the Constitution places upon Senators, and I have given careful consideration to the record of the nominee before us. Therefore, I cannot support his confirmation to a post where he must champion the deep hopes of Americans for progress on negotiated nuclear arms reductions.

Because I believe in the essential mission of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, I will oppose the nomination of Mr. Adelman to be Director of this agency. I urge my colleagues—both Republicans and Democrats—to do likewise.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cranston.

Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our colleague from Virginia, the distinguished Senator, who has brought the nominee this morning and who in his own right as a Senator from Virginia has meant so much to the foreign policy and defense policy of our country.

I take seriously the thoughts that have been expressed by our colleague from California, Senator Cranston, because he is extraordinarily sincere and gifted in his fight for nuclear disarmament and for treaties that would be meaningful in this respect.

I intend to listen carefully to the testimony and I suspect that perhaps Mr. Adelman would say at the outset that knowing that this hearing was coming he might not have written so much in the past. That is true of many of us and may curtail many promising journalistic careers of persons who want to be involved in this field. [Laughter.]

So there will be much to explain and many questions about that. But, Mr. Chairman, on balance I must say that Mr. Adelman's career has already been a distinguished one in Defense Department policy and in work at the United Nations and, indeed, many of the things which he has written have been most useful in the public debate on this whole area of arms control, as well as our general foreign policy.

I think arms control and foreign policy are inseparable. As a matter of fact, I believe the administration is making headway in bringing about unity in terms of defense policy, diplomacy and arms control, and that this appointment is an integral part of that. Mr. Adelman may want to speak to that point. Maybe he is in a position to do so.

But it would appear that the Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, has pledged to take much more interest in this situation, as indeed he must, and the President of the United States has indicated a great deal more interest and, indeed, the press is now filled with stories of flexibility. The Washington Post this morning suggests that we are the flexible ones and that the Soviets now are on the wrong foot—a turnaround in the last 24 hours from what we were understanding before.

So I think we are making headway and I look forward to these hearings as an illumination of our disagreements in both a partisan and nonpartisan sense, and an opportunity for the nominee to tell us what he really thinks. And I think we will proceed from this with a much stronger administration force in the whole disarmament situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.

Senator Boschwitz?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

I am pleased to be here today and to listen to Mr. Adelman. I'm going to reserve all my options with respect to his nomination until the hearings are concluded, as I think we properly should.

I think that arms negotiations—disarmament negotiations—really are the issue of the 1980's, maybe the issue of all the 1980's. I suppose that people felt the same during the days of bow and arrows and when gunpowder was invented. But I think the situation is far more dangerous now that we have nuclear weapons.

So I think that this post is of extraordinary importance and I must say that I was somewhat surprised when the President nominated Mr. Adelman. This is a man who was surprised by his own appointment, and he has expressed in the past some doubts about the efficacy of SALT agreements, and he has not been involved in councils about negotiations.

It might be due to his age, but he has also not gained the stature that I would hope would be found for someone in this position. I think he will be regarded worldwide as being in a focal position for this country's efforts on disarmament.

I think that the nuclear arms race has to be capped and eventually negotiated away. This issue is of extraordinary importance to the world, to the country, to myself, and as such I have some reservations about the President's nominee. But I must say that I am reserving my options.

Mr. Chairman, as I said to you in a letter, I have not had an opportunity to read all of the material that has been submitted by staff on this nomination. I would hope that the hearings would not be concluded today but would be carried forward into next week so that we will have a chance to read more of the material and to listen to Mr. Adelman not once but twice.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boschwitz. There will not be a request for a vote on this nomination this week. The earliest that it could be put on the agenda would be for the regular business meeting next Tuesday.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. And would we expect to see Mr. Adelman back next week, then?

The CHAIRMAN. Let's see how far we get today. He is available to this committee for as long as the committee needs to hear from him, and we will spend the entire day today on the hearing and see how far we get. Thank you.

Senator Kassebaum?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing Mr. Adleman. I have no other comments at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Warner, we are finally, at long last, coming to you. I would particularly welcome you to this committee because of your interest in this field and your knowledge of weaponry. You were the distinguished Secretary of the Navy and thus have firsthand experience. You have been a valuable member of the Senate on the Armed Services Committee and particularly helpful to this committee when we reported out our resolution on arms control.

We established a policy which you fully supported in the bipartisan Warner-Jackson resolution that was introduced into the Senate. Our goal should be the utter destruction of every single nuclear weapon existing in the world today. That ought to be our real goal, and I commend you on your foresight and support.

Of course, we welcome you and are happy to have you make any statement you care to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN W. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

As you know, our custom in the Senate prescribes that when a constituent appears, the Senators have the option to join in his introduction. I not only exercise that option, I do so with enthusiasm because I support this outstanding American for this very, very important post. Senator Trible would have been here this morning except that other Senate duties prevented him from joining us.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened very carefully to the opening statements by yourself, a very comprehensive statement; and the ranking minority member, together with others. You have covered the particulars that I otherwise would have enumerated as to his career before arriving at this juncture in his life.

I would like to add a personal observation. I was privileged to be appointed by the President to the Second Special Session on Disarmament this summer, at which I had, although only briefly, the opportunity to work directly with the nominee during the heated sessions at the United Nations.

And, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I can tell you from firsthand experience that he is a cool man under fire. It was a divisive session, regrettably inconclusive on some very important issues, but he was able to discern the feelings of not only all the various special representatives there from all over the world, but he knew them personally. They respected him. I watched him in informal sessions as well as in formal sessions, in private consultations with the Ambassadors and others of the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

And I came away with a very high regard for his professional intention. It is for that reason, as well as others, that I appear here today in support for this nominee, and I am confident that after a hearing by this committee and further reflection by the Senate as a whole, he will indeed emerge as our next Director of the Arms Control Agency.

In his capacity as U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative, Mr. Adelman served the chief U.S. delegate to the First Committee on the U.N. General Assembly. In that role, he was an effective spokesman for the need for further arms control efforts in the field of chemical and biological weapons. He played an important part in urging the United Nations to investigate the Soviet Union's use of chemical and biological weapons in Southeast Asia and chemical weapons in Afghanistan.

As everyone here knows, the position to which he has been nominated is a very important one. The Director of the Arms Control Agency is a principal participant in all of our Government's deliberations on arms control. President Reagan has assigned his highest priority to the pursuit of nuclear arms reductions. I am confident that Mr. Adelman will apply his very considerable talents and energy to the achievement of the President's goal of meaningful arms negotiations and reductions.

I am confident also that he will effectively direct the considerable resources and talent of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency toward the same purpose. As we all know, that Agency right now is in need of strong leadership, administratively and otherwise, and this nominee can provide that leadership.

Through the years I have met with our President many times on the subject of arms control. We know his sincerity. This nominee is his personal choice for that post, and I intend to support our President and this nominee and I urge the committee to give him a fair and objective hearing. I am confident that he will prevail.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Warner, very much indeed. We appreciate your being here and I can assure you that there will be a fair and complete hearing.

I don't know how long ago you made the statements, Dr. Adelman, that were quoted by Senator Cranston. Today your name is not a household word, but it may be that by tomorrow morning it will be. I think the media is an accurate reflection of American interest and many times of worldwide interest.

I note today the press tables are just as filled as they were when Secretary Haig was here for the longest hearing we have ever held in this history of the U.S. Senate by any committee, and certainly they are as filled as when Secretary Shultz was before us.

I have asked for a list of some of the media that is here, to give some degree of interest, relative interest, as to what they think the American public interest is in this subject and in your nomination.

National Public Radio advises that they will carry the entire proceedings live all day.

ABC, NBC, CBS-TV and radio networks are here. The Cable News Network is here. The Satellite News Network is here. UP, UPI, Mutual Radio are here. McNeil-Lehrer Reports for public TV is here, and Voice of America is here, so you will become a household word.

As I say, I don't know how long ago you indicated that there wasn't much public interest in foreign affairs and in arms control. I can well remember 17 years ago as I went the length and breadth of Illinois saying that nuclear is a paramount issue. I really could not arouse interest in it, and I was discouraged by that. There seemed to be little interest in anything but the Vietnam war.

Put in perspective, that tragic war, tragic as it was, costly as it was, still would be dwarfed by the consequences of a nuclear war. As President John F. Kennedy said in his inaugural address, we have the power to eliminate poverty, but we also have the power to eliminate all life here on Earth.

That is the subject we are dealing with. That is the responsibility the President has nominated you to assume. We would like to have you make any statement that you would like to make.

[Mr. Adelman's biographical sketch follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Kenneth Lee Adelman

Position for which considered: Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Present Position: Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations.

Office Address: United States Mission, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, New York 10017.

Born: June 9, 1946, Chicago, Illinois.

Legal Residence: Arlington, Virginia.

Martital Status: Married.

Family: Wife: Carol Craigle Adelman; Children: Jessica and Jocelyn Adelman.

Home Address: 501 East 87 Street, Apartment 15B, New York, New York 10028.

Education: B.A., 1968 Grinnell College; M.S. in Foreign Service, 1969, Georgetown University; Ph.D., 1975, Georgetown University

Experience: 1981-Present: Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations; 1977-81: Senior Political Scientist, Strategic Studies Center of SRI, International; 1976-77: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense; 1975-76: Congressional Liaison Office, Department of State (ADI); 1972-75: Doctoral Dissertation Research; 1970-72: Office of Economic Opportunity; 1968-70: Department of Commerce.

Publications: Books: "African Realities" (1980); Contributor, "National Security in the 1980's: Weakness to Strength" (1980). Articles: "Giving Peace's Friends a Chance," the New York Times, November 27, 1982; "Healing NATO: Quick Fixes Are Not Enough," co-authored with Seymour Weiss, Chapter 12 of "NATO's Strategic Options: Arms Control and Defense" (1981); "Beyond MAD-ness," Policy Review, Summer 1981; "A Critical Phase in Trans-Atlantic Relations," co-authored with Seymour Weiss, Strategic Review, Spring 1981; "NATO and the 'Division of Labor' Thesis," the Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1981; "Japan's Security Dilemma: An American View," Survival, March/April 1981; "Revitalizing Alliances," Chapter 11 of "National Security in the 1980's: Weakness to Strength", edited by W. Scott Thompson (1980); "Japan's Debate on Security," the International Herald Tribune, September 16, 1980; "Helsinki Pact: A Three-Way Battle in Madrid," the Christian Science Monitor, September 9, 1980; "Hands Across the Borders, European Style," the Christian Science Monitor, August 22, 1980; "Nixon Goes to War," the American Spectator, July 1980; "Intelligence: The Wrong Debate?" the Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1980; "The Unexpected Outcome of Detente," the Christian Science Monitor, April 7, 1980; "Pulling Japan Into the Big Leagues," the Washington Post, March 17, 1980; "The Seven Lessons of SALT," the American Spectator, December 1979; "Foolish Intelligence," co-authored with Robert F. Ellsworth, Foreign Policy, Fall 1979; "Japan's Security Awakening: Regional Factors," Asia Pacific Community, Summer 1979; "Rafshooning the Armageddon: The Selling of SALT," Policy Review, Summer 1979; "Monitoring Nuclear Proliferation: A Case Study on South Africa," co-authored with Albion W. Knight, SRI International Project for the Defense Intelligence Agency, April 1979: "SALT II: In Search of the Debate on U.S. Foreign Policy," the Miami Herald, April 29, 1979; "That Elusive Soviet Quagmire," the Wall Street Journal, January 4, 1979; "Toward a More Sensible Foreign Policy," the Miami Herald, November 28, 1978; "West's Superiority: Even If True, Is It Decisive?", the Wall Street Journal, October 5, 1978; "Can There Be SALT III?", the Wall Street Journal, August 28, 1978; "The Runner Stumbles: Carter's Foreign Policy in the Year One," Policy Review, Winter 1978; "Fear, Seduction and Growing Soviet Strength," ORBIS, Winter 1978.

Memberships: Member, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, England; Pi Sigma Alpha, National Political Science Honor Society of Georgetown University, Washington, DC (1972).

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STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH L. ADELMAN, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Ambassador ADELMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, it is truly an honor to appear before members of this distinguished committee for the second time as President Reagan's nominee for a critical position in the executive branch. Because of the support of this committee and the consent of the U.S. Senate, I have been privileged to represent the United States on many key issues, including arms control and disarmament, at the United Nations and spend a wonderful period of my life with a superb individual and a dear friend, Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick.

I appear before this committee now as President Reagan's nominee for Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I deeply appreciate the President's confidence in me and, if confirmed, will work tirelessly to fulfill the goals he has set in this critical area. I appreciate Secretary Shultz's confidence as well and realize that if the Senate concurs together we will be grappling with one of the most intellectually challenging, emotionally gripping, and profoundly important issues of our era—the control of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of peace of world stability, and of national security.

My close associate and friend for a number of years, Dr. Eugene Rostow, summarized our task in his most eloquent farewell remarks to the ACDA staff. He said:

> What is at stake in the negotiations for which we have statutory responsibility under the President and the Secretary of State, especially those about nuclear arms—negotiations on the basis of policies to which ACDA made such a major contribution—is nothing less than that of assuring our capacity to maintain a credible and defensive nuclear deterrent, and thus to sustain the alliances, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific, on which our national safety depends.

Mr. Chairman, I come before this committee fully aware of the central importance of these issues for our Nation and for the world. I come before you also with pride in America's record in this realm. Perhaps no people in modern history have held higher hopes for real arms control measures. Perhaps no nation in modern history has presented more farsighted plans for real arms control measures.

The post-war era began with America fully willing to give up our position as the world's only nuclear weapons state, to destroy our own nuclear weapon entirely, to turn over to an international authority all atomic energy research and development and, in fact, to give it control over all atomic activities. The post-war era certainly would have unfolded differently and certainly in a far better manner had the Baruch plan of 1946 been accepted by the Soviet Union.

After the inception of the Marshall plan, President Eisenhower proposed to the United Nations an international atomic energy agency to channel future nuclear progress into peaceful purposes. Consequently, the International Atomic Energy Agency was established.

There followed a series of institutions and of arms control measures which have been positive, which have contributed to our national security and to world stability and peace, among them the Antarctic Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, hot line agreement, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Seabeds Treaty, the ABM Treaty, and interim agreements of 1972, and the Biological Weapons Convention.

President Reagan seeks to continue this proud American tradition and to go further than ever before in agreements dramatically reducing the number and destructive capability of nuclear weapons in the world. His is a deep commitment to do everything possible to realize his arms control goals.

I need not repeat here that his package of START, INF, MBFR, and other proposals calls for deep cuts and greater world stability based upon genuine equality with effective verification. This package and these proposals are being negotiated seriously through private negotiations in Geneva and Vienna.

The American position will be presented in that forum—the forum in which there can be real results—rather than in any public forum. These proposals have received widespread popular backing and genuine bipartisan support. Our allies have endorsed them enthusiastically. These proposals deserve no less now and in the times ahead.

And these will not be easy times ahead. The President will face increasing pressure to settle for less—to agree to fewer and smaller reductions in nuclear weapons, that is, to permit more nuclear weapons on each side; to settle for less stabilizing arms control agreements, less precision in evaluating equality or in attaining effective verification.

Those of us committed to arms control measures that achieve tangible and far-reaching results realize that conditions in the world today may possibly enable us to achieve excellent agreements—ones clearly in our interest, in the Soviets' interest, and in the world's interest—rather than simply acceptable agreements about which no more can be said than: "Well, we can live with that." If the Soviet Union is as willing as we are, excellent agreements can be the outcome of our efforts.

Moreover, President Reagan is fully committed to measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It would be tragic to succeed in reducing Soviet and American nuclear weapons only to have new nuclear powers emerge in the years ahead. As the President has believed from the beginning, solid achievements will require patience, fortitude, and wisdom. The President set the path in 1981 and 1982.

I am proud that he chose me to join him on this path in 1983. I am personally convinced that all his time and energy, all the efforts of Secretary Shultz, of our excellent negotiations—knowledgeable, experienced, skillful men—and of the dedicated professionals in ACDA can work toward arms control results that make us, that make the Nation, proud, that make the world more stable and more peaceful, with fewer weapons of destruction.

Again, may I express my profound appreciation to this distinguished committee for considering my nomination so expeditiously and with such sincere interest.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. We will go on a 10-minute rule and because we are running all day the Chair intends to continue until 12:15, recess at that point, pick up at 2 and then continue until 5 or 6 this afternoon, and then determine from there on what the schedule will be, depending upon the number of Senators that still have questions.

Dr. Adelman, let's just begin with some basics. Congress established ACDA. The President signed it into law. Do you believe it important that the U.S. Government have an agency such as ACDA and, put somewhat differently, do you think it important that the President have a specially designated, high-level arms control advocate on his inner team?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I do, Mr. Chairman. I think that when an issue such as arms control becomes so important in international affairs generally, as the Senators here this morning all acknowledge it is, that there should be, in the words of the statute, a principal adviser on arms control matters for the President and the Secretary of State, for the National Security Council. And, if confirmed by the Senate, I would welcome the role of being the advocate of strong arms control measures according to the ACDA mandate and, I think, according to the demands of international relations today.

The CHAIRMAN. Considering your long career in Government, why would you particularly want to assume this assignment? How did it come to you? Did you seek it? Did someone recommend you? And, if so, who?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have been involved, as you know, in international affairs and national security affairs, including arms control, for my entire adult life. Many of the years have been spent in writing articles and contributing what I can contribute to the public debate on those issues. I also have served for 7 or 8 years in Government, starting out in the poverty program and then in the fields of foreign affairs and national security.

I have been interested in the arms control matters, as is clear from my writings, through the years. I handled, as several members said, the arms control issues at the United Nations. I was a participant, as you said, Mr. Chairman, in a lot of the National Security Council's deliberations on these issues. And so the President was familiar with my work in this area.

I think it was only fair to say that when the administration first began, my good friend Eugene Rostow spoke to me about joining him as a Deputy in ACDA. People have known about my interest in the position. Although I am very, very honored for this position, this is not a position that I sought in any way. I did not talk to anybody about it or even think about it, Mr. Chairman.

As Senator Boschwitz, I believe, said, it came as a big surprise.

The CHAIRMAN. Given your previous reservations about the value of arms control agreements, could you tell the committee how you feel you can be a strong advocate, an advocate of arms control at this time?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Mr. Chairman, I was a critic of the SALT II Treaty. Let me say that I was not a very hard, fast critic of SALT II at all. Many of the writings, including some that were cited today, I was thinking that SALT II was not a very major contribution, nor was it a major setback in international relations.

My problems with SALT II were that it was largely irrelevant to the subject of arms control. What I mean by that is that it did not reduce nuclear weapons. What it did was, as Senator McGovern and Senator Helms and other members of this committee during those extensive hearings on SALT said, that the SALT II process was a process of codifying or making a treaty about increases in nuclear weapons in the world.

A lot of my writings, even at the time, were saying that if there could be arms control with real reduction in significant measure, I think that would contribute tremendously to the stability in the world, and I would be happy to elaborate on some of those points to you. So it was not a criticism of the entire range of arms control. It was that the SALT II Treaty itself was not a measure that really was substantial reductions in nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. General Rowny has said that he thinks there is a 50-50 chance we can have arms agreements. We have not ratified one for 7 to 8 years now with the Soviet Union and that has been a very discouraging record. Paul Nitze has been optimistic about the possibility.

What do you think the odds are that in the next 2 years we can put together a significant arms control agreement that will provide for significant reductions in the levels of armament on both sides?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Mr. Chairman, as I said in my opening statement, I think the conditions in the world are such that there can be real arms control. By that I mean that certainly the year 1983 is going to be an important year on the INF negotiations. The NATO allies decided in December of 1979, the dual decision, and meeting the deployments of intermediate-range missiles in Europe by the United States unless we can come to some agreement—the zero-zero option of President Reagan.

I believe that there is a tremendous Soviet interest in keeping those missiles over Western Europe, and I think there is a Soviet interest in real reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. I, for one, was pleased that the Soviet counterproposal to President Reagan's START proposal called for a 25-percent reduction in measures of strategic power. This is, I think, further than they were willing to go in SALT II. It seems like the general direction of the March 1977 proposals of the Carter administration and also the START.

So I think that there are serious negotiations going on. I think that the movement toward real reductions is under way.

The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Republic of Germany indicated to me that there was considerable encouragement throughout Europe as a result of the statements made by the President and Secretary of State that the Secretary will assume a stronger role in connection with arms control. The actual statement of President Reagan was made on January 12, when he declared that as in the past, ACDA will report to and through the Secretary of State.

The following day, Secretary Shultz indicated that both before and after Director Rostow's resignation the President had asked him to exercise greater control over ACDA and over arms control policy. Is there any discrepancy between what you see as your role in the arms control policy area and the jurisdictional arrangement outlined by the President and the Secretary of State earlier this month?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Mr. Chairman, those statements by the President and Secretary of State are quite consistent with the 1961 act that calls the Director of ACDA the principal adviser on arms control to the Secretary of State, to the President and to the National Security Council.

It also has language about under the direction of the Secretary of State, managing and orchestrating arms control negotiations if they are under way—the impact statement, the other responsibilities.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not exactly an answer to my question. My question pertained to the President's statement that ACDA will report to and through the Secretary of State. Do you accept that?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. From your discussion with the President and Secretary Shultz, is it clearly established that you will serve under the direction of the Secretary of State? Do you anticipate making major changes in the staff or the organization of ACDA and, if so, would you outline what changes you might intend to make? Have you discussed any of those with the Secretary of State?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have not discussed any of those with the Secretary of State. We have spent considerable hours since the announcement of my nomination talking about arms control and talking about the proposals, the visions of the future, the problems we are going to face. The Secretary is very interested in this area and we have not gotten into structural reform or personnel changes or anything like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you selected or are you in the process of trying to select names for assistant directors? We have a team that has not been put together for some time. What qualifications are you looking for in your assistant directors?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have not addressed the personnel situation at all. I thought it was premature before the Senate voted on this matter, and I was considering the issues involved.

The main characteristics I would look for is to get the most professionally competent, the most qualified, and the most gifted individual we could get for the responsibilities there. I think that even

2 years into an administration we can attract that kind of talent for the simple reason that this is such a critical area and I think people, experts, are generally willing to be part of an activity that is of such known importance and felt so important by the President.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Just one last question. I was somewhat astounded at the statement attributed to you that there have been no savings in any of the previous SALT agreements. That would come as a shock to Senator Cooper, as it is to me. We worked together for months once we had decided the ABM would escalate the nuclear arms race, and the expert testimony was incontrovertible to us.

We figured the capital cost investment would be $70 to $75 billion. Operating expenses alone to just maintain it would be $15 billion, and it would accelerate. Do you not think that we saved money by agreeing with the Soviet Union that we would not, neither one of us, go ahead with the plans we had for completing ABM systems?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. Yes; Mr. Chairman. I do think we saved money on the ABM Treaty. I do not think we saved money on the interim agreement, on SALT I, or on SALT II.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you very much.

Senator Pell?

Senator **PELL**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess the purpose of this hearing is really a broad and basic philosophical one—to ascertain your views and the degree of vigor with which you will pursue them within the Government.

In that regard, I would like your views as to whether you believe there is such a thing as a limited nuclear war.

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. Senator Pell, I believe that the U.S. forces should be structured for very, very strong deterrence and that the main question that is facing mankind is just to maintain the peace. And I think that the big break is between peace and conflict rather than between any kind of gradations of any kinds of conflicts.

By that I mean that I would see the first order of priority of the President is to work out diplomatically, solutions to these kinds of problems.

Senator **PELL**. I think we would all agree that any kind of nuclear war is escalation to a manifold degree from a conventional war. My question to you is, do you think once we go nuclear, if we go nuclear, is there any way—do you believe that that war can be limited, or do you think both sides would then use their total arsenals?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. Senator Pell, I just have no thoughts in that area, and I will tell you why. I think it would be such a time of extreme human stress and extreme conditions that I think any predictions on what leaders around the world would do in that kind of situation would just not be accurate or not be based on anything that I know.

Senator **PELL**. But in your own view, do you have an opinion? As I understand it, when I asked that question, you do not have an opinion. I know my present opinion is that if one side uses nuclear weapons and the other side finds itself being defeated they will escalate until the total armaments have been used. Would you agree with that view, would you disagree, or do you not have an opinion?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator, really that is an area that I have not gone into. It is an area of, I might say, of just speculation of what men would do in those kinds of conditions, and I don't have a strong opinion.

In any case, as you know, in the administration today there are those who believe we can have a limited war.

Senator **Pell**. And you do not necessarily agree or disagree with them, is that correct?

Ambassador **Adelman**. This is not an area that I have ever gone into in any depth, and it is not an area that I have any strong feeling. I have been known, as you know, Senator Pell, at the U.N. for being frank, and open, and having strong feelings about certain things, and this is not one of them.

Senator **Pell**. Another broad philosophical question. If there were a full-scale exchange with the Soviet Union, do you believe that either country could survive or prevail, which would seem to be the current term in use, to any substantial degree?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I entirely agree with the President that there could be no winners in a nuclear war.

Senator **Pell**. I'm delighted to believe that the President said that. But I thought the word "prevail" was creeping into the lexicon these days and that the administration's view was that one side or the other could prevail. I am delighted to hear that is your view and that the administration believes neither side would prevail.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator, as you say, I have read in the newspaper about supposed defensive guidance leaks that have prevailed on prolonged nuclear war. I personally have not seen that kind of defense guidance in the classified form. I do not know if the wording is correct, or what the situation is. It has not been an area of responsibility of mine at the U.N.

Senator **Pell**. But your personal view is that neither side could win and neither side could prevail. Would that be a correct statement?

Ambassador **Adelman**. My personal view, which I do feel strongly about, is that any kind of nuclear conflict would be just a catastrophe.

Senator **Pell**. I'm trying to pin you down a little bit here. Do you agree that neither side could win? You said there were no winners.

Ambassador **Adelman**. That is right.

Senator **Pell**. Would you agree that neither side would prevail?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator, you are asking me to look at a word that has been used in a context supposedly because of these newspaper reports of a defense guidance that I just have never seen, and you are asking me to judge that word in a larger context. I don't know what the context is. I trust it is an accurate reflection of what the defense guidance is, but I have never seen the context and I don't know the document.

Senator **Pell**. Let's leave it, then, that there could be no winners and that the administration is of that view. And you believe that will reflect on your view or the administration's?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I know the President feels very strongly about that.

Senator **Pell**. Does he feel very strongly there could be no winners?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes, he has said that.

Senator **Pell**. Now in the case of a full exchange, do you believe that either country could survive in any governable form?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Pell, again over the years I have been acquainted with some of the literature, but not very much of the literature, on those kind of scenarios and the pro and con, kind of looking at the kind of figures back and forth. But it has not been an area of relevance to my government experience at the U.N. It has not been an area that I personally have been engaged in.

So, again, I am sorry to tell you, I just have no strong opinion on that.

Senator **Pell**. Would you agree with me that the Director of ACDA should develop very quickly very strong views on this subject, because it is your job to be the protagonist of the arms control and disarmament views?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I think that a Director of ACDA should have very strong views on the structure of the arms control agreements, to go after the problem of instability in the nuclear field. I think that addressing the most destabilizing systems on both sides, like the START proposal does, the systems that are most threatening to each side, that are most vulnerable, that are the land-based systems, the most rapid, and the biggest problem in the world, I think that would be a very important responsibility for an ACDA director.

Senator **Pell**. Several of us introduced yesterday in the Senate the freeze resolution calling for a mutually-verifiable freeze on, as you know, the production, deployment, et cetera, of nuclear weapons. What is your reaction to our resolution?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I have met with freeze groups pretty continually since joining the administration, and I share the sentiment that they are expressing—the sentiment of the tremendous concern over nuclear arms buildup through the years. While sharing that sentiment, I do not share the proposal itself because I think that what we need are real reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and not just a freeze at the present level.

I think it has to be verifiable. It has to be mutual. Senator Pell, in order to have it mutually verifiable is going to take extensive negotiations with the Soviet Union. I would rather have those negotiations be about real reductions in the strategic nuclear field, greater stability, greater verification, and equality of systems, rather than going for a freeze.

The freeze, I am sure you know, Senator Pell, would freeze in certain vulnerabilities of the American force, the vulnerability of the land-based ICBM force, and would be a system that in Europe, the INF theater, which would go against what the NATO allies have wanted to do since the December 1979 dual-track decision.

Senator **Pell**. I think the architecture of our resolution meets some of the points that you raise. What it says is that an immediate arms control objective of the United States and Soviet Union should be to pursue an immediate and complete halt to the nuclear arms race, decide when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze on testing, production, and deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems, and give special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make a freeze more difficult.

Proceeding from that freeze, then talks toward reductions would proceed. It would seem to me that those words do not contradict any of the points you made.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, let me just say that the Soviet proposal on START that they have presented—inadequate in many ways, is already calling for a 25-percent reduction on some of their strategic nuclear measures. I would like to see results of real reductions in strategic nuclear weapons rather than a freeze at present levels.

And since the Soviets are already talking—in an inadequate proposal—already talking about reductions of 25 percent, it would seem to me against the interests of arms control, about which an ACDA Director should care deeply, to go in for a freeze when their is a real chance for real reductions.

Senator PELL. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Adelman, do you believe that arms control is an important part of foreign policy?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, I really do. I think that the President realizes that. The Secretary realizes that. It has just become an indisputable fact of international relations.

Senator LUGAR. Do you feel comfortable that your own views on arms control policy will be listened to by the Secretary of State and by the President, and what assurance could you give the committee that your views will be taken seriously? What sort of a role do you anticipate that you will play in this foreign policy formulation?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The Director of ACDA sits at National Security Council meetings and presents views directly to the President on these critical issues—START, INF, and MBFR. He is also the principal adviser to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State has made it very clear that if I am confirmed by the Senate, the two of us would work very closely. Where there are disagreements, the Director of ACDA would go directly to the President.

Like I said in answer to the chairman's first question, I was asked to do this job for some reason, and I imagine the same reasons that the President asked me to do this job would include that he has studied my counsel over the last few years, and that he would be very anxious to hear my views in that area.

Senator LUGAR. But it is your view that you would have, in the event of disagreement with the Secretary of State, direct access to the President of the United States, that your appointment comes from him, and your primary responsibility is to him?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Absolutely, Senator. The relationship seems unusual in the statute relative to the way Washington usually works. I find it very usual because it's very similar to the way the U.N. Ambassador works in that we work with the Secretary of State. If there is a basic disagreement about a Security Council resolution, about a General Assembly vote, about what we should do in the United Nations, and there is a firm disagreement with the

Secretary of State, Ambassador Kirkpatrick has direct access to the President and also has a seat on the NSC.

So I am very comfortable with that relationship.

Senator LUGAR. There has been much public discussion, as you know, as to how serious the administration is with regard to nuclear disarmament. Let me ask this question with regard to a stance that we have enunciated, and that the President, in fact, enunciated publicly in a celebrated speech. Is there any proposal that has been made by any side in the argument that is more comprehensive with regard to the curtailment of the construction of nuclear weapons and the zero option idea?

Ambassador ADELMAN. When you look at the European theater, Senator, you realize that the President wants to, I think in a unique way. He wants to address a serious security problem, a security problem that was first publicized by Chancellor Schmidt in his speech at the IASS in October 1977, and got tremendous notice at that time, a serious security threat in Europe strictly through arms control, in other words, an elimination of an entire class of weapons.

The normal history would be that since the Soviet Union has these weapons—the SS-20's—aimed at NATO capitals in Western Europe, the normal response through history would be to keep the balance, to go for the deployments. What NATO had the foresight to do and the President concurred with and went further on that path is to say let's solve the entire problem through arms control. Let's have the zero-zero option. This is better for the United States, it is better for the Soviet Union, it is better for NATO, and it is better for arms control.

Senator LUGAR. Why should the Soviets want to adopt any part of a zero option? Why would the Soviets want to negotiate seriously given the fact that the SS-20's are in place and, as a matter of fact, we do not have very much of anything in place? What sort of a bargaining hand do we have?

As you face this situation, what kind of counsel do you give to Mr. Nitze or others who are on the firing line? What do they have to deal with?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, what they have to deal with is, I believe, a genuine Soviet concern that the deployment of the 572 GLCM's and Pershing II's would constitute a danger to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. I think when you look out from Moscow you understand that the Soviet leadership would have the same kind of fears over these American weapons systems that our NATO allied leaders have over the Soviet systems.

And I think that the way to prevent the escalation of fear on this is to remove the source—to remove these intermediate-range weapons on both sides.

Senator LUGAR. But what if, for various reaons, the NATO decision of December 1979 to put the cruise missiles on European soil is not implemented? Where are you then with regard to any of your negotiations?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Every time NATO leaders have gotten together, including last month, the foreign ministers and defense ministers meetings have reaffirmed the dual-track decision—to go ahead with deployment and meanwhile to explore and try to solve the problems through arms control. In my mind as a writer in or out of the Government, would be a case study of cooperation in NATO and NATO cohesion.

I personally am convinced that the NATO leaders, as I said in my statement, enthusiastically endorse the President's plan and, of course, the dual-track decision that came before the zero option speech, and they are dedicated to the dual-track decision.

Senator LUGAR. Many of us who opposed the SALT II Treaty were deeply worried about the whole problem of verification. Indeed, we would be worried about the results of your negotiations presently in the event the Soviets were to agree to some of the proposals that we have made.

What kind of verification can there be of what occurs to these SS-20's? In short, can you outline for the committee some of the things that you might insist upon or suggest to our negotiators that they insist upon so that we have some idea about what happens to the SS-20's and can keep track of them in terms of numbers and configuration, location, and what have you?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, the total elimination of the SS-20's has made verification relatively simple. That is a big advantage to the zero-zero option. If you allow some numbers and you can have tests for those systems, and you can have transport building for the system with facilities for those systems, et cetera, then you get into problems of verification on whether any of the systems are, of course, hidden.

If you have a zero-zero option and agreement, then you will not allow, obviously, any tests, any production, any facilities for that. So again in terms of all kinds of interests, both your tremendous interests and the President's tremendous interests, on verification and the INF talks, the zero-zero option is far, far superior.

Senator LUGAR. Well, indeed, it is, but what if we get into a negotiation ultimately in which the Soviets agree to remove some but not all. They can place SS-20's at some distance away from Europe, but not off the planet altogether. This is being advocated by many people who argue that this shows progress. Now in the event that this happens, how do we know where they are?

Have the Soviets offered any indication whatsoever that they are going to be cooperative in allowing us to keep track of these weapon systems within the Soviet Union, or have the Soviets given us some idea as to what in fact is being done to the weapons systems in terms of enhancement or modifications?

The zero-zero option was selected deliberately because it really does offer arms control, verification, and would solve a lot of problems. In the event that we were to have something other than the zero-zero option and an enticing option was presented which people saw as progressive and flexible, what then? What sort of advice do you have as to what kind of insistence we might have and what would the Soviets be willing to offer to us as assurance in this regard for verification?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The President is determined that any agreement that would be sent to the Senate for ratification or that he would sign would have to have adequate verification and effective verification. ACDA in this administration has been moving toward injecting considerations of verification earlier in the process of negotiations and to consider this uppermost, rather than have the negotiation proceed and then wonder how you can verify these measures.

So looking at the technical options of verification, as opposed to any formulated American proposal, would be a big responsibility of the Director of ACDA. I am sorry I can't go into more detail with you, Senator Lugar, but you know that a lot of this gets very technical.

You have to know what kind of issues you are really talking about. What is the best way—national technical means, intrusive measures, limited onsite inspection, cooperative measures, exchange of information? There are all kinds of those. There is an array of possibilities in this area, and you would have to know exactly what weapons system you were looking at, or parts of that weapon system, the unit of measure, in order to know which is most appropriate.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that is sure. Mr. Chairman, I just want to emphasize that. Indeed, we may get into classified material at this point, but what the Soviets are willing to do is the critical point, quite apart from our desires and our technical expertise in knowing what we would like to see.

Ambassador ADELMAN. The Soviets realize, Senator Lugar, that verification is a very important consideration and they realize that during negotiations they are going to have to come to terms with our requirements on verification.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Senator Cranston?

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Adelman, you sought to reassure this committee in your opening statement that it was your view that "it would be tragic to have new nuclear power emerge in the years ahead."

I want to read you something that summarizes your statements in a Stanford Research Institute study that you prepared in January of 1981.

> A clear South African nuclear capability might be helpful to Western security interests in one respect, namely if Pretoria tried to produce anti-nuclear submarine weapons. An announced ASW nuclear capability would enhance South Africa's capability to protect the Cape route during times of global tension or global confrontation. Since such an ASW weapon could easily be converted into a nuclear gravity bomb, South Africa could simultaneously gain a deterrent capability with respect to threats it perceives looming from ground assaults in the region.
>
> To serve overall Western security interests in this matter, Western-South African security cooperation would have to be far more extensive and intensive than presently exists.

Now that, to me, is quite an astounding statement, contrary to your statement to the committee this morning. You apparently believe that proliferation would be helpful in some respects to our country if South Africa were to develop a nuclear capacity. If South Africa started using nuclear antisubmarine weapons off the cape, that is the first use of nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and there are many who doubt that once you start using nuclear weapons you would soon stop.

You seem to suggest that it would be helpful to the United States, at least this is inferred from what you have written, if

South Africa were to use nuclear weapons against their own blacks or against neighboring black nations. I cannot read anything else in your writing that South Africa could simultaneously gain a deterrent capability with respect to threats it perceives as looming from ground assaults in the region—the threat to use nuclear weapons against blacks in Africa, which hardly seems to me helpful to the United States.

If, as you suggest in the next sentence, we would have to be more extensively and intensively cooperating with South Africa, if we would then be cooperating with a nation that uses nuclear weapons on blacks trying to achieve justice in a part of the world where 95 percent of the blacks are oppressed by the 5 percent white population, it seems to me that we create astounding problems for the United States and Africa, astounding problems at home and so on.

The distinguished chairman of this committee, Chairman Percy, other members of the committee, including John Glenn, have led the fight on nuclear proliferation. I have been actively involved in that fight with those Senators and others. You would have to carry on this fight if you were confirmed as ACDA Director.

In view of your statements of 2 years ago, a carefully thought-out document, not something just off the top of your head, I cannot see how you would have any credibility or any effect or any dedication to that particular effort, so I would like to ask first, if you can tell this committee how American security interests would be advanced if South Africa developed nuclear weapons and threatened to use them and perhaps reached the point where it would have to use them either off the cape or against the black majority in South Africa or against neighboring black countries?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. Yes, Senator, I would be happy to do that.

The study that you refer to was a study with two objectives in mind. One was to look at the whole question of South African nuclear proliferation on American interests, and, second, if South Africa did acquire nuclear weapons, what would be the effect, what would be the usefulness, what would be the utility.

Let me just read the summary of this from the material contained in the preceding seven chapters of this report, and anybody can read all seven chapters because they come to the same conclusion.

> It is clear that the overall effect of an overt South African nuclear weapons capability during relative peacetime would be negative. This conclusion would lead U.S. policymakers to strive to head off this action, rather than to manage it once South Africa clearly displays the possession of nuclear weapons.

The whole point of this study, Senator Cranston, and the whole point of the seven chapters was to describe how the South African possession of a nuclear capability would be adverse to our interests. This is in conformity with the work that you have done, the chairman has done, and the Reagan administration has done on nonproliferation.

Now we were also tasked in the study to look at a second thing. OK, it is against our interests. It should not happen. But everybody knows that there is a possibility that that would happen. What would be the effect of that then? And the parts that you read on the ASW and the use of South Africa for deterrent capability against attacks would be what the South Africans would have in mind.

But the whole study is very clear, and I stand by it, that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Africa would be very adverse to American interests.

Let me just say, Senator, in all candor, that the idea of using nuclear weapons on blacks in South Africa is something that comes as very abhorrent to me personally. I have spent 2½ years of my life in Africa. I have traveled around Africa, in Zaire, not in South Africa, and not in Rhodesia. I have traveled around to the little villages all through Africa. I have worked for AID. I started my life in the Government in the poverty program here at home and worked with OEO.

I have devoted a lot of time in Africa. I devoted a lot of time at the United Nations. I handled African affairs there, and for any implication that there would be any consideration of South Africa using nuclear weapons against blacks just goes against everything I believe in. It goes against everything I have stood for through these years. It goes against my choice to go to Africa for 2½ years, to work on poverty programs here and in AID on development in Africa.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, can you explain the statement that a clear South African nuclear capability might be helpful to Western security interests? That appears in this document. How might it be helpful?

Ambassador ADELMAN. If you take the question of whether South Africa should have nuclear weapons capability and whether it would be something that is helpful or harmful to American security interests. I spent seven chapters talking about how it would be harmful.

Then, the second question that the people who hired the study wanted to know is: OK. Given that overall assessment, what would be a role if the bad happened, if South Africa obtained open nuclear weapons? What would be the role of that? In that bad contingency, would there be any value to Western interests? And what we looked at was the small value in that contingency of South Africa possessing nuclear weapons. It goes against the recommendation of the study on the ASW front.

Senator CRANSTON. What small value? You haven't spelled out the small value.

Ambassador ADELMAN. What we were talking about is the shipping line around the Cape of Good Hope. Again, you are looking at the second part, and the second consideration we were tasked to do, which was even if it goes toward proliferation then what happens.

There are all kinds of studies, as you know, Senator, from your long experience in the Government, that look at contingency planning.

Senator CRANSTON. But do you think it would be helpful, then, if South Africa had a nuclear capability that it could use off the Cape?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No sir.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, that's what your statement says.

Ambassador ADELMAN. No, sir. The study spent seven chapters saying that proliferation by South Africa would be harmful to

American interests. If that happens, if there is proliferation against American interests, then what is the second step and what would be the considerations then.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, if proliferation happened, which is fundamentally against our interests, but if it happened nonetheless, that could then be of value, according to you, in that they would then have this nice capability to use off the Cape.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I do not consider it a nice capability. If South Africa had nuclear weapons, which again goes against our interests in various ways, then there is the ASW capability.

Let me just say that I am not a lawyer, but I understand that lawyers always often make the argument that we are going against this, but if it happens, then you have to look at that. Certainly the Defense Department studies are tasked to look at contingencies, overall assessment.

I think anyone reading this entire document, Senator Cranston, would find that overall it is very strong on nonproliferation and fits into the whole pattern of the postwar era, a pattern I feel very strongly about, on nonproliferation, and I do not think that there is anything inconsistent.

Senator CRANSTON. In this eight-chapter study of yours, Chapter 3 is entitled "Utility for South African Nuclear Weapons." And from pages 10 through 25 there are 13 rather enthusiastic pages about the utility of South African weapons. So I cannot ignore the fact that you clearly stated a clear South African capability might be helpful to Western security interests, and you go from the Cape in one sentence to another sentence, a very short sentence, in which you say an ASW weapon could easily be converted into a nuclear gravity bomb, that South Africa could simultaneously gain a deterrent capability with respect to dangers looming from ground assaults in the region.

You do not say that in the negative. It comes after the sentence in which you are saying there are positive aspects and plainly we are only talking about blacks. I do not know about any whites that are threatening to invade South Africa.

The CHAIRMAN. Your time has expired.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to reply?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Just for a second. Chapter 3, you are absolutely right, in talking about South Africa utility with the weapons. That was the task in that study—to look at the worst option, the option that the report very much hopes does not happen, the option that the report recommends U.S. policymakers be more vigorous regarding nonproliferation. That is the conclusion of the report.

If that does break out, if we are not successful and South Africa does possess nuclear weapons, what would they use them for? Why would they have nuclear weapons? This is an area that is completely in conformity with the Reagan administration's approach to nuclear proliferation, meaning that you have to look at motivations. You have to look at security considerations. You have to look at all kinds of different values and not just the technological values, as important as they are. You also look at settings, and the study did that.

But I just want to leave no misimpression that the purpose of the study recommendation, the outstanding recommendation of the study, is that we have to double up our efforts for proliferation. The U.S. policymakers should head off this problem and not try to manage it once it becomes a severe problem, in other words, not get into how to deal with South Africa as a nuclear power state, but to stop that problem before it emerges.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Adelman.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Adelman, I guess at this point one is very cognizant of the fact that the purposes of some studies, such as the very convoluted arguments in this one, can come back to cause some confusion. I would also like to say, Senator Cranston, that I think to go beyond what is in the study and infer that the thesis would be destruction of the black population is a rather sensational charge. I am sure that would be abhorrent, as Dr. Adelman said, to him as well as to any of us.

I would like to move on with a question. I would certainly agree with you that I think the time is ripe and the opportunity does exist for significant arms control agreements that really reduce the number of nuclear weapons and the threat they pose. But, there are many who do believe that the negotiations have stalemated. In that light, I introduced a resolution yesterday for myself, and Senator Glenn, and Senator Gorton that I think would help restore some measure of confidence in the interim period so that we can move forward.

The thrust of this resolution—and it is unfair to ask you because you have not seen it—would be to provide a limitation on the testing of nuclear warheads and land based ICBMs. One, it would require advance notification for all nuclear warhead tests and ICBM tests. Second, it would limit the number of tests that could be done each year, and, third, it would ratchet down that quota each year until eventually one would hope it would reach a zero limit.

I would like your thoughts on such a resolution at this point in time. It does not interfere with any of the negotiations that are ongoing, it seems to me, and it serves as an interim confidence-building measure to show that we are intent on moving forward.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, there are two general approaches that I have been able to decipher on arms control. One is what Prime Minister Trudeau called the U.N. strangulation approach, looking at the test ban kind of approach.

The other is kind of a START or INF approach. Now that you have these nuclear weapons, let's try to reduce them. One goes from the bottom up and the top down, so to speak.

As you know and I put in my opening statement the Limited Test Ban Treaty really has contributed tremendously through the years. Discussions are taking place now in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on verification provisions for a ban on nuclear testing, and, as I am sure you know, one of the problems with nuclear test limitations of whatever type, including the two treaties that Senator Percy and other members of this committee have been so interested in over the years, is verification. A complete test ban has all kinds of difficult verification questions.

How do you know a low yield test from a natural phenomenon? If you have a threshold test ban of 150 kilotons, that presents verification procedures.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Verification is always going to be a problem with anything we look at, and I think in light of Senator Lugar's extensive questioning about what can we expect the Soviets to do, I think we are only going to know this through very patient negotiations. But certainly there are some premises, it seems to me, we could start with—the advanced notification and an agreement to quotas. These would assist verification rather than present an additional problem.

Now, perhaps this is going to be difficult to reach. It would seem to me it is a basic step. If we cannot even discern how we are going to verify that, I am not sure we can negotiate anything. It would seem to me that verification is always going to be a problem, and we will probably have to assume that it is not always going to be perfect. We should welcome measures that assist verification. I would think this is an assumption one would make from the very beginning.

I would wonder what you would view at this point in time as a positive step forward. Do you see ahead a period of time in which there could still be some negotiations on my proposal? I am sure there are other outside factors and political factors at this time that are going to be an influence on negotiations in Geneva.

What would you regard as a top priority if you called the shots?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, the idea of advanced notification of launches is under consideration in Geneva as part of the START negotiations. Like I say, the discussions on verification for nuclear testing is another forum in Geneva. We have a lot of things going on in Geneva, and I think that pursuing the idea of confidence-building measures in the strategic nuclear realm, like advanced notification, is an important ingredient.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Can you see separating that out as something that we could work toward as part of the overall package?

Ambassador ADELMAN. You mean separate it out from the START negotiations or something? I just do not know, Senator. That would be an interesting thing to look at.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I started to say thank you, Mr. Chairman, but he is gone. That is all the questions I have right now.

Ambassador ADELMAN. It is an interesting area and it is just not one I had thought about—if you took that away from the kind of negotiations in START now or whether that would have to be part of the START package—but it is something I would like to keep in touch with you on as we go along.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Senator Zorinsky.

Senator ZORINSKY. No questions.

Senator LUGAR. Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, since I will not be able to be here this afternoon, I am interested to hear an advancement of Senator Cranston's line of questioning and I would like to, with permission of the Chair, yield my time to Senator Cranston.

Senator LUGAR. Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much, Senator Boschwitz. I appreciate that very much.

Let me ask you, Ambassador, if you have ever stated the belief that the United States should withdraw from the United Nations unless there are major changes at the mission.

Ambassador **Adelman**. I do not believe that the United States should withdraw from the United Nations. I think that the United States should try to work in the United Nations to infuse more responsibility there, to get the institution to be more responsive to priorities in the world and critical questions in the world, and I devoted the last 17, 18 months of my life to doing that.

Let me just say that, for example, I thought it was irresponsible of the United Nations to vote a resolution the very week that there was normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt, the very week when they had diplomatic exchanges, the very week when the Israelis returned to the Sinai, to have a resolution before the General Assembly, sponsored by Afghanistan, by Vietnam, by Libya, by Iraq, by countries like that calling Israel no longer a peace-loving country, calling for the total political, economic cultural, and military isolation of Israel.

Those kind of steps, I think undermine the charter, undermine the credibility of the United Nations, and I worked tirelessly over the last 17 or 18 months in order to infuse what I considered to be a sense of responsibility into the United Nations. I would not go to an institution and be part of an institution and work tirelessly in an institution that I felt we should get out of and that was just hopeless.

Senator **Cranston**. Well, I have been told by staff, by two members of the staff of this committee and two members of the U.S. Mission at the United Nations that you have expressed the view that the United States should withdraw from the United Nations unless there are substantive changes in the way the United Nations operates.

Let me ask you another question. Do you feel that the specialized agencies have a positive role to play? Again, I ask that question because I am told that you have expressed the view that specialized agencies have not performed any valued services to the world.

Ambassador **Adelman**. I do not know. Obviously I cannot address the specifics because I do not know who you are talking about, or what date you are talking about, or what I said, or who I said it to. Let me just say that Senator Boschwitz and I had a discussion of this, I believe it was yesterday—the days are very long these days.

I was making the basic point that I thought my experience at the IAEA had a very positive role in the nonproliferation activities, that it was one of the best United Nations specialized agencies, that it helped with its 1,400 inspections each year, that it contributed—it did not sell the nonproliferation effort and we should not think that because the IAEA exists and does its work that nonproliferation is taken care of. But it certainly does contribute to it, and with the safeguards, with the procedures, and with the expertise. I was proud every year at the United Nations to give a speech saying that the IAEA was a valuable institution.

Senator **Cranston**. In the matter of limited nuclear war, whether there was any such prospect of limiting nuclear war, you told Senator Pell this morning that: "I have no thoughts in that area." You declined to answer his question about whether or not we could prevail in a nuclear war. In your writings, that are available for everyone to read, you have clearly embraced the idea that limited or small nuclear wars can be fought and can be won. For example, in 1981 you urged that:

> The United States should be prepared and be seen to be prepared to put our strategic forces into limited play in limited crises, such as the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Middle East war of 1973.

Could you tell us a little bit more about the limited nuclear war? What gives you such great confidence that escalation could be averted once it started? Could you tell the committee what the situation will be on the ground after a limited nuclear war or a limited nuclear conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Cranston, the quotation you just read to me is not about limited nuclear war. The quotation you read to me is about the American military posture, including the strategic nuclear forces of the United States being designed to provide a security role for its forces overseas, in Europe and in Asia. That has been a policy of the United States since the early fifties and continues to be a policy of the United States, and it does not get into the question that I discussed with Senator Pell this morning on limited nuclear war.

As you know, from being a member of this committee over the past several years, the United States has commitments to its NATO allies and that our nuclear forces are designed to keep deterrence strong.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, what you are suggesting is that the deterrent policy which we presently rely upon must continue to be relied upon. I grant that. I believe in deterrence, although I do not believe deterrence can forever prevent nuclear war.

But you are suggesting, I presume, that we have to mean it, that if there is an act of aggression that we would have to respond with nuclear weapons.

Ambassador ADELMAN. There has to be credibility that the United States is preserving its vital interests overseas. That has been the basis of NATO since the NATO Treaty of Rome in 1949.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you think that a Soviet first strike against our land-based missiles, which would obviously kill tens of millions of Americans—we cannot estimate how many—could possibly be deemed a rational act?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No, Senator. But the real concern is to make sure that there is no policy adviser in the Kremlin who could see this as a rational act, in other words, to keep the deterrence sufficient so that it is not within the realm of rationality to those in the Kremlin.

Let me also say that the concern is to look down the road, to make sure the deterrent in the future is as strong as the deterrent, or at least as strong as the deterrent today. When President Reagan took office he found himself in a situation where the trends of the strategic nuclear balance had been reversed for a number of years.

I remember, and I put into writing, Senator Cranston, at the time of the SALT hearings of this committee that Senator Javits gave a talk in this committee in which he said wasn't it good to have these hearings and to realize how much slippage there has been in the strategic nuclear balance over the years? By gosh, what has happened to us over the years?

I know that many members of the committee--and I wrote this at the time—that this committee served a very useful public education function by talking about nuclear considerations. So the considerations and concerns about the nuclear balance come out loud and clear through this committee's deliberations on the SALT II Treaty in 1979.

When President Reagan took office, he faced the situation that there was not an open American production line on either the land-based leg of the strategic triad or the air-based leg of the strategic triad. There was an open production line in all three legs of the strategic triad in the Soviet Union. This, coupled with the concerns over the strategic balance, that this committee did such noble work on, is cause for concern about the Nation.

Senator CRANSTON. If a strike against our nuclear weapons here in our country would be either irrational or accidental, how are we really going to deter it since deterrence only works against rational decisionmaking?

Ambassador ADELMAN. If your question is can there be an irrational leader overseas——

Senator CRANSTON. Or an accidental launch. The trouble with deterrence in the long haul, it seems to me, is that there may well be an irrational act at some point, and you cannot deter against that. There may be an accidental launch and you cannot deter against that. Does not this mean that unless we achieve effective arms control agreements, reduce the hair trigger situation where we now find ourselves, sooner or later there is a grave danger, if not probability, that there could be a nuclear war that no one really wants and no one rationally decided to launch?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That is an excellent question. If I could take a minute to answer that, it is very difficult and it is very fearsome in our day and age to contemplate an irrational act by a powerful country overseas, and I think you are absolutely right. That is something that is very worrisome.

Second, I would differ with you just a little bit in saying that an accidental nuclear situation is something that we cannot prevent or do anything about. There are measures that we can do in C^3I. It really has to be a serious effort, and there have been serious efforts in this administration, to really reduce or almost eliminate the statistical probabilities of accidental occurrences, and that is one of the reasons why this administration has been so emphatic on the C^3I budget, which is the command, control, communications, and intelligence budget, just to make sure that that accident does not occur.

Third, let me say that, Is the answer eventually arms control? Yes. I think you are absolutely right, Senator. I think that if we can go after the most destabilizing systems on both sides, the land-based systems, systems that are the most powerful, systems that are the fastest, the hair trigger response, in your words, that is exactly the way to approach things.

And I think that the START proposals that the President has presented have advocated reducing ballistic missiles by one-half, ballistic missile warheads, deployed warheads by one-third, going after the most destabilizing systems. So I do share your views that the answer in this realm lies in our control as well as it does in deterrence.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cranston.

Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Adelman, as ACDA Director you will in effect be the Washington anchor for our negotiations in Geneva and Vienna. Should they request flexibility in order to pursue compromise proposals, will you take on the responsibility of strongly arguing for their position within the administration?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I am very honored and privileged, Senator Pressler, that I have known Ambassador Ed Rowny and Ambassador Nitze and Ambassador Abramowitz for a number of years. I have worked with them long before the Reagan administration came into office, and I certainly feel so comfortable with all three of them, so I am really looking forward to this very forward to this very much.

We will be discussing the American position on these negotiations very intimately, I would presume on a day-to-day basis, if the Senate confirms me. I treasure their counsel so highly, in the past have and in the future certainly will work so closely with them. I would think that we would have our positions and our policies very much in line.

Senator PRESSLER. You should expect there to be some vigorous differences; how strongly will you carry those views?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Between me and the negotiators?

Senator PRESSLER. Yes.

Ambassador ADELMAN. There has not been in the past.

Senator PRESSLER. Are you just going to take what Washington sends out, or will you really argue strongly in the administration if your people decide that some more elbow room or more flexibility is needed in negotiations? Are you going to be a vigorous advocate of the negotiations views within the administration?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes, I will, Senator Pressler, and I know that you visited us up in the United Nations and Senator Cranston had conversations with people at the United Nations. I do not think anybody knowing my experience from the United Nations could think of me as anything else but a vigorous participant in the policymaking process.

Senator PRESSLER. A report in today's New York Times suggests that senior officials who only last week argued for delaying any INF compromise are now calling for a change of options in which the United States would deploy a reduced number of INF systems in exchange for reductions in Soviet SS-20's. What is your view of such an interim solution?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, as I said in my opening statement, the real results of these negotiations are going to take place in the quiet and privacy of the negotiating room in Geneva. I know that the President is very serious about these negotiations. I know that he is absolutely convinced, as I am absolutely convinced, that the zero-zero option is best for many, many reasons—reasons that I would love to go into.

To speculate on the future course of those negotiations I do not think would help.

Senator PRESSLER. The Soviets have an operational ASAT system and in 1978 the United States began to develop a counter in order to draw the Soviets into negotiations aimed at banning such weapons in outer space. These talks were abandoned in 1979, along with other negotiations in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Do you agree with me that we must give arms control a try before military developments make it extremely difficult to reach a verifiable arms control agreement?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I do agree with you, Senator, that the fact that the Soviets have an operational ASAT capability—antisatellite capability—is very worrisome. It is not only worrisome for our national security, let me say, but in what Senator Cranston—to follow up to his remarks—it is very worrisome from an arms control point of view.

So much of our success or our prospects for arms control through the years have depended, as you know, on national technical means. If there is some threat to systems of national technical means, that will throw back the prospects for real reductions, for verification, for success in arms control significantly.

As you also know, Senator Pressler, the United States is discussing space and arms control on space matters at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, which is a 40-member group that participates in active negotiations.

Senator PRESSLER. Now would you be willing to strongly argue for this, for an immediate resumption of talks within the administration? You will have the key role in deciding what direction the administration goes in this area, will you vigorously argue for a resumption of talks in that area?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Pressler, I would really have to look at the record of what has taken place at the CD in Geneva. I would want to work with your counsel, because I know of your—speaking of articles as we have all morning—of your articles in the area of space and military concerns in space. I would really have to examine that.

Senator PRESSLER. In a 1979 article you wrote that the burial of SALT would resurrect the U.S. strategic program as, first and foremost, a matter of national security, and not primarily one of arms control. There are analysts who claim that security is exclusively a matter of maintaining modernized weapons, and since arms control seeks to restrain or ban such activities, it has led to decreased security.

Do you share the views of such analysts, as your statement might imply?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No; I certainly do not, Senator Pressler. As we discussed this morning, it is, I think, unique in the annals of modern history that President Reagan is looking at a security situation in Europe because of the European leaders' fear of the SS-20 and trying to resolve that problem strictly on the basis of arms control.

So you are using arms control, the zero-zero option, elimination of intermediate-range forces to address a serious security situation. I think that, as I said this morning, that that would be of tremendous interest to the United States and NATO, of the Soviet Union, but also, above that, a tremendous interest to arms control as a field, as a subject, as an endeavor to say that there was an example in history that had made a tremendous contribution to security concerns.

Senator PRESSLER. Does your definition of national security not include arms control as an important aspect of national security policy?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; in the same light as I have just discussed.

Senator PRESSLER. Let me say that I think in Europe and Japan and around the world the Director of ACDA is regarded as a Cabinet-level post. It is perhaps not regarded as highly within the United States, but I found when I go abroad that people are very interested in who our ACDA Director is. Your words will make the headlines both here and abroad and, in many cases, abroad more so.

In this, the ACDA Director must display statesmanship. May I note that age and statesmanship or the wisdom that it implies are not synonymous. We should remember that among our founding fathers who authored our Constitution there were many men in their thirties and forties. But do you feel that you will have to make extra efforts to deal with your Russian counterparts who have perhaps been in this field much longer?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I know that over the last 17 months I have had many dealings with Russian counterparts at the United Nations. I would expect to have fewer dealings with Russian counterparts in this position than I have had over the last 17 or 18 months. The fact is that we have superb negotiators—Ambassadors Nitze, Ambassador Rowny—who are sitting across the table from the Soviets. They will do the negotiations.

Senator PRESSLER. You mentioned earlier that you were very concerned about the nuclear war. With regard to limited nuclear war you have previously written that "Regardless of the causes or comparison with previous doctrines PD–59 has important consequences, first and foremost its issuance gives official blessings to existing reality in the world. This is important in itself for it bolsters those forces in a bureaucracy responsible for limited war planning and procurement.

"Before PD–59, many of them were working on the sly. Now they conduct their affairs in broad daylight, with full backing when obstacles arise." So it sounds like at that time you did believe that a limited nuclear war could be won.

Ambassador ADELMAN. No, Senator. If I may take exception to what you said, the point of that article was to talk about, in a very positive way, the Carter administration's approach to this issue.

As you can see, reading that article, it was to say that the whole idea of deterrence is an idea that is very dependent on credibility for a President and for options for the President, that the nuclear forces of the United States, going to PD–59 and predecessors in the Schlesinger years, should be structured in such a way as to give the President options and in such a way as to make our deterrent capabilities very strong. And that in essence was the theme of it, and the part you just read just fit into that theme.

Senator PRESSLER. I see I have a red light.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pressler, very much indeed.

Senator Zorinsky, you ought to be recognized at this time. I am going to ask Senator Helms if he would be good enough to chair the hearing and, after every Senator has had one round, to recess until 2 p.m.

Senator ZORINSKY. Ambassador Adelman, I would like to ask you a couple of questions regarding your views as to whether you think that national technical means are adequate in policing a deescalation of arms on both sides.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, I think that the national technical means have contributed significantly to verification in the past. As you go into measures, units of account, that are more meaningful in terms of stability, as we discussed before, you may have to augment the means of verification.

Let me just give you an example. In the SALT process, one of the things that I objected to was that the unit of account was launchers. It is easier to verify; it is a less important factor. There are all kinds of launchers—the SS-18, with 10 warheads, more powerful than anything that we have, the Minuteman with its launcher, far less powerful.

When you look at, as the START proposals are doing, the number of missiles and deployed missile warheads, these are more important factors but more difficult to verify. We may find as the negotiations proceed that there has to be more than national technical means, to answer your question explicitly. There has to be notifications, like Senator Kassebaum discussed. There have to be exchanges of information. There must be pledges by both sides not to encrypt their telemetry and areas like this.

There is a whole panoply of possible verifications. We may find that national technical means are not adequate.

Senator ZORINSKY. When you say "we may find," you mean you do not know?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That means it depends a great deal on what the nature of the treaty—the direction of the negotiations itself.

Senator ZORINSKY. Would you sufficiently trust our national technical means as they exist today to initiate any type of agreement with the Soviet Union and to give you confidence and the feeling of security on behalf of 230 million people in our country? Are you prepared to say yes, our national technical means are sufficient?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think our intelligence capabilities in this realm are very good. I have written that in the past. Whether they could verify a unit of measure depends on the unit of measure—what they are supposed to verify. For example, if you have asked them to verify accuracy, just to take one example of a strategic ingredient that is very important in the overall strategic balance, it is difficult to verify accuracy.

If you ask them to verify launchers that is an easier measure. So it would depend very much on your unit of account.

Senator ZORINSKY. How much time do you think we have left before the proliferation of nuclear capability reaches sufficient nations that it becomes academic as to what extent you can negotiate with the Soviet Union?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Let me just say, Senator, that is a very worrisome situation. When you think out yourself, as I said in my opening statement, it seems to me that one of the real fears that we all have to acknowledge and live with is the idea of nuclear proliferation in the future.

Let me just say, though, that as an interested person in this field, if you look at the literature from the 1950's, we have done better—the world has done better in the proliferation field than in the 1950's, meaning that when you read literature on strategic issues in the 1950's many authors are talking about 20, 30, 40 nuclear weapon-powered states in the 1980's. Now that is not to say that we should rest. That is not to say that we should congratulate ourselves.

Senator ZORINSKY. What are your views on onsite inspection for verification?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Onsite inspection is one of the panoply of verification means. There are certain kinds of treaties. For example, if you get into the chemical weapons production kind of affair or whatever, an onsite inspection would be a valuable contribution to that. It would depend, again, on the unit of account and the kind of treaty.

Senator ZORINSKY. Would you be supportive of onsite inspection?

Ambassador ADELMAN. If you need onsite inspection in order to have verification of a treaty, then you should have onsite inspection.

Senator ZORINSKY. Where do you think that onsite inspection would rank insofar as a method of verification?

Ambassador ADELMAN. It would depend, like I say, on the unit of account. For the number of launchers on the Soviet side, it would not be especially important. We can do that.

Whether they are producing a certain chemical or not in a certain plant, you cannot tell that from the national technical means. You would have to have somebody in that plant to look. So it would be very much dependent on the kind of treaty, the subject you are talking about, and the unit of account.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS [presiding]. Senator Murkowski?

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My first question may be a bit regional, but the State of Alaska is in the backyard of the Soviet Union and I am interested to know whether or not you feel that the United States or the Soviet Union at the present time, either one, has an overall military advantage.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think, Senator, that the trends of the United States, the overall military balance, has been very adverse in the past. I think that we have, as this committee had commented in its hearings in 1978 and 1979, that the slippage of American power, including overall strategic nuclear power, has created doubts about stability and peacefulness in the world.

I think that when you think to yourself in the strategic nuclear realm that in the last 10 years, which I would remind members of this committee were the years of the SALT process—we are living under the SALT treaties right now—that in those 10 years the Soviet Union has had 10 new variants, 3 new land-based missiles. The United States has had one variant to the existing Minuteman missile.

As I said, when President Reagan came into office he faced the situation where there were not open production lines in two out of the three legs of the strategic triad. Today, the number of missiles and missile launchers, of warheads, megatonnage of the Soviet overall strategic nuclear capability is superior to the United States.

And these are worrisome trends that the President has been dedicated to reversing and to keep our deterrent strength up while he is really trying to have arms control, real reductions.

Senator **MURKOWSKI**. So pretty much without qualification you feel that the Soviet Union has a superior capability at the present time?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. I think that there are areas of certain definite Soviet superiority, and they are very worrisome.

Senator **MURKOWSKI**. Would you generalize on those areas briefly that you feel the Soviet Union has a substantial increased capability and also briefly comment on those areas where you feel that we have the upper hand?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. Let me do the latter first, because it is easier and shorter. The United States being the island nation, with all of our allies overseas—except for Canada and Mexico, as you know—our principal trading partners overseas—has a margin of superiority in the naval field that we have had to keep freedom of the seas and to keep the sea lanes of communication open. And that, I would think, is an essential element of the United States and should be an essential element to the United States.

The Soviet Union has long had conventional superiority in Europe of an indisputable nature. They have in the 1970's acquired at least parity in areas of overall strategic nuclear superiority, in, for example, the number of missiles today, the United States—I am talking about the missiles of the intercontinental range—the United States has 1,600. The Soviet Union has 2,350. President Reagan wants to bring both sides down to 850.

The number of warheads, which has long been an area where the United States had a comfortable margin, today the United States has 7,200 warheads—intercontinental warheads. The Soviet Union has 7,500. The President wants to bring both those levels down to 5,000—no more than 2,500 in ICBM forces.

If you look at any kind of a NATO balance in terms of tanks, in terms of aircraft, they are very familiar. The Soviets usually have a 3-to-1 advantage in areas like that.

Senator **MURKOWSKI**. And submarines you classify in the Navy, is that correct?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. Yes; and the submarine balance I just do not know at this time.

Senator **MURKOWSKI**. I have one more question, Mr. Chairman. Many people in the country feel that we should go ahead and ratify SALT II since the President has pledged to observe its conditions as long as the Soviets do equally. I wonder if you would care to comment on your personal opinion with regard to that.

Ambassador **Adelman**. President Reagan has said that the United States would do nothing to undercut the SALT agreements, provided that there is similar restraint from the Soviet Union. This is not the same as ratification of SALT because ratification would make, as you well know, Senator, the SALT agreement the supreme law of the land. It would not only make it the supreme law of the land, but it would also set precedents for future arms control negotiations that we may be negotiating. For example, the units of account of SALT were, like I said, launchers. We think it is far more significant to have missiles and throw weight and warheads as the unit of account, at this stage.

I would also say that the imbalances in the SALT II would be presumed from now on, the right of the Soviet Union to have 308 heavy missiles and we have no corresponding right. The exclusion of the Backfire bomber from consideration as a strategic force would then be presumed for future negotiations. There are all kinds, and I do not want to get into a debate of SALT II again, but there are all kinds of imbalances and deficiencies in that treaty that would be presumed for future treaties if the Senate went ahead and ratified.

Senator **Murkowski**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Senator **Helms**. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Adelman, I had a meeting this morning with Secretary Shultz which delayed my getting here. I must say, sir, that the Mr. Adelman that I met yesterday and visited with is not precisely like the Mr. Adelman I read about in some of the letters floating around up here—some of the distinguished commentaries by pundits.

Frankly, based on our conversation, you have been encouraged that we can have an arms reductions treaty, and I, for one, want to work toward that. Let me ask you a couple of rhetorical questions and I am going to ask these not to be whimsical, but to make a point.

I hear so much criticism of the United States in terms of efforts to maintain our defense capability, and I am among those that wish that it was not necessary. With that predicate, suppose Ed Rowny were to get from the Soviet Union an offer to have a verifiable elimination of nuclear weaponry altogether. What do you think the U.S. response would be to that?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator, I would not be honest if I did not tell you that is a thought that I just have never thought about in my life. I would have to really look at that and explore it. It seems a breathtaking type of endeavor and may we be blessed with such a problem in the future.

Senator **Helms**. Of course it does. Now the other half of the question is, suppose we were to make that offer to the Soviet Union. Do you entertain in the vaguest sort of way any notion that the Soviet Union would accept that?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Helms, I think that in the coming 2 years, if we can reduce the number of missiles on both the American and Soviet sides by one-half, the number of warheads by one-third, the amount of megatonnage on the Soviet side significantly, I think we have something to be very, very proud of.

Senator HELMS. Certainly. I remember when we opened the SALT II hearings over in the Senate Caucus room in the Russell Building, and, as discussed earlier, the chairman made his statement and the ranking member and so forth down the line, and it so happened that I immediately appreciated George McGovern, then a distinguished member of this committee, when I made the observation that my problem with SALT II was that it was not a limitation treaty, it was an escalation treaty, that what I favored was a true, verifiable arms reduction treaty. And George McGovern said, "You stole my speech."

I guess that joining of hands between Helms and McGovern was the widest wingspread in political history. [Laughter.]

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, I hope you would not be embarrassed if I told you that when you were meeting with Secretary Shultz this morning, we encountered that situation because I read it in the transcripts of this committee during SALT. It said that you and Senator McGovern did agree that this was not a reduction treaty.

Senator HELMS. Certainly. I think that the only reasonable position to take, and I hope that somewhere along the line—and I do not derrogate or question the good faith of the people who are constantly critical of our own efforts—we can understand that the United States does not have an Afghanistan. The United States does not have a Poland, and the American people indeed genuinely, sincerely are in favor of peace.

My conversation with you yesterday indicates to me that you want to work toward that, and while there has been vigorous questioning of you this morning it has been done in good faith, and I hope you will be reported out and confirmed as rapidly as may be possible, and I thank you for appearing.

If there are no further questions——

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I would like to return to your question. I was flabbergasted by the answer. I agree that most negotiations go in stages, but we have a President who has suggested a zero-zero option in Europe. Obviously, the objective and the goal of nuclear negotiations has to be a zero-zero option overall. So if you say that you have never considered that, I must tell you I am somewhat alarmed at that, or somewhat surprised, at least.

You have never considered the idea of a total elimination of nuclear weapons on both sides of the major powers? Is that correct?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, I have found that this subject is so difficult, as we have seen from the 7½ years of negotiating SALT II, that the stability in the strategic nuclear realm is a very difficult thing to attain. I think that we will find in the future that this kind of START proposal that the President is recommending—a one-half reduction in the missiles and one-third in warheads—greater stability is going to be a very difficult prospect and I understand your sentiment for a long-term goal. That is absolutely right.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Why is it a difficult prospect, when you said already when you talk about a one-third reduction, you mentioned a little earlier that the Russians had already come to us with what amounted to a one-quarter reduction.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Different measures. The Soviet proposal also has many things that are very objectionable, like not going ahead with the GLCM's and the cruise missiles. But the fact that they are heading downward is a good sign.

My point was simply, Senator, that it certainly remains a long-term goal of the United States. It would certainly remain a personal goal of mine for the elimination of these kinds of awesome weapons in the world. But just thinking possibilities and what the obligations of the Government and an agency like ACDA, as Senator Pell and others know, have limited time, limited resources, and limited attention.

If we can get real reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, working toward an eventual elimination, but that kind of eventual elimination is not a near-term prospect.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I was also very surprised when you waffled on Senator Zorinsky's question with respect to onsite inspection. To me, that is almost as difficult a goal to achieve when we are dealing with the Russians as the zero-zero option overall. But yet it seems to me to be a desirable one to achieve. I will reread your testimony on that, but I was surprised when you equivocated in that area.

It would seem to me that the beginnings of real arms reductions and real verification would be enormously served by that.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Boschwitz, I could not agree more that onsite inspection, depending on the treaty we are talking about, depending on the unit of account, is an effective means of verification. It may not be necessary, but it may be very helpful.

My point to Senator Zorinsky was that if it was needed for there to be effective verification, then that was the only way that that treaty was going to come about, depending on the subject. If it was not, we would look at alternative arrangements.

Senator **Boschwitz**. In answer to Senator Zorinsky you began to talk about chemical weapons and not about the subject at hand. You have during the morning talked about the fact that launchers, which are the subject of SALT II, are not the critical aspect in terms of much ability one side has to destroy. And yet launchers are the subject of the treaty because they are indeed verifiable by national technical means.

And the other aspects that you spoke about—how many warheads, how much strength, how much throw weight and so forth—those are the things that could be indeed observed by onsite inspection. So I was surprised and continue to be surprised that you did not and do not still seem to adopt the idea that onsite inspection would be a great achievement and a great step forward.

Ambassador **Adelman**. I am sorry, Senator. There seems to be confusion here. Let me try to clarify my views. My views are that if onsite inspection is absolutely needed for verification of provisions of the treaty, then we should settle for no less than onsite inspection.

No. 2, onsite inspection may not be needed for verification of provisions of the treaty—for launchers, for warheads, for other missiles. It may not be needed.

No. 3, as you said in your statement, Senator, the Soviet Union has been fairly allergic to onsite inspection in the past. It has not been entirely the case, but for practical purposes there are some—

the PNE Treaty does have some modified—but generally speaking the Soviet Union has been very reluctant on onsite inspection.

So, if you find yourself wanting real arms control, to demand onsite inspection for every treaty, whether it is needed or not, knowing the Soviet Union is not going to adhere to it, it can be used as a way of subverting any chances of arms control.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I do not think the Senator talked about demanding onsite inspection. As I recall the question, he was more interested in your views with respect to it.

Ambassador ADELMAN. My views with respect to it are that it is needed.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Senator Boschwitz.

Senator Percy asked me to recess the committee, but, without objection, Senator Cranston has another line of questions he wishes to pursue and after that we will recess until 2.

Senator Cranston?

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I gather we will resume at 2. I cannot be here until about 2:15, and I would like to request unanimous consent that I can return at that time to finish my questions.

At the time they were under consideration, Ronald Reagan opposed every major nuclear arms control agreement consummated by the United States, including the Limited Test Ban, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT I, the ABM Treaty, and SALT II. I read your statement a bit ago this morning that SALT has not saved money, has not reduced the destructive power of either side, has not enhanced strategic stability, and you do not expect that to ever be accomplished.

Are there any strategic arms agreements that you think have added to American security?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I would just refer you—Senator Cranston, I would read it to you, in my opening statement where I addressed that very explicitly. There followed a series of institutions and arms control measures which have been positive, which have contributed to our national security and world stability and peace. Among them are the Antarctic Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Hot Line Agreement, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Seabeds Treaty, the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreements of 1972, and the Biological Weapons Convention.

Senator CRANSTON. Why did you write this other statement that SALT has not contributed anything and never will?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I was talking about SALT II, and I do not believe that the strategic nuclear situation in the world today that causes you such distress, Senator, and causes all of us such distress, is a situation that is prevailing under the conditions of SALT II.

I do not think that from a SALT II Treaty you can say or anybody can say we have saved money. We are living under SALT II now. We have had to modernize our forces.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you think the ABM Treaty has saved some money?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; and I said that to the chairman this morning.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you think that the Reagan administration should allow an unratified treaty like SALT II to inhibit the strategic weapons buildup?

Ambassador ADELMAN. One of my obligations, if confirmed by the Senate, would be to look at the impact of the major weapons systems on any kind of arms control agreement that is being adhered to by the United States. I would fulfill that, if confirmed by the Senate. I would fulfill that statutory obligation seriously.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you feel our security is inhibited by SALT II?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The President has said that he is not going to undercut the agreement or take any steps to undercut those as long as the Soviet Union shows similar restraint.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you believe that the Soviets are violating the terms of SALT?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, that is not an area that I have looked into. It is not an area I am knowledgeable about at all.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. That is another answer that surprises me. Here is the man who is going to be the head of ACDA and has not looked into whether or not the Soviets are complying with SALT II.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Boschwitz, let me just say that my obligations for the last 2 years, because of the action of this committee, and the action of the U.S. Senate, has been to represent the United States at the United Nations.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. But very much involved with arms control, if I read the material that has been given me correctly. That would seem to be to be a rather important facet of what you are doing.

Pardon me, Senator.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I agree with you, Senator. If confirmed by the U.S. Senate, that would be an area that I would really want to look at, and that would be an area that I would consult with you about and to really investigate very carefully. The area of verification and compliance is an important area of ACDA to do. It is not a responsibility of the Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, but it is a responsibility of the Director of ACDA.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, I too am astounded that you do not have a view of whether the Soviets are cheating or not.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Cranston, that is a very important subject. That is a very delicate subject and delicate in the sense that you have to look at it, what you have to know to answer that question is first, what is the specific provisions of SALT II itself, second, what is the legislative history of the treaty.

In other words, did one side or another side make a unilateral interpretation of a provision? Did we mean this by the interpretation? The other side says we accept that interpretation of that provision or do not accept that interpretation.

Three, you would have to look at the verification techniques and the verification of them. That is a very, at times, uncertain area, so you have to know what it is that you have agreed to. You have to know what it is that the other side and your side agreed to at the time.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you know all that?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No, I do not, Senator.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Would you yield for just a moment? I do not think we are looking for an interpretation. We are looking for your judgment as to whether or not you feel there have been violations, or whether or not there has been any act within the import of SALT II.

In the biography that the committee prepared, it states you coordinated the U.S. Delegation to the U.N.'s Second Special Session of Disarmament and headed the U.S. delegation to the United Nations personally, which is responsible for arms control matters.

I confess I have not read everything that has been submitted to me, which is the reason that I asked that the hearings be extended so we have a little bit more time, but I thought that you were coming to this committee with considerable background in arms control. You have written about this subject, so I continue to be surprised that you want to say it is a matter of interpretation whether or not the SALT II Treaty, which was certainly not ratified and not binding, has been conformed with by either or both sides.

I understand that, like everything else, this is open to interpretation, but in your judgment perhaps we should ask the question, has SALT II been adhered to by the Russians and, if not, where not—and I do not mean to impose on your time, Senator.

Senator **Cranston**. You are not imposing. I appreciate your interest.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Boschwitz, let me just tell you, in all frankness, that that is not an issue that I have dealt with at the United Nations. It is not an issue I have a judgment about, and I just cannot give you a judgment if I do not have a judgment about it. I know it is very important. I would think that any ACDA Director into his term who had the responsibilities of compliance, of verification in his mandate, would be derelict if he did not know the answer to that.

I do not think a Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations would be derelict in his responsibilities if he could not answer that. I can assure you that is an area I would look into, I would be in touch with you about. It is going to be an important area and it is an important consideration. I do not want to minimize it for a minute to you.

Senator **Cranston**. Has the United States submitted any evidence to the Standing Consultative Commission that the Soviets are cheating?

Ambassador **Adelman**. As you know, Senator Cranston, the proceedings of the SCC are confidential, and the only mechanism, the only reason that those consultations have worked nicely since the Interim Agreement, and since the ABM Treaty, is that they are kept confidential. And for me to break the confidentiality of those proceedings in this open hearing would cast a doubt over a mechanism of working out these differences, but I think it is a very positive mechanism.

Senator **Cranston**. Do you know the answer to the question that I asked?

Ambassador **Adelman**. The answer to the question——

Senator **Cranston**. Do you know the answer, without expressing it? Do you know the answer to the question that I just asked you—

whether we have ever submitted evidence in the form of a complaint to the Standing Consultative Commission that they are violating, cheating on SALT II—the Soviets?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes.

Senator CRANSTON. You know the answer?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes.

Senator CRANSTON. I think that I will take it upon myself to state for the record that while we have had concerns about the way the Soviets have complied with certain aspects of the treaty, and they have had concerns about the way we have complied with certain aspects of the treaty, all such issues have been resolved to the satisfaction of both parties without any charge that one side was deliberately cheating.

It was a matter of interpretation, except one, where we have not yet assented to the Soviet concerns about what we are doing.

Do you believe that we need weapons like the MX as a bargaining chip?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think that we need weapons like the MX or any weapons that are like the MX in the strategic nuclear realm to keep the deterrent very strong.

Senator CRANSTON. But you do not view it as a bargaining chip?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The MX?

Senator CRANSTON. Yes.

Ambassador ADELMAN. No, I do not. I think we need it for our national security because of the trends that you know and that I have discussed here this morning, that the strategic nuclear balance is such that it has weakened the deterrent capability of the United States.

Senator CRANSTON. Would you oppose any MX deployment scheme that violated SALT II?

Ambassador ADELMAN. My statutory obligation, if confirmed by the Senate, would be to report on the conformity of a large program like the MX in terms of arms control agreements, and I would fulfill that statutory obligation.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you feel the MX deployment in the proposed—perhaps now dead—Dense Pack mode would be a violation of SALT II's prohibition on fixed-site ICBM's?

Ambassador ADELMAN. As you know, Senator Cranston, the Scowcroft Commission is looking at deployment techniques for the MX, and I would hate to or be reluctant to speculate on what they are going to recommend.

Senator CRANSTON. I am not asking what they are going to recommend. I am asking about the Dense Pack, which was a proposal. Do you believe that it violated SALT II because of the new fixed site ICBM launcher prohibition?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I do not know. I would have to look at that. I would have to examine exactly what the SALT II Treaty said exactly, what both sides said it said, whether one side agreed with the interpretation, at the same time, the considerations I discussed with Senator Boschwitz.

Senator CRANSTON. I take it you have not done that yet?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No, sir.

Senator CRANSTON. My time is up, but I will be back at 2:15.

Senator HELMS. In accordance with Senator Percy's instructions, the committee stands in recess until 2 p.m.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tsongas, you have not had first round yet. I wonder if you would like to proceed at this time.

Senator TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, would you preside while I make an urgent phone call?

Senator TSONGAS. Do I have to give it back?

The CHAIRMAN. We will negotiate that.

Senator TSONGAS [presiding]. You must have done very well this morning. Everyone else has dropped off.

I apologize for not having been here. I thought this session was going to be yesterday as it was intended to be, and I could not get out of a commitment I had earlier. I kind of suspect you wish I had a commitment this afternoon, too, but we will let that pass.

Let me pursue the issues that you and I talked about in my office, which I thought was a very constructive session. I am interested in the mind set of the President and why he chose you.

Now, Dr. Rostow had credibility, he had a constituency, he was well known, and when he either jumps or is pushed off the ship, it makes international headlines. You are not well known, you are not perceived as an expert in these affairs, you don't have your constituency. And if I were the President and wanted to have someone who I could control, whoever I could control with little effort, without much concern, why is it not logical that you are the kind of person I would go to?

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR KENNETH ADELMAN—Resumed

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Tsongas, as we talk, I very much welcomed the opportunity for this nomination. It was not, as I said this morning, something that I ever sought, but when the opportunity came, it was an opportunity because of the importance that you, the President, I, and everybody attach to this general field; that it is a position of tremendous responsibility and tremendous, I think, opportunity for real reductions.

In terms of the President's policies, I think the President's policies have been very, very consistent in arms control during this administration; but he wants real reductions is strategic nuclear arms, he wants a total elimination of a class of nuclear weapons in Europe. The President, in your phrase, should control any of his advisers, any chief of any of the agencies of the Government; and we are there to serve the President and to be his advisers but also his implementors of his policy. This I do with entire comfort and total agreement with the real reductions that he has proposed.

On Gene Rostow and what happened to Dr. Rostow to lead up to the events of 2 weeks ago, like I told you in your office, I have no personal knowledge of at all. I began the administration by being good friends with Dr. Rostow. I remain good friends with Dr. Rostow. I was talking to him the night before all of this happened about U.N. matters and about personal matters. It had nothing to do with any of this. And I cannot speculate on what happened.

Senator TSONGAS. Let me pursue that. Would you feel comfortable with President Reagan going into a negotiating session with Andropov with only the translator in the room with him to negotiate arms control?

Ambassador ADELMAN. If you are asking me would the President of the United States be very good on the issues between the United States and the Soviet Union, the answer is absolutely yes.

Senator TSONGAS. Technical judgments?

Ambassador ADELMAN. To the extent the President has to make technical judgments, which I do not think is an extensive amount. I think what you have a President for, and the National Security Council meetings I have attended, which have been many in this area, are basic issues of approaches. They are not technical issues. The President does not have to decide on, as we discussed this morning, exactly which technique of verification, for example fits which measure of an arms control package, in what degree do you have a reliability, and what error of probability, and you know all the kind of computer equations.

I do not think we elect the President, and I do not think we have a President to make those decisions. We have a very competent staff in ACDA and elsewhere in the international affairs community to do those.

Senator TSONGAS. But on the big issues of diplomacy, approach, arms control, setting the plan for arms control negotiations?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; I think President Reagan is very good at that, superb.

Senator TSONGAS. You have been involved around this scene for some time. Do you think, for example, if Senator Glenn and President Reagan got into a discussion on verification they would have about an equal amount of knowledge on the issue?

Ambassador ADELMAN. On the technical kind of question there is no doubt that there are lots of people in Washington who know almost every technical area. But like I say, when you are looking for qualifications for top directors in the executive branch, you would look for a wider perspective.

I would think it is the same way, let me say, when I vote for a Senator. I mean the Senator handles issues of health, he handles issues of wilderness, he handles issues of arms control, he handles issues of 89 things. And I would not want a Senator that would know the nits and nats of health insurance programs so extensively that he just did not have a grasp of the other issues before him.

Senator TSONGAS. Would you want to name some Senators who would know less than the President on arms control? You agree there are some who know more, but do you think there are any who know less?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think that the President has gone for arms control packages, Senator Tsongas, that have been the most radical, the most substantive, and the most clear cut of any President in the post-war era. And I think that is a very bold move, and I think it is a very intelligent move.

What he has done is to come up with a proposal, a series of proposals on arms control that would very much reduce nuclear weapons—50 percent in terms of missiles, one-third in terms of warheads—that would address a serious security concern in Europe with a total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Senator TSONGAS. I happen to agree with you on that, and that is the point I am trying to make. The reason he did what he did at Eureka College was because there was a feud within the administration between two sides. The side that prevailed were those that were moderate on arms control. The side that was vanquished were those that were hard line.

Assuming that is the same process, that will continue because he does not have the technical knowledge himself, and it really does come to a point of the information given to him and the kind of arguments made to him by people like yourself. And so it is important in that sense that the person who sits in your position be a supporter of arms control in the real sense of that term.

I'm not talking about traditional analytical, amoral perception of any issue, but someone who believes that arms control is important.

I read through most of your writings, and I think you would agree that you would really have to look far and wide and read between the lines to detect any passion for arms control as opposed to an analysis. For example, the piece we referred to before, "Rafshooning the Armageddon," I thought that was an interesting piece and well done, but it was a cold analysis and stepping back from the moral side of the issue.

I do not get the impression I am dealing with an advocate. This is a job you could have been appointed to, the job X, Y, or Z. But there is no sense that what I do may affect the survival of mankind. There is a coldness to your approach.

If you combine that with a President whose information is marginal and a Secretary of State who has got a lot of other things to do around the world, where is the push for arms control?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Tsongas, let me make just two points. One is the discussion this morning that led me to believe at lunch anyway that the article you are referring to was more passioned than the cold, analytical approach.

Second, I think your summary is a fair summary. I was cold and analytical about SALT II. I was not a fanatic opponent of SALT II. In fact, in some of the writings that I believe you have read I said it was kind of irrelevant. It was kind of irrelevant to arms control.

When you have a treaty that basically legitimizes a tremendous Soviet strategic buildup, the kind that you have discussed in just the last few days, this is not something to get passionate about in terms of arms control. What it is, you may get passionate about it for other reasons, but it is not an arms control package.

And what we are doing now today is living under the provisions of SALT II, as you know. The Soviet buildup is continuing, as you discussed in the last 2 days. And it is not something I can get passionate about.

I could get passionate, and I am passionate, and I am an advocate, in your words, about real reductions in nuclear weapons. I think if we over the next 2 years can get missiles down, strategic nuclear weapons 50 percent, get warheads down to one-third to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons and eliminate this threat in Europe, I think that is something I would get awfully emotional about.

Senator Tsongas. I agree, but the problem is the rhetoric is fine, but if you look at, for example, the President after the Rostow resignation really did suffer in Europe. There is no question the Soviets ran with th[illegible] and had a field day. So the President called everybody in and the press to really reaffirm his commitment to arms control and that he was on the top of the issue, and his full confidence in Ed Nitze, his negotiator.

Well, I mean if you are a European listening to him refer to Ed Nitze, knowing something of the general reputation the President has on issues that he deals with, would you not conclude that what was engaged in in that session was public relations, not substance?

Ambassador Adelman. No, Senator, I do not. I was in that session. I do not want to reveal meetings with the President, but let me just say in general terms that was entirely substantive.

Senator Tsongas. You believe he is committed to arms control.

Ambassador Adelman. I do.

Senator Tsongas. If you were to conclude that he was not committed to arms control, would you resign publicly and so state your conclusions?

Ambassador Adelman. The problem I have been thinking about over the last 2 weeks is the problem of confirmation and the problem of doing a responsible job in what I consider as an awesome task; and you are asking me am I thinking about resigning X, Y, and Z.

I am committed on taking this job that the President assigned to me. I have listened to the President discuss these issues. I have heard him discuss these issues for over 2 years. I am absolutely convinced that he is very sincere on an arms control package.

Senator Tsongas. OK. But let me ask this, and I am going to ask this until cows come home, so you had better get ready to answer it. You are in what may be the single most important position in our Government, given the fact that, as I said, the Secretary of State has other things to do, the President is not really versed in it. And if we get to a point where you conclude the President really does believe that no treaty with the Soviets is the best way to go—you cannot trust them or whatever—that he is really not sincere about arms control, it is critical in my mind that you are prepared in your own mind to resign and to state the reasons for that resignation.

So I would ask you if you should conclude the President is not sincere on arms control, are you prepared, have you come to your own conclusion, are you comfortable within yourself that under those conditions you have no choice but to step down and to publicly state the reasons?

Ambassador Adelman. Senator Tsongas, it seems to me your question is one of will the President really want to go forward with the treaty. The answer is yes. Will he want to go forth on any treaty that comes up, and I would think that the answer is no.

And I think you are asking me to say well, are we going to have a treaty in the next 2 years.

Senator Tsongas. That is not my question.

Ambassador Adelman. OK. I am missing it.

Senator TSONGAS. My question, very simply, if you decide that he is not serious about arms control—that is, your definition of arms control—that the belief you have expressed now is indeed not the case, do you feel that you have an obligation to the rest of us to state that and to resign?

Ambassador ADELMAN. My first obligation—I cannot conceive of that ever being the case. I have spent 2 years with the President on these issues, and I know he is very sincere.

The second thing would be that if confirmed by the Senate, my overriding obligation would be to serve as an advocate of arms control to the President, and to tell him that this is a very important subject, and to tell him that it is an objectively important subject in the world, it is a subject that is well worth pursuing, and that I came to this position with an absolute clear and heartfelt impression gained over 2 years' time that he was very, very sincere and serious in this area; and that I cannot conceive of a situation where that would not continue.

Senator TSONGAS. You mean you have not spent any time thinking about what would happen under those circumstances.

Ambassador ADELMAN. No; I have not. Senator, I know it sounds funny, but I just have not gone into this job thinking about under what conditions I would resign.

Senator TSONGAS. So I have asked you now four times, and you managed to—very well, I might say——

Ambassador ADELMAN. Thank you.

Senator TSONGAS [continuing]. Dance around the issue. So the only conclusion I can draw is that under those circumstances you would not.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, I am just going to be very honest with you and say that I—at a confirmation hearing I am just not going to get into a subject that I have absolutely never thought about in my life, namely under what conditions I would resign from this job, that I think is a job that I agree with you is of critical importance to the country that the President wanted me to fulfill, and the President is very serious about.

Senator TSONGAS. I will come back to this.

[The following information was subsequently received for the record:]

UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D.C., January 28, 1983.

Hon. KENNETH ADELMAN,
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR AMBASSADOR ADELMAN: As you recall during your nomination hearing yesterday, I posed the same question to you several times. I never received a precise answer. That question asked the following:

"Subject to your confirmation by the Senate, would you resign from the Directorship of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency if you became convinced that others in the Administration, including the President, were opposed to and were effectively blocking any arms control agreement with the Soviet Union?"

I regard this question as more than a measure of your commitment to arms control. More importantly, your public willingness to lay your job on the line will be your only source of leverage and political clout with the Reagan Administration. You do not come to this position equipped with either stature or constituency in the arms control community. Therefore, your ability to advance the case for arms control in the Administration will depend very directly on your status as a mid-term replacement for a dismissed predecessor. As Dr. Rostow's replacement, your willingness to stay on and pursue your statutory responsibilities will be of critical importance to the President.

I would like to have a written reply before next Thursday, February 3, the tentative date set for your next appearance before the Committee.

Sincerely,

PAUL E. TSONGAS,
United States Senator.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., February 2, 1983.

Hon. PAUL E. TSONGAS,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR TSONGAS: I am writing this letter in response to our discussions during my nomination hearing and your letter of January 28.

Your question presents a hypothetical situation that is highly unlikely to occur. President Reagan is deeply and personally committed to arms control as a means of achieving peace, reducing the risk of war, and enhancing the security of mankind. I share the President's deep commitment. If I had any doubts in this regard, I would not have accepted the nomination to be the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

If confirmed, I will be a vigorous advocate and proponent of arms control agreements that are equitable, verifiable and militarily significant. I intend to fulfill these obligations to the best of my ability. However, as a general proposition, it is my belief that if any public official finds that his values and principles are in fundamental conflict with Administration policy and he has concluded that his capacity to change those policies have been exhausted, resignation is an appropriate recourse.

In closing, let me repeat that this is a hypothetical situation that is not likely to be encountered because I know that President Reagan is fully committed to this important goal.

Sincerely,

KENNETH L. ADELMAN,
Ambassador.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Tsongas.

Ambassador, I would like to go back to the South African discussion. You have testified about your extensive knowledge in Africa, your extensive travels and studies there. I think you would fully understand the implications if it ever appeared as though we participated in any program that would make it possible for South Africa to have atomic weaponry.

The law of the land is very clear. It is an act I introduced. Senator Glenn cosponsored with me. It means we should exert every power and influence we can to prevent the proliferation of weapons to nonweapons states.

What I have been particularly concerned about with respect to South Africa is dual usage technologies which could be sold for one purpose but could be used in a weaponry program. Time and again I questioned the wisdom of such exports, and I am very glad the administration is now reviewing these applications much more closely.

And I, without objection, will put into the record a recent letter I have received from Secretary Baldrige confirming to me that South Africa has been denied export licenses for one of these items—that is, dual usage hot isostatic presses which can have applications in a nuclear weapons program. And I think the letter is a very welcome sign of what may be a tougher stance on nonproliferation than we have had to date.

[The letter referred to follows:]

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,
WASHINGTON, D.C., *January 18, 1983.*

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Government Processes, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHUCK: Thank you for your letter regarding the export of nuclear-related items, particularly hot isostatic presses (HIPs), to countries that pose a proliferation risk. The Department of Commerce has recently denied several license applications for the export of HIPs to South Africa.

The export of HIPs has been an issue carefully and closely reviewed by the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination. This review was necessary because of HIPs dual use in nuclear weapons development and in the manufacture of a wide range of industrial equipment which requires special shape and density.

Because of HIPs essential role in the fabrication of nuclear weapons, the U.S. policy is one of denial for the larger size HIPs to countries in which nuclear proliferation may be a risk. Based on technical analysis performed by the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, it was determined that HIPs above 3-5 inch size had a greater potential use for nuclear weapons development than did the smaller units. Consequently, we will consider approval of exports of small HIPs (the 3-5 inch size), on a case-by-case basis, to nonsensitive end users, conditioned upon previous receipt of government-to-government nonproliferation assurances. To date, we have denied exports of the larger HIPs to countries such as South Africa with nuclear programs of proliferation concern.

This Administration will continue to deny the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment and technology to countries where the danger of proliferation exists, and work to achieve international cooperation for a strong international nonproliferation agreement.

Sincerely,

MALCOLM BALDRIGE,
Secretary of Commerce.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Adelman, there is a subgroup on the Committee on Nuclear Export, and the agency has a key role in spotting items of this kind. Can you assure the committee that ACDA, under your direction, will continue to exert itself vigorously in that group to prevent potentially dangerous exports to any country?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; Mr. Chairman, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good.

Your previous writings have been subject to interpretation. The one I would like a further amplification on goes back 5 or 6 years. It is a 1978 Wall Street Journal Op Ed piece that you wrote, that SALT or "any variant thereof" is incapable of halting the Soviet strategic building. You concluded that:

> A stable United States-Soviet truce based on mutual distrust is preferable to aberrations of friendship accompanied by unsavory political and military Soviet conduct.

Just a few questions that have not been asked you about that particular statement. Do you believe that the U.S. START proposal, if accepted, would halt the Soviet strategic buildup?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; I do, Senator, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that the U.S. START proposal incorporates much of what was learned and successfully negotiated in SALT?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you regard our negotiating effort in START as an aberration of friendship?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No. I regard it as a very sound approach to strategic weapons.

If I may say, Mr. Chairman, if I may take 30 seconds of your time, I reread that piece last night, too, and it strikes me as an interesting piece for those Senators and others who say that I was not interested in arms control, in any serious arms control through the years. Because if you look at that piece, there were three specific suggestions I made on augmenting the future of arms control.

One is the unit of account had to be changed. We had to look not at launchers but at missiles and at warheads. That has now been done in START. Second, that any kind of arms control agreement would have to include gray area systems. The omission from SALT II of the Backfire, the SS-20, the cruise missile problem was a tremendous omission that was going to have to be addressed if arms control were going to be successful. That is now being done in the INF and the START.

Third, the NATO allies have really been distressed by the direction of the SALT negotiations, the lack of consultation, et cetera, et cetera, and we are going to have to deal a lot closer than also I think this administration has been doing. I am not saying there is any cause and effect, but the point of that article was to think very deeply about arms control itself, what would constitute a new kind of framework for successful arms control. And I just think that there is a correlation, not a causation, but a correlation between the START package today and the INF package in that particular article.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Finally, on that particular question, do you regard our negotiating position on START as preferable to an unregulated truce based on mutual distrust?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. In your testimony this morning, you indicated there were a number of issues that you simply had not thought about or were not yet adequately informed about, and that is understandable. Since you will have to try to play a very key role quickly, time is pressing heavily.

I would appreciate your describing your experience on arms control issues in some more detail; specifically, I want to ask about your responsibilities as assistant to Secretary of Defense, Don Rumsfeld in 1976 to 1977. What were those responsibilities?

And I would like to precede it by saying I have had a very, very strong endorsement from my long-time friend, former Congressman and colleague in the Congress, Don Rumsfeld. He thinks very, very highly of you, as does Dr. Robert Goldman, whom I have known for decades and think highly of, and was a colleague of mine at the University of Chicago. So I am pleased to have those references.

But could you describe the kind of duties that you carried out as assistant to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; I was primarily responsible for his congressional testimony, which is, for any Secretary of Defense, a very awesome task. The preparation and supervision of the staff of the annual defense report, the posture statement from the Secretary of Defense to the Congress. I did various speeches and studies for him, traveled with him all around the world and in the United States, and headed up a little think tank in the Pentagon at that time for him.

The CHAIRMAN. How about your work as a senior political scientist at Stanford Research Institute beginning in 1977?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I was conducting studies that members of this committee are familiar with on proliferation/nonproliferation, South Africa, on various other studies that were done; some at the request of the government, some at the request of business firms.

I was teaching at Georgetown University, Catholic University, and American University at the same time, and I was doing a great deal of writing as well.

The CHAIRMAN. And then the role you played in the Committee on Present Danger and on the Reagan campaign and transition teams.

Ambassador ADELMAN. On the Committee on Present Danger I was on the executive board with Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Rowny, Dr. Rostow and various other members of the current administration. On the Reagan transition team, I was helping Secretary designate Haig on the preparation for his hearings. He asked me to be a part of a small team to handle the hostage situation for the President-elect, to watch it, and to advise the President-elect before the inauguration. There were various decisions at that time to keep him informed on everything.

The day before the inauguration, President-elect Reagan asked me to go as his official representative to Wiesbaden with President Carter to see the condition of the hostages, to go back to the White House and report after that trip back to President Reagan after the trip with President Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. In your opening statement you state that we should hold out for what you describe as excellent agreements and not settle for ones that are simply acceptable. Do you believe that a good agreement should become hostage to the best agreement?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The point of my opening statement, Mr. Chairman, was to say that the President is going to come under increasing pressure to have a less good agreement, to have a less than excellent agreement; that I have had discussions over the last 2 years with individuals who say that we should not have such deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons, that we should not have such deep cuts in warheads, that the pressure that the President will be under that is of concern to many members of this committee is a pressure to get away from good arms control and to lessen up on the package, the proposals that he has today.

The CHAIRMAN. My final question in this round concerns the conduct of negotiations. I spent a good deal of my life negotiating. I have negotiated against rigid, impossible negotiators where, as soon as I learned I was wasting my time and theirs, we cut off negotiations. And I think there are some people like that in the administration who really do not want an agreement and are trying to undercut the President.

I take as sincere the President's statements that he really wants an agreement and he really wants deep cuts. But there are those who were described as stonewalling by your predecessor, if you are confirmed in this post.

Do you think it is realistic in a negotiating position, taking into account the whole history of negotiations that you can have only "a take it or leave it" position and never deviate from it and expect ever to end up with a negotiation that is successful? Or that you can always come out and say that the first position is the best position, and therefore, it is the only position?

In other words, do you feel that flexibility is the essence of negotiating; maybe you do not come out both totally happy, but equally unhappy, possibly. But you at least end up with an agreement that is in the interest of both sides. You are never going to get an agreement that does not have mutuality of interest on both sides.

I happen to think we have a mutuality of interest in stopping the arms race and stopping proliferation throughout the world and setting an example.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I honestly believe that, too, Mr. Chairman. I think that the INF proposal and the START proposal are absolutely in the interest of the Soviet Union and in the interest of the United States. And I said in the nice visit we had that so often the arms control agreements in the past have been looked upon as what we in political science would call a zero-option game; a gain for one side is a loss for the other, a loss for one is a gain for the other.

I think for the IMF, the zero-zero option would be a tremendous gain for the Soviet Union; I think it woud be a tremendous gain for the United States, a tremendous gain for NATO and a real shot in the arm for arms control itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Adelman, you have some pretty good, pretty distinguished predecessors. Wiliiam Foster, Gerard Smith, Fred Ikle, Paul Warnke, George Seignious and Gene Rostow. With the exception of Gene Rostow, have you consulted with any others since the President nominated you?

Ambassador ADELMAN. A very dear friend of mine is Fred Ikle, and I have worked closely with Fred Ikle over the last God knows how many years. I thought it was presumptuous of me, given the Senate's role in confirmation of hearings, to get into the role of acting like a director of ACDA.

I have also, in the planning in my own mind regarding what will happen if confirmed, vowed to myself that I would want to get together with each of these gentlemen. I have already put that in my mind but I have not done anything about it.

Senator PELL. I do not want to infringe on any of the subject matter of the Senator from Massachusetts, but I hope when his time comes that he will continue to press this point that he was making with you.

To my mind, as a former member of the executive branch, if you believe—if you find yourself not believing in the mission you were assigned or in the good faith of your boss, you have only one alternative; that is, to quit. And I would hope that this would be your view. In general terms, is this your view?

Ambassador ADELMAN. My view is that we have a President who is deeply committed to real reductions arms control. I cannot conceive in my mind that there would be a change in that position. If, under the slight provision that there were a change in that position, I would feel it my obligation to show him why arms control was in the national interest and to be the kinds of arms control that the statute and the history of the statute would want.

Senator PELL. And if you did not succeed, would you quit?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, I know that you and Senator Tsongas want me to talk about under what condition I would resign from this position, but it is just not something I am comfortable in doing.

Senator PELL. The personnel and the money have been, as you know, drastically reduced by the administration for ACDA. If you are confirmed, what would be the steps you would take to insure that ACDA has the necessary means to do its job?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think, Senator Pell, that my experience in 7 or 8 years in the Government has been that when an agency has important work to do, has gifted individuals to do it and is kept busy doing the important work, the problems of morale, the problem of agency cooperation really disappear. I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that the work of that agency is exceedingly important at this time.

Second, I have no doubt in my mind that the ACDA professional individuals are superbly well qualified, and I can pledge to you and I have no doubt in my mind that if confirmed by the U.S. Senate, they would be kept very, very busy.

Senator PELL. As you know, ACDA is being subjected to a rapid turnover in staff and there have been rumors recently of an even further far-reaching purge. What are your own plans in this regard? Do you plan to pretty well keep the staff as is, or do you plan to have another purge?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I would think that the demands—what we have to do in ACDA, and hopefully do it quickly—is to get at the task of organizing the arms control effort in as good a way as we could possibly do. I would think that purges would just be a confusion of time, it would be an exercise in futility.

I have a predisposition after my years in Government against massive reorganizations as really diverting the time and the energy and the attention of the employees away from the task at hand. And like Senator Boschwitz has said this morning, 1983 is going to be a critical year for arms control. And if we spend the year worrying about those kinds of considerations, we are just going to lose sight of the important thing, which is the advocacy of a very sound arms control agreement.

Senator PELL. Well, to be specific, you must be aware of the low morale, the low condition of morale in the organization now. You must have thought about what you intend to do to raise that morale. What are the steps you are going to take?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I have. What I would do to raise that morale is to proclaim the self-evident fact that this is a very, very important subject in the world. It is self-evident that my responsibility is one of organizing, if confirmed, that Agency to serve the President, to serve the Secretary of State, to serve the National Security Council in a very forceful and vigorous manner.

And like I say, Senator Pell, my 7 or 8 years in Government have shown me that when people feel like they are doing something very important, feel like the boss appreciates what they are doing and that they are busy and being in demand, that there is no problem ever that I have seen with morale.

Senator **Pell**. Those are not specific steps. Do you have any specific steps?

Ambassador **Adelman**. In terms of reorganization?

Senator **Pell**. Not reorganization. We often reward those who have done the best job by way of Presidential citations. You must have some ideas along these and other lines as to what you could do.

Ambassador **Adelman**. I have really not thought about that. I have not thought about the personnel situation at all, Senator, and I say that with all sincerity. I have thought about the question of the low morale in ACDA. That has been a prospect that very much depresses me.

I come as no stranger to ACDA. The fact is that over the last 2 years we have had a large delegation from ACDA going up to New York to help us on the arms control and disarmament efforts up there. I am familiar with many of the employees in ACDA, and I think they are just fine, superb individuals.

Senator **Pell**. I think several years ago you wrote an article criticizing the then-administration's efforts to clarify and win support for its arms control policy amongst the American people. Yet, as you know, by legislative mandate the ACDA Director has public affairs activities as one of its primary responsibilities. And the Reagan administration, as I understand it, has just created a team to engage in public diplomacy vis-a-vis Europe, and also in public affairs vis-a-vis the American people to explain its arms control policy.

Would you be a central participant in those efforts of public diplomacy or public affairs, or whatever you would call it?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I would hope to be, Senator.

Senator **Pell**. Then what is the difference between that in the Reagan administration effort in this regard from the same activities you criticized so harshly under a previous administration?

Ambassador **Adelman**. There would be two differences, Senator. And interestingly enough, at the chairman's suggestion I read what I think is the fascinating testimony of John McCloy who appeared before this committee on the SALT hearings. And at that time, he gave background on the Senate's involvement in the treatymaking process, which is fascinating. I have never seen it anywhere else in print.

But he also got into this very question. He spoke about the fact that he was disturbed at the tremendous efforts being waged to pressure Senators to ratify a treaty which he did not think was in the fine tradition of treatymaking in the Senate.

That would be one difference I would see. But I think that public information is a very, very critical consideration in all this, in this field but that is not directed to lobbying for Senators to ratify a treaty in front of the committee or in the Senate.

And secondly, I objected to, in that article that you referred to, the scare tactics which I consider irresponsible. The kind of idea that if you did not have SALT II you were going to have Armageddon. As the title of that article shows, the Rafshooning of the Armageddon, treating this subject which is of such importance and such criticality and has such an emotional grip on people as a public affairs, a slick Madison Avenue kind of technique. And I think those kind of scare tactics are not appropriate for the Government to do.

Senator PELL. I think when it comes to the defense budget, you have scare tactics being used by the administration. Would you not?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I have never used scare tactics, and I do not know what scare tactics you are referring to.

Senator PELL. The same scare tactics you were referring to on the other side. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I have not heard the President nor the Secretary of Defense say if we do not get this deployment of this weapons system, we are going to have Armageddon.

Senator PELL. He did not say Armageddon. But he said he would be very much against it. It would increase our risk in the event of nuclear war; at least the risk of nuclear war, if we do not move ahead, for example with the MX missile.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think if the trends continue on the strategic nuclear balance, as they have over the last 10 years, it does lower our deterrence.

Senator PELL. Well, I guess this is like that old business that one country's freedom fighter is another country's terrorist. It depends on how you look at it.

My time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tsongas, I believe it is your turn, but if you want to yield to Senator Cranston——

Senator TSONGAS. Go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tsongas has yielded to you, Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, before I renew my questioning I would like to emphasize for my colleagues an important fact that was revealed this morning when Senator Boschwitz and I were questioning Ambassador Adelman.

One of the key issues before us today is Mr. Adelman's dubious qualifications for the No. 1 arms control advocacy position in Government; a position which takes on all the more importance since there are no arms control experts in the senior councils of the Reagan administration. Neither Ronald Reagan nor Bill Clark nor George Shultz nor Cap Weinberger have any prior professional experience or training in strategic arms matters. So we need an expert to run the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and to fight knowledgeably for arms control.

It is clear that the Reagan administration is trying to speed Mr. Adelman's confirmation process by making all sorts of assertions about how his speechmaking in U.N. subcommittees and his academic writings on African affairs have made him an expert on the crucial matter of strategic arms control.

He is being presented to us as a certified arms control expert who has been at the center of Reagan administration arms control policymaking. And yet this morning, in response to Senator Boschwitz and to me, Ambassador Adelman could not address and had no informed opinion on two of the most pressing, fundamental arms control questions of the day.

He claims to have been an arms control negotiator dealing frequently with the Russians at the United Nations, and yet, he admits that he has no idea whether or not the Soviets are cheating on the SALT provisions. He claims to be prepared to strengthen arms control and enter agency debates, yet, has no idea whether the President's major nuclear arms reduction proposal of 1982 to deploy MX missiles in the Dense Pack mode—would be a violation of the SALT regime.

Mr. Chairman, this is not a partisan issue. As an American, I am deeply concerned that we would even consider entrusting the senior Washington policymaking post on arms control to a man who, despite assertions to the contrary, is clearly a novice in the arms control field. We are unilaterally disarming in strategic and arms control matters in terms of the U.S. team versus the team of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets have a foreign minister who dealt with more than a dozen American Secretaries of State. The Soviets have arms negotiators in place who have been working at that task for years. We have had four Secretaries of State in the past 3 years, and have a tremendous disarry in the Reagan administration's arms control policymaking apparatus.

I do not think we should compound this problem by confirming a novice in strategic affairs to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We absolutely need a sincere, expert advocate of strategic arms control in this vitally important arms control post that relates to the security, and quite possibly, the survival of this Republic.

I would now like to ask you this question, Dr. Adelman. How devastating do you feel an all-out Soviet nuclear exchange would be should it come?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Very. I would think it would be a very devastating thing.

If I could mention for a minute, Senator Cranston, on some of your points this morning, I did say that I was involved in arms control and disarmament in the United Nations. The United Nations, as you well know, Senator, is a forum for multilateral diplomacy. When you deal on arms control and disarmament matters there, you are dealing with 157 countries who are making up the United Nations.

The SALT Treaty and SALT Treaty violations are not in the area of multilateral diplomacy. They are in the area of bilateral diplomacy. We have framework to do that and that is not the framework of the United Nations there.

Second, let me say that the question of Dense Pack——

Senator CRANSTON. On that point, what negotiations on arms control have you carried on at the United Nations?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The United Nations is a forum for discussing the important issues. I will give you one example if you would like. This year three items that we were very interested in pushing came up at the first committee, which deals with arms control.

One was a conference on military expenditures, so we could have honesty in defense budgets and hopefully reductions in defense budgets on that.

Second was the chemical warfare/yellow rain issue, the use of illegal and inhumane chemicals by the Soviet Union, to make progress on that.

Third is a resolution that I am very proud that the United States introduced and sponsored, so that all citizens around the world have the capability and the freedom to express their own views on arms control and disarmament issues.

This was a resolution that I think is important because—one of the Senators mentioned it this morning—we know that in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe there is no such capability of expressing their interest. I came to the conclusion that if there was the same kind of public participation, public awareness and public involvement in this issue all around the world that there is in the West that this would be a tremendous impetus, a tremendous vigor for arms control.

We worked on this resolution. We consulted many countries of the world on this resolution. We finally worked out a text of the resolution that I am proud to say has a new standard of international behavior. Citizens around the world—whether it is followed or not is something to be seen, but it passed by consensus that citizens around the world have a capability of expressing their own points of view on all issues dealing with arms control and disarmament matters. And I think that was a contribution.

Let me, if I may, say on the MX and Dense Pack, again, Senator Cranston, this is a technical issue. It was not an issue at the United Nations to handle. I have since found out that the Dense Pack basing mode that the President has proposed but is being examined now by the scope of our Commission would be fully consistent with the provisions of SALT II.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you believe that nuclear war can be won by either side?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No; I believe both sides would be losers.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you believe there is such a thing as meaningful nuclear superiority?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I believe there is such a thing as, in various measures of the nuclear equation, one side being ahead of the other. If you measure missiles today, for example, the Soviet Union has 2,350 missiles, we have 1,600 missiles. They have more missiles than we do. They are ahead.

Senator CRANSTON. What is superiority in a meaningful sense? How can either side use nuclear superiority?

Ambassador ADELMAN. What you have to look at in a meaningful sense is the strength of your deterrent capability, Senator Cranston, and the strength of the persuasion that you are making to other leaders, especially in a crisis, that it is in no sense a rational decision to have a conflict. And I know that this morning you expressed your own doubts on the long-term possibilities of deterrence, but the essence of deterrence is to make it so that it cannot be a rational decision to have war.

Senator CRANSTON. I accept that as the goal of deterrence. I just question how long we can depend on it, in view of the danger of accident and miscalculation.

Do you believe that expanded civil defense efforts can improve U.S. security to any significant degree?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I know that the Soviet Union today has 20 times the level of effort on civil defense as the United States.

I have not been involved in this field in the Reagan administration and so I do not know how my views conform to the views of those handling the issue in the administration. But I will be very honest with you in saying that through the years it has been my assumption that civil defense is something better done by a controlled totalitarian society that has a very clearly identifiable elite, membership in party positions and responsibilities, rather than the kind of open, fluid, free society we have today.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you believe a freeze on testing and deployment of U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons is verifiable?

Ambassador ADELMAN. On the testing and deployment, I do not know, Senator. I do not think it would we wise, because like I said this morning I think what we should really be looking at, and I would hope that all of the people interested in arms control through the years, like you have been with your Cranston meetings that I have heard about, for instance, when I joined the Government, looking at arms controls in a serious way, would be for real reductions if we can get real reductions.

And I am convinced that in this day and age, 1983, we can have real reductions in the strategic nuclear forces on both sides, and then elimination of an entire class of weapons in Europe. And I would hate to look back, if confirmed as Director of ACDA, I would hate to look back on my years in ACDA and think to myself, you know, we went for a freeze when we could have had real reductions.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, of course, the objective of a freeze is to stop and then start going down. As Senator Hatfield put it, if you are on an elevator going up you have to stop before you go down.

If we go to cruise missiles on general purpose submarines, how would we verify cruise missile limitations if the Soviets follow suit with their cruise missiles on submarines?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That is a technical question I just do not have the answer to now. I would be happy to look into it for you, Senator. I would be happy to discuss it.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, it is highly technical, but incredibly important.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I agree with you. The whole question you raise there, Senator, on the amount of verifiability for cruise missiles and technologies in the future is a very essential question, and I think it is a question that a lot of arms control will turn on.

Senator CRANSTON. The President talks of a window of vulnerability. Do you believe that our land-based missiles are vulnerable?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; I do.

Senator CRANSTON. Are not the Soviets far more vulnerable under their present circumstances, since about 75 percent of their strategic forces are on land while only 25 percent of ours are on land?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That is true, but you have to look at the number, the explosive power, the accuracy of missiles, land-based missiles on our side. You would have to look at the hardening, the dispersal, the placement of missiles on their side, to answer that question.

Senator **Cranston**. Do you believe the Communists have manipulated the freeze movement in this country?

Ambassador **Adelman**. No; I believe that my experience with the freeze movement is that there are a lot of people who share the same concerns that I share. That is not to say that there has not been exploitation of the movement to the extent that it could be. I think it is far less here than it is in Europe.

But the thrust of the movement and the purpose of the movement is a very human response to a situation of the world today with nuclear weapons and seemingly ever-rising nuclear weapons.

Senator **Cranston**. Thank you. I have no further questions at this time.

The **Chairman**. Senator Tsongas?

Thank you, Senator Cranston.

Senator **Tsongas**. Let my try in our session to be honest with you, and I would hope that honesty would continue to guide our discussions. You are certainly aware of what is happening here, and let me rephrase it in what might be a brutal way but what I think happens to be the case.

My judgment, and I think this is shared by a lot of people in this country and others, as to your appointment and who you are and where you are coming from would be that you are certainly a decent person who cares about arms control, that you are very intelligent, you come with a very conservative ideology, you are a loyalist, there is no rebellion; that there is a limited expertise and no political constituency.

And watching all of that and knowing about the hardliners that have been referred to by many in the administration, you would have to conclude objectively that the hardliners are going to chew you up, and that you are some day going to be faced with two choices: accept the chewing process and like it or do not accept it and become a kind of pathetic figure, that the hardliners will say, boy, we certainly had our way with him, he never got in our way.

Now, having raised that, let me give you some political advice. When Ed Muskie, whose place I took on this committee, became Secretary of State he had power, not only because of his relationships here, because Secretary Vance had resigned and President Carter knew very well the last thing he could stand would be Secretary Muskie quitting.

Secretary Shultz is in exactly the same position after the Haig debacle. The last thing the President can live with is Shultz packing his bags and leaving. They are in exactly the same position.

With the Rostow debacle, you are in a position of enormous leverage over a President of the United States. You have the capacity because of what happened to Rostow to go in there if you think things are not going the right way and saying, Mr. President, with all due respect, this is not what I signed on for and I am going to resign. And the President cannot afford to let you do it.

That is enormous leverage, and you come to your confirmation hearing and boot it by saying very clearly, "I cannot think of any circumstances under which I would resign in principle." You are giving away, at least at this hearing, the one thing you hold over their heads.

Well, I am going to ask you once more and then I will go hug my children or something. [Laughter.]

The President has been urged by this committee and particularly the chairman to ratify treaties that have been brought forth by other administrations, including Republican administrations: the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. And all we have gotten is a lot of bureaucratese. This administration, obviously, does not want to move on these treaties.

That is one point that is not in dispute, and you have to ask yourself, well, gee, these things are not really controversial. Nixon, Ford, Carter—no problem. Yet they are not moving, despite a lot of rhetoric.

The White House Oval Office, please imagine you and the President there. The President says, look, I do not believe in treaties with the Soviets. I did not believe in those little things Percy is always knocking me over the head with and I do not believe in big treaties like SALT. You just cannot trust the Soviets, but we cannot say so publicly. People want at least the illusion of negotiation, so we have to go through the motions, and that is what you are about. And I can tell you, there is not going to be a treaty as long as I am President of the United States.

And your response is?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That there is another President sitting in the Oval Office and it is not Ronald Reagan.

Senator TSONGAS. I did not hear you. What?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That there is another President sitting in the Oval Office; it is not Ronald Reagan.

I am not taking this position, Senator, with total inexperience on the views of the President in these matters. And I just will not look at a situation where you say that there is a President who sits there and says he is not interested in arms control, he does not want any treaty with the Soviet Union in any situation, that he cannot say so publicly but this is his view.

That is just not the man I have seen in the Presidency for the last 2 years. And let me just say, Senator, that I would not take a job if I thought that there was any such fundamental difference or any possibility of such a fundamental difference between my views, the President's views, and Secretary Shultz' views. Maybe that is the reason I do not have a political constituency.

But I do not look at this job as leverage, over-leverage, around-leverage, through the President, the Secretary of State, or anybody else. I think we all have very, very important things to do. I think we share the general outlook on these issues and I think that we just have to work closely together to make real progress on arms control, and not look at the leverage or not leverage or whatever.

Senator TSONGAS. Well, I have really tried to give you every opportunity to gain leverage. Your reply astounds me. For instance, somebody goes home and has a headache, does not feel well. The person goes home, walks into his house, goes into his bedroom, and there is his wife and somebody else. And his reaction is, that cannot be my wife. [Laughter.]

What do I say to my neighbor?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I do not know.

Senator TSONGAS. You know, I was hoping I would feel toward you the way I felt about Dr. Ernest LeFever. But I do not feel that way, because I do think you have the right intentions. But you are dissipating your leverage.

These have not been good hearings, from what I have been told this morning and this afternoon, and unless you are in a position to really understand the politics of gaining that power over those hardliners that do play a tough game up there on the National Security Council and elsewhere, you are not going to be effective.

There are those of us who want to help you, and you are the vehicle, and yet we are giving you all this opportunity to no avail. I want you to pound the table. You have got two daughters at home and I want to know that if something happens and you feel that these guys are not serious or that the hardliners have taken over the President's position that you can go home and say to your daughters: Yes, I did something for your survival. Not, gee, I do not like it; and gee, I cannot believe what he is doing; and oh my God, that is not the guy I knew before.

Ambassador ADELMAN. On that, Senator, I have no problem at all. Now you are asking me, has it been a pattern of my life to be very frank with bosses, has it been a pattern of my life to be very honest and to take positions. And I would have to say, yes, it has been.

And certainly I have heard criticism among members of this committee and others that at the United Nations I was too frank and too just determined to present the arguments that I believe in deeply. And if you are saying once in office, if confirmed by the Senate, would you get there and present your views to the President and the Secretary of State and make it very firm, the answer is, yes, I will.

Senator TSONGAS. That is not my question. If he says, Kenny, go away, I do not want to deal with you, I have my feelings, you are going to have to live with it, what do you go home and tell your children? And what do I go home and tell my children that I did as a member of this committee?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, let me just say, I think you and I are just looking at this from just different angles. I do not think about and I have not thought about—since the President asked me to do this job, I have not thought until 10 minutes ago about the question of leverage and I have leverage over the President, the President has leverage over me. I have not thought about that.

What I have been overwhelmed by is the task that we have to do together with the job at hand.

Senator TSONGAS. I will stop my questions. I will only ask that you submit to this committee in writing a response to my question, once you have thought about it, to be accepted by the committee prior to the vote on the Senate floor. And I will vote present here in the committee and my vote on the Senate floor will be a function of your response to that question.

I had a lot of technical questions I was going to ask you that have been given to me by some Harvard nuclear physicists, but I will pass on that. I am much more concerned about where you are coming from as an individual, rather than getting technical information.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Senator Pressler.

Senator **PRESSLER**. I am going to try to clarify some areas here that I do not feel are completely clear. Some of these questions might have been asked before. But if we can get very specific answers on your feelings to these next few questions, the committee would be greatly aided. I think we on the committee need to learn the following:

First of all, do you support ratification of the TTB and PNE accord, and will you fight for the ratification within the administration?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. I have discussed this with several members of the committee. My views are that, like Chairman Percy, I think that it is a very positive element to sign the treaties, to show the U.S. follow-on on the treaties negotiated by two Presidents of the United States.

Senator **PRESSLER**. Do you support their ratification and will you fight for their ratification within the administration?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. Yes.

Senator **PRESSLER**. The answer is yes?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. No; Senator. Let me say that I believe the verification provisions have to be tightened up. As you know, there is a factor of two.

Senator **PRESSLER**. So, you do not support them in their present form?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. I think what we need to do is tighten up the verification provisions. I do not think that that is a burdensome or time-consuming element on that, and once we have adequate verification, because of the principle that you should not submit a treaty to the Senate that does not have adequate verification provisions——

Senator **PRESSLER**. So you do not support them in their present form?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. That is true.

Senator **PRESSLER**. Do you support the resumption of high-yield testing and would you take positions on that within the administration?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. I have understood clearly since the chairman had the hearings, in 1977 I think it was, on this that there is no need of the United States for nuclear testing above the 150-kiloton mark, and I think that is absolutely true today.

Senator **PRESSLER**. So, on that the answer is no, you do not.

Now, do you support the need for flexibility and compromise in Geneva on INF and on START?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. As I said in my opening statement, Senator Pressler, that is not an area that I am going to get into in open session.

Senator **PRESSLER**. Do you support the immediate resumption of ASAT talks directly between the United States and the Soviet Union—not simply discussions at the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva—as a way to immediately deal with the threat posed by a space weapons race? In other words, do you support the immediate resumption of the ASAT talks and would you fight for it within the administration?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The answer to that is I just do not know yet. I will look into it. I have to read up on the history of where those talks left off, on the technological development since those talks, and where they could be headed.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, I do not know the committee's plan, but could we perhaps continue this next week? Perhaps we could have an answer to my concerns by next week? Are we going to continue next week, perhaps by next Tuesday? Can we have another short hearing?

The CHAIRMAN. Our aim was to have this on the executive calendar for committee vote on Tuesday. However, that was just assuming that there would be no additional hearings. Maybe we could get those hearings in before then.

Senator PRESSLER. I would like to request a 9 o'clock hearing. So perhaps by next Tuesday you could have some clear answers. That is important to me, to know your feeling on this, if a further hearing is impossible.

Do you support continued adherence to the ABM Treaty?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes.

Senator PRESSLER. You do? I must note that as recently as mid-1981 you advocated that "the U.S. push for defensive strategic systems." I guess that is not entirely inconsistent, but it could be read that way.

Ambassador ADELMAN. No; that is not, Senator, my statement. My statement was that one of the political pressures in the future was going to be the push. It is not a recommendation of mine. I was saying that this was going to be a push.

Senator PRESSLER. I want to discuss a little bit the desirability of zero option. I know you have covered some of this ground before, but I just want to clarify.

Thus far, the administration has held fast to its zero-zero proposal as representing the only acceptable INF outcome. How would you explain the rationale for that zero option?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I believe that the elimination of an entire weapons system would eliminate the threats to our NATO allies that have caused them such apprehension over the last 5 years; would eliminate any future threat that the Soviet leadership obviously feels by the prospects of the deployment of the GLCM's and the cruise missiles, the 572; would eliminate the need of the U.S. military to deploy a whole new nuclear weapons system in Europe; and as I have said throughout the day, would be a real shot in the arm for arms control in the sense of addressing a serious security issue through arms control and to addressing it successfully.

Plus, as we talked about with I believe it was Senator Lugar, the verification of a zero option would be a blessing for verification advocates.

Senator PRESSLER. Now, is it not true that the Soviets, under any negotiating other than total disarmament, will continue to target Western Europe just as they have since acquiring a nuclear capability? In other words, superficially a zero-zero outcome implies removal of nuclear forces from Europe. But even in the event of a Soviet INF dismantlement, is it not inevitable that the Soviets would retarget other missiles, the SS-17 and 19, from their vast long-range nuclear arsenal, leaving Europe equally vulnerable?

Ambassador **Adelman**. To answer that question, Senator Pressler, you would have to look at the targetability and capability of the Soviet strategic weapons force. You would have to look at whether they would have their own SLBM's targeted on Europe instead of the United States or where they are targeted now, how they could be retargeted. You just cannot answer that in the abstract.

Senator **Pressler**. Mr. Chairman, if I could have the chairman's attention.

Mr. Chairman, I have completed my questioning, except in the area of the ASAT talks. I would like a chance to continue next Tuesday. I would appreciate a chance on Tuesday morning to get an answer.

Also, I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that—maybe it is not the time to suggest it—that at some point we should hear from Gene Rostow. Not necessarily in regard to this nomination, but I admire Mr. Rostow, and I think it would be good to have him as a witness here before the Foreign Relations Committee to give his views of the prospects for arms control. And I do not know if it would be proper to do that Tuesday morning or Wednesday, but I have been told he would be willing to come as a witness.

Would it be proper to call Gene Rostow next Tuesday?

Senator **Pell**. If the Senator would yield on that point, I would like to add my voice in support of your thought. I have already spoken privately with the chairman about it.

The **Chairman**. We have already a subcommittee being chaired by Senator Mathias that is holding a hearing with Miller, Hormantz, and Simons, an extremely important hearing at 10. That is the final windup hearing on the world debt hearings that Senator Mathias has chaired, and we cannot change those witnesses, so that we cannot have another hearing on Tuesday morning.

We could set this aside.

Senator **Pressler**. Could we have one on Wednesday?

The **Chairman**. We could have a subsequent hearing on Thursday. I doubt even if we report the nomination out by Tuesday is it possible before the recess to even take it up on the floor? We cannot anyway. So we could hold a hearing on Thursday.

Senator **Pressler**. I would request that we do that, and I would request that we call Gene Rostow.

The **Chairman**. Without objection then, considering that we have had requests on both sides of the aisle, we will ask; and as I understand it, Gene Rostow has indicated he has no problem about testifying. We will schedule a hearing then on Thursday.

Also, at that same time would you want a written answer to the question that you put to Mr. Adelman, or would you want Ambassador Adelman to come back?

Senator **Pressler**. Yes; I would like him to come back because we began a discussion of the ASAT talks, and he said he could not answer it at this time but he had to study it more. And I would appreciate talking about that next Thursday. It probably would be fairly brief.

The **Chairman**. All right. Fine.

Senator **Pressler**. I would, therefore, request that we have Mr. Adelman back and Mr. Rostow.

The **Chairman**. On Thursday.

Senator **Pressler**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. Fine.

We have had some discussion of the two treaties—the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. At his confirmation hearing 2 years ago, Dr. Rostow confirmed that those should be ratified as requested by Presidents Nixon and Ford, and that he would do his best to see that they were done. He finally had to admit he could not overcome what he called the "stone wall," and that they were not going to be forthcoming soon. It was just not possible to even get a recommendation from the administration.

Have you researched enough to know where that "stone wall" exists and whether you would have the competence to overcome that "stone wall"?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I know that the problem, Mr. Chairman, is the problem of the range of verification, and as you know, the tests are say at 150 kilotons which could show up in the verification monitors as either 75 or 300. The factor of 2, the range is the factor of 2.

The President has considered this, and it is the feeling of the administration that measures can be taken to reduce that range of error or the uncertainty in the verification without a great deal of going back and renegotiating the treaty or any other ways.

I have not researched it beyond that to find out exactly where in the executive branch there had been problems. It is my understanding that it is well on its way to looking for the easiest, the quickest way to narrow the doubts on the verification.

The **Chairman**. Can you be more specific about exactly what would be required? Does it take negotiations with the Soviets? Have we got the language that we are going to change, procedures? Does it get to the heart of the agreement, or is it just tightening up the specifications which should be possibly in the interests of both sides?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I am not an expert in this. I have not talked to those directly affecting it. It is my impression, Mr. Chairman, that it would not go to the heart of the treaty to be renegotiated for another 7-, 8-year period. But it would be a measure that could be in the interest of both sides to change parts of the verification.

The **Chairman**. Can you give me some timeframe as to when we can expect all of this to happen?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I can just give you the assurance that if confirmed by the Senate that I would push it as fast as I could. I have had a habit through my life in Government and out of Government of not making promises of something I am unable to assure. And to say that yes, Senator, I am going to in 4 months have this right here knowing that I am not the—contrary to what Senator Tsongas may think—I am not the only one who is going to have to decide on these matters, that there is going to have to be a tremendous amount of discussion, that I just would be very reluctant to give you a date, as you could well understand.

I know that Gene Rostow was very sincere in this. I know he tried to do this.

The CHAIRMAN. I sent my first message on this to President-elect Reagan in December 1980. I emphasized the importance that I attached to this just as a symbol; that after 7 years we can get something done. If President Reagan says he wants the ratification of the treaty, we can get a two-thirds vote, which I think is a very important principle to establish. It provides incentive for everyone.

These treaties are not great shakes at all. But we must be able to solve little problems like this with this kind of advance notice. I think you will find Secretary Shultz, Deputy Secretary Damm, Judge Clark, and the National Security Council willing to help you. And what I want is an answer next Thursday as to when we can get this done. I am not inclined to vote for your confirmation until we get it done.

I just cannot any longer accept the fact that we cannot get this thing done. And your best effort after as many best effort pledges as I have had, I have just had it. We really have to come down to grips with this. If, for instance, the administration does not want to ratify them, then let them just say so. Let us get a decision, though.

I want to prove the principle that the administration does want arms control, that they are not putting up insurmountable hurdles. I have had testimony time after time and statements privately that there is not a big problem here, it can be done. The only problem is it never gets done.

This issue has been raised now by four members of the committee. I am not the only one talking about it. I had been talking about it alone for 2 years. Now it is a matter of principle with all of us that we get an answer on this.

So if you could bring yourself to bear on this, I think you can just explain to your colleagues that this is now a matter of principle and very important, and we want to get a specific answer on it.

In your 1979 article entitled "Can South Africa Go Nuclear?," you advocated greater interaction with South Africa as the proper approach for pursuing the goal of halting nuclear proliferation. In the same article you stated that unfortunately, and I quote,

> Such issues as nuclear proliferation and the future of South Africa are largely outside of Washington's control. Those steps taken by the U.S. Government can and do influence various decisions in South Africa. Less fortunate still, those matters might well prove intractable.

Do these statements now some years later still represent your views, or have you revised your thinking about the appropriate U.S. response to the proliferation problem presented by South Africa?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think that as we discussed this morning, Mr. Chairman, that a South African nuclear capability would be very adverse to American interests. I think that the U.S. Government should do everything in its power, in its capability to discourage nuclear weapons' possession by states such as South Africa, and there are a number of them.

I also regret to say that it is still my view that we have a limited capability to influence those kinds of decisions in South Africa, and should we prove unsuccessful, God forbid, and South Africa go nuclear, we shoud not get in the situation that the United States in some way caused that. The United States is a factor and an important factor. We should use our entire potential. We have to realize that we do not control the situation entirely.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Kennedy has the full-time responsibility for nonproliferation, and I was extremely pleased that Secretary Shultz and the President saw fit to assign that function full time to an extremely competent, very capable high official of the administration.

What will your role and interaction be with Ambassador Kennedy to use what influence we can in causing South Africa to think favorably about signing the NPT. Do you think there is a chance South Africa might do that or could be induced to do that and join the hundred or more nations that have signed it?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think there is a chance, Senator Percy. In a situation like this the blind you are always in is to realize that chance, to the greatest extent possible takes involvement with that country. If you just isolate it or something like that, you are encouraging the impulses of that country for proliferation. So I would say that there is a chance of that.

Second, let me just say that I have known Secretary Kennedy since before the Reagan administration, and I was just as pleased as you are that he was given those full-time responsibilities.

The CHAIRMAN. And what is the relationship that you would have with him? What degree of responsibility do you have? What degree of responsibility does he have for nonproliferation then?

Ambassador ADELMAN. In ACDA we have a bureau with two offices that deal with nonproliferation items, such as IAEA safeguards, such as the export of nuclear materials and items in the whole range of nonproliferation. I have understood it from my very preliminary briefing so far that the relationship between ACDA and Secretary Kennedy has been very close. It has been almost an intermingling of staffs, and, I think that is a very good situation to just keep as it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you ever think that South Africa would accept full-scope safeguards, and will you exert your best efforts to bring that about?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes, sir, I would, Mr. Chairman. They do have safeguards.

The CHAIRMAN. You think there is a chance they might?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; they have safeguards in the Koburg facility, or they have been trained to have safeguards at the Koburg. And I think we can build on that, and there is a chance.

The CHAIRMAN. I was not fully satisfied with your previous answer on negotiating posture. I want to try to determine in my mind whether you would be practical enough to reach in the short time we have now, less than 2 years, an effective arms control agreement.

I want to go back at it once more in another way by just simply quoting what has been said by a respected negotiator, Paul Nitze, to see how you would respond to what he said. On January 18, Paul Nitze said he is—

> * * * confident that if it becomes wise for the U.S. Government to change its position in talks with the Soviet Union on reducing nuclear missiles in Europe, it will in fact do so.

I can understand that you did not want to stray from the official U.S. negotiating position in this open hearing, and that is why I did not press you before when I got what I considered an incomplete, inadequate answer. But now that that position has been taken in open session by the very negotiator who has that responsibility, do you agree with Ambassador Nitze on this point?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator, let me just say that I am going to have to waffle again, and let me just say that the reason is that this matter is under very serious examination, and I just do not think in an open hearing of this type it is wise to go into this area. I know that your experience on negotiations through the years has been one that has not been conducting these negotiations in public in any realm. And I think that for real success to take place, it will be in the private of these rooms.

That is not to say that the Senate does not have a very important role and the chairman does not have an important role. And I would expect that if confirmed, this would be a matter that members of the committee and the director of ACDA would be in constant contact.

The **Chairman**. What he says is not a very dramatic thing.

Ambassador **Adelman**. I know that.

The **Chairman**. He really is standing right within the framework laid down by the President.

Ambassador **Adelman**. I know that.

The **Chairman**. That is not a "take it or leave it" position. This is our best thinking. This is what we think is fair and balanced, but we are willing to listen to you. And all he has said is if it becomes wise—that is a condition—for the U.S. Government to change its position in talks with the Soviet Union on reducing nuclear missiles in Europe, it will in fact do so.

Do you concur with that statement?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I think the President is very serious in these negotiations. I think he is a very wise and prudent individual and that he will handle the negotiations in a very wise and prudent manner.

The **Chairman**. I listen. I try first to select staff that I respect, staff that hopefully knows more about a given subject than I do, because we have to spread ourselves pretty thin on an awful lot of subjects. I hope every staff member knows more than I do about it. Certainly in Ambassador Rowny and Ambassador Paul Nitze we have seasoned, experienced long-time people in this particular field. And there has been criticism evidenced that even though you have written about the subject and so forth, it is quite different than really grappling with it, setting across the table year after year negotiating these fine points at Geneva or Helsinki or wherever it may be.

Would you be inclined, if our two negotiators felt very strongly to achieve an agreement some alteration and shift in position on the United States might be necessary, some concessions might be necessary to be able to come down to a practical position for an agreement, would you be inclined to accept their advice in that regard?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I have such high esteem for Ambassador Rowny and Ambassador Nitze—I know them over the years; I worked closely with them—that I would think that if confirmed by this position that their own position on these two negotiations would certainly be of overriding concern to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I just commented not only in my San Francisco speech that was referred to earlier on one accomplishment of our negotiations, that is, my analysis that our negotiators have drawn from the Soviets START and INF proposals that go far beyound the positions the Soviets were willing to take 2 years ago, and I think this is progress.

For example, the Soviet START negotiating position is now in some respects superior actually to SALT II. Do you agree with that assessment?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. The Soviet START position calls for capping all strategic delivery systems at 1,800. The U.S. position translated into the same terms calls for capping these systems at 1,200. Do you believe that a possibility to compromise on these numbers does exist, that it is encouraging on both sides that we are at least getting down there? Both of them are cuts. Where SALT was not really any kind of a major reduction, here are some major reductions. We are now getting down to the point where we can have negotiating postures that we can both live with and that we can reach agreement on.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I believe it is in both of our interests to have very dramatic cuts in the strategic nuclear force.

The CHAIRMAN. The President has stated that all strategic U.S. systems are on the table in Geneva. You stated this morning that you did not see the MX as a bargaining chip. Do you believe that the MX and cruise missiles should be the subject of negotiations in Geneva at this time?

Ambassador ADELMAN. As the President said, everything will be on the table including cruise missiles. And they have, as members of this committee know very well and as we have discussed, they have their own particular qualities and their own particular problems for verification.

I was asked the question this morning do I think that MX is a bargaining chip or do I think that we need new land-based missiles for our national security. My position was that we needed a new land-based missile, invulnerable missile for our national security.

The CHAIRMAN. But if, for instance, the Soviet Union—let us assume that the MX is fully prescribed and provided for by SALT II, and a similar system, a new system being built by the Soviet Union is provided for in SALT II. It is not a contravention of that at all.

But what if the Soviets did come forward with some dramatic proposal, just as we did in the ABM, and said let us end this arms race, if we are going to end it, let us end it. Let us at least not start to build or continue to build systems that are brand-new systems that we do not need if our objective is, as this committee said it should be, and a position supported by the President, that we ought to try to destroy every missile, just destroy them all and say that is not going to be the way to live in the world.

Then is it not possible that the MX itself under certain conditions if there are enough concessions on the Soviet side would be subject to negotiation?

Ambassador ADELMAN. If we get the reductions far greater than anybody can envision today, I think there are all kinds of possibilities we do not envision today. My point this morning was to say if we can get a cut in the next 2 years, Mr. Chairman, of missiles by a half, warheads by a third, that is so dramatic that we can all take a great deal of satisfaction in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I regret to announce that Senator Biden has been detained in the organized crime hearings in the Judiciary Committee and has asked that some questions he intended to ask be submitted for response.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, they will be submitted for response.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, on another subject, I was struck by the nominee's observation that people in the Soviet Union who are for peace are locked up. And in that regard, I would like to insert into the record a letter I wrote last December to Mr. Andropov, similar to one I had written in September to Mr. Brezhnev.

[The letter referred to follows:]

WASHINGTON, D.C., *December 3, 1982.*

Hon. YURI V. ANDROPOV,
General Secretary, Communist Party,
The Kremlin, Moscow, RSFSR, U.S.S.R.

DEAR MR. ANDROPOV: As you assume your new duties, I wanted you to know that many of us in the United States strongly support the pursuit with the Soviet Union of a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems.

The Administration does not concur in our wish. However, in the United States, constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech has allowed the growth of a broadly based and flourishing freeze movement. This public movement has served to encourage the Administration to engage seriously in arms reduction talks with your government.

In this regard, it has been said that nuclear war is too important a decision to leave to governments and is one that must be left to the people. In the West, the people are involved deeply in decisions on matters central to their own destiny, such as nuclear policies. This is as it should be in any society. Unfortunately, efforts to devise sound nuclear policies which warrant and receive genuine public support are hampered when concerned citizens are forbidden to debate and to express their views freely on these issues. I realize that you have a government-sponsored peace movement, but what I am talking about is an open and free citizens' peace movement.

I and many of my colleagues were shocked to read of the arrest of Mr. Sergei Batovrin and of the harassment of others in your nation who wish spontaneously to plead for peace. Such actions can only lead people in the West to question the sincerity of the professed Soviet commitment to arms control.

As a strong opponent of nuclear war, I urge you, as one of your first acts in office, to permit a free rein to those who wish to express their personal views and concerns in the Soviet Union.

With every good wish.

Ever sincerely,

CLAIBORNE PELL.

Senator PELL. And I think so far, needless to say, neither the letter to him nor to his predecessor, sent courtesy of Ambassador Dobrynin, have received a reply.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, let me just say I think that is a wonderful approach to take. It was exactly what we were trying to do at the United Nations, and I hope the next time we get together I would like to share with you the resolution we passed at the United Nations and the kind of followup we intend to do for exactly that same point. And I think that was a very good step to make.

Senator PELL. Thank you. Now, on another subject in connection with arms control in outer space, I moved a resolution that was accepted at the last meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in London, of which the pertinent paragraphs read.

> Member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance should conduct, in cooperation with the United States, a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which verifiable agreements governing weapons in space, anti-satellite programs and peaceful cooperation in space would enhance the security of the Alliance; and
>
> To press for negotiations leading to agreements aimed principally at limitation of the deployment of offensive weapons in space.

Do you have a reaction to this resolution? Would you be in support of it? The main thrust of which is, as it says, to limit the deployment of offensive weapons in space. And I ask unanimous consent that it be inserted into the record at this point.

[Resolution 132 on Arms Control in Outer Space follows:]

RESOLUTION 132 ON ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE [1]

The Assembly:

Noting that on 24 May 1982, the US-Soviet agreement on co-operation in space expired and that discussion of future co-operative projects has been suspended;

Concerned that inadequate progress has been made in seeking arms limitation in outer space;

Regretting that the United States and the USSR are actively developing anti-satellite weapons and are already testing aerial detection and attack systems (ASAT);

Recalling that a major superpower armament competition was avoided by the SALT I limitation on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployment and that the simultaneous failure to limit multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) deployment has destabilized the strategic nuclear balance, which in turn has created pressure to abrogate the ABM treaty;

Concerned that the failure to limit deployment of outer space weapons could have more profound effects on arms control and international security and that inadequate consideration has been given to the potentially negative impact of new Soviet systems on Alliance security;

Urges member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

1. to conduct in co-operation with the United States a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which verifiable agreements governing weapons in space, anti-satellite programmes, and peaceful co-operation in space would enhance the security of the Alliance; and
2. to press for negotiations leading to agreements aimed principally at limitation of the deployment of offensive weapons in space.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I would really have to look at a resolution like that. My feeling is to address the problem of having the Soviets with an ASAT capability or antisatellite capability is a very dangerous thing, not only for security but also for arms control. And if we could solve that problem through an arms control device, or help solve it through that, I think it is well worth exploring.

Senator PELL. But you would not be able to support that? You could not say you support that as of now?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Pell, I would have to look at it, I would have to know the history, and I just would not want to give you an answer right now and have someone say, well, this language goes against the Outer Space Treaty III words and, therefore, it is going to cause something else.

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[1] Presented by the Scientific and Technical Committee.

I have had some experience in the United Nations at looking at different resolutions, and you have to do it on the basis of the legislative history on a lot of these things.

Senator PELL. I would be grateful if you could give me a written response to that prior to this time next week.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I welcome the chance to do that.

Senator PELL. What would be your view on the inclusion in the START negotiations of a proposal to ban the deployment of long-range ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles? The reason I raise this question is because such missiles are very difficult to verify, and I would find it difficult to believe that we would be comfortable if the Soviets matched our planned deployments.

Ambassador ADELMAN. As we discussed this morning, Senator Pell, the whole question of verifiability of cruise missiles is a very difficult technical question. It is a very difficult political question because it goes to the heart of arms control. Whether you can actually control, reduce, eliminate a weapon where the verification may be in some cloudy or doubtful stage.

As to inclusion or exclusion in the START negotiations themselves, the President has said that anything can be on the table.

Senator PELL. OK. You have been quoted, Mr. Ambassador, as saying that although U.S. intelligence has been bad at predicting trends in Soviet strategic systems, it has been superb in verifying existing Soviet weapons. In this regard, what is your view with regard to START verification? Was this one of the reasons you did not support START—because of the verification, or were there other reasons?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No; I support START. I support START.

Senator PELL. I know you do. I am sorry. I misphrased it; I had in mind your opposition to SALT. Do you believe in START that this is adequately accomplished—verification through national technical means?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I do not know, Senator, because I have not had the opportunity to look at the classified information on exactly what our START proposals are, what kind of measures we are proposing on verification, and it is very cumbersome.

But as you quoted, I believe that the intelligence community and the verification capabilities of the United States, in terms of the SALT Treaties and other treaties, has been effective.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much. I have no more questions. I have not reached a decision. I am still a little puzzled in my own mind whether you have the strength, the depth of knowledge and force to handle this job correctly. There is no question that you are a nice and decent man.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Thank you.

Senator PELL. But more than that is needed in this job. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Pell. There being no further questions from the committee at this time, we will recess this hearing and we will try to get the committee together on Thursday morning.

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.]

NOMINATION OF HON. KENNETH L. ADELMAN

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1983

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:25 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, and Tsongas.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the second hearing the committee is holding on the nomination of Ambassador Adelman.

Ambassador Adelman, I have indicated that I would not schedule a vote on your confirmation until the committee receives answers to certain important questions left unanswered in last week's hearing, and a satisfactory answer as to how the administration intends to proceed with two nuclear testing treaties negotiated by previous administrations, the Threshold Test Ban [TTB] Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions [PNE] Treaty of 1976.

As you know, this committee has time and time again been frustrated in its efforts to get a resolution to this issue, yet the best that you could offer at the last hearing was to say that you would try again after being confirmed. As you know, I and other committee members did not consider this good enough.

Let me briefly summarize why I believe the United States cannot afford to waste any more time in deciding the fate of these two treaties. First, it should be understood that the United States and the Soviet Union are actually informally observing these treaties even though they have never been ratified.

If there are reasons to believe that we cannot be confident that the Soviets are upholding their half of the bargain, then we should get on with the business of strengthening the verification provisions provided for in the treaties.

If verification is indeed a genuine pressing concern, then we do not serve our own national security interests by delaying for years, deciding actually what will be done.

Second, by not formally entering the treaties into force, we forfeit the precedent-sending verification enhancement provisions which our negotiators spent years getting, including provisions for onsite inspection of Soviet nuclear detonation sites. That part of it is not implemented.

We are observing the treaties, but we do not have in place the onsite inspection which is a precedent-setting event. We deprive ourselves of the right to implement that part of the treaty which the Soviets indicated they would respect when they signed the treaties. They have no problem with ratification, and they will comply with that part of it.

Ambassador Rowny has told me that it would be enormously useful to him in START if we could codify the principle of onsite verification by ratifying these two treaties. I find it especially ironic that those who are arguing that verification must be strengthened before the treaties can be implemented are in fact denying the United States the substantial improvements in verification that would come into force once the treaties are ratified.

The present situation is thus the worst of both worlds. Not only are we not moving quickly to renegotiate new verification procedures, but by standing still, we are also forfeiting the substantial verification enhancement provisions that were painstakingly negotiated many years ago.

Finally, I would point to a more fundamental reason for bringing these accords into force. There are many people in this country, and around the world who question the sincerity of this administration in the START and INF negotiations. In my opinion, and I feel strongly about this, such doubts are thoroughly unfounded.

I know how deeply President Reagan and Secretary Shultz are committed to achieving significant arms reductions, but if we spend years negotiating two nuclear testing treaties, and 7 years negotiating SALT II only to then choose not to cross the final hurdle of ratification to make them effective, how can we dispel the cynicism that the START or INF negotiations will ever lead to ratified accords when we have not had a ratified treaty, as you know, in almost a decade now?

If the various agencies of our Government cannot decide what they want from these two relatively minor testing treaties, how will we ever get an interagency consensus on a final START or INF text, which is far more complicated? And I can only say time is running out.

These two testing treaties are very limited in scope. The world is not going to stop spinning if they are not ratified. But great journeys must begin by small steps forward. President Ford supports the ratification of these treaties. President Nixon supports them. Gen. David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified that there was no strategic rationale whatsoever for the United States testing above the limits provided in the treaties. Secretary Weinberger has recently reaffirmed this.

I therefore reiterate what I said last week. I do want to know when, and this committee wants to know, and by this I mean a date certain in the immediate future, not a vague estimate, when the administration will be prepared to come before this committee and present its final recommendations on these treaties.

It is 2 years since I received a commitment from Dr. Rostow on these two treaties. Since then, two deadlines set by administration officials have been broken. You have an opportunity this morning to deliver on something that your predecessor was unable to produce. When the questioning begins, I will start with that question to you.

Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the first hearing on this nomination a few days ago, Mr. Adelman, I thought, did not address substantively a number of key questions bearing on arms control issues. For instance, he told us in the questioning that he had no thoughts on whether nuclear war could be kept limited. He had no strong opinions on whether our society could survive nuclear war. He was not willing to address directly whether SALT II, which he opposed, inhibits our security or not, and said he was not knowledgeable about whether the Soviets have violated SALT.

This morning, I would hope that the committee will pursue these and other questions with Mr. Adelman. I will be encouraged if he knows more today as a result of his subsequent briefings. However, I am not sure that improved answers will remove the reservations that some of us have.

We know now that Mr. Adelman does not appear to be knowledgeable in depth on a number of arms control issues, although he may have studied hard these last few days. Unlike all seven of his predecessors, he does not yet have the significant statute that this job calls for, and given his limited knowledge and experience, there is in my mind a very real question whether he could, whether he would be able to have, as the statute provides, "primary responsibility within the government for arms control and disarmament maters."

We must remember that through no fault of Mr. Adelman's, ACDA has dwindled in size and effectiveness to a shocking degree in these past 2 years. At present, ACDA does not chair a single interagency group overseeing a major arms control issue for negotiation. This is certainly a far cry from the agency that we envisioned when we set this agency up in 1961 and 1962.

This committee is responsible for oversight of the Government's arms control activities and the agency with the statutory responsibility to pursue arms control and disarmament. I must say I find this a very difficult nomination, too, because I find Mr. Adelman a very decent, bright, and nice man, but the question is not the qualities of his decency and niceness and his intelligence, which he has, but whether he has the statute and force to take the lead within the Government to restore ACDA to a position where it does chair some interagency committees and where its Director inspires the respect of his colleagues in the administration and basically acts as the counterforce for the Pentagon. These are where my doubts lie, and I find it a very close issue indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Ambassador Adelman, I do not know if you have any comments you would like to start with. If you do, go right ahead.

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH L. ADELMAN, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Ambassador ADELMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of this committee.

I appreciate the opportunity to return today and continue our dialog of last week. I am troubled by the impression created in last week's testimony that I am somehow unfamiliar with the issues in the fields to which I have devoted my entire adult life, both in the academic world and in public service. I was overly cautious last week. For this reason, I am eager to continue our dialog throughout the day, Mr. Chairman, if the committee so wishes. It is my deep desire to clear up whatever doubts remain, and I wish to spend as much time as it takes to do so.

Throughout my career, and in my writings, there has been one recurring theme: the pursuit of a just peace. In my writings on strategic affairs, I have always set one criterion: "What strategy and what systems best prevent war?" In my speeches in the United Nations, I always identified one enemy, the hypocrisy and self-delusion that have contributed to the outbreak of bitter wars in this century and before.

In objecting strongly to Soviet use of chemical and biological weapons, I have had but one objective: to reestablish the rule of international law which prohibits indiscriminate human suffering and death from the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare.

My foremost objective, if confirmed as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, will be to help formulate and shape arms reduction proposals which substantially reduce nuclear arsenals and reduce the risk of war, be it nuclear or conventional, intentional or accidental.

If nuclear weapons are ever used, there can be no guarantee that their use would remain limited. In fact, I seriously believe the chances of escalation would be dangerously high. Therefore, we must make every effort to insure that nuclear weapons are never used. As President Reagan said, "* * * nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." I fully share that view.

If confirmed, I will work, together with the able professional staff at ACDA, to insure that this Government's commitment continues to be toward fair and verifiable agreements which enhance world stability, and provide impetus to a continuing process whose object must be the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee, I intend, if confirmed, to enhance the pattern of openness and cooperation that has existed between ACDA and the committee. I hope that I will have your confidence in the important times ahead, when all of us must work to insure and preserve the just peace.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

The committee will, without objection, observe the 10-minute rule now.

Let me start out. It will not be any surprise to you that Secretary or Director Rostow finally testified that he was absolutely up against a stone wall. He could not deliver on the promises that he had made on these two treaties. What have you been able to accomplish since we first discussed them?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Mr. Chairman, since a week ago, there has been a lot of pulling and tugging and hauling, and I think that we have overcome Dr. Rostow's great stone wall in the bureaucracy. I believe that the interagency process of the technical kind of expertise and considerations on the verification issue that you are well acquainted with have been overcome. The issue is now on the President's desk, and we will have a decision very, very shortly.

There is a whole procedure and course of action to outline on that whole package that will be in place very shortly.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you will be able to come before this committee immediately after the recess and testify then as to what the Presidential decision will be. I understand then that the recommendations have all been made, State, National Security Council, Defense Department, and it is now on the President's desk?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Awaiting his decision?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are sure he will make his decision by the time we return from our recess. Is that correct?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I would say that you have made considerable improvement and progress in that particular very important area.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. As you do know, I do feel it symbolically a very important area.

I would like to go through, and I know other committee members will also, the things that we were concerned about that you have alluded to in your opening statement. I think you said very forthrightly that you gave unsatisfactory, incomplete answers to some very paramount questions. Though you touched on one or two of them in your opening statement, I would like to put them to you again, just to hear it right from you.

First, can a nuclear war be limited, in your judgment?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Mr. Chairman, in my personal judgment, the impulse, the pressures would be toward escalation. It would be a very dangerous situation—any use of nuclear weapons is a horrendous situation to comtemplate, and once involved in the conflict, the pressures are toward escalation.

What we have to do is arrange ourselves and arrange our arms control package and our modernization program in such a way as to preclude any possibility of this happening, and to keep deterrence on all levels as strong as we possibly can.

The CHAIRMAN. Second, could the United States and even the Soviet Union survive a full nuclear exchange in any manageable or governable form?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No; it would be a horrendous situation. It would change the fundamental nature of the world, the fundamental nature of human life. It would be such a cataclysmic event, Mr. Chairman, that it would just be horrendous.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you. I do not want to take too much time agreeing with you, but that is a much more satisfactory answer than we had before, and a more complete one.

What if the Soviet Union did suddenly come out of the blue to us and propose dramatically that the Soviet Union and the United States, to prevent and set an example to the world that proliferation is not the way to go and the nuclear route is not the way to go, and proposed the total elimination of all nuclear weapons? What should our response be? What would you recommend to the President? What would your response be?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That has been a long-term goal of the United States. It was part and parcel of what I consider the most dramatic arms control proposal ever made by any country, the Baruch plan for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. And as a long-term goal, it is something we should strive for.

I think that the START proposals go a long way in that direction to reducing the number of missiles by one-half, and the number of warheads by one-third.

Such a situation as was asked last week in terms of your question would have to be looked at not only from the verification point of view, but the effectiveness. If you are going to have a treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on such a matter, then you could not expect those two countries to have any say over the nuclear arsenals of other countries around the world, so it could not be a bilateral kind of treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons. But as a goal and as a direction, it is absolutely clear that that should be the way it goes.

The CHAIRMAN. Your answer is consistent with a resolution adopted by more than a two-thirds vote of this committee last year.

Next, on Dense Pack, would the proposed Dense Pack MX basing plan violate the SALT II prohibition against construction of new fixed land-based ICBM launchers?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No; it would not, Mr. Chairman. In the SALT II provision they talk about the fixed launchers with the MX Dense Pack mode. The launcher is the cannister that can be moved from one vertical shelter to another, and so there would be no problem with consistency with the provision.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that the Soviets are going ahead and are actually testing a second system comparable to the MX, and are proceeding, to the best of our knowledge, with production of it, and that that system is allowed by the provisions of SALT II, which both countries pledged to observe, but did not ratify?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The Soviets have a system, the SS-18, which is more capable, more powerful than the MX. They have 308 heavy missiles of that type. The Soviets have about 300 SS-19's, which are the missiles of comparable effectiveness as the MX today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We did not get a satisfactory answer to the question of potential or actual violations by the Soviet Union of the terms of the SALT II Treaty. To the best of your knowledge now, with the access that you now have to all of the material of intelligence of this country, have, in your judgment, the Soviet violated the terms of SALT II?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No President has found the Soviets in clear violation of the SALT provisions, SALT I or SALT II. Since the SALT process began over 10 years ago, there have been questions about Soviet adherence to certain parts of the treaty. Those questions arise, as I explained last week, because of ambiguity in the treaty itself, on the understandings of what the treaty language means, and on our methods of verification of those treaty restrictions.

Those kinds of ambiguities are raised on a continual basis in private diplomatic channels with the Soviet Union. They are continuing now.

The CHAIRMAN. Could the United States prevail in a nuclear conflict? I put it very concisely, because it requires a concise answer, which we did not have before.

Ambassador ADELMAN. There would be no winners in any kind of nuclear conflict. There would be only losers. The world, as I said, would be a radically and tragically different place if there is any kind of nuclear exchange.

The CHAIRMAN. So the answer to the question is, no, we could not prevail and we could not think in terms of winning a nuclear war?

Ambassador ADELMAN. There could be no winners in a nuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN. Could limitations on cruise missiles deployed on submarines be verified?

Ambassador ADELMAN. As we discussed before, the cruise missiles do present very many difficulties in verification of all kinds of agreements. In the SALT II, the ALCM's, air-launched cruise missiles, were limited. In the INF negotiations, now the GLCM's [ground-launched cruise missiles], are hopefully going to be eliminated. And with sea-launched cruise missiles, they present their own unique problems, because they are small, because the conventional nuclear roles are difficult to decipher, because they are put on platforms which are not themselves normally part of arms control agreements.

But in answer to your question, depending upon the terms of a treaty, there could be verification techniques. This is a subject that has not been fully decided on the technical basis. There are a lot of studies going on, in fact, very good studies in ACDA going on today on this very question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

For years, I have talked about the necessity of confidence-building measures in dealing with our adversary, the Soviet Union. We will have, as a committee, the most exhaustive hearings ever held on United States and Soviet relationships in the nuclear age in April, but I would like today your answer to this question.

Can we reach, as in these two treaties, a separate agreement with the Soviet Union on confidence-building measures without waiting for an overall START accord?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The President talked about confidence-building measures when he visited us at the United Nations for the Second Special Session on Disarmament. He has done it in Berlin, and he has done it many times. I believe that confidence-building measures of exchange of information and notification and better communications among top leadership can take place separately from a START treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to ask a question which I hope Senator Pressler will follow up on, because he is the Senate expert on this subject. He has had a long series of hearings. I have followed his leadership in this, and I am proud to cosponsor his resolution. I would like to ask the basic question, should the United States propose an immediate resumption of bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on limiting antisatellite weapons?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The United States is engaged in discussions of these kinds of issues at the Committee on Disarmament

[CD] in Geneva, and the discussions are proceeding. We have various ideas on the space proposals. The Soviets have various ideas on space proposals, and whether the best forum is a 40-member committee in Geneva or a bilateral effort is something that just will have to be explored depending on the progress in the CD itself.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. I am certain that other questions that were left hanging in the last hearing will be asked by others. If not, I will pick them up when I come back.

Senator Pell, thank you very much.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just following up on the question of space, the North Atlantic Assembly adopted my resolution calling for negotiations with regard to prohibiting space as an area for armaments, and I would hope that our message that was agreed to unanimously at the North Atlantic Assembly by all of our NATO allies there would be followed by administration notice and action.

The CHAIRMAN. May I modify my statement to say that Senator Pressler is the majority expert in this area?

Senator PELL. He is an expert.

The CHAIRMAN. I can only speak for the majority.

Senator PELL. I would like to return to a point the chairman made, that is, this question of prevailing. I know I have had some discussion with Secretary Weinberger on this, and an exchange of correspondence, but I understood you to say there would be no winners in a nuclear war, but did I hear you say that neither side could prevail?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Pell, the word "prevail" became current and important in this room because it was in defense guidance as we discussed last week. It took on a separate meaning because of the inclusion in those documents. The point is, I think, not to get hung up on one word or another word, but the whole idea.

The idea we are talking about here is an idea of whether nuclear war can be winnable, can be won, and therefore putting it in a rational kind of prespective. It is my feeling that through very strong and effective arms control agreements, and through a modernization program, we must keep our deterrence strong to prevent any kind of a chance that there would be any level, any prospect, any type of a nuclear exchange or even a conventional exchange because, as I said last week, the real firebreak, the real difference may not be within a nuclear exchange between limited or partially limited or unlimited or all-out nuclear war. It may be just between war and peace.

Senator PELL. Is it your view that if there was a nuclear exchange, nuclear war, that either side could prevail?

Ambassador ADELMAN. It is my view that in any kind of nuclear exchange, the tendency would be toward escalation, and it is my view, as I told the chairman a minute ago, that that kind of a nuclear exchange would just be horrendous, that there would be no winners in that at all. No good could come out of that in any sense.

Senator PELL. I do not want to seem to be persnickety here, but the word "prevail" has, as you suggest, crept into the lexicon in the last few months. I think it is a dangerous word because, as I understand it, the administration has been saying there would be no winners, but that one side or the other might prevail. So I am a little confused. It seems to me that if there are no winners, neither side could prevail. I do not quite follow your wish to avoid saying the same thing.

Ambassador ADELMAN. My wish is quite simply that, like my experience in the United Nations, words, and especially on Middle East resolutions, words take on a special context, a special meaning. When you talk about a just solution of the Palestinian situation words that would normally not be explosive in a particular situation take on significant meaning. When you are negotiating a resolution, as I have done in the United Nations, you have to not only take the word and the meaning of the word, but you have to look at the history of the word, and how it has been used in the Camp David Accords, and how it has been used before that time.

And similarly, Senator, the thought of any kind of gain from a nuclear war, any kind of an achievement from a nuclear war, any kind of winner from a nuclear war I think is the wrong thought. And if I do not get into the word "prevail" it is because, quite simply, that has taken on a whole set of meanings because of the defense guidance that was leaked in a classified document.

Senator PELL. Well, I am concerned about this subject. Let me put it to you in another way. I have a Webster's Dictionary here, and it says "prevail" means—its first meaning is "to gain ascendency, win mastery, triumph." Could either side in a nuclear war gain ascendency, win mastery, or triumph?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No; I do not believe that either side could do that. I think it would be devastating. But let me just say that because of my experience in the United Nations——

Senator PELL. Just let it go. [General laughter.]

Now, the question of Dense Pack and whether or not it would violate SALT I concerns me because, you know, the SALT I Agreement prohibits the construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, and yet Dense Pack involves 100 missiles and 100 silos. Well, it seems to me those missiles are pretty much fixed in those silos, and they are not mobile. Silos are never mobile, as you know.

So, would this not be a violation of the treaty? What is your argument that it would not be?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The argument is, Senator, that the SALT II Treaty talks about fixed launchers. The MX is constructed in such a way that the launch mechanism is the cannister of the missile, and therefore when the missile is taken from one vertical shelter into another, the cannister goes with it, which is the launch mechanism.

So, the launch mechanism is not part of the vertical shelter. It is part of the transportable device of the missile itself.

Senator PELL. But is that not quibbling?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I am sorry?

Senator PELL. Is that not quibbling?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Is that not quibbling? No. I think that what you have to look at is the definition of a fixed launcher in terms of SALT II. If you have a vertical shelter that has no capability to launch a missile, then I do not think that that would be a launcher. I think a launcher, by definition—we are getting into semantics here—but a launcher would be a device to launch a missile.

Now, the vertical shelter could not launch a missile. The cannister that goes with the MX can launch a missile, and that is part of the missile that would be transportable.

Senator **Pell**. Well, let me put it another way. If the Soviets deployed 100 new ICBM's in land-based silos, would that be consistent with SALT?

Ambassador **Adelman**. If they had a cannister that could launch the missile itself, then that would be a launcher, and that would be consistent under the terms of fixed launchers in the SALT II Treaty.

Senator **Boschwitz**. However, there is a limitation on the number that they can have.

Ambassador **Adelman**. That is correct.

Senator **Pell**. As you know, the Soviets maintain to the contrary. How can a question of this sort be decided? Is there any arbitrator arrangement? You cannot go to the World Court, I guess. Can they go to General Ellis's group? Is there any way of deciding?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes, Senator Pell. There are constant communications between the United States and the Soviet Union, and not only the SCC that General Ellis heads up, but in other arenas as well, to discuss issues like this on a confidential basis. In response to the chairman's question, when ambiguities in SALT have come up, they have been handled this way. They have been kept confidential, and many of them, most of them have been resolved for the simple reason that they are done seriously and they are done confidentially. So we do not make a big public splash about them, and the Soviets usually do not make a big public splash. We take it very seriously and discuss it on a technical basis.

Senator **Pell**. I do not recall—but I should—but in SALT II, or in SALT I, rather, what was the provision made for violations? It was to the SCC, was it not?

Ambassador **Adelman**. That is correct.

Senator **Pell**. But there was no referral to a higher power, or appeal mechanism, was there?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Beyond the SCC, no. The SCC was the mechanism, but both sides understand, Senator Pell, that if issues are not resolved on the SCC level, then they may be resolved on a higher level in each government. In other words, the dialog does not take place just between the SCC, but it would be in the political leadership on both sides as well.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you.

Going to the question of the organization of ACDA, I believe that General Rowny, the Special Representative, as you know, at Geneva, is subordinate to you. Would you agree with that, that he reports to the Director of ACDA?

Ambassador **Adelman**. The way I think of it, Senator Pell, is that I am the contact point and ACDA is the contact point for our negotiators in Geneva. That means to keep them abreast of what the thinking is in various parts of the decisionmaking process in Washington, keep them abreast on the thinking of this committee and others in the U.S. Senate who will have to ultimately decide on the achievements that we can bring, and to get their views as well.

Senator PELL. I think when we set this Agency up, I recall vividly our missions for it, and I believe that this was not what we had in mind. We had in mind that it would be not just the contact point and a relaying of information point, but that it would be the focal point for giving direction to arms control. But my time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is such an important point for the committee to have clarified. As I understand it, and could you confirm whether I am correct in my impression or not, the President has decided that Secretary Shultz will head the decisionmaking process in arms control, and that you will be working with Secretary Shultz, but that he will be the deciding point. The President will be the actual decisionmaker, but he will control the process of decisionmaking in arms control. Is that correct?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Mr. Chairman, the process on arms control is going to be in practice very much the way it is spelled out in the act that Senator Pell just referred to, that the Director of ACDA will be the principal advisor on arms control to the Secretary of State and to the President of the United States. This means that the Director of ACDA will work very closely with the Secretary of State, who is taking an increased interest in this whole field, but he will also—the Director of ACDA will be an independent advisor to the President, and so that there will be this kind of a dual role involved.

It comes as no surprise to me, because it is very much, Mr. Chairman, the way the U.S. mission to the United Nations works, that even though we at the U.S. mission coordinated very closely with the Secretary of State on issues before the United Nations, we also had a separate vote and a separate spot on the decisionmaking procedure to the President directly.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a practice familiar to anyone serving as a member or delegate, which all of us have. That was the policy we followed at the United Nations when Kissinger was Secretary of State. Well, now, I do not want to invade the time of our other colleagues.

I would like to advise the committee that in accordance with the notification to you, as soon as we have a quorum present physically, we will interrupt at the end of that Senator's questioning so that we can go right into executive session for a business meeting.

Senator Lugar.

Senator PELL. Excuse me. Just to finish up your point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read the sentence in the act as to the responsibilities of the Director. It says,

> In carrying out his duties under this Act, the Director shall, under the direction of the Secretary of State, have primary responsibility within the government for arms control and disarmament matters.

Ambassador ADELMAN. That was the provision I was just thinking about.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the controlling wording.

Ambassador ADELMAN. If I may take up just 10 more seconds, Mr. Chairman, under this administration, President Reagan has been very anxious to include the negotiators on the procedures as we have gone along on these, so that during NCS meetings there is not only the Director of ACDA there, but the negotiators have been included, too, so they can be very heavily involved in the President's decisionmaking.

The **CHAIRMAN**. All right. Thank you.

Senator Lugar.

Senator **LUGAR**. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Adelman, at least for the record I want to make mention to the committee that we have known each other for a period of time, we have shared conversations going back on flights to Indianapolis together, and some conversations about your writings, which have come into some controversy during these hearings, and much earlier than this controversy. I have appreciated those opportunities to visit with you and I have admired what you have done. So I lead forth in these questions, obviously, as a friendly questioner as opposed to an adversary proceeding.

But I think it is fair to say the disappointment, at least as I see it, comes because the President of the United States and the Secretary of State are attempting to get all of our disarmament negotiations onto a track which is serious and concerted, and your appointment is an integral part of that.

As my previous questions have indicated and as my colleagues have zeroed in this morning on this, clearly the President's interest in this is paramount and one of the reasons why this nomination is attracting a great deal of attention is, I suspect, that Senators and others are using your nomination as a way of indicating either pleasure or displeasure with the progress of negotiations or the degree of attention the President has given to the negotiations. Perhaps the same might be said for the Secretary of State.

Now, in fairness to both the President and the Secretary, we must point out they are attempting to make headway here. I think it is fair to debate cosmic questions as to whether nuclear war is winnable, whether we should or should not have ratified SALT II. Those are important questions, and this offers as good a time as any, I suppose to have another go at that.

But I would like to say that at least in my judgment, your nomination needs to be confirmed so that we can get on with it, after we have had an airing of these problems and everyone has put the President on notice that progress is necessary, and his attention is required and this is an uppermost priority.

Now, let me ask two questions which will give you an opportunity to say some things for the record that I think probably need to be said. Much has been written and spoken about your writings, and some have apparently been negative with regard to arms control. Would you cite, if there have been, some writings that have been positive in which you have had some things to say about this issue to which we ought to have our attention directed?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. My writings in the past have been negative on the Salt II Treaty. They have not been, as I said last week, I was not in the forefront of the debate on SALT II. I was just thinking that on balance, it was not good.

At that time, I did some thinking about what would be successful arms control. There was one piece I did that went into this in particular depth in the Wall Street Journal of August 1978. When I looked at what was wrong with SALT II and tried to make it just instead of a carping that was so prevalent at that time on the SALT Treaty, what needed to be done in the future.

There were three things that I recommended at that time to do. One was to get away from the unit of accounts of fixed launchers. There are more meaningful measures—warheads, missiles—that I describe. That, let me say, is—well, has been done. In START we have gotten away from the launcher measure.

Second is the whole question of grey systems that were such a problem in Salt II. As you know from the good hearings of this committee at the time, the exclusion of the backfire bomber, the exclusion of some consideration of the SS-20 from those negotiations caused tremendous distress in NATO and among our allies. Something would have to be negotiated on the grey area systems; that is, the systems that are neither strategic nor theater—neither strategic nor tactical really—and those kind of theater systems.

And third, what had to be done was to include the European allies a lot more into the negotiating picture, because they felt that the dual track decision was a result of some of the feeling that they had that their security concerns had not been fully appreciated by the United States. I do not think it is due to any of my writings, because I do not think that before this confirmation came about I had any sense that these writings were widely read. I have no such sense now.

But let me say that since August 1978, 4 years ago, that those three constructive steps that I did propose are included in the new arms control package.

Senator LUGAR. Well, indeed, Mr. Adelman, your readership has expanded considerably; most astonishingly, as a matter of fact. And those of us who enjoyed what you wrote earlier on are gratified that so many others are coming to an appreciation of that now.

Senator MATHIAS. If Senator Lugar would yield for a moment, I am reminded of Dr. Samuel Johnson's observation that nothing is so conducive to a good conscience as the suspicion that someone may be watching.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, if you could just tell us the other quip that we discussed in your office the other day which sticks in my mind even more.

Senator MATHIAS. The line from the Book of Job? "Oh, that mine Adversary should write a book." [Laughter.]

Ambassador ADELMAN. I know the feeling very well.

Senator MATHIAS. Perhaps you will read more of the Book of Job.

Senator TSONGAS. I used that as a preface to my book, and I got it from Senator Moynihan, who is a Democratic researcher as well.

Senator HELMS. Job is not a Democratic researcher.

Senator MATHIAS. I apologize to Senator Lugar for taking more of his time.

Senator LUGAR. That is all right, a Biblical injunction.

The CHAIRMAN. For that injunction, I will yield my time.

Senator LUGAR. I have just one more question. You have indicated in your earlier remarks some qualifications for this office, but I think it is important that you lay before the committee as extensively as you can, without any degree of modesty, what in your background qualifies you to assume the role for which we are examining you presently.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Thank you. This gets into Senator Pell's concern and the concern of many members of this committee on the whole question of stature. Let me say that in terms of rank, quite simply, the Director of ACDA is one notch above the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations.

This is as it should be, in my mind, because in the United Nations you are dealing in a situation which I think is probably the foremost diplomatic arena in the world today, with 156 other countries whose ambassadors are at the peak of their career. They have been ambassador to Washington, to Paris; to London; many have been foreign ministers, many are going to be foreign ministers. And they are dealing with them on a daily basis on a whole range of issues and representing the United States in that arena.

I think there were questions—well, I know there were questions when I was appointed to that position because of the age consideration and because of the background consideration. All I know is that in the last few weeks, the outpouring of calls and letters and going away dinners and parties that could last from now until the next 4 years showed, I think, to my satisfaction that I made a mark there and obviously, to the President's satisfaction.

Before that time I was dealing in these issues, I was at the Strategic Study Center, SRI, working on nonproliferation issues as members of this committee now know, studying strategic issues including arms controls.

I, before that time, worked in the Pentagon. I started my career, as you know because I visited you when you were mayor in Indianapolis, in the poverty program. I have also worked in the Office of Economic Opportunity and then later on in AID for the international development work, plus the 2½ years in Africa.

So, I feel comfortable with the issues in the field very much.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I would like to, with the remaining time, read into the record a letter that I have just received from Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I have just scanned it.

"I understand some question has arisen concerning the managerial experience and skill of Ambassador Kenneth Adelman in relationship to his nomination as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I hope you will not think me presumptuous if I comment briefly on this question.

"I have had particular opportunity to observe Ambassador Adelman during his nearly 2 years as my principal deputy. As you know, the United States mission to the United Nations is a very large, extremely complex organization which poses all the problems of leadership and management characteristics of complex organizations.

"In addition, we are charged with the more difficult job of overseeing the U.S. role in a much larger, infinitely more complicated organization, the United Nations. In his role as Deputy, Ambassador Adelman had substantial managerial functions. In my absence, he was responsible for the management of the mission. Personnel and organization matters were an important part of his regular responsibilities more than half the time. He was charged with managing delegation meetings which included representatives of half a dozen Washington agencies.

"His chief responsibilities at the mission were representing us in affairs concerning national security and disarmament and African affairs involving organizing and leading meetings with representatives of many countries and many technical organizations. He did a first class job and won the respect and friendship of his colleagues in the mission and among other delegations. There was wide regret among his U.N. colleagues at the thought of his departure. Americans who know him well will, however, take pleasure in anticipation of the still more important responsibility the President has asked him to perform for the country.

"With best wishes, Jeane Kirkpatrick."

At this time with nine members present and without objections, we will go directly into a business meeting session.

[Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the committee proceeded to a business meeting session.]

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee reconvened in open session.]

The **Chairman**. Senator Biden.

Senator **Biden**. Mr. Adelman, it has been pointed out by Senator Lugar, and I think it should be reiterated here, that your nomination is in question, and it is for reasons not merely including you but beyond you. I think you have gotten a sense from this committee that a lot of us—and I would suggest probably on both sides of the aisle—are concerned about the President's attitude toward arms control. Some of us, like me, just do not believe that he believes in arms control.

We are concerned about your attitude toward arms control and your ability, your background in the area, not your general background. I for one am not concerned about your age, having come here at age 29.

But the real question is not merely whether or not you have expressed a point of view with regard to arms control in the past that may not be in agreement with mine—and I should note for the record that it is not in agreement with mine, mine personally—but how strong a player are you going to be able to be in the equation that is constantly changing in this administration.

The President of the United States came to office with no demonstrable background in foreign policy, particularly in strategic arms control. That is not unusual. Other Presidents have also. The men that he initially put in place were strong skeptics in two cases, and I believe an outright opponent in another, of the notion of the value of arms control. And there is an overwhelming concern, to quote a line from the New York Times editorial, "The most baffling question is why the administration believes it can go on avoiding serious negotiation."

I do not believe there is serious negotiation underway. I do not believe it has been demonstrated there is serious negotiations underway. And when we have seen glimmers of that for a hope of the prospect of that, we have seen Mr. Nitze's knuckles crack, we have seen your predecessor, in my characterization, called on the carpet. I am not suggesting that is why he left; I am just saying that occurred.

And so the issue is a little bigger than you. And I am not sure that the consequence of the backdrop in which this nomination is being considered, someone who does not come to this nominating process with an already accepted and recognized expertise in the area of arms control would get anything less than you are getting, which is trouble.

Now, I think you went a long way to clarify some of the concerns, although I missed the first two hearings because I am the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, and we had organizational hearings going on at the exact same time. I wanted to make sure Strom Thurmond did not give Delaware to New Jersey.

I did read the record. And I think the concerns expressed by my Democratic colleagues, particularly Senator Tsongas, who will continue, I hope, to express them during his questioning period, I think were legitimate. Had nothing else occurred, had the hearing ended at that time, it really would have been a tough decision for me whether or not to vote for you.

Now, I still have not made up my mind in light of the first 2 days of testimony. But your answers and your questions directed to you by Senator Percy and others, as I said, and Senator Pell, have gone a long way to alleviate my concern.

But let me ask you in the probably 5 minutes that I have left—and I have a whole series of specific questions—your view on SALT, your view on START and explanation of further discussion of MX and so on.

But as I thought about it sitting here, that is really not my problem. My problem relates to the larger question of philosophically where do you come from, because somebody in this administration has to be an advocate, has to be knocking on the President's door, notwithstanding the fact that the Secretary of State is now involved in the process.

I have great respect for him, and I really truly do. I did not have a great deal of respect, not as a person but as a Secretary of State, for his predecessor. This guy I think is first rate. But he also had no background. The first time I had a long discussion with him in my office, he did not know anything about some issues. He may now.

He did not know anything about arms control. And as is uncharacteristic for all Washington officials, including those of us in the Senate, he acknowledged that he did not know anything, he was leaning on experts. Now we look at the experts, and the experts, in my view, either are not committed to arms control or are being shut out or come to it with not a great deal of background in arms control.

Now, here is my question. Do you see any way that we can enter the 21st century without a serious arms control agreement or agreements? Do you see there is any way that we could be moving into the 21st century in the same status that we are in now, no arms control agreement and have during the period between now and the 21st century, avoided a nuclear confrontation?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Biden, thank you for your line of questioning, because I think they are really getting to the heart of the matter of this hearing and the concern of this committee.

In a simple answer, I think that the world would be so much better off, that arms control would be so much better off, if we entered the next century with real reductions in nuclear weapons, with elimination of systems of nuclear weapons, with effective arms control that is really turning around the situation that has developed in the postwar era of ever escalation.

Senator **Biden**. Well, you see what some of us, or what I believe and I suspect some others believe in this body, is that it is almost at this juncture less important that we have a meaningful reduction than that we have a superstructure, a framework within which we in small increments, even if it is keeping the escalation from increasing, a superstructure under which and through which we are able to build that constant dialog with the Soviet Union, which scares the heck out of me and I think the American people.

This President came along and said what is in place is not working. That is fine. I do not trust the Russians. They said, that is fine. We do not either. So we are going to wipe away this whole SALT process we had going here. We are going to then build up our military and then we are going to negotiate. That is what he said first.

He subsequently changed what he is saying. And I do not see how, if we continue to insist on major breakthroughs, that that is likely in the near term. For example, we talked about the relative value of nuclear weapons—would you not admit that nuclear weapons in this day and age have no value once deterrence has failed, their only value is deterrence. Would you agree with that statement?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes. The main value.

Senator **Biden**. No; I did not say main.

Ambassador **Adelman**. No; the value of nuclear weapons is deterrence.

Senator **Biden**. Because one deterrence has failed, school is out. You said it again in answer to the Senator from Rhode Island that there are not any winners, and by definition of Webster, that no one will prevail. And so obviously, the only value in nuclear weapons is deterrence.

Now, let me get you to the crux of what I think is your problem and mine as one who wants to have arms control. You answered the question that if in fact the Baruch plan were reintroduced or proposed or the Soviets were suddenly willing to accept it, that it would be a good idea.

I am not sure that view would be shared by the Pentagon and some very, very bright people in this country, because absent the deterrence of nuclear weapons, we are on a conventional, totally conventional, playing board. And on that playing board there is no way in the near term or long term we can match Soviet capability in the area we see as the most important to us, which happens to be, other than our territorial area of the United States, Europe, and the Mediterranean.

Would you like to respond to that?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes; I would like to respond to a whole series of things you said, Senator Biden, because I think you are really getting to the core issue before us.

First of all, let me just say that I considered the Baruch plan one of the most noble and farsighted arms control agreements that has ever been proposed by any side. It was in a situation where the United States had a total monopoly on nuclear weapons. We were willing to give up the only—our status as the only nuclear weapons state in the world and to put it in an international organization.

That is not the situation that exists today. There is not only one country in the world with nuclear weapons. The kind of Baruch plan cannot be resurrected today.

My point was today we have to work toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, something that I am very optimistic about. And I could go on in depth about that.

But let me get to the larger issues. The larger issue is the advocacy of arms control agreements. I come before this committee as I came before this committee last week with a personal and deep commitment for a strong arms control package. I did this without hesitation, without reservation, without qualification in any sense. I do this sincerely. And I do this myself personally.

I am bothered very deeply by the suspicion that the President of the United States is not interested in arms control. And I know that is a prevalent position, and I know that is current.

But it still bothers me very much, and I will tell you why. When this administration came to office, I think that the easiest thing would have been to continue the SALT process with very small modifications, to continue or to task the Pentagon, find out what our building plans were in the future, and try to come to an agreement that would encompass that, basically the SALT pattern, as you well know, find out what you want to do, and put a little cap on it and put some little changes on it, but do not do much in terms of reduction.

The President did not choose this way. He would have been politically more popular. It would have been internationally probably more accepted. The President wanted to do a thorough arms control package that called for real reductions that were verifiable, that went to the heart of the problem with stability and to enhance stability and to really get at the situation.

Now, I know that you and others who are very favorable on arms control are saying, take tiny steps. The President is saying, take big steps, let us have real reductions. I think if you look over the last 2 years since the President came in office, the Soviets are on a roll for real reductions. If we had taken baby steps when this administration started, we would have been basically the SALT pattern, the pattern of SALT II.

The Soviets already, even in an incomplete package, already are talking about 25-percent reductions from the SALT II Treaty. Now, I think that is very favorable. I think that they should go deeper. I think there should be a better unit of count, et cetera, et cetera.

But I said in my opening statement, Senator Biden, and I mean it, that the arms control community, those very deeply interested in arms control, are criticizing the President because his arms control package is too thorough in many cases. And they are urging—

and I have had discussions on this in 2 years at the United Nations or since November 1981, especially on the INF—that they, a lot of people who were very committed, who were very passionate, are urging the President of the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe, you know, the GLCM's, the Pershing II's.

So you have the ironic situation that I discussed at Yale not too long ago with a student body that a lot of people very dedicated to arms control are urging President Reagan to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe when the President does not want to. The President wants to solve the security situation strictly through arms control. He wants a total elimination of those systems.

My point to you is that those of us very serious on arms control are in a situation now where we do not know really what can be possible by the Soviet Union on the other side. But if you ask for baby steps, then you are going to get baby steps. If you go for very deep reductions, as the President has done in START, then the Soviets are going to come back on an opening package, talk about 25-percent reductions, which are very dramatic from their point of view, again in an incomplete package. You are getting on to a position where arms control is a very strong and a very meaningful kind of endeavor.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I disagree with your assessment. My time is up.

Do you know what the President reminds me of on arms control? I was at a fund-raising event for a charitable organization, and one man in the room was considerably more wealthy than everyone else in the room. And there were 35. And they said, let us get together. And the one man in the room who could afford to contribute $100,000 if he wanted to, stood up and said—and no one else could really afford to contribute even $3,000 for themselves. The man in the room who had all the money that he could have done it very easily, got up and said, I will contribute $25,000 if four other people in this room will match that contribution. Now, he walked down and said I was ready to commit $25,000.

I think that is how the President approaches arms control. I sincerely hope you do not approach it that way. I do not think you approach it that way. I think you are wrong in your approach in terms of tactics. But my time has been long up, and I will stop asking questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden. Senator Mathias?

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Adelman, Senator Lugar said that his questions would be friendly ones; I hope that does not imply that any other questions are unfriendly. Besides, this really is not a subject that can be decided on the basis of friendship. We are dealing here with the most vital interest of the United States of America, nuclear arms control, a troubling issue for all of us. I think we have to probe very deeply discern the right course to follow regarding the decisions that confront us.

I must say I was encouraged by one line in your statement this morning. You said, "If confirmed, I will work together with the able professional staff at ACDA." Who is going to appoint the personnel of ACDA? What is your understanding on that?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Mathias, let me say this is one of the many things I wanted to get back to when Senator Biden made such interesting points. It is not that there is no expertise in this Government on arms control and nobody of commitment in this Government on arms control. I think overseas forgets the fact of ACDA; the fact that we have a group of 154 professionals who are very gifted and very dedicated and very technically——

Senator **Mathias**. I agree with that and I think most of the people here would agree with that. What is the future of current ACDA personnel? Are they going to be cleaned out? Have you made some arrangement with the Secretary of State as to how retentions or replacements will be agreed upon?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I have an agreement with the Secretary of State and with the President of the United States to get the absolutely best qualified people we can for ACDA.

Senator **Mathias**. What about those able and professional people that are there now?

Ambassador **Adelman**. They would be busier and doing a lot more.

Senator **Mathias**. Where?

Ambassador **Adelman**. In ACDA. I guess, Senator, the implication that you are making is that there is going to be some kind of a cleaning out or a purge or something like that. That is the farthest thing——

Senator **Mathias**. I want your opinion on that.

Ambassador **Adelman**. You have that.

Senator **Mathias**. Is there going to be a housecleaning at ACDA?

Ambassador **Adelman**. No; there is not going to be a housecleaning. There might be changes in personnel depending on the position—there is not going to be any purge or housecleaning or anything like that. I think the work of ACDA is so important, I think the competence of ACDA is so high that the last thing we need is a lot of turmoil in the personnel area. I think what we have to do is buckle down.

Senator **Mathias**. Don't you think we have had too much turmoil in the personnel area recently?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes; I do, Senator. And let me say if I may, Senator, the ACDA people do not come as new to me in any sense. I have worked with a group of outstanding ACDA individuals at the U.N. for the last 2 years.

Senator **Mathias**. I will leave that subject for the moment, but I think there is still a little bit hanging by your statement.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Well, let me just clarify it right now, Senator. I have heard the rumor and it came as a very big surprise to me that there were thoughts of a purge or a big departure from ACDA. That is the furthest thing from my mind. I think there have been too many changes in personnel in ACDA.

I have always had very high esteem for the people in ACDA and have never heard the Secretary of State, the President or anyone in the Personnel Office, in the White House or anyone else talk in those terms. And they have been personally distressing to me because I think they are just rumors to make this situation more difficult than it is.

Senator **Mathias**. Do you have any assurance that your views will be definitive on ACDA personnel questions?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I have assurance that working with the President and Secretary of State, that my views will be very heavily involved.

Senator **Mathias**. That sounds like two to one to me.

Ambassador **Adelman**. The President has to have the final determination, Senator, in all of these things.

Senator **Mathias**. I hope we can come back to this in another round, but let me move on to another subject.

The other day Mr. Donald Cotter, a former government official, said, in essence, "We aren't getting anywhere with arms control anyway; let's just forget the whole subject. There are now more nuclear warheads in the world than when we began arms control, it's futile. Let's build all the missiles we can, let's build all the warheads we can, let's deploy everything in Europe, and go ahead on our own." How would you dissect that?

Let me add that I reject such thinking as a kind of a right wing extemism. However, some elements of it are really being talked about around town. I have picked that up in more than one place. How do you assess that kind of talk?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I just disagree that arms control has had its day and is useless. I think that when you look at the European situation that you mentioned and the trouble that has been caused by the infusion of the SS–20's, as you know, that has caused some security concerns to the Europeans since 1977.

The President is looking at that situation. The normal response would be, according to the perspective you have just delineated and the perspective usually associated with President Reagan, to solve the security problem through another move in the security realm. Build missiles to counteract the missiles there.

What the President would much prefer to do, and I believe all of the members of this committee would much prefer to do, is to solve this problem strictly through arms control, to have the zero-zero option, and to eliminate that kind of fear.

I think in the START negotiations that contrary to the view that you just passed along, that there can be a more stable world, a world with less nuclear weapons, a world with greater quality of nuclear weapons but at a much reduced rate through arms control. And if I took anything like that perspective that you just passed along, then I just would not be in the right job and I never would have accepted the President's offer to be his nominee.

Senator **Mathias**. Would you feel comfortable advocating an alternative position? Would you feel comfortable taking on Mr. Cotter, and Mr. Cotter's friends, and the people around town who are considering just that kind of program?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Anybody who says the day of arms control has passed, that arms control has been harmful, that there is no need for any kind of arms control in the world, I would, in your phrase, Senator, certainly take on, because I disagree with that. And my past in the United Nations and even before that has been, in summary, to take on positions with which I disagreed.

Senator **Mathias**. The Secretary of State has just sent to the National Security Council a recommendation that we resume full activity in the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. Do you concur with that judgment?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Let me give you my private opinion. My private opinion is that I do concur with that judgment. I have, in my experience at the United Nations, been of the opinion that the IAEA is one of the best specialized agencies of the U.N. family. That is not to say that it does not have a lot of problems, that is not to say that it solves the nonproliferation problem. It is one element to help solve the nonproliferation problem.

On the other hand, I was very supportive of the administration's stance that once the IAEA General Conference last September rejected the credentials of the Israeli delegates, that we should withdraw and reassess our participation in the IAEA. I think that move taken at that time in that forum helped to preclude the expulsion of Israel in the General Assembly the next month.

And I think if international organizations like the IAEA, the U.N., the ILO, et cetera, are going to have any future, their future is going to be one of doing their jobs that are very important and not getting politicized the way they have been.

Senator **Mathias**. We now have half a dozen card-carrying members of the nuclear club. There are also 6, 9, or 12 nations, however you may count it, that are suspected of being at least candidates for membership in that infamous club—Libya, South Africa, Israel, Pakistan, and others. Do you think the IAEA program is adequate to restrain nuclear proliferation under current conditions?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Let me give you two answers, Senator Mathias. One is that like any international organization, it can do a far better job in the area than it does. Some of its inspections have been incomplete; it cannot inspect facilities that the host country does not want it to inspect; it does not inspect facilities where the host country is not part of the safeguards system.

At times, the host country can put restrictions on the inspection, like we saw at the inspection of the Iraqi procedure. That is not to say that the IAEA on balance does not help the nonproliferation area. I think on balance it does help nonproliferation. I think it does a good job of deterring and detecting any kind of spread of nuclear material that could be of weapons grade.

Let me also say that you have the IAEA doing a fairly good job, although not perfect, in the area that it does. But that is not the whole area of nonproliferation. There has to be nuclear export controls, there has to be all kinds of motivational considerations as well.

So IAEA is not equipped to make sure that there are not more nuclear states in the world, and it has to be encouraged to do a better job than the 1,400 or so inspections that it does every year.

Senator **Mathias**. My time is up, but Dr. Morozov, the Deputy Director of the Soviet State Commission on the Applications of Nuclear Energy has said that the Soviet Union would be interested in strengthening inspection and enforcement provisions of the IAEA. Would you, as head of ACDA, be willing to see the United States take the lead in negotiating for a strengthened IAEA?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes; I would, Senator. And let me say this is an area, a wonderful area, where we and the Soviets could work much closer together. I think in the past we have had bilateral discussions on nonproliferation. It is an area that both of us are deeply concerned about, and we can use this as a cooperative endeavor to tackle a common security concern.

Senator **Mathias**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Mathias, for the information to the committee. After Senator Tsongas, if we could go to Senator Pressler—Senator Pressler's bill has been delayed until later—and complete that and then recess until 2 o'clock.

Senator **Pressler**. I can wait here. Let the other people go ahead of me.

The **Chairman**. Well, maybe it would be best then just to finish up with Senator Tsongas and we will resume at 2 o'clock with Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Tsongas.

Senator **Tsongas**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is very difficult for all of us and I am sure for you as well. The fact is that the hearing last Thursday has set a new environment in place. What was set last Thursday has its own life, and that has to be dealt with.

The question in my mind last Thursday was your qualifications and your views. I think the dynamics that have taken over since then raise another question, and that is what is this committee about; what is our role; how deep are our beliefs; where in essence is the soul and the spine of this committee on arms control.

That is very different. That is very troubling. My own view is that there were times when this committee would have been viewed somewhat differently.

When you were here Thursday I assume that what you said was the truth. That is a fairly innocent assumption, which you would sign on to that.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes.

Senator **Tsongas**. When Senator Pell asked you whether nuclear war could be limited, you said I just have no thoughts in that area. Were you telling the truth?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Tsongas, let me say I know that you have carefully reviewed the transcript. I have as well. There are areas of that transcript where obviously I did give thoughts on limited nuclear war. I thought about the tremendous stress that people would be under at that time, about the importance of deterrence to preclude any such possibility of that.

What I was talking about and thinking about in that answer was a far more technical response. It was misreading Senator Pell's question. Let me make apologies for that. But what I was talking about was a series of studies with which I know everybody on this committee is familiar. They go back and forth through different scenarios on limited nuclear war with computer printouts and a variety of scenarios that we have seen in the postwar era on those kinds of studies.

Senator **Tsongas**. I have 16 examples of it. I can go through each one if you prefer. But let me give you another one. In reference to the question about verifiable elimination of nuclear weaponry by the Soviets, you said I just never thought in my life, and now you have given us a detailed exposition of Baruch's plan, et cetera.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Let me answer that one, if I might, Senator Tsongas. That the point of that answer was, as you know from the transcript, Senator Helms was asking me supposing the Soviets tabled a treaty that was verifiable to eliminate all nuclear weapons around the world. I was thinking in my mind, and I should have said so, that how could a Soviet treaty eliminate the nuclear forces of Britain, France, China, the United States, the Soviets, everybody in a bilateral treaty? It seemed to me a kind of non sequitur.

And I am not saying that that was the way the question was intended or anything like that. I should have made the points that I made this morning on movement toward elimination of nuclear weapons in the world.

But the question before it was supposing in a bilateral treaty the Soviets had tabled a proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the world.

Senator **Tsongas**. And you expect me to believe that all of these answers are simply a function of the circumstance?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I am explaining from the transcript what I was thinking at the time and why that kind of a question: Supposing a bilateral treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union would eliminate nuclear forces of other countries that had nothing to do with this bilateral negotiation.

Senator **Tsongas**. Let me give you a specific: Senator Cranston's question about violating SALT II by the Soviets. You said, "That is not an area I have looked into. It is not an area I am knowledgeable about at all." And today you responded in great detail.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Let me say, Senator Tsongas, that the detail I responded with today was not of a technical type, and it was not of a classified type. When you talk about violations of a treaty, as I explained last weekend—it is in the transcript—you are in a very difficult situation. What you have to do is, *(a)* decide what the treaty itself says; *(b)* you have to look at what the unilateral statements on the Soviet side were, what the unilateral statements on the United States side were, what our statements were of their statements, what their statements were of our statements.

Senator **Tsongas**. Explain the difference in your answers to the same question 1 week later.

Ambassador **Adelman**. I will explain it to you that there were these kinds of considerations on the difficulty that I went into last week about the question of the compliance with SALT II.

Over the last week, as I said in my opening statement, I have decided that the impresson was created that I did not know a field to which I have devoted my entire life and to most of my academic life, and public service career. I also know that, as you said absolutely correctly when you started your questioning, that this has created a different environment this week.

I said that I was too cautious last week. I was too cautious last week.

Senator **Tsongas**. I would feel a lot better if you would say look, Senator, I was told to keep my mouth shut and not say anything controversial. I did the best I could. It was a mistake. We had a week of briefings. Now I am going to tell you a different story. At least you would be honest with me. Rather than to suggest that when you say this is not an area that I have looked into, it is not an area I am knowledgeable about at all. In response to Senator Boschwitz's question on the same issue you say, "It is not an issue I have a judgment about, and I just cannot give you a judgment if I do not have a judgment about it."

Who is the real Ken Adelman—this week or last week?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, I think there is a consistent record in all of my writings——

Senator TSONGAS. There sure is.

Ambassador ADELMAN [continuing]. That members of this committee are now familiar with. I think there was a common pattern of what I have written in those and a common response. I do not think anything I have said this morning is inconsistent with what I said last week. I think it is an elaboration of what I said last week. If you are asking me did I make a mistake last week in being too cautious, my answer is "Yes," I made a mistake last week.

Senator TSONGAS. Let me ask you if anything you say by definition is an elaboration of what you said last week because you just did not say anything?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I do not believe that, Senator Tsongas, and I do not believe if you read the transcript that there were 86 questions in fields that it would be a fair summary to say that I did not say anything. I do not believe that is true myself.

Senator TSONGAS. Tell me of the briefings that you have had in the last week. Who have you sat down with and how much time did that consume?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I would have to think. I cannot think of one briefing that I have had on any of the subjects today that have come up that I had over the last week. I reviewed the materials, like I said, last week, in the areas that I have written about and dealt with.

Senator TSONGAS. You know what I am getting at. I want to know how much time was spent with you by State Department officials, ACDA officials, White House officials in the past week on the issue of the hearings and the confirmation.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Very little. Most of the time I have been reading by myself at an apartment in town.

Senator TSONGAS. What is very little? Who are these people?

Ambassador ADELMAN. These are people that have discussed about the hearings——

Senator TSONGAS. State Department?

Ambassador ADELMAN. State Department, ACDA, White House, all around. And basically I have not had extensive briefings. I am just thinking I went to New York last Friday if you want to go through day by day. I went to New York last Friday to play with my kids who I had not seen in 10 days and to roller skate with them. I came back on Monday. I cannot think of briefings. Most of the time I have been doing reading and mulling myself, going over the transcript, going over questions that I knew were of interest to this committee.

Senator TSONGAS. Did anybody advise you to change the strategy on your approach this week as opposed to last week?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I came to the decision looking at the media, not when I left the room last week, that I was too cautious.

Senator TSONGAS. Answer my question. Did anybody advise you to change your strategy?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The general consensus was that I was too timid, that people said to be more myself. So in that sense the answer is yes, the people did advise me of that.

Senator TSONGAS. Where do you disagree with Richard Perle on arms Control? Give me specifics of where you and Richard Perle would be different in your approach. You have dealt with him at great length obviously. Delineate what some of the differences might be.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I know that during the SALT debate Richard had a view that SALT II was generally a lot more harmful to the national security than was my view.

Senator TSONGAS. You were both opposed to it?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I was marginally opposed to it and wrote much. And in articles Richard thought it was a far worse treaty than I did. He thought it was far more important to defeat SALT II than I did. I think this would be fair. And he was far more emotional about it than I was.

Senator TSONGAS. So the difference between you and Richard Perle is you are both opposed to SALT II, but he is more emotional about the opposition than you are?

Ambassador ADELMAN. He took the position that it was a far more important issue, I guess, than I did. As I said last week, I thought it was kind of irrelevant to what was happening in the world.

Senator TSONGAS. So what we have, Senator Biden, is absolutely correct. The issue is whether you are going to be an advocate. If Richard Perle came before this committee as the arms control nominee, I mean everyone would have a very clear sense that not only would he not be an advocate, he would be out to sabotage. And now you are saying to me that the only difference between you and Richard Perle is that although you are both opposed to SALT II, his was a more strident, emotional——

Ambassador ADELMAN. I did not say, Senator, that was the only difference between me and Richard Perle.

Senator TSONGAS. Well, give me another one.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I am saying that that was the difference back then. Right now I know Richard is very supportive of START and the INF proposals, and I am just trying to think. We have not, since I have been at the United Nations, had extensive discussions on exactly the details of his positions. And in fact if we did, Senator, let me say in all frankness, they would be of a confidential basis, and I would not say them in public before this committee.

Senator TSONGAS. Why do we not save some money, given the deficit, if Richard Perle is going to call the shots and just not have anybody in this slot? I mean we have an enormous deficit problem.

Ambassador ADELMAN. If you are asking me is Richard Perle going to be the President's nominee for ACDA, no, he is not.

Senator TSONGAS. Are you going to stand up to Richard Perle? We asked a question last time about resignation. You said, "Resignation is an appropriate recourse under certain circumstances."

Ambassador ADELMAN. Am I going to stand up to Richard Perle? Yes; I am if I disagree with him. I am going to stand up to anybody if I disagree with them.

Senator TSONGAS. If you disagree with him.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Should I stand up to him if I do not disagree with him?

Senator TSONGAS. I would rather that you disagreed with him and then stood up.

Ambassador ADELMAN. If your question is am I going to disagree with Richard Perle on any issue that the two of us discussed, my guess would be that I am not. If your question is do I disagree on some issues with Richard Perle, the answer would be yes, I do. If the question is are you going to be very frank when you disagree with Richard Perle, yes, I certainly will be frank with him.

Senator TSONGAS. If you ever have a disagreement with him, could you give me a call? My problem is you are a decent person even if I disagree with you; you have to acknowledge that. But do I believe that in the inner circles when these top decisions are going to be made are you going to stand up for arms control and make it clear, as the New York Times did on Nitze yesterday that you would resign, that you feel so strongly about it that they cannot afford to get rid of you.

Will you stand up? And listening to all of this in my heart I have to say that Dr. Adelman is a bureaucrat; he is just not going to resign, either because he does not have the constituency or he happens to agree with the hardliners. If that is the vote that we have on arms control, I do not think we have a choice.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Well, Senator Tsongas, let me just tell you that if you have been familiar with my background, as I believe you have, that I have been criticized for many things at the United Nations but being a bureaucrat is not one of them. The criticism at the United Nations may have been that I was too frank, I was too bold, I stood up too much for American values, for the protection of not throwing Israel out of international organizations, for the values I had, for the beliefs I had. I do not think the President wanted a bureaucrat for the Director of ACDA, and if he did, he would have chosen someone else.

Senator TSONGAS. Let me say that I would vote for you for almost any position in the Government because I think you are exceptionally bright. Arms control, I am just too troubled.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, I think that if you are troubled about my commitment to arms control that you should just ask me straight out on it, and I will answer you.

Senator TSONGAS. That is what I tried to do.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Well, let me just say straight out that I am planning, if confirmed by this Senate, to be a very strong advocate of a strong arms control package. I believe President Reagan's package is very strong. I want to take a position and do a good job in the area of arms control. I want to have a success over the next 2 years. I want to solve the problem in Europe of a security kind through arms control. I want to make greater progress, if confirmed as ACDA Director, toward strategic nucler reductions than has ever been done since the SALT process began.

I believe that the opportunity is there to do it, and I think that the Soviets have shown through the 25-percent reduction the President has proposed, the 50-percent reduction of missiles, one-third in warheads, that we have a chance over the next 2 years to have real reductions and to have arms control that I could bring before this committee and ask; did we not do a good job?

Senator TSONGAS. What is your recommendation to the President on the two treaties of Senator Percy?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Mr recommendation to the President was that these two treaties should move ahead. I think that the principle of having these treaties and the followthrough of the U.S. Government was an important consideration.

I also recommended to the President that we should look at the verification provisions of that just to make sure that we were not getting involved in two treaties that would have very wide verification as to exacerbate superpower relations.

Senator TSONGAS. To confirm or not to confirm, ratify and not ratify, what was your recommendation?

Ambassador ADELMAN. My recommendation was as I explained it to you. It was not a situation of should we sign it right now or should we not sign it. It was a question of focusing on a verification procedure with the idea over the last week that I have expressed very frequently in the executive branch to please move these treaties along. They are important treaties, they are important symbolically, and I share the chairman's view. I shared the chairman's view before I was nominated to this.

Senator TSONGAS. I thank the chairman for being so patient.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I would like to simply say that the questions you put, Senator Tsongas, have in a sense been answered by Ambassador Adelman with a very frank statement that he was overly cautious. As he knows, I not only notified Ambassador Adelman, but also the White House and the State Department that that would be unacceptable, that the chairman would protect the right of every Senator on this committee to insist upon an answer to their questions, and we would not have a vote until such time as we had his thoughts.

I think you have clarified tremendously today a number of issues that were left hanging before, and I am extremely pleased with the hearing to date.

I am going to ask Senator Mathias if he would be good enough to chair the remaining questions to be asked. I understand that both Senators ahead of Senator Pressler have yielded to him so that he can take up his business on the floor then at 2 p.m. We will close then with 10 minutes of questioning by Senator Pressler. Senator Mathias, would you take the chair please? We will resume again at 2 this afternoon.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will begin by saying that at last week's hearings I for one came away with the view that the nominee for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's Directorship had left too many questions unanswered. It was for that reason that I urged recalling Mr. Adelman for the second day of hearings on his nomination.

I have questions in three areas. The first area is the space weapons race, on which I asked a couple of questions last week. Yesterday, I introduced a resolution, along with several cosponsors, regarding the resumption of ASAT, Senate Resolution 43.

I have received Mr. Adelman's initial reply to my question on the desirability of moving forward with talks directed at banning antisatellite weapons. But I do have some additional questions.

First of all, while I do thank you for your written response, I would still like to know when do you expect that we will return to the negotiating table on ASAT's?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I do not think, Senator, it would be particularly helpful to you or to members of this committee to give a date or a time certain about a bilateral negotiation where there is some doubt whether such bilateral negotiation would be productive. As I explained last week, the space issues are very important; they are areas where we should have more effective arms control in the future and to really make more progress, even though they are areas where there has been arms control in the past, for example, the Outer Space Treaty contains important limitations on outer space activities.

Senator PRESSLER. I know that. My question is, Should we not negotiate directly with the Soviets now?

Ambassador ADELMAN. We are negotiating, in a sense, in the 40-member Committee on Disarmament, and we are discussing space issues. The Soviets are present in these meetings.

Senator PRESSLER. Why that committee—but only the Soviets and the United States have ASAT weapons? Why wouldn't we negotiate directly with the Soviets on this issue?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Pressler, the United States does not have ASAT capability right now. The Soviet Union is the only country in the world with a capability of an antisatellite sort that is in operation right now. If your question is, whether a bilateral approach is better than a multilateral approach, that would depend on the progress made in the multilateral approach and whether we should continue on the pattern that was successful with regard to the Outer Space Treaty where issues were addressed and put in a multilateral treaty.

The treaty I described to you was not bilateral; it was multilateral. It addressed space weapons and outer space. It has been successful.

Senator PRESSLER. In other words, you oppose—and I am trying to get your answer here—you oppose negotiating directly with the Soviets, as we did up until Afghanistan, when the Carter administration decided to break off talks.

Ambassador ADELMAN. They are suspended right now. If you are asking me, do I support continuing or starting a bilateral, that would be something that I would just have to study, and I will get back to you and get your advice on this issue to see how this bilateral would affect or siderail the multilateral discussions that are going on right now.

Senator PRESSLER. You may well find that multilateral talks avoid the real issue of United States-Soviet talks. What I am really getting at here is United States-Soviet talks on this issue. Would you just state your position on United States-Soviet talks, very briefly?

Ambassador **Adelman**. My position is that the United States and the Soviet Union are talking about arms control in outer space at the forum in Geneva. It will be a question that a Director of ACDA will have to address in the coming year.

There is a question whether it would be more productive to do this in a bilateral setting. Let me just point out to you once again, Senator Pressler, that the issue of the Outer Space Treaty in the fifties was a successful treaty, it was multinational, multilateral. It addressed the stationing of military facilities and nuclear weapons in outer space. Most countries in the world do not have that kind of capability, but it was a successful treaty done in a multilateral forum.

We may decide, with your counsel and with other counsel, that this kind of pattern of successful treaties in a multilateral forum on outer space is the best road to go.

Senator **Pressler**. You have said that verification is a major source of delaying ASAT talks. Do you believe as I do that once we test and deploy our ASAT system, verification will be an even more difficult problem?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I think the problems in verification, as I explained in my letter to you, are very extensive. There are very few systems; they are systems that can be enacted relatively—with many deceptive devices et cetera.

Senator **Pressler**. I would like to bring to the attention of the Senators a GAO classified report. Portions of it are not, regarding the potential cost of the U.S. ASAT system. Presently it has a price tag of $3.6 billion on it, which is a sevenfold increase over its original cost estimate and a lot of people feel it would be much higher.

Quoting an unclassified part of this report, what we are talking about is a "tens of billions of dollars" weapons system and other systems could be far more expensive than the MX missile systems. Let me turn to the second subject.

Last week, you said that you would oppose ratification of the TTB and the PNE accords in their current form. Why do you oppose ratification?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Pressler, what I said was I agree with the chairman that we should push these treaties very much. I know the President had made a determination——

Senator **Pressler**. Pardon me, you said what last week?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I said last week that we should push these treaties along in the executive branch in a far more vigorous way than has been done.

Senator **Pressler**. You did say that you were opposed to them, personally, didn't you? That you would not support ratification? Didn't you say that in answer to my question last week?

Ambassador **Adelman**. My position on that was that the President had decided last June that there had to be improvements in the verification parts of that. These were not extensive improvements and they were not going to be time consuming, but there had to be improvements. That was the President's decision.

Senator **Pressler**. Is it not true that the problems associated with verification would be significantly reduced if these accords are ratified? Because none of the verification provisions, including data exchange and on-site inspection could come into force until after ratification?

Ambassador **Adelman**. That is basically correct, Senator. On the other side, let me just say that the technical experts explained that the two treaties, the TTB and the PNE, can be verified at a factor of 2. What that means, basically, if there is a test at 150 kiloton, that will show up on our verification devices as either a test ranging from 300 to 75. That is a very wide range, as you well know.

And those kinds of considerations led the President to decide that without major modifications, pushing these two treaties along, that we could narrow that gap from a very wide range of verification without too many problems. And I was pleased to announce to the committee this morning that that kind of package is on the President's desk.

Senator **Pressler**. Yes; but what frustrates me is they are on the President's desk. Now, if the President asks you, shall I send these over to the Senate for ratification or not, what will you say?

Ambassador **Adelman**. The President has already made the decision that there has to be some tightening up of the verification parts of those two treaties.

Senator **Pressler**. So, in other words, the decision has already been made to renegotiate them.

Ambassador **Adelman**. It is not a question of renegotiation, as I understand it, Senator Pressler, but it is a question of discussing these kinds of considerations in private with allies and with the Soviet Union.

Senator **Pressler**. So that is renegotiating them, isn't it? It's further negotiation?

Ambassador **Adelman**. No. You can take the treaty as it is now, and to make clear how the operation will work on both sides.

Senator **Pressler**. So you are opposed to the treaties in their present form.

Ambassador **Adelman**. No, Senator. Let me just put it in my own words. I think the two treaties have a tremendous amount of value and are important. They should be pushed and they should go forward. My view also is that some tightening of the verification parts of those treaties is needed.

Senator **Pressler**. I think everybody agrees that they should go forward, but the question is are they going to be submitted to the Senate? Are they going to be renegotiated? I want a clear answer—before you go back to the Soviets and negotiate additional protocols to the treaties. Is that not what you are advocating?

Ambassador **Adelman**. No. To negotiate other parts of the treaty would mean that you take the language that is in the treaty itself and you want to change it. I do not think that that is the case right now. I think there has to be an elaboration of how we would do various parts of the verification.

The President has this on his desk. It is a package that has been cleared by the various agencies involved. There will be, within a very short time, a program of action implemented, and I would be happy——

Senator **Pressler**. Yes; I am glad to hear that. But it has been my frustration on questions related to ASAT's and to this issue.

You are in favor of the treaties but you want to further negotiate. Negotiations have to be reopened with the Soviets to change the treaty. You might say that we want something different, but you do not support—you would not advise the President to send the treaties over in their present form; is that correct?

Ambassador **Adelman**. The President has decided that there have to be some changes not in the text but in the implementation on the verification aspects.

Senator **Pressler**. In other words, the treaties have to be renegotiated.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Pressler, let me say that when you have the body of the treaty, you may be talking about an elaboration or you may be talking about an implementing protocol. And I do not want to quibble with the words, but I do not want to leave you with any idea that is not consistent with what I know or believe the situation to be.

I believe the situation to be that there are parts of the implementation of this that need to be clarified and tightened up. I do not, as I understand it, intend to include in that the body of the treaty itself.

Senator **Pressler**. I am told my time is up, and I have a third area of questions on the START proposal, but I have to manage a bill on the Senate floor. I will submit it in writing, but I will give you the question so you can think about it. Would you support putting all existing U.S. strategic systems on the negotiating table if the Soviets would accept reductions in comparable Soviet weapons? Specifically, do you believe the MX should be on the negotiating agenda, along with the Soviet SS-18's and SS-19's? Similarly, should the B-1 be subject to negotiations?

That is, in the current negotiations? But my time is up, and I thank the chairman.

Senator **Pell**. Could I ask for one point of information? Do you or do you not recommend the ratification, the recommendation for ratification of the treaties that we are talking about?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I recommend that the treaties be ratified by the Senate once the verification parts are cleaned up. This is the decision that the President has made this summer, Senator Pell. That the treaties themselves are sound.

Senator **Pell**. Then you do not recommend them in their present form.

Ambassador **Adelman**. The President has decided this summer——

Senator **Pell**. I asked you what you recommend.

Ambassador **Adelman**. What I recommend? I believe that the verification, as I understand it, from the technical experts, verification problems are very great and they can be cleaned up without too much effort.

Senator **Pell**. Fine. But you do not recommend them in their present form.

Senator **Pressler**. Can I ask just one more question, then, and I thank my colleague for clarifying it.

Senator **Mathias**. Senator Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. How long will renegotiation of the verification improvements take, in your estimation?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I do not think it would be helpful of me to speculate on that kind of thing. We would have to talk to other countries involved, and it is my understanding and it is my deep hope that this would not be a long process.

Senator TSONGAS. Can I ask just one question, Mr. Chairman? If the President arrived at this conclusion in the summer, as you said, what has happened from the summertime until now, if it was so easily resolvable, in the 7 months?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That is the problem that the chairman and many members of this committee has had; that there has been a lack of moving forward on exactly what the technical situation would be on this. But I am happy to say that over the last week, this has moved forward. And over the last month or so it has moved forward, especially in the last week, and the President is making the decision now, and then there will be a program of action very quickly.

Senator MATHIAS. If we could suspend this until the afternoon session, the Chair will announce that it will take precisely 1 hour and 15 minutes to have lunch. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Adelman, I will catch up on what happened after I left to go over to the international meeting that was being held in the House this noon, but from every account I have heard, the entire morning hearing was extremely satisfactory and very helpful.

Just a few areas that are of great importance, one involving yellow rain. There has been evidence that the Soviets have used chemical warfare agents in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, and that has seemingly continued to grow for the past 2 years.

In addition, the United States and Canada have each issued reports essentially supporting the U.S. contention. In December, despite Soviet interference, the United Nations decided to continue its investigation. What is your own assessment of the evidence suggesting that the Soviets are involved in chemical warfare in Afghanistan and in Southeast Asia?

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR KENNETH L. ADELMAN—Resumed

Ambassador ADELMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I personally believe, looking at the evidence for a number of years, that the Soviets are using illegal and inhumane chemical weapons against innocent Third World people such as the H'mong people in Southeast Asia. I am also convinced personally that in Afghanistan they are using illegal and inhumane chemical weapons as well. I think that the world attention on this has to be focused and the horrendous practice just has to be stopped. And I think the most effective way to do that is to bring it to the attention of the world and to the United Nations.

We did that through a series of briefings, through a series of speeches, through all kinds of very careful deliberations, including resolutions at the United Nations. And I would think that it is important for the future of arms control to show that not only is there a prospect of having real arms control in the future, but that we, the United States, take arms control so very seriously that we are going to be very forthright in compliance of existing arms control agreements.

The CHAIRMAN. Recently, the United Nations did issue, as I have indicated, an initial report essentially supporting the U.S. contentions. What was your own evaluation of that report, and what reaction did you detect it had among other delegations?

Ambassador ADELMAN. My own personal reaction to that report was it did not go far enough, Mr. Chairman; that the evidence had been overwhelming for a number of years, and that the U.N. experts group should have found that it was overwhelming.

I think that my problems with the expert group was such that they had structured the questions in themselves in such a way as to preclude any real conclusive evidence. But let me say, Mr. Chairman, that the report went farther than past reports, and therefore raised in a lot of delegations' minds the belief that this practice is continuing.

So while it was welcome and I think it was a positive movement by the United Nations in this direction, it did not go far enough, in my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that the United Nations can be effective in investigating such incidents? Have they demonstrated any real effectiveness in this area?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think they have demonstrated some effectiveness, Mr. Chairman. I guess my standards are too high. I was disappointed at the amount of effectiveness and the way the group was structured. They did have very competent individuals from around the world, but they did not want to have any mechanism for gathering the information firsthand. They did not want to rely even on the U.N. family, the refugee agencies and other parts of the United Nations. The U.N. High Commissioner of Refugees [UNHCR] that has offices there—the whole UNHCR—the Red Cross, and other aspects that are part of the United Nations and part of the international welfare community.

So they did not want to rely on that, but they did not have an apparatus to really trust secondhand information. In other words, they were skeptical of information that the U.S. Government and other governments gave them. So it was kind of a bind of not having firsthand information and not really being willing to go with secondhand information.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the United States can be more effective in any way in presenting its case to the United Nations? Or in your judgment, have we effectively presented that case and had as much impact as we can?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think we have done, especially during the General Assembly, just about as much as we possibly could on this issue.

The CHAIRMAN. What sort of lessons can we draw from this situation? How does it apply to, say, arms control? What can we learn from the experience where we have a situation that has been discussed, talked about, written about, reported on, and yet no satisfactory resolution of it?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think one of the lessons, Mr. Chairman, is that when we look at future treaties on arms control, that we must insist on very adequate, tough verification provisions.

I know that when the ACDA Director at the time, Fred Ikle, came before this committee and talked about ratification of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, I believe in 1971 or 1972, he made the point that there were no verification provisions in this treaty. The reasons why they were not necessary was that there was no known military utility for these kinds of weapons; that they were so inhumane and illegal that it went against human practice for the last half century. Therefore, we were not very concerned about their use.

I think to get into a situation like that invites violations in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there prospects within the United Nations community—recognizing the negotiating process that is going on—for an effective ban on chemical weapons? For instance, can you give us an updated report on the current activities going on in the Committee on Disarmament discussions in Geneva on chemical warfare?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; there are discussions going on now in the Committee on Chemical Weapons. The United States would like to move those negotiations as quickly as we possibly can, as long as there are effective verification provisions. As you know, the whole notion of producing and storing chemical weapons is one that is very tough for verification. You have to be sure that not only is the illegal chemical not produced in this plant, but it is not produced in other plants, and it is not stored anywhere.

But I think that there is progress being made, and there is certainly serious attention. And that would be an area that, if confirmed by the Senate, I would certainly want to push.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be having, by the way, in Senator Pressler's subcommittee, hearings on this subject on February 24th, which I think will be interesting.

Ambassador ADELMAN. If I may say, Mr. Chairman, that the past hearings of the subcommittee that Senator Pressler conducted on yellow rain and chemical weapons were very helpful in this regard. I used those transcripts of that hearing extensively in the United Nations. I borrowed information that was contained in those, and that is the kind of public information use and diplomatic use of information from this committee that is very effective in an arena like the United Nations.

For some reason, when it says the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the hearing report or on the hearings themselves, it lends a tremendous credibility and prestige to the issue, and to hand those out to interested Third World diplomats, Asian diplomats, African diplomats, Latin American diplomats and say, this is a copy of the hearing on the subject, was, I think, very, very effective.

The CHAIRMAN. Just to touch on one other subject that involves two previous negotiations and treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union, that of biological weapons, including research and development and actual deployment and production of biological weapons of war. A certain amount of research is provided for on both sides in the treaty. But it is very clear by the treaty that you cannot get into production.

However, if there is a suspicion that one side or the other has engaged in production, there is a set of procedures to be followed. There was an anthrax oubreak some years ago. We went to the Soviets and a demarche was laid down. Can you update us to what has transpired in that situation? Where is the treaty failing and lacking in our not being able to satisfactorily answer a question that was seriously raised?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I know that the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention is in effect, and I know that at the United Nations there was a move by Sweden to have a states' party meeting to talk about compliance with the treaty. The United States was not in the forefront of that for the obvious reasons, but it was very much in our interest. So that there was a convening of the parties to that treaty so that we could really improve the compliance provisions of that. And I think that meeting is something that will take place in the near future and I think is in all of our interests to have and pursue.

The **Chairman**. Could you supply for the record an update for us under whatever classification might be required as to what we have learned as of now about the reported outbreak which may have led to the conclusion that there was actual production of biological weapons going on in the Soviet Union, and that the procedures established under our treaty were apparently inadequate? That episode emphasizes and strengthens our contention that verification is essential and necessary in any treaty that we do enter into.

Ambassador **Adelman**. I would be happy.

[The information referred to follows:]

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION UPDATE

Testimony by government officials at hearings held in May 1980, before the House Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and in September 1980, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services evinced the fact that the Soviet explanation for the Sverdlovsk incident was inconsistent with the evidence available to the U.S. Government and that there was sufficient cause to believe that the Soviet Union was not in compliance with its treaty obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).

Soviet use of toxin weapons in Afghanistan and provision of these weapons to their surrogates in Southeast Asia have further reinforced our belief that the Soviets are indeed engaged in production of prohibited agents. Our concerns regarding activities at certain Soviet facilities remain grave.

We have pursued several bilateral and multilateral courses of action in attempting to resolve our concerns. In particular, we are supporting a U.N. General Assembly resolution calling for a special conference of the BWC States Parties "as soon as possible to establish a flexible, objective and non-discriminating procedure to deal with issues concerning compliance with the Convention."

We remain open to other courses of action including those provided by the Convention (i.e., lodging a complaint with the U.N. Security Council or withdrawing from the Convention.)

With respect to a related matter, Vice President Bush in his recent speech to the Committee on Disarmament called upon the Committee to accelerate its work to negotiate a complete, effective and verifiable ban on the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons.

The **Chairman**. Thank you. Senator Kassebaum?

Senator **Kassebaum**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Adelman, my apologies, because of one of the real flaws in this institution is that we frequently have an obligation to be at two hearings at the same time. I was in the Budget Committee this morning with Secretary Weinberger. The other day when you were here I was only able to be here for part of it. I have tried to read as much as I could about the hearing because in all honesty I share with a number of us who heard you last week in the morning, a sense of disappointment. As you expressed it, perhaps you were overly cautious at that time.

What troubles me—and I tended to think this morning at the end of the hearing as I was listening that perhaps you were becoming overly cautious again—is that in your role, in any role, there is a certain guiding principle and philosophy, a judgment that one has to bring to bear on an issue. It really should not be so much a question of being cautious, it seems to me, as being able to thoughtfully articulate what that principle or judgment is.

It seems to me that in your role as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that you are responsible for the whole operation of the agency and of the negotiations and of the negotiators, General Rowny and Mr. Nitze, in their roles?

Ambassador **Adelman**. That is correct.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Am I right?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes.

Senator **Kassebaum**. So you obviously cannot be overly cautious there, as you all are discussing the approaches that need to be taken. It does seem to me that some of the answers to questions that have been put—despite a great desire on the part of all of us to see you do well—that there has been a disappointment in your inability to phrase in a way that would lend confidence to negotiators not only on our side but the other side. The question is whether you are willing to lead the charge and whether you are able to pull that together in a way that is effective.

This is more a statement than a question, but it is troubling to me and I would like to hear you respond. I may be putting you through what has already been done this morning. What I am looking for is an understanding of the way that you would feel that you could really provide the direction, or assist the Secretary of State, in setting the course of ACDA and making yourself the focal point of U.S. arms control policy.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Thank you, Senator. Let me answer in two parts, if I may. One is the personal commitment. The personal commitment to a strong arms control package is very deep and very sincere. I would not take this job if I had any reservations whatsoever that the program that President Reagan has proposed is, I think, a very far-reaching and effective realistic program for real reductions in nuclear weapons and for real improvement in stability around the world.

I have no reservations myself on the advocacy role of such a strong arms control package as a Director of ACDA. With that I am entirely comfortable, and I feel very strongly about that. And I want to take every opportunity to convey that strength on the more bureaucratic level of the role of ACDA Director.

I used the phrase "focal point" for a simple reason. That was that President Reagan has been very determined since these negotiations began to not only to hear the point of view of the ACDA

Director and take that very seriously as the principal adviser to the President on arms control, but also to hear directly from his negotiators. And when major decisions come up, he has invited them, along with the ACDA Director, the Secretary of State, other members of the National Security Council, to come present their views, how the momentum is going, how the actual negotiations are coming.

And I think the President is very wise to do that, and I think that kind of practice should continue, and the President should get the point of view not just of the ACDA Director, but of his negotiators on the spot and what their own thoughts are. And supposing we did this and that, what would happen, and that kind of thing.

So I did not want to mince the question in any way, but I did not want to leave a false impression that the way for the ambassadors, the negotiators, to get to the President was through me. They have a seat and they have had a seat, and I just wanted to be very clear on that.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I think, Ambassador Adelman, this is a very crucial time for this appointment, which of course is another factor that enters into our decision. Obviously, the elections in West Germany are going to be very important in terms of the direction of arms control. It is important for us here to show support and strength for our negotiators in our arms control agency.

So, it poses a very sensitive issue for us, but I cannot help but say I am disappointed, after having visited with you personally and having gotten the impression that you can certainly do a good job in this position and then to hear your testimony which, in all honesty, was a disappointment. Even this morning in reply to Senator Pressler, I guess I would have appreciated your being a little more forthcoming in saying that yes, indeed, we will have a problem because it would require, it seems to me, renegotiation if it is a question of tightening up on verification. Those things don't just sort of float back around again. Obviously, there are problems in an open hearing that you cannot address, but there is a point when one has to call a spade a spade, and it makes negotiations and an understanding that much more sensible.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Thank you, Senator. Let me just explain that, and I was thinking about this at lunch, that I was just not as clear as I should have been. The point is that we may be in a situation where we have the treaty itself, which is set and fine. If I can use that analogy of the Constitution, you may want amendments to the Constitution, like the Founding Fathers wanted and that is not renogotiating the Constitution in any way.

The Constitution is locked into place. That is taking these 10 amendments in the case of the Constitution and adding them on as elaborations of the basic documents. And I think it would have been misleading of me—and something I am never going to do is mislead this committee—misleading of me to talk about renegotiating the treaty when, as I understand it, although this still may be open, but as I understand it, we are not talking about renegotiating the treaty; we are talking about an analogy like with the Constitution with one of the amendments.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I am sure that is what we are talking about. The Soviets might interpret it a different way, and perhaps our allies who all have an interest in this as well.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes; the allies would have to be consulted on this, and that is something that would be the normal course of action. The Soviet reaction on this is unknown at this time. I think the Soviets are interested in these two treaties, as I understand, in the improvements in the verification that would really narrow the verification gap, that would not be burdensome. And we might find it a very easy and quick kind of process. We may not. But that is something we just cannot gauge at this time.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Thank you.

Senator Boschwitz has been waiting very patiently all morning and all afternoon.

Senator **Boschwitz**. The problem with waiting is that you have to reformulate your questions because they get asked during the course of the day.

Ambassador Adelman, you were asked this morning by Senator Tsongas—we have lost some of the crowd—but you were asked by Senator Tsongas whether or not you had had briefings during the course of the week and so on and so forth. You and I got together because I was upset, as was my colleague, Senator Kassebaum, with your testimony of last week. I have reread this testimony and I also read all the articles that you have written on strategic issues and other subjects.

And we got together and talked. You said you had no briefings. Very often before a press conference I will go over and ask my press secretary or one or two people from my office who are particularly knowledgeable on a subject—we are generalists in many subjects—to go over possible questions.

Did you have those kind of briefings?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator, I had, to the best of my recollection, no briefings over the past week. I did have two murder boards, and they were murderous, and they were good preparation for this kind of hearing. That kind of murder board is standard procedure, as you know, and all of the briefings I had on the details and the substance occurred before the hearing last week. But I did have the last 2 days in the State Department, 2 hours each time, murder boards where people were pretending they were Senators and firing all kinds of hostile questions and some friendly questions as well.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Who pretended that he or she was—— [Laughter.]

Ambassador **Adelman**. It is fun to be on the other side of those murder boards.

Senator **Boschwitz**. It is easier at least.

As Senator Lugar said, if everybody knew that they were going to come before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or another committee, we would not have very many writers, or we would certainly have more cautious authors.

I also spoke to one of your predecessors, Fred Ikle, whom I have gotten to know well over the years I have been here, and I would like to make, Madam Chairman, his letter a part of the record. If I may, I would like to read it into the record at this time.

Dear Rudy: You asked me to give my views on Ken Adelman in light of the President's intention to nominate him to be Director of ACDA. Based on my own past experience as Director of ACDA, 1973 to 1977, I do believe that the job does have special requirements. The skills required do not lie in the area of management. ACDA is one of the smallest agencies in town. But what the job does require above all is intellectual honesty. The Director of ACDA will help the Secretary of State and the President work out arms control solutions that will improve our long-term security. A great many problems have to be thought through carefully. Negotiating tactics, solutions to our verification needs, diplomatic approaches to our allies, and last but not least, a public posture that is effective because it is honest and grounded in fact. Ken Adelman possesses precisely the qualifications that are needed for these tasks. He is imaginative, as many of his past academic writings show. He can find new solutions to difficult problems, but he is also cautious; that is to say, he will not suddenly go public with statements that might damage the Secretary of State's diplomatic efforts. From what I have heard about Ken Adelman's testimony last week, it was precisely this sense of responsibility and caution that may have been misinterpreted by your colleagues as a lack of knowledge, and was deliberately distorted by some of those excerpting it on TV to make him seem uniformed. Ken will not reach for some cheap slogan to get some temporary applause if he knows that doing so would be damaging to the long-term interests of our country. Something else is needed in this job as well: a determination to succeed and a sense of optimism in the face of all the enormous obstacles that confront us. Ken's personality is ideal on this score. He tries to see the best side of things and to move around difficulties.

This is an interesting part of the letter, I might say:

He did a most effective job in the United Nations on arms control issues. For example, last year he urged and coached all of us here in the executive branch in Washington entirely on his own initiative into supporting him during the U.N. special session on arms control. He talked us into adding flexibility to the U.S. position. He brought State and Defense positions together to obtain an agreed public presentation on many U.S. contributions to arms control. Indeed, Ken even managed to get some money out of the Pentagon budget.

You must be a miracle man—

Allocated to his efforts at the U.N. mission to help explain to the world at large what the United States stands for in arms control. I do not know of any other candidate for the position of Director of ACDA who might claim to have accomplished such a feat. In short, the fears expressed by some that Ken Adelman could not prevail in the bureaucratic struggles here in town are totally contradicted by past experience, but more important than these bureaucratic skills is his intellectual strength.

And, Madam Chairman, I would like to submit that for the record.

I also talked to Larry Eagleburger. I talked to him last night; we happened to be together, and he wrote me a letter as well saying that the ACDA Director's job indeed is important, particularly in Europe, and that your confirmation will help in his efforts there.

[The letters referred to follows:]

The Under Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C., February 2, 1983.

Hon. Rudy Boschwitz,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Rudy: You asked me to give you my views on Ken Adelman in light of the President's intention to nominate him to be director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Based on my own past experience as Director of ACDA (as you know, I served in the Arms Control Agency from 1973 to January 1977) I do believe that the job does have special requirements. The skills required do not lie in the area of management—ACDA is one of the smallest agencies in town. What the job requires, above all, is intellectual honesty. The Director of ACDA must help the Secretary of State and the President work out arms control solutions that will improve our long-term security. A great many problems have to be thought through carefully: negotiating tactics, solutions to our verification needs, diplomatic approaches to our allies, and, last but not least, a public posture that is effective because it is honest and grounded in facts.

Ken Adelman possesses precisely the qualifications that are needed for these tasks. He is imaginative, as many of his past academic writings show. He can find new solutions to difficult problems. But he is also cautious. That is to say, he won't suddenly go public with statements that might damage the Secretary of State's diplomatic efforts. From what I have heard about Ken Adelman's testimony last week, it was precisely this sense of responsibility and caution that may have been misinterpreted by some of your colleagues as a lack of knowledge (and was deliberately distorted by some of the excerpting on TV, to make Ken seem uninformed). Ken won't reach for some cheap slogan to get some temporary applause if he knows that doing so would be damaging to the long-term interests of the United States.

Something else is needed in this job—a determination to succeed and a sense of optimism in face of all the enormous obstacles that confront us. Ken's personality is ideal on this score. He tries to see the best side of things and to move around difficulties. He did a most effective job in the United Nations on arms control issues. For example, last year he urged—and coached—all of us here in the Executive Branch in Washington, entirely on his own initiative, into supporting him during the U.N. Special Session on arms control. He talked us into adding flexibility to the U.S. position. He brought State and Defense positions together, to obtain an agreed, public presentation on the many U.S. contributions to arms control. Indeed, Ken even managed to get some money out of the Pentagon budget allocated to his efforts at the U.N. mission, to help explain to the world at large what the United States stands for on arms control. I don't know of any other candidate for the position of Director of ACDA who might claim having accomplished such a feat! In short, the fears expressed by some, that Ken Adelman could not prevail in the "bureaucratic" struggles here in town, are totally contradicted by our past experience. But more important than these bureaucratic skills is his intellectual strength.

Sincerely,

FRED C. IKLE.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., February 3, 1983.

Hon. RUDY BOSCHWITZ,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR BOSCHWITZ: Following up on last night's conversation, I want to reiterate my strong personal view that the confirmation of Ken Adelman as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is extremely important to the success of the President's arms control program.

We are at an important point in both our INF and START negotiations. Having demonstrated that we will take the steps necessary to make our defense second to none, it is just as important to show our citizens, allies, and adversaries that we are equally serious about arms control negotiations. Confirmation of Mr. Adelman will do that.

The primary purpose of the Vice President's trip to Europe is to reassure our allies that the United States stands firm in its commitments to them, and is dedicated to the concept of arms control. Adelman's confirmation is directly related to this effort; it will be a positive sign of this Administration's commitment to arms control, and that we are moving forward to implement it.

Sincerely,

LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER.

Senator **BOSCHWITZ**. Have you worked with each one of these people? Could you describe your relationships with them?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. Yes; I have worked with each one of those individuals, and I hold them both in high esteem. I knew Secretary Ikle for many years before the Reagan administration. I have known him first from his own writings in this field that go back in foreign affairs to, I think, the early 1960's or something like that, in Foreign Affairs Journal and other places. I worked very closely with Under Secretary Eagleburger because of my capacity at the United Nations.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. One of the things brought up this morning is that you are to be an independent adviser to the President. I would also like to ask you how you think your relations will be with him. Have you worked with him in the past, and what kind of relationship exists?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think the relationship is very good and very close. I first met the President during the campaign when he asked me to be one of his foreign policy advisers. Before that time, with one little exception in 1964, I had not been part of any partisan political campaign or endeavor. And to be very frank with you. I told Dick Allen, who was doing the campaign work at that time, that I was not about to change that practice.

Fred Ikle has asked me to join the Republican Foreign Policy Advisers Board, or whatever it was called, years before that, and I told him I just have never—I have always been more independent, kind of nonpartisan in that sense. So I was not at first anxious to be an adviser to the President-elect, although I very much agreed with all his major positions in foreign affairs and defense programs.

Then I was told that this did not indicate any partisan position and that we had people like Eugene Rostow and Jeanne Kirkpatrick and others that I had worked with for years who were also going to be advisers, and I went along.

After that time, during the transition period, I worked very closely with others on the Defense and other transitions but also on the State Department transition. I was asked to be part of a three-person team to oversee the hostage negotiations at the tail-end of the Carter administration. The day before the inauguration when this was coming to fruition, all our endless hours of work, the President-elect asked me to go to Weisbaden——

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Personally asked you?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Personally asked me to go to Weisbaden with President Jimmy Carter, to represent him or to visit the hostages when they were first released and to report back to him in the White House after that time. This I did on the night of the inauguration. In fact, we took off at 1 in the morning after the inauguration and went to Weisbaden with President Carter, came back, and that Monday reported to the President and Vice President and most members of the National Security Council on that trip.

Since that time, I have been at the United Nations trying to do the best job I could to represent the United States in that forum. The President asked me to join my old boss and dear colleague, Don Rumsfeld, who was former Secretary of Defense, to go around the world and talk to major allied leaders about the Law of the Sea Treaty and his position on that. That I did a few months ago, at the President's request as well. And then the President asked me to be his nominee for ACDA.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Really, one of the problems that has surrounded your nomination is that there were first some reports in the press that the President and the administration really had no interest in arms control. In the midst of these reports along came the resignation or firing of Eugene Rostow.

Senator Biden said this morning in response to your answer that the administration was indeed interested in arms reduction that he did not think that they were. Then he gave the example of a man who is a donor to charitable causes and makes suggestions that were not realistic, and therefore covers the fact that he is not really interested in giving. In this case, the efforts are unrealistic or the proposals are unrealistic, the therefore, they mask the administration's real feeling of not being interested in arms control.

How would you respond to that? Would you elaborate on that?

Ambassador ADELMAN. As I said this morning, Senator, that is one of the most disturbing parts of this confirmation process. I knew that this perception was around that the administration was not interested in arms control, but I did not feel the intensity of it until these hearings.

It is distressing to me because I have seen the President deal with these issues for the last 2 years, not on a day-to-day basis but on a periodic basis at NSC meetings. I know that he is very interested in arms control. He asks often in his morning briefings that he has what is happening in Geneva, what is the progress, what did our negotiators say yesterday, what happened there?

When I have seen him talk about this issue, as we did in the Oval Office 1 week ago Friday, you can tell that this is a man who is interested in what is happening in this field, and you can just feel it, and you can just tell.

I think the President is very sincere on pushing his agreements as far as they possibly can be pushed and coming up with not just another agreement or the kind of baby steps that Senator Biden was talking about, but an arms control agreement that would really have wide and important reductions and increased stability. And I think he is very determined to do it, and personally he is very interested in this and very committed.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. And you do not think that the suggestions that he has made have been unrealistic?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No; I just do not, Senator, and the reason for that is if you were going to ask for a general—in the SALT process the problem I had in the writings that you are familiar with, if you are going to ask to cap what has taken place anyway on the strategic arms buildup, that is what you are going to get. If you are going to ask for real reductions, you are going to get, I think, the Soviets talking about real reductions.

As I said this morning, the Soviets are now talking, although in an incomplete package, they are now talking about 25-percent reductions in measures of strategic strength. That is far beyond what they were willing to go in SALT II. And so to give up and to say, well, we cannot get that much, so let us not even try, let us not even try for reductions, let us just go along with the pattern in the past of capping what would take place anyway, I think is to surrender before you ever try, and the President wants to have arms control, real reductions.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I see that Senator Sarbanes has come in and that my time is up, but at the completion of the questioning, I would like to ask some more.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Adelman, what is your perception of how you came to be nominated?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Sarbanes, my perception is that I was called on a Wednesday morning to say that the President would like me to be his nominee for Director of ACDA, would I accept his notification of that?

Senator SARBANES. What is your understanding as to why Mr. Rostow was dismissed?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, I have no understanding of why Dr. Rostow was dismissed. It was something that was obviously decided by the President. I was in New York dealing with the issues before the United Nations when all of this was happening, and I have no light to shed on that.

Senator SARBANES. You have not sought to ascertain the reasons?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I have talked to Dr. Rostow since that time. I saw him the next morning, the Thursday after this happened. I have had lunch with him since. I talked to him last night on the phone again. I have been in constant touch with Dr. Rostow.

Senator SARBANES. Did you think he was a good Director?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I believe that Gene Rostow is a very gifted individual and a wonderful person from the perspective that I had in New York dealing with ACDA on the issues in New York, that yes, he performed very well.

Senator SARBANES. If you thought that about him, would it not behoove you to try to understand why he was dismissed? The same thing might happen to you. If he is very gifted and a wonderful individual and you thought he was doing a good job, should you not wonder why he is gone and you are named to be in his place?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Sarbanes, I was dealing with Dr. Rostow and Dr. Rostow is one category: multilateral diplomacy. I did not have a wide view of what was happening in ACDA on the START, on the INF, and others. It has not been an area that I do not think it would be useful to go in for this committee on any thoughts on Dr. Rostow's situation at all.

Senator SARBANES. How long do you expect to stay in the position if you are confirmed?

Ambassador ADELMAN. At the pleasure of the President.

Senator SARBANES. And how long do you expect that would be?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I cannot foresee that at all.

Senator SARBANES. What is it that you would do differently in the job, or what set of qualities do you have different from Mr. Rostow's that lead you to think that you would stay in the job and not be dismissed from it?

Ambassador ADELMAN. To know that, Senator Sarbanes, I would have to know exactly what took place in Washington when Eugene Rostow was Director of ACDA.

Senator SARBANES. Do you not think it is a pertinent and relevant matter that you would have interest in?

Ambassador ADELMAN. To review the past? No, Senator. I have been, since the President asked me to do this, I have been looking toward the future and——

Senator SARBANES. I would regard this as looking toward the future. That is the point I am trying to make.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Since being asked by the President to take this, I have been spending my time looking toward the future and looking toward what I consider the awesome responsibilities of the Director of ACDA, how I could be the most effective advocate for arms control in the coming years, how I could work closer with this committee, and the issues that are going to be before the agency.

Senator **Sarbanes**. What do you understand your relationship would be, if you were to become the Director, with General Rowny and Paul Nitze?

Ambassador **Adelman**. The relationship would be they report to the Director of ACDA as the focal point of the contact point in Washington. As I explained to Senator Kassebaum, they do participate with the President on major decisions within their specific negotiations.

Senator **Sarbanes**. You would be their superior, is that correct?

Ambassador **Adelman**. As you know, the relationship is similar to the relationship of an ambassador overseas, and an ambassador is ambassador for the President. They work with individuals in the State Department at the Assistant Secretary level, et cetera, and cooperate in that regard. The negotiators are the President's negotiators right there, and they participate in the National Security Council.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Is there then a direct relationship from the President to them that simply bypasses you; is that correct?

Ambassador **Adelman**. During National Security Council meetings the President would deal directly with them. During the normal course of events and business, the Director of ACDA would be that conduit reflecting the President's wishes to the negotiators.

Senator **Sarbanes**. If you wanted to dismiss them, could you do so?

Ambassador **Adelman**. The President would make personnel decisions of that type.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Of what type?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Of dismissing one of his main negotiators, just like the President would make personnel decisions of an ambassador around the world.

Senator **Sarbanes**. To what extent would personnel decisions within ACDA be made by you and to what extent by the President?

Ambassador **Adelman**. There are two positions that are Presidentially appointed that are open in ACDA today.

Senator **Sarbanes**. What are those?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Those are directors of two of our divisions on strategic programs and on nuclear and weapons control.

Senator **Sarbanes**. And you expect those appointments to be made by the President?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. What would be your involvement in those?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I would make recommendations to the President on those nominations.

Senator **Sarbanes**. What is your involvement on Nitze and Rowny?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I am bound to work very closely with them. As I said last Thursday, they are men I have known for years before the Reagan administration began, and I feel entirely comfortable with them. They are men who I believe were both consulted before the President made his decision to ask me to be his nominee for this position. I know that Ambassador Rowny was. I think that Ambassador Nitze was directly asked about this. And they are individuals with whom I would work, as I said last week, on hopefully a daily basis.

Senator SARBANES. Now, do you expect to make personnel changes in ACDA?

Ambassador ADELMAN. As discussed with Senator Mathias today, I would think that the main thing to do is to buckle down and to do the task of ACDA. I cannot foresee any kind of purge or any kind of big changes or anything like that. There are personnel slots that are open, like I mentioned to you just now. There are other positions that are open that would need to be filled.

Senator SARBANES. To what extent would you personally be directing ACDA, and to what extent would you simply be directing it on behalf of the Secretary of State and the President?

Ambassador ADELMAN. If confirmed by the Senate, I would be the Director of ACDA.

Senator SARBANES. And what does that mean?

Ambassador ADELMAN. What that means is I would have responsibility for what happens in that Agency, and our function is to be the principal adviser on arms control and disarmament matters to the Secretary of State, to the President, and to the National Security Council.

Senator SARBANES. How do you see the relationship between you and the President and you and the Secretary of State?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I would, if confirmed by the Senate, be the principal adviser to the President on arms control, to the Secretary of State and to the President.

Senator SARBANES. In what sequence?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Would I talk to the Secretary of State about an issue before I talked to the President?

Senator SARBANES. Do you expect to go to the President directly on arms control issues?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; there would be a seat and an avenue of the Director of ACDA for direct access to the President; yes. That is well understood by the President, by the Secretary of State and by myself. That has been the practice in the past. That is the practice we are all comfortable with.

Senator SARBANES. Is it your view that the Soviets would like to achieve an arms control agreement?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; it is my view that they would.

Senator SARBANES. Why?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Well, I believe that, to take the situation in Europe on the INF arms control agreements, I believe that the Soviet Union is very concerned about the risk of the stationing of the 572 GLCM's and cruise missiles in Western Europe. I think they have the same depth of concern, and we are concerned, that our NATO allies have had over the last 6, 7 years by such systems on the Soviet side. I think it would be in their interest to preclude the stationing of these weapons in Europe altogether, and I think that their statements on INF show their apprehension on this whole issue.

I also believe that in the START negotiations, that they have shown a willingness to go for real reductions in strategic nuclear weapons.

Senator **Sarbanes**. What is your view of the Soviet assertion that the British and French nuclear capability is relevant in examining the question of arms control?

Ambassador **Adelman**. That is a presumption or an assertion that they made through the entire SALT process, Senator Sarbanes. What that assertion does, is to say that the security of the Soviet Union is to be equal to the military prowess of all of the potential adversaries of the Soviet Union, which is to say their military forces should be superior to any one of those potential adversaries.

The Congress in Public Law 92-448 to the President of the United States has made very clear that we are supposed to negotiate and are going to negotiate on the basis of equality with the Soviet Union and not on the basis of inferiority to the Soviet Union.

Let me also say that the Soviet proposal on the INF when they talked about the 162 in the British and French forces, that that proposal was phrased in such a way as to leave them with more SS-20's at the end of the negotiations than they had at the beginning of the negotiations. When the negotiations began in November 1981, they had 250 SS-20's. According to Andropov's proposal, they would have 162 aimed at Europe and at least 100 in the Far East, giving them a total of 262, putting them over the amount that they had when the negotiations began.

Senator **Sarbanes**. I do not want to get into the specifics: I think your point there might have something to it. I am more concerned with the general proposition. Is it your view that the nuclear force of Britain and France should be treated as irrelevant as we approach this question of arms control or that the Soviet assertion that it is relevant is without any merit?

Ambassador **Adelman**. The Soviet assertion that it is relevant to the INF negotiations I believe is ill founded. All but 18 of the British and French forces are SLBM's [submarine-launched ballistic missiles]. They are not part of the negotiations in Geneva. As you know, the negotiations in Geneva are about the land-based forces. So if you introduce these different systems, you introduce the French and the British in these negotiations I think is ill founded.

Senator **Sarbanes**. If they were land based, what would your feeling be?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator, you are asking me a hypothetical. The fact is all of them but 18 of them are submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Apparently you hold the view that we should not try to get an arms control agreement unless it is a big step, not a little step.

Ambassador **Adelman**. I hold the view that we should not get an arms control agreement unless it is in our national interest, and it is more in our national interest to go for deep reductions and enhanced stability and a quality of forces with strong verification. That is my view.

Senator SARBANES. Do you regard a little step as being in our national interest if the big step is not achievable?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I would have to know what the little step was. And I am saying now, Senator Sarbanes, that the conditions are such that I believe that there can be real arms control and arms control agreements that have real reductions and enhanced stability. That has not been the pattern in recent times.

Senator SARBANES. How important do you think it is, leaving aside the question of big step or little step, to get an understood framework between the two superpowers with respect to future development of nuclear arms?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think that is important. I think that is the kind of measures we were talking about.

Senator SARBANES. Has SALT I tried to do that?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think that is the kind of confidence-building measures we were talking about this morning and the kind of information sharing that we should be engaged in.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think SALT II tried to do that?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think SALT II was inadequate and that it did not reduce nuclear weapons in any meaningful sense. It was not a treaty that was based on equality or enhanced stability or firm verification.

Senator SARBANES. Leaving the latter points to one side, is it your view that an agreement which did not reduce nuclear weapons but succeeded in establishing a cap on them—so that we know exactly where we stand, and precluding constant escalation—would not be in our interest?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I believe in specific terms that we are living today under the general framework of the SALT II Treaty, that that treaty allows the Soviet Union to have up to 8,000 warheads.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think we should be doing that?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I believe we should not undercut the SALT II Treaty.

Senator SARBANES. Why not?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Because I believe that it sets a climate between us and the Soviet Union whereby we can negotiate for real reductions in nuclear weapons in the START negotiations.

Senator SARBANES. How did it set that climate?

Ambassador ADELMAN. It continues. It does not undercut agreements that were signed by the President of the United States Jimmy Carter years ago, and then were pushed aside, or were not at the urging of the President, were not brought up to the Senate.

Senator SARBANES. You were critical of that treaty.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes, I was.

Senator SARBANES. Why should we adhere to its terms even though it has not been ratified?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Because there is a feeling that it would set a good climate for the START negotiations, the kind of serious negotiations that are going on now. And I believe as I said last week, Senator Sarbanes——

Senator **Sarbanes**. Would ratification not set the climate even more strongly?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Ratification would make this treaty the supreme law of the land, as you well know, and by doing so, it would set precedents for future treaties. It would set the precedent that we have talked about, the inequalities, the lack of reduction. The unit of measure is different. If you ratified SALT II, the presumption in future negotiations would be that units of measure would be the fixed launchers.

Senator **Sarbanes**. How long do you think we should go on adhering to the terms of SALT II even though it has not been ratified?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I cannot foresee in the coming months or times when that kind of condition would change where I would recommend a change in the President's current policy of not undercutting the treaties as long as the Soviets show similar restraint.

Senator **Sarbanes**. So you would go on adhering to it, I take it, indefinitely, as long as the Soviets adhered to it. Is that correct?

Ambassador **Adelman**. As long as the Soviets show similar restraint, and I think that would be really until the START negotiations bore more fruit.

Senator **Sarbanes**. How long did the SALT negotiations go on before they bore any fruit?

Ambassador **Adelman**. The SALT I was 2½ years. SALT II was 7½ years.

Senator **Sarbanes**. 7½ years. If the START goes along—and we do not even have to say for that period of time—you would say that, so long as the Soviets continue to adhere to SALT II's terms, we should continue to do so as well. Is that correct?

Ambassador **Adelman**. That is my view right now.

Senator **Sarbanes**. It is your view?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Conditions may change, and I may in the future, depending on how conditions do change, I may come up with a different recommendation. I am saying right now I see nothing to change our view.

Senator **Sarbanes**. It is your view that we ought in effect to adhere to this treaty and continue to do so over a sustained period of time. Why were you opposed to the treaty in the first place?

Ambassador **Adelman**. For two reasons, Senator.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Let me turn the question the other way. Given that you were opposed to the treaty and did not think that we should approve it, why should we adhere to its terms for a projected indefinite period of time?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Because I think it is important in establishing the kind of climate for real reductions in the START negotiations. I do believe that there is a major difference, Senator Sarbanes, between ratifying the treaty like SALT II and not undercutting its provisions as long as the Soviets show similar restraint. Ratifying SALT II would make it the supreme law of the land.

Second, it would create precedents.

Senator **Sarbanes**. In effect, the Executive has made it the supreme law by its own action, has it not?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The President has said the United States would not undercut the provisions of SALT II as long as the Soviets——

Senator SARBANES. To what extent do you think the President ought to be able, by a commitment to a unilateral course of action, to exclude or preclude the involvement of the Congress in the very important issue of arms control?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Sarbanes, that is a question I would have to seek legal counsel to answer and look at the precedents in law and the kinds of legal judgment that would have to be rendered to answer that kind of question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes, can I advise you we are still under the 10-minute rule. I was mistakenly under the impression that you were winding up, and you have long exceeded that. We have other Senators who are waiting to ask questions. May I ask you to rotate? Have you completed that particular subject?

Senator SARBANES. I will just close, Mr. Chairman, by saying I am really brought up short by the nominee's statement on a matter of the consequence of arms control, which I think we assume in the end is premised upon a treaty and a corresponding vote in the Senate to approve a treaty that he will have to go to legal counsel to see to what extent adherence to a treaty can simply be accomplished unilaterally by the executive branch.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We will go back on the 10-minute rule. Senator Kassebaum?

Senator KASSEBAUM. I have no further questions. I have asked mine.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boschwitz?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Ambassador Adelman, while we have been talking principally about treaties, bilateral treaties between ourselves and the Russians, one of the aspects of ACDA's function and charter, I believe, would also apply to proliferation of nuclear weapons. I consider that to be perhaps even a greater problem than the United States-Soviet arms competition because the two superpowers would probably—not probably, but undoubtedly—would be more conservative in their consideration of the use of nuclear weapons than many other countries in the world.

I wonder if you would give us your viewpoints of what you think we can do about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and how clear ACDA's charter is with respect to it.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Thank you, Senator. This is an area that I have felt deeply about for a number of years. As everybody who was here last week knows, I once did a study on nonproliferation matters in terms of South Africa when I was at the Strategic Studies Center of SRI.

I think that it is an area that has gotten too little public focus in recent years. The public attention has been riveted on the INF negotiations and START negotiations, and while progress on those two fronts is very important, I believe that at the same time, if there is going to be widespread proliferation in the future of nuclear weapons, that really enhances the dangers of the world tremendously.

I think that in the proliferation field, you have to take many approaches. It is not a field where you can look to the technology or look to the political or look to the military, look to the economics and say that is my answer to it. I think all of these areas have to be done.

As we discussed this morning, the IAEA has a role to play. It does not do a perfect job; it does a better job of not having an IAEA for safeguards. They do 1,400 inspections in 50 countries each year, and I think those are positive. What we are doing is—we have to do as we are doing; watch the export of nuclear material to countries around the world for a view of very careful nonproliferation angle, so we are not caught in a situation where any of the material that is exported could be used for any kind of a nuclear device.

Third, that this administration has been stressing—which was the point—one of the points that I read about in that study on South Africa, that we really have to look at motivation on nonproliferation. What that means is the security feelings of the leaders of a country.

If a country—to the extent that a country's leaders feel very insecure, very nervous in the world situation, it will increase the motivation of proliferation for acquiring a nuclear weapon. To the extent that through their security arrangement with the United States, as the United States is a strong and reliable security partner, that will alleviate their fears. To the extent that they have confidence in their own conventional arms, confidence in their own organizations themselves it will alleviate their fears.

All of these things have to be examined carefully. Let me just say that in reading the committee's very good report on S.J. Res. 212, that the chairman shepherded through some months ago on the START negotiations, I was caught by one of the points in that report; namely, that START negotiation will help on the nonproliferation issue, but if we have the kind of vertical proliferation that has been going on in the past 15 years, that is some kind of an increase for the horizontal proliferation.

To the extent that we can through START, as your committee report says, really lower nuclear weapons of the two major nuclear powers of the world, then that will contain the pressures for nonproliferation.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I agree that nonproliferation will not be achievable unless the two superpowers do bring their heightening arms race under control. You mentioned the IAEA. The only time we have really had a connection with the IAEA was at the time of the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi reactor. And we had a fellow by the name of Richter, I think, who was a former inspector come in and very soundly debunk the IAEA.

You spoke about the IAEA rather warmly. Do you share his feelings?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes.

Senator **Boschwitz**. How, in your position, can we improve it, or is that to be done principally through the United Nations?

Ambassador **Adelman**. No. I do know at the time of the Israeli attack on the Baghdad reactor, there were many serious questions about who was inspecting, the conditions of inspection, and it seemed all too inadequate at that time.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Notice had to be given, they could choose the country from which the inspectors came, they could specify what was to be inspected. It is hard to believe that the IAEA is a very effective organization. It may be better than nothing.

Ambassador **Adelman**. The Iraqi case study was a case study that did not lend a great deal of confidence to the IAEA. On the other hand, there are cases each day where inspectors of the IAEA do make the inspections without the kind of prohibitions and restrictions that the Iraqi officials put on them.

They do have—the countries have the knowledge that these IAEA inspectors are going to come. There is a deterrent quality and a quality of early detection that is important. Certainly, I do not want to be in a position of saying that the IAEA is the answer to the nonproliferation; it is not. I am saying that of those in the U.N. family, it is in my mind one of the most effective organizations, and it does help us with the problem of nonproliferation.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Mr. Ambassador, you spoke in answer to Senator Sarbanes about the necessity or the desirability perhaps of bringing in the Europeans into the arms negotiations. And in an article you wrote, "The Seven Lessons of SALT," one of the lessons was that European security must be tied to SALT, and you say the systems to be negotiated and the negotiators of SALT will have to be revised accordingly, I believe, to bring into the negotiations either the Europeans or at least their interests.

Would you propose to bring in the Europeans, or would you only propose to bring in their interests? How would you achieve that?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I would propose at this time to bring in their interests. I believe if you review the history of SALT II——

Senator **Boschwitz**. Say that again. You would bring in——

Ambassador **Adelman**. Their interests, in very careful consultation with the Europeans, which is being done now on both START and especially on INF. If you review the record of SALT II, there is a feeling among leaders in Europe that because of the exclusion of the Backfire bomber from the SALT II Treaty, the exclusion of the SS-20, the inclusion of cruise missiles, the noncircumvention clause of the protocol, the 600 kilometers, and those kinds of arrangements that the United States would not be sensitive to European security interests.

That, I believe, if my memory serves me right, was part of Helmut Schmidt's speech before the IISS in October of 1977. He was saying that because of the SS-20's and because of the growing imbalance of these systems in Europe, we have to really look at the situation. And I believe at that time, or subsequently, one of the facts that led him to that conclusion that later led to the dual track position—but one of the factors that led him to that conclusion was that in the SALT process, European interests were not being carefully considered or were being downplayed.

My point in writing that article in the Wall Street Journal and the American Spectator was to say that we really had to include the Europeans in the considerations of these negotiations. I believe since the dual track decision, there have been working groups with the Europeans and it has been a model of NATO alliance solidarity and sharing of information and cooperation.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Mr. Ambassador, finally, you are characterized as a hardliner on the whole business of these types of negotiations. A hardliner on the ideal of SALT and a hardliner on even the desirability of SALT. And some of that was attributed to your writings—"the Rafshooning of Armageddon"; for instance, and "The Selling of SALT."

But you said disillusionment reflects a creeping consciousness that SALT has not saved money for either the Americans or the Soviets; it is unlikely to do so. It has not reduced the destructive power of either side and it is unlikely ever to do so. It has not enhanced strategic stability; quite the contrary, and it is unlikely ever to do so.

That sentence was extracted. Then a sentence or two was extracted from an article you wrote, "Can There Be SALT III" in the Wall Street Journal. But as I read these articles, it would appear to me that you want a broadening of these negotiations rather than a constriction of them. Do you feel that the representation that you are a hardliner, that you are a person who does not want to go forward with the SALT negotiations, that your views are a reflection of what Senator Biden perhaps alluded to earlier—a lack of realism in wanting so much that, in effect, in reality you want nothing. Please comment on that.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Thank you, Senator. I think that in retrospect, looking back over since the 6 years, 7 years since I have written those words, I think that holds up pretty well. I think we now know we are living under the provisions of SALT II. It has not saved us any money, it had not enhanced stability, it has not reduced the weapons.

And for those three reasons, I feel very passionately, very personally, very strongly about the value of the START negotiations, because I believe that the proposal that the President put on the table to the Soviet Union would save money and would enhance stability and would certainly reduce nuclear weapons. It would reduce the number of missiles by half, the number of warheads by a third, megaton as by significant amounts, and would accomplish the three objectives that they had to the SALT process.

If that makes me a hardliner, so be it, but my feeling was that that was a question, a prediction on what would happen with SALT II. And we know, like I say, over the 5 or 6 years since I wrote it, that that has been the case.

Senator **Boschwitz**. You are pessimistic about dealing with the Russians? Are you optimistic or pessimistic about dealing with the Russians in the future on this?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I am optimistic, perhaps too optimistic about dealing with the Russians in this area. I believe the conditions in the world are right to have real reductions and real contributions through arms control. I think that we can address a security situation in Europe strictly through arms control and we can reduce strategic nuclear weapons by a great, great deal through arms control.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the additional time.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Boschwitz. We have the Chancellor of Austria waiting for the committee over at S-116. Maybe this could be asked for the record.

Senator **Kassebaum**. This is in line with Senator Sarbanes' and Senator Boschwitz' question because I find it interesting, Ambassador Adelman, that you are saying that we should adhere and are adhering to SALT II. But I presume you do not assume that the Soviets are adhering to SALT II.

Ambassador ADELMAN. No. Let me clarify that, Senator. I can do that relatively quickly. Throughout the SALT process there have been ambiguities in Soviet behavior; there are ambiguities in the treaties. When those ambiguities arise, we address those on a confidential basis with the Soviet Union. Those kind of things have been done with SALT I and are being done with SALT II.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Because actually if SALT II were ratified, I believe the Soviets would have had to reduce by 250 I believe their ICBM's. I guess I am questioning your strong support for our adherence to SALT II at this point without calling attention to the fact that there is a difference between adherence and ratification.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Well, let me clarify that. The point is that the reductions—and there were some in SALT II—were relatively of obsolete systems that really had no effect. Systems become obsolete and they are retired constantly. The Soviet leadership has announced, for example, in the European situation that they have the SS-20's and they have the SS-4's and SS-5's. The SS-4's and SS-5's are destined to be scrapped anyway. That is the word they used, scrapped.

So the point is that the SALT Treaty would have had some of these reductions which were of obsolete systems and very marginal. The President's policy, in my view, the right policy, is not to undercut these agreements; not to make them the supreme law of the land; not to have the precedent of them in the future, but not to do anything to undercut them. As long as the Soviets show similar restraint—and the Soviets have been showing similar restraint—on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kassebaum. Senator Pell, you and I have a joint obligation as cohosts to meet with the Chancellor of Austria.

Senator PELL. We do. He has been there for 5 minutes now. And yet, we have an overriding responsibility here. I have a couple of questions. The quicker you answer them, the happier we are. But this morning, you said that we were on the threshold of a decision on the TTB and the PNE Treaties; that they are on the President's desk. Could you clarify for us without going into classified information, whether the President is going back to the Soviets for clarification or, if that it already decided, just what the administration would seek from the Soviets?

Ambassador ADELMAN. We discussed the outline of that earlier this afternoon, Senator Pell. The latter part, to be very frank with you, is classified information. I would be happy to share, and the administration would be happy to share it with you on a classified basis, once the President makes his decision on what needs to be done in the future.

Senator PELL. Excuse me. You said this afternoon there was a question of whether the President wanted to go back to the Soviets on verification? You answered that question already?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No. The President has decided that the verification provisions of these treaties have to be tightened; that it may not mean a renegotiation of the treaties themselves but of techniques to verify those treaties.

Senator PELL. Can you tell us in open session what the administration would seek from the Soviets?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No; I cannot in open session.

Senator PELL. Can you tell me whether ACDA and State and Defense all favor going back to the Soviets to redo the verification procedures?

Ambassador ADELMAN. As I understand it, Senator, the answer to that is "Yes."

Senator PELL. All three departments?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The answer to that is "Yes."

Senator PELL. I sort of wonder if the opponents of these treaties are using verification as a pretext for killing the treaties which, as you know, were supported by two previous Republican Presidents. Do you feel that this is a mistake on my part, or that my apprehension is justified?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I do not know the motivations of what has caused this great stone wall that has so plagued this committee and so plagued this administration on these two treaties.

Let me just be very frank with you, Senator Pell and with the chairman and others by saying that if confirmed by the U.S. Senate, I would never use the verification provisions to subvert these two treaties. And I would watch it and I would ride it and I would push it as a strong advocate and to really champion these within the executive branch to make sure that those individuals, if they exist, who are wanting to hang up these two treaties on the verification provisions are not allowed to succeed.

Senator PELL. Is the Department of Energy willing to allow Soviets access to the Nevada test site if we have onsite verification?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I believe that is a classified piece of information that I would be happy to share with you in private session, Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. In your dialog with Senator Tsongas you said you were perhaps too cautious or too timid in your answers last week. Can you give us some assurance that you might not be cautious or even timid in standing up to your colleagues in Government, some of whom are pretty heavy hitters?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I have never been cautious or timid about standing up to my colleagues in Government. I have always given my view in a very forthright manner and a very clear manner.

Senator PELL. Since last week.

Ambassador ADELMAN. That has always been very clear. In the proceeding last week I was too cautious on that, and I said so in my opening statement.

Senator PELL. If it works out that the START agreement is too ambitious, would you settle for another agreement which though it might not be perfect, would still be good?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes. A good agreement is better than no agreement at all, Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pell. I will put the committee on notice because there are no more votes scheduled in the Senate and Senators are departing already, there is no session tomorrow. The earliest time that we logically can call for a vote on the nominee of the President in this case would be February 15 when we start the hearing at 10 a.m. with Secretary Shultz. We will arrange with Secretary Shultz that whenever a quorum is present, if it is at a logical point in that hearing, we will then have a vote.

Senator PELL. I must interrupt for a moment. One of my colleagues informed me that he will not be here on Tuesday and requests that it be postponed.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate is in session beginning Monday. I do not see how we can expect every Senator to always be here every time. It is the duty of a Senator to be here in the Senate when we are in session, and the vote will be held February 15, sometime during the course of that hearing.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. That is one of those statements, Senator, that may come back to haunt you.

The CHAIRMAN. You are possibly right, considering I am up for reelection.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Me, too.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, there is another point here, too. My understanding was that Mr. Rostow might well be a witness prior to the vote on the confirmation.

The CHAIRMAN. There was discussion about that. It was my understanding, first, that Director Rostow had indicated an interest in testifying. That was a mistaken impression.

He made it very clear that if strongly requested by the Chair he would come in, but he made it clear to me and to others that if he came in, all he would simply do is say that he had asked Ambassador Adelman to consider coming with ACDA; he wanted to have him on his team. He thinks very highly of him and supports the nomination. And that is all he could say.

He felt it would be far better, and I thoroughly agree with him, that he come in at the time of our April hearings when we will have all the directors of ACDA testify on the real problems of how to live with the Soviet Union and the United States in the nuclear age. He was very enthusiastic about coming in to participate in those hearings.

So I put on the record the statements that he has given to us on the nomination, as I understand it. Did you put into the record the letters that you had received?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Yes; I put into the record a letter from Under Secretary Eagleburger and also from Fred Ikle.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I want to concur in your decision not to bring Mr. Rostow back at this time. Also, I believe it is correct to say that Mr. Rostow at one time asked you to be a deputy of ACDA; is that not right?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That is right.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. And I think that that would just lead us into a whole bunch of issues that are not pertinent to a confirmation hearing. It would lead us into issues of why Mr. Rostow is not continuing in office, which I do not think would be productive.

The CHAIRMAN. He is looking forward to being with us in April, however, in the context of those hearings.

If there is no further business, the hearing is adjourned.
[Additional questions and answers follow:]

Mr. Adelman's Response to an Additional Question Submitted by Senator Pell

Question 1. What are your comments on Resolution 132 of the North Atlantic Assembly on the subject of arms control and outer space, sponsored by Senator Pell?

Answer. This resolution urges member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

"1. To conduct, in cooperation with the United States, a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which verifiable agreements governing weapons in space, antisatellite programs, and peaceful cooperation in space would enhance the security of the Alliance; and,

"2. To press for negotiations leading to agreements aimed principally at limitation of the deployment of offensive weapons in space."

This resolution calls for negotiations on space-based weapons and on antisatellite weapons. With regard to outer space arms control, the President has said: "that the Administration will continue to study space arms control options and will consider verifiable and equitable space arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons, should those measures be compatible with U.S. national security."

The Administration is currently studying various possible options. The United States cannot, however, enter into negotiations on this complex subject until it is satisfied that it has concrete proposals that satisfy the essential criteria the President has set down (equality, verifiability, compatibility with U.S. national security). There are several reasons why it is not a simple task to formulate such proposals; these include:

Verification. Effective verification is central in all arms control; it is particularly important in space arms control, in view of potential risk inherent in even a small number of undetected ASAT weapons. This flows from the fact that there are a relatively small number of satellites that are most important to U.S. national security. There are several difficult, unresolved space arms control verification problems.

Soviet ASAT Capabilities. The Soviets have been conducting space tests of their ASAT interceptors for over a decade and are judged to have an operational capability. They are the only nation with such an achieving capability. This asymmetry is a serious obstacle to equitable space arms control agreements.

Non-Specialized Weapons. Space arms control is complicated by the fact that a variety of weapons could potentially be used for ASAT attacks, including some weapons, such as certain ABM interceptor missiles, that are permitted under other arms control agreements.

Defense Policy. There is a threat posed by present and prospective Soviet satellites that can be used in time of war to direct Soviet military forces against United States and Allied forces. Any space weapon limitations which limit the threat to U.S. satellites will necessarily protect threatening Soviet satellites as well.

Technology. Space technology is evolving at a rapid rate and these advances bring with them implications for the use of space weapons and for space arms control; we know that future developments may be important for our security, but our vision of the future is unavoidably clouded.

Other Negotiations. Outer space is an inseparable element of our broader security concerns. Space arms control, too, is inextricably linked to our broader arms control initiatives. The President has now made a series of arms control proposals to the Soviet Union, on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles and on conventional forces in Europe. The outcome of these negotiations will have a profound effect upon our security concerns and upon our defense forces and requirements. Satellites serve the needs of both arms control verification and of defense. Hence, the demands we will place upon our satellites, and the risks we would be willing to accept under space arms control limitations, must be influenced by the course of these other negotiations.

The Administration is addressing all these issues. In addition, we have consulted and are continuing to consult closely with our Allies, bilaterally, and in NATO on these issues. The United States has also supported discussion of the question of space arms control in the multilateral Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and participates fully in those discussions.

I can furthermore say that, within the Administration, ACDA has taken, and will continue to take, a leading role in attempting to resolve the obstacles to space arms control I have mentioned: ACDA has an active program of research on space arms control matters.

This is an area of great importance to me personally, and I intend to actively pursue all possibilities for devising practical steps in space arms control that can meet the President's criteria.

MR. ADELMAN'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PRESSLER

Question 1. Should you be confirmed as ACDA Director, will you rely on ACDA's corps of senior professionals who have the Government's corporate memory on arms control?

Answer. My answer to this question is an unequivocable yes. My testimony on both January 27 and February 3 makes this completely clear.

Question 2. Would you support putting all existing U.S. strategic systems on the negotiating table if the Soviets would accept reductions in comparable Soviet weapons? Specifically, do you believe the MX should be on the negotiating agenda, along with the Soviet SS-18s and SS-19s? Similarly, should the B-1 be subject to negotiation?

Answer. The President has stated that everything is on the table in Geneva and that we will listen to all serious Soviet proposals. This does not mean that elements of the President's strategic modernization program are designed to be bargaining chips. The systems that the President has requested are vital elements in restoring the survivability and effectiveness of our deterrent. Our goal in START is to achieve significant reductions to equal levels, an outcome which we believe would contribute substantially to stabilizing the strategic balance. Having achieved our objectives in START, we would certainly be willing to consider further reductions that would be consistent with maintaining deterrence and stability.

Question 3. What is your view of: (1) Senate Resolution 129 of May 1981, on limitation of antisatellite weapon systems, introduced by Senator Pressler; and, (2) a new resolution sponsored by Senator Pressler on this subject?

Answer. The first resolution (S.R. 129) resolves: "That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should promptly resume negotiations with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on a balanced and verifiable agreement limiting the development, deployment, or use of weapons systems designed exclusively to intercept, damage, or destroy orbiting satellites."

The second resolution calls upon the President to: "immediately prepare a proposal and invite the Soviet Union to negotiate a verifiable ban on the development, testing, production and deployment of antisatellite weapons as a first step towards prohibiting all space-based and space-directed weaponry".

These resolutions call for negotiations on space-based weapons and on antisatellite weapons. With regard to outer space arms control, the President has said: "that the Administration will continue to study space arms control options and will consider verifiable and equitable space arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons, should those measures be compatible with U.S. national security."

The Administration is currently studying various possible options. The United States cannot, however, enter into negotiations on this complex subject until it is satisfied that it has concrete proposals that satisfy the essential criteria the President has set down (equality, verifiability, compatibility with U.S. national security). There are several reasons why it is not a simple task to formulate such proposals; these include:

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States and Allied forces. Any space weapon limitations which limit the threat to United States satellites will necessarily protect threatening Soviet satellites as well.

Technology. Space technology is evolving at a rapid rate and these advances bring with them implications for the use of space weapons and for space arms control; we know that future developments may be important for our security, but our vision of the future is unavoidably clouded.

Other Negotiations. Outer space is an inseparable element of our broader security concerns. Space arms control, too, is inextricably linked to our broader arms control initiatives. The President has now made a series of arms control proposals to the Soviet Union, on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles and on conventional forces in Europe. The outcome of these negotiations will have a profound effect upon our security concerns and upon our defense forces and requirements. Satellites serve the needs of both arms control verification and of defense. Hence, the demands we will place upon our satellites, and the risks we would be willing to accept under space arms control limitations, must be influenced by the course of these other negotiations.

The Administration is addressing all these issues. In addition, we have consulted and are continuing to consult closely with our allies, bilaterally, and in NATO on these issues. The United States has also supported discussion of the question of space arms control in the multilateral Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and participates fully in those discussions.

The second resolution also contains two other elements. One is that, in pursuing agreement with the U.S.S.R. on ASAT, the President should agree to no provision that would in any manner restrict the space shuttle or impede legitimate activities permitted under the SALT I ABM Treaty. I am certainly in full agreement with the goal of not restricting the shuttle or impeding legitimate activities under SALT I. The resolution also calls on the negotiations to seek to restrict to the extent consistent with U.S. national interests deployment of hazardous objects and materials, such as nuclear materials, in outer space. With regard to this element, I fully agree with its objective, and am pleased to be able to note that the United States has supported efforts in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its Subcommittees to address this problem.

I can furthermore say that, within the Administration, ACDA has taken, and will continue to take, a leading role in attempting to resolve the obstacles to space arms control I have mentioned: ACDA has an active program of research on space arms control matters.

This is an area of great importance to me personally, and I intend to actively pursue all possibilities for devising practical steps in space arms control that can meet the President's criteria.

MR. ADELMAN'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BIDEN

Question 1. Dr. Adelman, why would you want a job working on "fruitless" and "debilitating" agreements which offer little chance of saving money, halting the Soviet buildup, or enhancing our security?

Answer. I believe achievement of agreements in START or INF that result in substantial reduction to the more threatening and destabilizing weapons systems and meet the tests of equality and verifiability would significantly add to U.S. Security, global security and lower the risk of war. If I can assist in reaching this goal, I will consider my time well spent.

Question 2. Why do you think this Administration has a better chance of reaching meaningful arms control agreements than in the past, especially given the evident disagreements and disarray within the Administration on some of these issues?

Answer. The President is strongly committed to meaningful arms control. As he has stated, we are pursuing arms control agreements that are militarily significant, verifiable, and result in real reductions to equal levels. The strategic modernization program clearly demonstrates to the Soviet Union U.S. determination to maintain and improve our strategic deterrent. The strategic modernization program coupled with the President's bold and comprehensive arms control proposals enhance the likelihood of attaining arms control agreements that will maintain U.S. security.

Question 3. You are currently on leave from membership in the Committee on the Present Danger, but you had joined in earlier calls by that group for increased military capabilities. Recently, the Committee reviewed its recommendations in 1980 and compared them with the Reagan defense plan. It concluded: "The Administration's defense program is a minimal one. It will not halt the unfavorable trends in the United States-Soviet military balance, let alone reverse them." Do you agree with that conclusion? If the picture is so bleak, how can we even contemplate arms control?

Answer. I have not closely examined the Committee's study. However, I don't agree with the conclusion you have quoted. I believe that the dual-track course of improved defenses and vigorous efforts to achieve arms control, which is being pursued by the Reagan Administration, is a sound and proper course which will lead to a more stable strategic balance. I believe, further, that the defense proposals put forward by the Reagan Administration are the minimum level of effort appropriate to the threats we face.

Question 4. Are there some aspects of our strategic weapons program which are not subject to elimination or restriction through arms control? Is everything negotiable, so long as we receive comparable concessions in return?

Answer. The President has stated that everything is on the table in Geneva and that we will listen to all serious Soviet proposals. This does not mean that elements of the President's strategic modernization program are designed to be bargaining chips. The systems that the President has requested are vital elements in restoring the survivability and effectiveness of our deterrent. Our goal in START is to achieve significant reductions to equal levels, an outcome which we believe would contribute substantially to stabilizing the strategic balance. Having achieved our objectives in START, we would certainly be willing to consider further reductions that would be consistent with maintaining deterrence and stability.

Question 5. If the U.S. START proposal were accepted unchanged by the Russians, how precisely would it save us money, enhance our security, and reverse the unfavorable trends in Soviet capabilities? (In fact, wouldn't it allow the Russians a greater ratio of hard target warheads against our ICBMs and thus wouldn't solve our vulnerability problem, and wouldn't it force us to reduce our invulnerable submarine missile force?)

Answer. If the U.S. START proposal were accepted unchanged by the Soviet Union, it would provide savings in U.S. strategic force costs because we would be deploying and maintaining far fewer systems than in the absence of an agreement. More importantly, it would enhance U.S. security by enhancing strategic stability through reductions in the more destabilizing systems and by reducing the destructive capabilities and potential of the two sides. Soviet ICBMs currently have the combination of accuracy and yield to destroy U.S. land-based missiles in their silos. The Soviets have these systems in numbers such that they could attack U.S. ICBMs using only a small fraction of their own ICBM force. In this situation, the Soviets could, in a crisis, perceive it to be to their advantage militarily to launch or threaten such an attack. The substantial reductions in strategic ballistic missile forces proposed by the United States in START would leave the Soviets with greatly reduced residual levels of ICBM missiles and warheads after a first strike against U.S. hard targets, as compared to the current situation, thus reducing Soviet incentives to strike first. This would reduce the risk of nuclear war and enhance strategic stability.

Arms control, by itself, cannot solve the ICBM vulnerability problem. However, effective arms control, and the U.S. START position, in particular, would significantly reduce the threat to U.S. land-based missiles and thus help in our search for a survivable basing mode for our land-based ICBMs.

The U.S. START proposal would require some reductions in the U.S. SSBN/SLBM force. However, this force will remain highly capable and highly survivable, especially in light of the modernization of U.S. submarines and SLBMs, and will contribute to a strong deterrent even at reduced levels.

Question 6. In a welcome display of nonpartisanship, you once wrote that President "Carter has done more for the military bolstering of NATO than any president since Dwight Eisenhower." What above and beyond continuing those previous policies has this Administration done?

Answer. This Administration has enhanced our contribution to the Alliance's defense through significant increases in military spending levels aimed at both improving readiness now and accelerating modernization in the coming years. In doing this we have succeeded in improving in 2 short years the Alliance's ability to deter and defend itself in Europe and elsewhere. This tangible commitment on the part of the U.S. demonstrates strong leadership to the other Allies, who are striving, under difficult economic conditions, to also improve their military forces' ability to carry out NATO strategy.

Question 7. Were Administration efforts helped or hurt by last year's neutron bomb decision?

Answer. President Reagan's decision that enhanced radiation weapons would be produced and stockpiled on U.S. territory has given us the flexibility to make a decision in the future, in consultation with our Allies, on possible deployment of the enhanced radiation warhead. There are no current plans to deploy ERW. I am of course aware of European sensitivities on this issue.

Question 8. In addition to the START and INF talks already underway, what other issues do you believe should be pursued as arms control objectives? Nuclear testing? Antisatellite systems? Conventional arms transfers? Are there any you would definitely rule out at this time? Any that you already believe we need to do more on?

Answer. Apart from the START and INF negotiations, the United States is now participating actively in a broad range of other arms control initiatives:

In the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Vienna, the United States and its Allies tabled last summer the draft text of a treaty which would provide for major reductions in Warsaw Pact and NATO ground and air forces in central Europe.

In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva the U.S. has taken a leading role in efforts to develop a complete and verifiable ban on the production, testing, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons. We will press for greater progress on this in the CD's session this year.

Also in the CD, the United States has been a leading proponent of efforts to negotiate a ban on radiological weapons. The Committee has before it draft elements of a treaty banning such weapons, which were submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union.

There are as well other important areas of potential arms control progress, but which are not now at a stage appropriate for negotiations:

A comprehensive and verifiable ban on nuclear explosions remains a long-term goal of United States policy. With this in mind the United States last year proposed a working group in the Committee on Disarmament to examine issues of verification and compliance, issues which are fundamental to any possible progress toward such a ban.

The United States will continue to study arms control options applicable to outer space, and will consider verifiable and equitable measures that would ban or otherwise limit specific weapon systems. This includes the question of measures on antisatellite systems. The United States believes that it is appropriate to discuss the broad question of outer space arms control in the Committee on Disarmament, though we are not convinced that this discussion would point to the need for any additional arms control measures at this time.

Finally, on the question of conventional arms transfers, the United States retains a genuine interest in arms transfer restraint, and remains prepared to consider specific proposals directed toward that end. However, restraint must be multilateral; the United States cannot apply restraint unilaterally, to the detriment of its foreign policy and security interests. Thus far there has been no evidence of genuine interest by the Soviet Union, or on the part of most other arms producing or recipient nations, in such restraint.

Question 9. Defense and arms control issues in recent years have often been the object of partisan and ideological dispute, occasionally quite bitter and seemingly irreconcilable. I happen to believe that bipartisanship is better, and that there is a latent consensus for both a strong defense and effective arms control. In case you want to build some bridges, tell us what beliefs and goals you share with those of us who supported SALT I and II and what you share with the proponents of a nuclear freeze?

Answer. I believe that the vast majority of those who supported SALT I and II and those that now support a nuclear freeze have a sincere desire to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war and to encourage more rapid progress in arms control. This Administration shares their genuine and deeply felt convictions and this, I think, is a basis for bridgebuilding. At the same time, as we have noted many times in the past, the SALT II agreement has many serious flaws. We must look beyond SALT II and focus on agreements for substantial reductions, as embodied in the U.S. START and INF proposals. With regard to a freeze, supporters of a freeze should recognize that their proposal will not ultimately provide us with a sound basis for the kinds of reductions to equal, more stable levels that the President is seeking in our arms control negotiations. In sum, I share the deep desire to preserve the peace and I share the widely-held view that a stable nuclear balance at the lowest possible level of nuclear weapons is the best means of achieving that goal.

MR. ADELMAN'S RESPONSE TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TSONGAS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., February 2, 1983.

Hon. PAUL E. TSONGAS,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR TSONGAS: I am writing this letter in response to our discussions during my nomination hearing and your letter of January 28.

Your question presents a hypothetical situation that is highly unlikely to occur. President Reagan is deeply and personally committed to arms control as a means of achieving peace, reducing the risk of war, and enhancing the security of mankind. I share the President's deep commitment. If I had any doubts in this regard, I would not have accepted the nomination to be the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

If confirmed, I will be a vigorous advocate and proponent of arms control agreements that are equitable, verifiable and militarily significant. I intend to fulfill these obligations to the best of my ability. However, as a general proposition, it is my belief that if any public official finds that his values and principles are in fundamental conflict with Administration policy and he has concluded that his capacity to change those policies have been exhausted, resignation is an appropriate recourse.

In closing, let me repeat that this is a hypothetical situation that is not likely to be encountered because I know that President Reagan is fully committed to this important goal.

Sincerely,

KENNETH L. ADELMAN,
Ambassador.

[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

Prepared Statement of Dr. Homer A. Jack, Secretary-General, World Conference on Religion and Peace, New York, N.Y.

I submit this statement in my personal capacity as a U.S. citizen. Since 1957 I have been a non-governmental organization observer on disarmament affairs at U.N. deliberative and negotiating bodies. I am a Unitarian Universalist clergyman and Secretary-General of the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP) and Chairman of the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Committee on Disarmament at U.N. Headquarters.

This is the first time that I have ever taken the initiative to influence a committee of the U.S. Congress on a confirmation hearing. I normally believe that a President should have the prerogative to select his own administrative officers and that a President, in effect, sinks or swims on the pragmatic results of his appointees. However, in the case of Ambassador Kenneth L. Adelman, I believe that since he is so unqualified for the position as Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, I am making an exception to my belief and I am attempting to oppose his confirmation. I do this with regret, for I was one of many citizens who more than 20 years ago encouraged President John F. Kennedy and Senator Hubert Humphrey to establish the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and I have known personally most of its distinguished directors.

As an observer at U.N. Headquarters, I have had the opportunity to witness the performance of Ambassador Adelman since his appointment as Deputy U.S. Representative to the U.N. in 1981. I have seen him at work during parts of the 36th and 37th regular sessions of the General Assembly, and especially of its First or Disarmament Committee, and during the entire Second U.N. Special Session on Disarmament. I will only describe what I have witnessed and that is entirely in the field of disarmament, although Ambassador Adelman's duties at the U.N. covered many additional fields.

I believe that Ambassador Adelman is unfit to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for at least four reasons. For each I will give an example known to me.

1. Ambassador Adelman is needlessly confrontational. There are many examples of this kind of behavior by Ambassador Adelman at the U.N. Let me give one example, which I witnessed in the Ad Hoc Committee of the Second Special Session on July 2, 1982. During an important debate on how to discuss the prevention of nuclear war, Ambassador Adelman observed, "I feel it incumbent upon me to support the position of the Chairman, since he has been ganged up on by the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic, and to clarify some points . . ." Perhaps Mr. Adelman in his home town, Chicago, can talk about being "ganged up on," but this is not traditional discourse at the U.N.

Later in that same debate, Mr. Adelman made what turned out to be one of the most undiplomatic remarks of the entire Special Session: "We have now heard essentially the same remarks from the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Cuba. I hope that we can have the remaining countries, Czechoslovakia, Byelorussia, Viet Nam, submit the statement for the record while we move on to the more important and more substantive issues before the Special Session. I think that having countries make the same speech time and time again only delays the work of the Second Special Session, although I, for one, am quite willing to hear from the Czechs, Byelorussians, and Vietnamese if they wish to proceed along these same lines." Ambassador Adelman was technically correct, of course, but U.N. diplomats do not—and should not—utter what can only be classified as intemperate remarks during serious debates. (See U.N. document A/S-12/AC.1/PV.12, pp. 52, 66.)

2. Ambassador Adelman has had disastrous results in his overseeing of U.S. disarmament policy at the U.N. On a NBC telecast on February 2, 1983, U.S. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick said that Ambassador Adelman had "principal responsibility" both for the Second U.N. Special Session on Disarmament and disarmament and security affairs generally at the U.N. The fulfillment of these two responsibilities by Ambassador Adelman has been so unfortunate for the U.S. that I believe he is unfit for having "principal responsibility" for U.S. disarmament policy generally.

At the First Committee of the 37th General Assembly in October/December 1983, U.S. disarmament policy was never more disastrous and the U.S. itself more isolated, in some cases needlessly so. One must, of course, indict equally Ambassador Adelman's immediate superior in disarmament affairs, Prof. Eugene V. Rostow who was then Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Together they presided over what can only be considered a fiasco in American Disarmament efforts, or even imagery, at the U.N.

One somewhat objective illustration of the isolation of the U.S. last autumn at the U.N. is a comparision of voting records on the 25 resolutions adopted on nuclear issues. Most of the 25 were good resolutions, but some, of course, were better than others. Such responsible States as Mexico and Nigeria voted for 23 of these resolutions—or 92 per cent—while Romania voted for all 25. On the other hand, the U.S. voted in favor of only four of these 25 resolutions—for an abysmal record of 16 per cent. The Soviet Union voted for 21 of these resolutions and even China voted for 14. This isolation of the U.S. in the world community on nuclear issues is frightening. Ambassador Adelman must accept some responsibility for this unfortunate U.S. strategy and tactics. (For voting records, see U.N. documents A/37/PV.100 and PV.101.)

3. Ambassador Adelman has shown, at least on one public occasion, to be an easy target for Soviet maneuvering. Additionally, he got caught in the First Committee on allowing the U.S. to go down the slippery totalitarian slope of allowing governments to determine what is truthful, authentic, or accurate information on disarmament affairs. Some of Ambassador Adelman's own Western colleagues were astounded at his easy compromise with totalitarian thinking. In this particular situation, the gullibility of Ambassador Adelman was of memorable proportions, even in U.S. history at the U.N.

Ambassador Adelman was principal sponsor, and perhaps author, of a U.S. draft resolution on the new U.N.-related World Disarmament Campaign. This was one of three resolutions on the Campaign. The draft had the distinction of urging "the flow of a broad range of information" on disarmament to reach Eastern Europe and help the new, independent peace movements there. This was a laudable aim of the U.S. and of Ambassador Adelman. Just when he thought, and hoped, that he had a unanimous resolution in the First Committee, the Soviet disarmament ambassador raised his hand and asserted that his country would go along with the unanimity with only "a very slight amendment." This was the addition of one adjective to modify the noun, "information," in the phrase, "broad range of information." This addition was, of course, a longtime totalitarian ploy which, in other forums, the U.S. under both Republican and Democratic administrations has long recognized and regularly opposed.

The Soviet ambassador in his intervention gave a Russian adjective which, he thought, in English meant "truthful" or "authentic." He asked Ambassador Adelman if he would accept that one modifying adjective. All of the conservative instincts allegedly in Mr. Adelman's blood should have warned him not to accept any modification. Yet he quickly responded: "In keeping with the wonderful spirit of cooperation prevailing right now * * * The word, 'truthful,' would, I think, be very helpful." He publicly indicated to the Soviet representative that he would accept his proposal. As it was past time for lunch, Ambassador Adelman impatiently urged the Chairman—the Ambassador of Ghana—to call for the vote, since he saw "no reason for having lunch right now in the midst of our debate." Adelman badly wanted his resolution unanimously adopted before lunch! However, the Chairman brusquely replied: "Powerful as the delegations of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. are, there are other parties who are being asked to make a judgment on this." He adjourned the meeting.

After lunch, the modifying adjective was finally agreed upon: "accurate" information. But the Irish delegate perceived the surrender of Ambassador Adelman and refused to countenance it. He said that "any qualification of the word, 'information,' is . . . inappropriate." The Irish insisted that the Committee not adopt the resolution by consensus, but take a vote. In the roll call, Ireland and Brazil abstained. Afterwards, Sweden, Canada, and the Netherlands all expressed their reservations in effect at Adelman's easy acquiescence to Soviet blandishments. Several weeks later, Adelman in the plenary received the consensus to his resolution that he was so badly seeking, but only after sacrificing a valid—and conservative—principle. No person and no state can decide what is "accurate" or "authentic" or "truthful" information. Only the forces of the market, or freedom of expression, or the test of history can make that determination, even though totalitarian governments always seek the opportunity to do so. In this situation, Ambassador Adelman was simply outmaneuvered by the Russians; he was no equal to the much more clever Soviet diplomats. (See U.N. documents A/C.1/37/PV.42, pp. 71-72 and PV.43, pp. 38-56.)

4. Ambassador Adelman is an apostle of hubris. In a long, masterful, and much-needed address to the First Committee on November 4, 1982, Ambassador Adelman eagerly criticized the Soviet Union and other socialist States for their rough treatment of the several new, independent peace movements. However, in his address, Adelman cavalierly skipped over restrictions on the peace movement in his own country. To be sure, Soviet oppression is much more severe. But any denial of freedom of association in the U.S. is also serious in a society practicing and cherishing civil liberties.

The U.S. resolution which Ambassador Adelman promoted at the U.N. rightly calls on citizens "to organize and meet publicly" on disarmament questions. Yet the Reagan Administration which Ambassador Adelman represented for two years at the U.N., refused to issue visas to 318 persons coming to the U.N. to observe the Second Special Session and to demonstrate for disarmament on June 12th. We know well that the Soviet Union denies freedom of assembly, but now we know that the U.S.A. at times does also. Ambassador Adelman never intimated the exsistence of these denials of visas in his U.N. speeches and newspaper articles. Also President Reagan tried to intimidate certain members of the American public by suggesting that the freeze movement was being manipulated by Communists from overseas—a mirror image of Ambassador Adelman's correct assertion that the Kremlin accuses its new disarmament movement of being manipulated by the capitalists from overseas. Ambassador Adelman should continue his criticisms of human rights violations in the Soviet Union, but he cannot ignore and must admit the denial of visas and so-called Presidential "red-baiting" in his own government. Ambassador Adelman is a veritable study of hubris. (See U.N. document A/C.1/PV.25, pp. 21-32.)

For these and other reasons, I urge that Ambassador Adelman not be confirmed as Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. There is, of course, relief, widely shared, at the U.N. that Ambassador Adelman has finally left the U.N. community. But this momentary euphoria is tempered by the realization that Ambassador Adelman may do even more damage to world peace in his new position in Washington. This should not be allowed to happen, even if some of us might have to witness Ambassador Adelman's return again to his old position at U.N. Headquarters.

NOMINATION OF HON. KENNETH L. ADELMAN (Business Meeting)

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1983

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:20 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Baker, Helms, Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator Cranston has asked permission to make a request to the committee. Without objection, the Chair will recognize Senator Cranston.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, will we have a chance to make our statements, giving our reasons for our votes?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we will have that opportunity.

Senator CRANSTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your courtesy very much.

I sought recognition at this point because I want to make a procedural motion that I believe should be considered before members state their views on the Adelman nomination and vote for or against it.

I will ask the Chair if he would not entertain a motion to reopen the hearing and recall Mr. Adelman—and perhaps others—in view of some very disturbing information that I would like to bring to the committee's attention at this point.

I want to assure the committee, I am not seeking to delay or stall. I would like to distribute this material, explain my concern, and then make a motion to reopen which, it seems to me, should be in order prior to further proceeding today toward a committee vote.

I will not take any extended time on this but I would like now to have that material distributed and explain my reasons.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the Chair's feeling that the material, from what I understand of it, would probably not change any committee member's vote. It may have an effect upon Members of the Senate who have not had hearings. But we have had full hearings on the Adelman nomination and it would be the intention of the Chair to go ahead, after statements have been made, and actually vote.

I am sorry, Senator Cranston, very much indeed, but I think the Senate must carry forward on this now. We have delayed this vote several times and we can do so interminably. But I do not know of any Senators who will change their vote as a result of it.

Senator CRANSTON. Mr. Chairman, I have been trying to count the votes on the committee and there are at least two votes—perhaps more—where I do not know what that member of the committee is going to do in this matter.

May I just explain my reasons and then it can be up to the committee whether they wish to entertain a motion.

The CHAIRMAN. If they are the two you mentioned to me, both of them appear to be negative votes. So, if this is damaging information it will not change them.

Could the Senator just reveal right now what it is, in a moment?

Senator CRANSTON. That is what I would like to do.

The CHAIRMAN. How long would it take you to do that?

Senator CRANSTON. Three or 4, 5 minutes at most.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, we will yield 5 minutes to the Senator from California.

Senator CRANSTON. I ask the material be distributed.

The first item being distributed is a January 27, 1983, column by syndicated columnist Richard Reeves, which appeared in the Universal Press Syndicate wire under the heading, "Reagan and Arms Control, a Sham."

The second is a May 24, 1982, column in the New York Daily News by Ken Auletta, which contains a series of very distressing quotes attributed to Mr. Adelman, and which was the major focus of Mr. Reeves' column.

If these quotes are accurate, it seems to me that they are so serious as to disqualify Mr. Adelman from holding the position for which he has been nominated. At the very least, these quotes raise even greater doubts about Mr. Adelman's credibility than those very serious questions already raised by the first 2 days of his testimony.

I regret that I did not learn of these two columns until late last week, during the recess, after the 2 days of hearings thus far held on this nomination. Since learning of this information, I have been concerned about how best to proceed and only last night did I reach a decision to pursue the course I am proposing today.

These are some quotes which are not writings published by Mr. Adelman, they are quotes attributed to him. In fairness to him, to us, and to arms control, I think he should have an opportunity to comment on the quotes attributed to him before we act on his nomination.

Furthermore, I believe we would be doing a disservice to America's interests in Western Europe, where there is geat interest in arms control and great interest in Adelman if he were to be confirmed to the post for which he has been nominated, without the matter of these quotes having been cleared up.

I would like to read form Richard Reeves' column, quoting and discussing Mr. Auletta's article. Mr. Reeves writes, "These are quotes from Auletta's notebooks. The first three were published in the New York Daily News, the fourth was not used."

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Did the Senator give us a copy of Richard Reeves' article?

Senator CRANSTON. It is being distributed now.

Senator **Boschwitz**. This is a column, Senator?

Senator **Cranston**. Yes, that is.

So, reading from Mr. Reeves,

> These are the quotes from Auletta's notebooks. The first three were published in the News, the fourth was not used at that time.
>
> I can't think of any negotiations on security or weaponry that have done any good.

That is a quote attributed to Adelman.

Another quote attributed to him:

> One reason not to rush into any negotiations is that in a democracy the negotiations tend to discourage money for defense programs. The public says, "Why increase the military when we are negotiating with the Russians"?

In answer to a question concerning the desire of U.S. allies for arms control, Mr. Adelman said, "My policy would be to do it for political reasons, but I think it is a sham."

In answer to a question about whether we would not then be deliberately disregarding European opinion, Mr. Adelman said,

> Yes. We should be negotiating just for political reasons. I would have sent someone on January 21 to Helsinki for negotiations—very low key—and never mention it again. If anyone brings up the subject you can say, "We have a guy over there".

Mr. Chairman, that ends Mr. Reeves' quotes from Auletta's notes, but Mr. Reeves continues as follows:

> The interview was conducted before Adelman's appointment to his present position as Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations. When I called Adelman to ask whether he stood by those quotes, he sent me a message saying he would not speak to the press until after Senate confirmation hearings on his new appointment as Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
>
> But, a few hours later, I received a call from Joseph Lehman, a spokesman for the Arms Control Agency who said in part, "Ambassador Adelman does not recall having said anything of the sort and those quotes certainly do not reflect his thinking on the issue of arms control.
>
> "Ambassador Adelman believes strongly in the beneficial effects of many arms control and security agreements of the past, including the Geneva Conventions of 1925, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Treaties of 1972, as well as the treaties banning nuclear weapons in outer space and the militarization of Antarctica. As far as the relationship between arms control and defense spending, Ambassador Adelman believes the two should operate in a complementary fashion to achieve the same goal which is, of course, the preservation of peace."

Mr. Reeves then contacted Mr. Auletta to get his reaction to this statement on Mr. Adelman's behalf. Mr. Reeves wrote as follows:

> When he was informed of that statement, Mr. Auletta, who has attended several seminars on defense policy with Mr. Adelman over the years said, "There is nothing to discuss here. He said what he said and I printed it. I am absolutely confident it reflects his thinking—no matter what spokesmen say now."

I find it absolutely shocking, I would like to say, that this country may be about to place in the position as America's No. 1 champion for arms control, a man who may have expressed and may hold these cynical views. Many critics of the present administration's arms control efforts have asserted that these are truly the views of the Reagan administration.

Mr. Reeves writes,

> There is, in fact, nothing particularly unusual about Adelman's views—inside the Reagan administration. The people now running the U.S. Government obviously see arms control as a way to calm folks at home and in Europe, and as a cover for an arms buildup in an attempt to regain our traditional and big post-World War II military superiority over the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, it is one thing to infer and allege that these views are held. It is quite something else when a high administration official may actually have embraced them as his own. And it is positively devastating, it seems to me, to the people of this Nation and to the entire world who yearn for peace, if these are in fact the views of the person to be charged with the awsome responsibility of overseeing all arms control and disarmament activities and negotiations on behalf of the U.S. Government.

So, that is what we have here. I believe there is only one course of action that would be fair to Mr. Adelman, fair to the members of this committee, and to the Senate, and fair to the American people. That is for Mr. Adelman to return as a witness and testify under oath about these quotations attributed to him.

My staff has talked to Mr. Auletta who has offered to testify before the committee, if necessary. If the committee concludes that these are accurate quotes or even if it concludes that there is good reason to believe that they are accurate, I think it would be extremely difficult for Mr. Adelman to explain them away.

I believe, let me say finally, that Mr. Adelman has a very heavy burden in trying to establish his credibility as a sincere advocate of arms control. I believe we should give him every opportunity to do so.

It would be a grave disservice to the cause of peace if the U.S. Senate were to proceed now without making the full and fair examination that this matter requires providing the committee was to proceed to confirm him, and were to confirm Mr. Adelman as Director of ACDA, and to hold him out with this ominous cloud hanging over him, to our own people and peoples around the world, including our European allies, as credible and fit to assume one of the most vital responsibilities to confront any person in any government anywhere on Earth today.

So, Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee not vote today on the nomination, but first reopen the hearing, recall Mr. Adelman to testify on this matter under oath, and also hear from Mr. Auletta if that is deemed necessary in the interest of resolving the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Do any other committee members wish to be heard on this aspect of the subject, and the recommendation of Senator Cranston?

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pressler?

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, I am one of those who will be voting against Mr. Adelman—reluctantly. I think that the point of the gentleman has been well made. I would probably come down on the side of going ahead and voting today.

I think that the gentleman from California has made his point very well and I happen to think there is much merit to it. But I do not know that another hearing—and I am trying to be sympathetic—but I say that as one who would vote against Mr. Adelman—I do not think a further hearing would serve our purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone else want to be heard on the subject?

I would suggest, Senator Cranston, that we proceed with the statements of Senators. If Mr. Adelman wishes to come before this committee—and I think it would be a good idea for him to come before this committee again—he can come before the committee before the vote is held on the floor of the Senate, so that we can have his response to the statements that have been made.

But I think this vote has been scheduled. We have a quorum present today and we ought to go ahead with that vote.

Senator PELL. I must say, Mr. Chairman, I agree with you and I think we should move ahead with the vote. I do not think any minds are going to be changed.

Senator CRANSTON. Mr. Chairman, I will just say that I wanted to proceed in a way that I thought would be fair to him and others involved. If, as you state, all minds are made up regardless of this situation, then we might as well proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we will proceed with whatever statements Senators wish to give on this nomination.

I was interested this morning that the Washington Post reached the conclusion that on balance, based upon the last testimony given by Ambassador Adelman, they would trust the committee would vote him out favorably.

We do meet this afternoon to vote on the nomination. This is not the first time that Ambassador Adelman has come before this committee. He was here 1½ years ago to be the President's nominee for the second ranking position in the U.S. Mission, a post that holds both important responsibilities on multilateral disarmament and on arms control matters. On July 28, 1981, the committee voted 17 to 0 to confirm Dr. Adelman for that post.

Earlier this month, Ambassador Kirkpatrick wrote me to report that Ambassador Adelman did a first-class job in discharging his duties at the United Nations. Yesterday, Secretary Shultz also used these same words, "first class" to describe his performance there. The Secretary assured the committee that he has full confidence in Ambassador Adelman's abilities.

Dr. Adelman's passage through the committee confirmation process this time, however, has proven very rocky. In part, the controversy surrounding the Adelman nomination stemmed from the nominee's less than reassuring performance at his first hearing. In his own words he was "too cautious" in declining to offer his opinion on important subjects relevant to the ACDA position.

Along with many of my colleagues, though, I found his testimony at the second hearing to be far more satisfactory. I found in that hearing a refutation and answer to many, many of the questions, and a full answer to many of the questions that were put to him. His answers were forthright and forthcoming, and I commended him at the time for his presentation.

In large measure, however, the Adelman controversy has reflected broader issues. The abrupt—and never sufficiently explained—firing of Dr. Rostow rekindled longstanding suspicions that the media and many Americans, including some in the Congress, harbor with regard to this administration's commitment to arms control. For some, the vote on Ambassador Adelman's nomination has become a referendum on President Reagan's overall arms control policy.

To those who have established this linkage I would say that progress has been made, in my judgment, on arms control during the past 2 years. And in just the last few days, there has been a remarkable and unappreciated sequence of positive steps. Let me review this record:

In START, our negotiators have successfully drawn from the Soviets a proposal that goes well beyond the position the Soviets were willing to take 2 years ago. The Soviet START proposal, which would require a 25-percent reduction in their strategic forces, offers cuts far deeper than those negotiated in SALT II and, I might add, far deeper than might be achieved were a nuclear freeze agreement to be negotiated.

In INF, the Soviets have formally indicated their willingness to dismantle at least some SS-20's where before they were insisting on keeping what they have. With Vice President Bush's return from Europe, the stage is set for new movement in these talks, particularly to see whether a followup on the Nitze-Kvitsinsky talks would be productive.

Last week in Geneva, the United States submitted a draft treaty for the global destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities over a 10-year period.

Lastly, the administration has now decided, after an inexplicable delay, to move ahead with the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. I have been informed that President Reagan agreed last week to a recommendation that the United States ratify these treaties as soon as a new protocol strengthening verification can be negotiated. If the Soviets agree, these negotiations can be underway in a matter of weeks.

If the negotiations can be expeditiously concluded, I am confident that we can ratify them in the Senate. These would be the first arms control agreements ratified by the United States and the Soviet Union in almost a decade. I am especially pleased that Ambassador Adelman proved able to break through the "profound stonewall," as described by Dr. Rostow, that had been blocking progress on these treaties. He has succeeded where no other official has been able to prevail.

In conclusion, I believe that the administration is moving with determination to establish a constructive and stabilizing arms control framework with the Soviet Union. I am particularly pleased to know that Secretary Shultz and Deputy Secretary Dam will now take a larger role in this endeavor. In his tenure at the State Department, Secretary Shultz has demonstrated solid leadership and a pragmatic, flexible approach in dealing with seemingly intractable issues—qualities which I am sure he will also bring to bear in pursuing significant arms reductions. It is also evident that Vice President Bush will be heavily involved in upcoming initiatives.

Ambassador Adelman, backed by the able staff at ACDA, will thus be joining a very accomplished team. This is a time for looking forward, not back. Let us keep the momentum moving. My conditions have been fully met and I shall vote for Ambassador Adelman's confirmation.

Senator Pell?

Senator **Pell**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In making our decision on this nomination, I believe we must consider the present state of the Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, what ACDA ought to be, and whether Ambassador Adelman is an appropriate choice to be Director.

In the last couple of years, ACDA's budget has been slashed and its personnel ceiling vastly reduced. There has been a considerable turnover in people as many of its talented officers have left or were being discharged.

And despite former ACDA Director Rostow's efforts, there has been little evidence in the last year or two of drive or effectiveness at ACDA.

The present plight of ACDA is in marked contrast to the wonderful and auspicious beginning of the Agency in 1961. At that time, many hoped ACDA would take the lead in developing new arms control initiatives and hammering out strong, effective agreements to curb and eventually remove the threat of nuclear war.

We hoped that a tiny but feisty Agency would serve the public interest by balancing the military-industrial complex of which President Eisenhower had just warned us. Together with Senators Humphrey and Clark, I remember going down to the White House in 1961 and persuading President Kennedy to set up the ACDA as a statutory agency rather than by Executive order.

Our reason for doing this was so that the Agency would have more strength and force as a counterweight to the Pentagon since obviously the Pentagon is never going to seek fewer arms or stronger arms control measures. Many on ACDA have been of the stature to effectively serve as counterweights. They therefore deserve much of the credit for such arms control achievements as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Former Directors worked, too, closely with Congress and these and other ventures which came out of my own initiatives, the Sea Bed Arms Control Treaty and the Environmental Modification Convention.

Millions of Americans—and many of us in the Senate—question today whether our administration is truly serious about arms control. The administration had an opportunity to dispel those misgivings—if it is indeed serious—by its choice of whom they would choose as the new Director, and the signal that that would send to the world.

Unfortunately, the Adelman nomination sends the message that such doubts may be well founded.

The administration should have chosen a nominee with weight and stature within the Government, a broad and deep experience in the field and, most important of all, a burning passion to limit the spread of arms around the world—the same motives that we had when we originally set it up.

Through no fault of Ambassador Adelman he does not possess those qualifications. What makes my own personal position even more difficult is that I find Ambassador Adelman to be a decent, honorable, and fine person and one whom I personally like. The responsibility for any error in regard to his nomination rests with the administration in putting him in this position, and not with Ambassador Adelman.

All told, I find myself reluctantly intending to vote against his confirmation. But for the sake of humanity and of arms control in

ACDA, I would add that I hope I am incorrect in my concerns and that Ambassador Adelman, if confirmed, may quickly acquire these qualities I have described.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Helms?

Senator HELMS. I will pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. No comments.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Glenn?

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I ask unanimous consent to submit a statement for the record, and my remarks will be very brief.

[Senator Glenn's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN GLENN

Mr. Chairman, as a general practice, I believe that the President is entitled to be served by officials of his own choosing. Accordingl, I am very reluctant to vote against a President's nominee except in cases of clear misconduct, conflict of interest or obvious inappropriateness.

Because of conflicts in my schedule, I was not able to attend the hearings on Mr. Adelman, but I have studied the record closely. I must say that the misgivings I felt upon learning of his nomination were reinforced by my perusal of the record.

At his first hearing he gave the impression of being disturbingly uninformed on such centrally important issues as whether our societies could survive nuclear war, whether nuclear war could be limited and whether either side could prevail. On the vitally important matter of whether the Soviets are violating the provisions of SALT II, he described himself as not knowledgeable at all. He first said he did not know if Dense Pack violated SALT II. After being briefed, he described Dense Pack as being fully consistent with SALT. At his second appearance he told the Committee that he had been too cautious and gave much fuller answers to many of the questions, while still evading answering other questions.

The impression he left me with is that he is very artful—eager to be ingratiating while avoiding trouble at all costs. Through all the cleverness, it was clear that Mr. Adelman's knowledge of arms control is no deeper than his latest briefings and his commitment to arms control achievement is tempered, at best.

The Adelman nomination has to be considered in the context of this Administration's dismal record on arms control. This is an Administration that came to office disclaiming the SALT II Treaty to be fatally flawed and then decided not to undercut that treaty, so long as the Russians don't. However, the Administration has shortsightedly and adamantly refused to negotiate more formal adherence to the treaty—thus ensuring that the SALT regime could fall apart at any point. Despite its protestations to the contrary, this Administration seems bent upon a nonproliferation policy that the nuclear industry adores—no matter what the cost in foreign policy terms. The Administration claims to be serious about its arms control negotiations in Geneva, yet it undercut one negotiator when he seemed to be edging toward an agreement. If the Administration is serious about arms control, an excellent way to prove it would be to nominate a director of ACDA of an acceptable political outlook who also had stature and respect in the arms control and national security community and had a commitment to achieving strong, effective and verifiable arms control measures. From his testimony, it is clear that not even Mr. Adelman thinks of himself in such terms. He describes himself as a "contact point" for negotiations and told the Committee he would be one of many in the room when arms control decisions were made.

Accordingly, I have concluded that Mr. Adelman has been and is capable of being a productive public servant. I mean it as no slight to him that he is an inappropriate nominee for this post. For this reason I intend to vote against him and I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Senator GLENN. I agree basically with what Senator Pell has just said. I think some of the statements of the nominee that have come out, that are less than 2 years old, have not been adequately refuted. They cast too much doubt on Mr. Adelman as far as doing the job that absolutely has to be done with regard to arms control and with nuclear control in particular.

I have worked a long time on nuclear matters here in the Senate, almost from the day I got here. Along with Senator Percy, we were coauthors of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. So, this is something I have followed both publicly and privately, and with all the intelligence briefings that we can get on a very regular basis to keep up with what is going on all over the world.

I know the intensity with which people feel the need for control in that particular area. It has been reflected in the public over this past year.

I have nothing against Mr. Adelman personally, I wish him well. I hope they can use him in some other position in Government. But I think in the views of the Europeans, in the views of those who want meaningful arms control, it just seems to me that this is the wrong nomination at the wrong time, and I hope the President can find some other use for him. I regret that I will have to vote against him.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Senator Mathias?

Senator **Mathias**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The need to choose a Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency illustrates the President's dilemma. He is caught between the right wing and the right thing and he has lost the initiative. His reaction is to lower the profile of the administration and to avoid confrontation. The result has been a series of inappropriate appointments and smoldering criticism.

Thus, the United States with a proud role in the history of arms control and a fateful role in the future of arms control is muting its voice at a time when the whole world seems ready to listen.

It is an unhappy coincidence that at such a moment we should have a President, a Secretary of State, a Secretary of Defense, and a National Security Adviser who are all innocent of experience in the complex and bewildering world of arms control. It is the work of chance that brings together four officials at the head of government, each with an array of talent, skill, and experience, but none with a depth of knowledge about arms control.

It would be neither coincidence nor chance if a fifth man, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, should also be without experience, knowledge or competence in the field of arms control, a subject that demands those qualities and a great deal more.

Now is the time to reinforce the ranks of the Reagan administration and a weak flank by sending for the most able and distinguished Americans who have devoted themselves to this cause, and by choosing the best among them. It is no discredit to Mr. Adelman to say that he does not fit this description because he has in fact chosen to spend his life working in other vineyards.

But one example may make the point. I personally do not think that a nuclear freeze is possible now, nor do I think that it is a wise policy to pursue. In this I agree with the President and with his principal advisers. But we are probably in the minority among Americans today or, looking farther, among the peoples of those nations now allied with us.

If the United States is to convince our own people, let alone our allies in Europe, that there is a better and a safer, and a surer way, then our spokesman on arms control must be both convinced and convincing. He must speak from expert knowledge and from conscience. His record must be consistent and credible. If not, emotion may swamp reason and sentiment may replace policy in a dangerous passage of history.

So I would hope that Mr. Adelman could be excused from taking a crash course in a subject upon which, until now, he has not concentrated.

The President can then enjoy that privilege which is so rare in human experience—a second choice. And he can also have the time to reflect on the importance of that choice to mankind, to this Nation, and to his own peace of mind.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Mathias.

Senator Cranston, I am going to ask if you would care to renew your motion. [Laughter.]

I might say, if you do not wish to renew your motion, I may offer it myself. But I would like to give you the privilege of renewing it.

Senator CRANSTON. Having a clearer vote count now.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Ambassador Adelman ought to be given a chance to answer the allegations that have been made, the statements that have been attributed to him, and I think they are germane to this hearing.

We are unable to locate him, but I am sure that we can get a hold of him and have him over here by this afternoon sometime.

Senator CRANSTON. Mr. Chairman, I will renew my motion.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a second to that?

Senator HELMS. Second.

The CHAIRMAN. It is moved and seconded.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman, what is the motion?

The CHAIRMAN. The motion is that the vote be delayed so that Mr. Adelman can come before this committee and explain or answer the allegations that have been made, the statements attributed to him. To assert as to whether he made those statements, in what context, and whether he does believe the things that have been said.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes. My motion included that he be under oath.

The CHAIRMAN. That he be what?

Senator CRANSTON. Under oath.

The CHAIRMAN. That he be under oath when he answers the questions? He will be sworn in, then.

Yes?

Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Chairman, I was going to vote "No" on the Cranston amendment because I found the chairman's remarks so compelling. [Laughter.]

Can the chairman explain to me how those compelling reasons could have dissipated so rapidly in the last 4½ minutes of eloquence by the Senator from Maryland? [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. It is the judgment of the Chair that the remarks, on reflection, are absolutely essential. That Mr. Adelman must explain exactly what he meant. Are negotiations a sham? Are they to be just carried on?

It strikes at the heart of the credibility of everything that the Vice President has accomplished and tried to accomplish in Europe. I would think that he should explain, and if he stands on those statements I think he would have great difficulty in carrying out the arms control policy of this country.

Senator TSONGAS. I am undecided on this. I will vote against the motion if I believe that what the chairman is trying to do is to turn people around.

But if I believe that the chairman is sincere, that if Kenneth Adelman not only says that he rejects those statements but can prove that he did not say it, and the chairman in the absence of that proof will join us in opposition, I would have a different view.

The CHAIRMAN. I can assure the distinguished Senator that the chairman's knowledge of each member of this committee is that there is no way any member can be turned around in their judgment, other than whether or not those statements stand as the beliefs of Ambassador Adelman.

No effort will be made to turn anyone around that I know of. I have talked to each member—most members—about how they intend to vote. I think that Ambassador Adelman must come before this committee in order to have a chance to be approved by the committee. I think he, and he alone, can probably do that.

The chairman will certainly make no attempt to do so.

Senator TSONGAS. Is your mind open, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon?

Senator TSONGAS. Is your mind open on this issue?

The CHAIRMAN. My mind is open if these statements are damaging and he cannot fully explain what they did. He has, I felt, adequately explained things that he had said in the past in the context now, things that were said as early as 1978. Things that were said some time ago, he adequately explained them in the second set of hearings.

Others have felt the same way, that his performance in the first set of hearings was very unconvincing, very evasive, and he simply continued to say he had not thought about those issues. But I think the second set of hearings was adequate. Let us give him the chance. I think his performance will determine whether or not this committee would give him their vote.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, is your concern whether Mr. Adelman made these statements, or is your concern whether Mr. Adelman can appear before the committee and now explain away these statements?

The CHAIRMAN. My concern also is whether Mr. Adelman, whom I have not been able to contact, would want to come before the committee and explain these statements.

Senator SARBANES. You think he should have a chance to explain them away, as opposed to demonstrating to the committee whether or not he ever made them; is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. I think he ought to have both, the chance to say whether he said them, in what context he said them, and the significance he attaches to them.

Does anyone want to be recognized on this side? Senator Boschwitz?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to read some of the material that Senator Cranston has presented us, and I would hope that some of my colleagues would read some of the material that Kenneth Adelman has written subsequently to this.

"No good has ever come from arms limitations or arms limitations negotiations," it said in Richard Reeves' article. Later on in the article it says, "Ambassador Adelman believes strongly in the beneficial effects of many arms control and security agreements of the past."

If members would read, "Can there by a SALT III," they would find that the third statement, "The United States might have to pretend to negotiate, a sham to placate European allies."

In, "Can there be a SALT III," Kenneth Adelman states that one of the problems with SALT II was that NATO allies were not included, and that one of the problems with SALT II was that it was not broad enough. That it did not take into account MIRVing, it took into account only the launchers, and it gives a more up-to-date statement of where he stands.

As a matter of fact, "Can there be a SALT III" precedes this article, or letter, that I had not previously seen.

Senator BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a second?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. No. I will in a moment. If I may continue, Joe, for a moment. [Laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. I did not want to say anything. [Laughter.]

Senator BOSCHWITIZ. I would hope also that Senators would read, "The Seven Lessons of SALT," which was another article by Mr. Adelman—I forget the date—but it also outlines his feeling about the SALT process and why he was not satisfied with SALT II; and many Members of the Senate were not.

His principal dissatisfaction was because it was not broad enough. So, as we read some of this newly-submitted material it would be my hope that Senators would also have an opportunity to read at least those two articles, "The Seven Lessons of SALT," and, "Can There be a SALT III."

I now yield to the Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it the Senator's contention that there is a possibility that Ambassador Adelman could refer to SALT II—as others have—as a "sham" simply because he did not feel it did enough?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. YES.

The CHAIRMAN. He may have meant that it provided for no real reductions and that the START talks are aimed for a full one-third reduction, and that there is a genuine, sincere effort and a real hope that we can achieve that.

I think if he does, he ought to have the opportunity to explain that and not have a vote simply based on what has been now read into the record without his explanation as to what he said.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. The chairman summarized it very well.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to vote now, but I think it might be a good idea to withhold the vote for the following reasons:

One thing is absolutely clear by now to the President, I am sure, to the press, and to all of our colleagues, that at best this is going to be a very close endorsement and probably there are not enough votes.

I would hope that for the sake of the President and for Mr. Adelman, that not only would we withhold voting now but maybe even withhold hearings for several days to give the President an opportunity to contemplate whether or not he wants this to come to a head.

I feel very uncertain about my vote. I have decided how that vote would be cast. I had the distinction of my colleague—who has been attempting to convince me to vote one way—lean over and say, "Joe, it looks like you are the deciding vote."

I do not want to be the deciding vote. [Laughter.]

Not because I am unwilling to cast that vote.

The CHAIRMAN. Rest your mind assured, I have said that to three other people. [Laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. I can assure the chairman that if the vote is cast now, Mr. Adelman loses. And the fact of the matter is that I do not think we should put the President in that position.

I think that there is too much at stake in Europe. I think there is too much at stake in terms of Mr. Adelman's own career, which I think is a brilliant career and I think he is a brilliant man. I like very much personally which—I should note parenthetically—is not always the case on the votes I have had to cast in the last several years; for that matter, the last 10 years.

But the fact of the matter is that there are no winners here. If Mr. Adelman is defeated—even if he is passed on the floor which I suspect would be able to be done—we have a product that has been tainted. We have caused further doubts to be added in the minds of the Europeans as to whether or not we, America, this President, is sincere about arms control.

On the other hand, if Mr. Adelman is passed through by a narrow vote, the same thing occurs. If we defeat Mr. Adelman both here and on the floor of the U.S. Senate, we find a situation where on the one hand Europeans are reassured the Senate is more sincere about arms control, but that puts the President in even a greater dilemma.

I would sincerely hope—and I have had the occasion as I suspect most of us have, to speak to a number of people in the administration, people I greatly respect. I spoke 25 minutes ago to the Vice President to tell him what I was about to do.

I would hope that people like the Vice President, and the majority leader, and the chairman of this committee, would have an opportunity to speak with the President and say, "Mr. President, this may not be such a good idea to pursue. You can probably win it on the floor but it is not a good idea at this time in our relations with Europe—at this time in our relationship with the Soviet Union—at this time with regard to the attitude of the American people on the subject as it relates to you and to the whole country, to go with somebody who is not going to get overwhelming support."

I quite frankly think if I cast my vote—and were it to be cast now I would vote "no"—to cast my vote "no," I would feel forever indebted to Mr. Adelman because I would feel I have done him a wrong because Mr. Adelman is the wrong guy in the wrong spot, and he is going to have to carry that on his career for a long time. And it is not fair to him to be put in that slot.

So, I have spoken too much. If we are going to delay for this afternoon, Mr. Adelman is going to come back and say whether he said what is said. I am not shocked by what he said. I am not outraged by what he said. I do not want to put him under oath and ask him whether he said it, and did he mean it or did he not mean it. I think that is a useless exercise.

I would hope if we are going to do it, delay only for that reason, let us just vote now. But if in fact we are going to delay to give people a chance to rethink—not just members on how they vote rethink because I do not think you are going to get much of a change but to give the President a chance to rethink—I think we will be doing the committee good. I think we will be doing the nominee a great deal of good. And it is solicitous for me to say this and presumptuous, but I think we would be doing the President a lot of good.

The CHAIRMAN. I would not say it presumptuous at all. I think it is a statement that is characteristic, I think, of the way this committee has always operated.

Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Chairman, I will move in substitution because I think that the chairman was listening to Senator Biden. I think what Senator Biden was saying very simply, that no votes are going to change by bringing Kenneth Adelman back.

I went to the State Department and had breakfast a week ago Monday. The vote in my mind at that point was 11 to 6 in favor of the nominee. I told Mr. Dam to withdraw the nomination, even though as a Democrat his confirmation would be a boon to my party politically.

But I felt it would damage the country and play into the hands of Andropov. And my advice to the State Department was, "For God's sake, pull it down."

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anyone else who wishes to comment?

Senator TSONGAS. If I may finish.

The vote right now is 9 to 8 to reject the nomination. What possible good is served by an embarrassment to the administration. It will hurt them.

If we turn it down and the President gives us a nominee we can all joyfully vote for, he will strengthen the American position in Europe, with the German elections next month, and it will hamper the position of Andropov.

So, I would say that it would make sense—and I will so move—to put the vote off for 1 week. Let things calm down. With the clear understanding it is the wish of the committee to avoid confrontation and give the President a chance to do what we all know is right, and do what is in the best interest of this country. I so move.

Senator BIDEN. I second that motion.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a motion pending now. Is this a substitute motion?

Senator TSONGAS. It is a substitute.

Senator **Biden**. And I second it.

Senator **Pressler**. Mr. Chairman, for some time I have been trying to get a chance to speak. Would this preclude me from making a comment on this?

Senator **Glenn**. Go ahead, we want to hear you.

The **Chairman**. I think this would be the time to speak. Go right ahead, Senator Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. Well, if the real reason for delaying this is to give the President a chance to withdraw the nomination, I would support it. But if the real reason is for another hearing, I would not.

Senator **Tsongas**. I am not calling for a hearing.

The **Chairman**. The substitute motion pending does not require a hearing.

Senator **Pressler**. But it seems to me that we really are in a position where we should go forward with a vote if we are just looking to additional hearings because we have had such a difficult time getting candid remarks. Maybe that will change. Even in the last—I will cite just one example. Even in the last hearing which was more candid, in regard to ASAT the nominee said, "Well, rather than have direct negotiations we can have negotiations in Geneva with the 40 countries." But he failed to volunteer, that just last summer the United States rejected and opposed the creation of an ASAT working group in Geneva.

It would seem to me that a completely candid response to my question would have included that. I found it out subsequently by doing research.

So, if we are going to have another hearing, if that is the real purpose, I am opposed to it. So, if we could somehow amend this, I think it is apparent to everyone that the nominee will be defeated today and I do not want the President to have embarrassment.

But if our real reason is to give the President a chance to withdraw him, then I will go along and support it. But if our real reason is to have another hearing, I think this will just be an exercise in futility.

Senator **Tsongas**. I thought I made it very clear that the purpose is to give the President the chance to withdraw the nomination. That is the basis of my vote and I assume everyone who would vote with me would share that view.

Senator **Baker**. Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the President will do. I have not talked to the President and I have no idea whether he will withdraw it or insist on pursuing it.

I intend to vote for the substitute motion. I think it is a good motion and I think it meets the circumstances that need to be addressed now—and that is for the dust to settle and figure out what happens next.

But I do not want anybody here to proceed on the assumption that I am voting for this resolution, or the Cranston resolution, as some sort of implied promise that I know the President is going to take down the nomination. I do not know that. He may indeed insist on it, and it may indeed be defeated.

But do not let anybody be mistaken about that, I will support the motion and I think that the Tsongas motion, frankly, is the better motion under these circumstances. But I do not want anybody to think that I have some message from the President; I do not.

The **Chairman**. The motion does not rule out the fact that if the President determines that Ambassador Adelman should have an opportunity to come before the committee, the Chair can call him before the committee. That does not preclude that but it does not require it, either.

Senator **Biden**. Mr. Chairman, I concur in what the majority leader said. I do not think we should be saying to the President that this is the time to think it over, the condition you bring him down. That is not what I was saying when I spoke. I did not draw up the motion, obviously, but that was not what I was saying.

I think the President, knowing what he is confronted with, should in fact have an opportunity to reconsider and he may very well want to reconsider and go forward, and that is his right. That is something that I think he should be able to do. And if he asks you to have more hearings, I think that is his right. I think we should have more hearings if that is the case, if the President insists.

But all I was trying to say, this should give him an opportunity to reflect as to whether or not he really wants to push this all the way to the wall. So, my vote for the motion and seconding it is not a condition that the President bring it down.

The **Chairman**. We have a motion, it has been seconded. Is there a request for a rollcall vote or can we voice vote?

Senator **Dodd**. What exactly is the Tsongas motion, just so we understand it? Will you restate your motion?

Senator **Tsongas**. The motion would be that the vote on the nominee be withheld for 1 week. That would be the official part of it.

The unofficial part is, our advice to the President is that this is not working and it is time to go back and perhaps submit a nominee that we can all enthusiastically endorse, and hopefully reaffirm the U.S. position on arms control.

Senator **Glenn**. Mr. Chairman, would we want to set a time for the vote, pending no further hearings or anything like that, so we will know what to plan on right now?

Senator **Dodd**. I think just leave it as it is.

The **Chairman**. You specified in the motion the matter is to be deferred for 1 week?

Senator **Tsongas**. One week.

The **Chairman**. Why not set the vote, if there is to be a vote, at the business meeting on Tuesday?

Senator **Dodd**. Mr. Chairman, can I make a suggestion? I think the motion is fine as it reads.

Senator **Pell**. I would leave it loose.

Senator **Dodd**. I think setting times and dates—there may be a reason to delay it another 2 or 3 days beyond that, for whatever reasons.

I think leaving it open ended—I think we all know what we are trying to do here. Leaving it simple, without suggesting a conclusion, suggesting by a committee vote what the President's position ought to be, is the best way to proceed. I think it leaves everybody in a far more fluid position.

Senator PELL. And I think it is more respectful to the President too, to leave it loose and not give him like an ultimatum.

The CHAIRMAN. To retain the motion as you have given it, then.

Senator BIDEN. Let us vote on the motion.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been seconded. Is there a request for a rollcall vote?

Senator CRANSTON. No. I just wanted to add that this motion obviously leaves without prejudice the question of whether or not there should be a further hearing. You said perhaps there should be, perhaps there should not be. But we do not preclude a further hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator CRANSTON. For Auletta or for Adelman.

The CHAIRMAN. All those in favor of the motion say aye.

[Chorus of ayes.]

The CHAIRMAN. Opposed?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. No.

Senator PRESSLER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. There are two recorded "no" votes. Are there more? Senator Pressler and Senator Boschwitz.

Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that the President would understand that we had the votes and we could have been confrontational. We chose not to be and I hope he would accept that in the spirit in which it is offered.

Senator DODD. Will the Senator yield?

Senator BIDEN. I am not sure you had all the votes, I want to make it clear if my vote is being counted. I do not think we should say anything like that to the President. I may vote for Adelman.

Senator TSONGAS. I take back my original motion. [Laughter.]

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Just one point before we leave. In my 2 years here, every now and then there are moments of great eloquence. And the statement by the Senator from Maryland was one of those rare moments in my 2 years here, a truly eloquent, eloquent set of remarks.

I hope that all in this country have an opportunity to read them, to see them. They were truly brilliant.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. [Applause.]

If there is no further business, the meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

NOMINATION OF HON. KENNETH L. ADELMAN

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1983

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles, H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Baker, Helms, Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Murkowski, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd.

The CHAIRMAN. This morning the Committee on Foreign Relations will complete its deliberations on the nomination of Ambassador Kenneth L. Adelman to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We will vote on the nomination no later than 12:30 today.

This is the third time Ambassador Adelman has appeared before the committee on his nomination to ACDA. Members have already had extensive opportunities to direct a wide range of questions to him and to hear his views on all aspects of arms control. I would hope, therefore, that members would confine their questions this morning to matters not covered in the earlier hearings. Because of certain questions raised since his last appearance before the committee, Ambassador Adelman has asked to be placed under oath for this morning's discussion.

Prior to Ambassador Adelman's appearance, the committee will call Mr. Kenneth Auletta, a reporter with the New York Daily News. Mr. Auletta is appearing at the request of Senators Pell and Cranston and, at his own request, has been subpenaed to testify by the committee. He also has volunteered to appear under oath.

Throughout the consideration of this nomination we have made every effort to accommodate the views and requests of all members of the committee. Those not familiar with the traditions of the Foreign Relations Committee may not understand the need for such extraordinary deliberations, but it has been the historical practice of this committee to give every reasonable consideration to the requests of it members, particularly on matters of such importance and intense committee interest. I am proud of that tradition and will continue to uphold it while I am chairman.

At the same time, I do not think it is consistent with our responsibility to the Senate to keep this nomination in committee any longer One way or the other, we should report to the Senate today. I hold this view without regard to my views on this particular nomination and have expressed it on earlier occasions.

Nominations have a different status than legislation under the Constitution. They come to the Senate from the President for advice and consent. While the Senate is not compelled to give the President the advice he wants or the consent he wants or he needs, we are, I think, obligated to give him and the Senate our decision, up or down, without undue delay.

Certainly it is not for the committee alone to prevent Senate consideration indefinitely. If certain members wish to delay Senate action on this matter, they have the traditional opportunities available to all Senators on the Senate floor. The committee itself is not the place for such efforts. Therefore, I would hope that all members would join with me in seeing that this nomination is placed before the Senate for advice and consent, whatever the recommendations of a committee majority may be.

Senator **Cranston**. Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. One last thing I would like to put in the record. I have talked with Sam Stratton, a U.S. Representative and chairman of the Subcommittee in the House of Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, a member of the Decocratic Party, who has had the privilege of working with Ambassador Adelman directly, as very few of us have had the opportunity.

This morning, the Washington Post carried a letter, the substance of which he had earlier sent to me, and I would like to read it.

"As the chairman of the House subcommittee with major oversight of our nuclear arms reduction negotiations, I find it incredible that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should have held up the nomination of Kenneth Adelman to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on grounds that he has had no prior experience in direct arms control and disarmament negotiations, and also, like many of us, has occasionally spoken in a somewhat provocative way.

"The fact is that he has had a unique experience in negotiations relating directly to arms control and disarmament matters. During the second special session of the U.N. General Assembly on Disarmament, in New York in June and July 1982, he served on the firing line.

"As Deputy U.S. permanent representative to the U.N., he was the actual field commander of our delegation. It was Ken Adelman who ran the United Nations' U.S. staff on a day-to-day basis. He planned the day's strategy, outlined the guts of any written statements, assigned committee responsibilities, escorted visiting foreign delegations, foreign ministers, foreign journalists, through the impressive graphic display of U.S. involvement in disarmament initiatives over the whole 37-year period since Hiroshima.

"In addition, Ambassador Adelman, acting always with unfailing courtesy, patience and good will, met repeatedly with private peace-oriented and religious groups to outline U.S. policies.

"Is the Senate unaware, for example, that during this hectic 2-month period fully half the U.S. staff that Ambassador Adelman directed had been sent up to New York from the Disarmament Agency in Washington?

"Ambassador Adelman demonstrated not only diplomatic skills, but also a keen understanding of how to negotiate with foreign governments over specific issues of arms control and disarmament. He largely organized a select group of Western nations who generally supported the U.S. position, to counter the almost universal opposition that occurs at the U.N. not only from the Communist bloc but also from so-called nonalined nations.

"As a result of Ambassador Adelman's initiatives, Soviet bloc countries were forced to defend their reluctance to allow U.N. expert teams to enter Afghanistan and Kampuchea to determine the validity of the charges of 'yellow rain'.

"In negotiations with foreign delegations, Mr. Adelman also succeeded in eliminating from the final draft of one of the session's major documents language offensive to the United States, inserting in its place language that put the General Assembly on record calling for free expression of opinion for all disarmament groups, not only in Western countries—as in the original draft—but even in Red Square." Signed, Samuel S. Stratton, U.S. Representative (D-N.Y.), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems.

[The following letter was subsequently received for the record:]

SRI International-Washington,
Strategic Studies Center,
Arlington, Va., February 22, 1983.

Senator Charles H. Percy,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Percy: The President's appointment of Dr. Kenneth Adelman to be director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has of course been of great interest to the Strategic Studies Center of SRI International, where he was our colleague for over three years. Because of the high interest within the Washington official community and in the press in Dr. Adelman's research and writing while in the Center, I am moved to write to you to explain what the Center is and what it does.

It was my privilege to found this Center some thirty years ago as a research group within what was then the Stanford Research Institute. (now SRI International). The Center's objective then and now has been quite straightforward: to pursue a multidisciplinary research program on the basic strategic issues which bear upon the overall national security strategy of the United States, and to formulate the findings of this research in terms that will be useful to national security and foreign policy planners and decision-makers in the pursuit of their important tasks. It is the nature of such research to examine and give the proper weight to all the critical factors—political, economic, military, technological—which in their aggregate affect the interaction of this and other nations in the international system. Among these interactions it is clear that those involving the United States and the Soviet Union demand in-depth research. Similarly, as to key issues. are control is one to which this Center has always given careful attention.

The Center's studies are undertaken for specific clients, under contract. Most of these clients are in the U.S. Government, many in the Department of Defense. The researcher's task is to examine the factors and issues bearing on his assigned subject, with a scholarly, objective and orderly approach, seeking the logical findings which will derive from his research. Often the client requests examination of alternative potential developments in the national security arena, and the options open to the United States in coping with these contingencies.

The researcher's personal views are not a part of this process. It is fair to state, however, that in its broad perspective on national security matters, this Center has since the founding taken a basically conservative approach to Soviet foreign and national security policies, and over 20 years ago we correctly forecast the Soviet military buildup. The course of events over the past three decades—especially U.S.-Soviet relationships—have born out the correctness of this approach. The continuing Soviet arms buildup and aggressive international behavior affects American security in many ways. The Center's arms control projects generally treat control-negotiations as one very important aspect of American security.

Ken Adelman shared this general view of international relations and arms control. He understands well the key issues at stake. He is very well prepared to deal with the multitude of factors which must enter into a sound approach to the negotiations of arms control and arms reductions. Ken Adelman is an excellent scholar. His expertise on African affairs led to a series of studies for clients on Africa, and SRI subsidized his book, African Realities. However, his interests were and are much broader than Africa. He participated in SRI projects on Japan, arms control, and several analyses of the Soviet Union. He was and is a good friend of Gene Rostow, with whom he was a member of the Committee on the Present Danger. He participated with me in a seminar on "The Global Strategic Balance and Regional Issues" held in 1979 on Capitol Hill for incoming Senators and Representatives. Later, an issue of the journal comparative strategy was published with Gene Rostow as guest editor with major contributions from Paul Nitze, Donald Rumsfeld, and Ken Adelman. A copy of this issue is enclosed.

As Ken Adelman's former supervisor at SRI, I am very familiar with his ability and his views. He is conservative about American security and the threat from the Soviet Union. He is not an extremist of any kind. He is deeply concerned about human rights. I know he shares my belief that discussions and negotiations with the Soviet Union on many levels are a necessity if we are to maintain our security and at the same time prevent nuclear war. Ken has been a student of deterrence for several years and gave an excellent summary on the meaning and necessity of nuclear deterrence as a precondition for all arms control negotiations in a meeting at the State Department called by ACDA to which several critics of U.S. policy in the United Nations were invited. He did an outstanding job in presenting a clear and coherent outline of the Reagan Administration's position to a largely critical and hostile audience.

I recommend him to you without reservation.

Sincerely,

RICHARD B. FOSTER,
Senior Director.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no statement except to express thanks to you, as chairman, for scheduling this hearing. I would hope this question of pretty grave inconsistency between what Ambassador Adelman and Mr. Auletta have said can be resolved, and that is why I am glad you are planning to have them both under oath.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Does anyone else wish to make a statement?

Senator CRANSTON. May I make a brief opening statement?

I just wanted to make clear why I requested last week that this committee delay its vote, which would likely have been adverse to the nomination, and that the hearings be reopened to hear from Ambassador Adelman and Mr. Auletta.

It was after the second day of hearings that I learned of the May 24, 1981, column by Ken Auletta with the now famous and, to me, shocking statements attributed to Mr. Adelman. It seemed to me then, and it seems to me now that it would not be fair to rely on these statements in reaching a final decision on his nomination without first giving him and Mr. Auletta a full opportunity to address them under oath before the committee.

If the statements attributed to Mr. Adelman by Mr. Auletta are accurate, I believe they are so serious as to disqualify Mr. Adelman from holding the position for which he has been nominated—a position directly related to the most important security risk our Nation has ever faced.

Now it is one thing to infer and allege, as many critics of the Reagan administration do, that administration officials see arms control as a way to calm folks at home and in Europe and as a cover for a massive arms buildup. It is something else when a high administration official may actually have publicly embraced those views.

It seems to me positively devastating to the people of this Nation and to the entire world who yearn for peace if these are, in fact, the views of the person to be charged with the awesome responsibility of overseeing all arms control and disarmament activities and negotiations on behalf of the U.S. Government.

That is why I believed then and believe now that the only proper course of action that would be fair to Mr. Adelman, to the members of this committee, the Senate, and fair to the American people, would be to hear from both Mr. Adelman and Mr. Auletta under oath on this matter.

I oppose the confirmation of Mr. Adelman because I believe he lacks the necessary qualifications and commitment to be the lead advocate for arms control in the executive branch, especially under this particular administration, which has no Cabinet-level officials with arms control experience.

But there is another major issue here, and that is Mr. Adelman's credibility, in two respects: First, whether there is reason to conclude that Mr. Adelman has in the course of his testimony before this committee been substantially lacking in candor on material issues; and, second, whether the inconsistencies and apparent contradictions in Mr. Adelman's testimony and writings would so impair his credibility with our allies and adversaries as to render him ineffectve as the director of ACDA.

The place to confront these twin issues of credibility is before this committee, not in press conferences, not in newspaper articles. It is this committee's constitutional duty in carrying out our advice and consent responsibilities on this nomination to explore these issues firsthand and directly, and that is why Mr. Adelman and Mr. Auletta have been called before us today.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Would anyone else like to comment?

Senator Pressler. Mr. Chairman, will there be a chance to make statements before the vote?

The Chairman. Yes, of course. We will have a regular round of questions and you can make those statements during your round of questions.

We do have, I would like to announce to the committee members, an agreement with the ranking minority member. We will have a 5-minute break at the conclusion of the hearing so that there can be a meeting of Senators and staff directors in the room behind us so that we can discuss and everyone understands the procedure that we will follow on the voting.

Senator Tsongas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have inserted in the record, inasmuch as other things have been put in, four newspaper articles. One is a Joseph Kraft piece entitled "Adelman and Zero Options" of a few days ago; yesterday's New York Times piece on Andropov; the Worker piece on Adelman 2 days ago; and what I think is perhaps even more important—a piece in Newsday entitled: "The Nay-Sayer of Arms Control," a story on Richard Perle.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, they will be incorporated in the record at this point.

[The articles referred to follow:]

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1983]

ADELMAN AND ZERO OPTIONS

(By Joseph Kraft)

Ken Adelman is a bright young man with a flair for the public business. He knows the arms control field reasonably well and could easily become expert.

But strong impersonal arguments impel the Senate to play hardball with his nomination as director of the arms control agency. For the nomination flows from a policy that compromises both the chances for an accord with Russia and—far worse—this country's ties with Western Europe.

By giving Adelman a rough time, senators focus attention on the adverse consequences of a policy pushed by the Pentagon and approved by the White House, with the secretary of state standing ingloriously aloof.

At the heart of the policy is Soviet deployment of some 240 intermediate-range missiles—the SS20s, each with three warheads—targeted on Western Europe. NATO responded with a decision to deploy 572 U.S. cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe. Deployment was to go forward by the end of this year unless Big Two negotiations in Geneva yielded an acceptable compromise.

The administration went to Geneva with the "zero option"—a proposal to cancel deployment if Russia eliminated all its intermediate-range missiles. The Russians came back with a series of different proposals culminating in an offer—by Yuri Andropov—to cut back the SS20 force to the exact number of British and French nuclear weapons. That would mean 162 SS20s with 486 warheads.

Long before then it became clear that bellicose statements from Washington had made the West Germans and other Europeans skittish about further deployment of American nuclear weapons. Thus the talks at Geneva posed not merely a Soviet-American, or East-West, problem. They also posed a U.S.-European, or West-West, problem.

The West-West problem was sensed with special keenness by Paul Nitze, the chief American negotiator in Geneva, and by the former arms control director Eugene Rostow. Both became convinced the West Germans would never go for full deployment of the cruise and Pershing missiles. Both saw in the zero option the makings of an Atlantic crisis.

In that context, Nitze fashioned at Geneva an informal proposal that would move off the zero option. It called for the United States to deploy 75 cruise missiles with four warheads apiece. The Russians would go down to the equivalent number of SS20 warheads—or about 100 missiles. Thirty more would go to the Far East and the rest would be scrapped. Though the Russians rejected the idea, the Andropov offer, except for fingering the British and French, is not all that different.

But the Pentagon was furious about the Nitze proposal. Nitze and Rostow were reprimanded in a note from William Clark, the president's national security adviser, to Secretary of State George Shultz. When Rostow sought broad discretion for Nitze in the continuing Geneva negotiations, he was fired. Adelman, a protégé of former defense secretary Don Rumsfeld, was then named, with strong backing from the Pentagon, to succeed Rostow.

The firing of Rostow triggered a new burst of hostility to the zero option in Europe. In West Germany, it became a key issue in the election called for March 6. Vice President George Bush went to Europe to ease feelings and came to the Nitze-Rostow conclusion that the problem was more in alliance politics than in relations with Russia. He returned, saying that while the United States still favored the zero option, it could be flexible and consider some "interim solution."

But President Reagan, after meeting with Bush and Shultz, decided, apparently on the grounds it would look like weakness to Moscow, against any new show of flexibility. At that point, a key Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Charles Mathias of Maryland, swung into opposition to the Adelman appointment. The Mathias move, made after a meeting with a special representative from West Germany, tilted the committee against Adelman, 9-8. Majority Leader Howard Baker then phoned the White House, saying that to spare the president the ignominy of defeat, he and Committee Chairman Charles Percy would postpone the vote.

The president, instead of taking the chance for a graceful withdrawal, blew his cork. At his news conference Wednesday he spoke of the zero option as "the moral high ground" and showed no signs of coming off it. He endorsed Adelman warmly, and suggested it didn't make any difference whether he withdrew the nomination or was beaten in the Senate. "Either way," he said, "I would lose."

So there now shapes up a fight bound to be costly for the administration. If Adelman is confirmed, it will be by a tiny majority that makes him virtually useless in the job. In that case, the opponents of he present policy will gang up on some of the other projects coming down the pike—like the MX missile.

But the opponents, as long as the present inflexibility continues, have no reason to relent. By giving Adelman lumps, they not only emphasize that much more flexibility is required to hold this country and Europe together on arms control; they also drive home in unambiguous terms an important lesson to a man who needs to learn it with a vengeance. They teach Secretary Shultz that alliance politics is far too important to be left to those in the Pentagon and the White House whose understanding of foreign policy passes not beyond competition with Russia.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 23, 1983]

FRENCH OFFICIAL LIKENS ANDROPOV TO COMPUTER

(By E. J. Dionne, Jr.)

PARIS, Feb. 22.—The French Foreign Minister said Monday that Yuri V. Andropov, the Soviet leader, was "lacking in human warmth" and was a "nonromantic" who worked like "a computer."

The French Minister, Claude Cheysson, was one of the first senior Western officials to meet with Mr. Andropov since the death of Leonid I. Brezhnev last November, and he offered his unusually candid account of his encounter during an interview with French reporters on a flight from Moscow to Brussels late Monday night and in television interviews there.

His comments, all for the public record, were printed today in several French publications, including the newspaper Le Monde.

STICKS TO THE FACTS

"He is a sober man, precise, who shows no emotion, who sticks to the facts and to a mathematical reasoning," Mr. Cheysson said of Mr. Andropov. The 68-year-old Soviet leader, the French diplomat added, "made a presentation which was cool and objective, accompanied at times by a little personal touch in his gesture, in his smile or in the way he set out an argument."

"But in all this, he was extraordinarily dispassionate, lacking in that human warmth which I found elsewhere, in Leningrad and even in my talks with Gromyko," Mr. Cheysson said, referring to the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

Mr. Cheysson described Mr. Andropov as a "nonromantic," and when asked if the Soviet leader was a modern man, the French Foreign Minister replied, "Yes, he is a modernist in the sense of a computer, in the sense of precision of word and gesture."

Mr. Cheysson's portrait of the Soviet leader, the former head of the K.G.B., as a cold and calculating man contrasted sharply with the characterization provided by Soviet officials since the death of Mr. Brezhnev.

In the Soviet press and in conversations with Western reporters, Mr. Andropov has been portrayed as a man whose tenure in the 1950's as Ambassador to Hungary and exposure to Western ideas gave him a unique ability to compromise and innovate.

Mr. Andropov is familiar with the English language and has been presented as a voracious reader of Western magazines and novels, a lover of jazz and a collector of Glenn Miller records, a connoisseur of Scotch and cognac and a tennis enthusiast.

On Soviet television, Mr. Andropov has recently been shown mingling with blue collar employees in Soviet factories. His drive against Government corruption has been seen as an attempt to align himself with lower-level Soviet workers.

In Moscow, Mr. Cheysson reiterated France's opposition to Mr. Andropov's proposal to reduce the Soviet Union's medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe to the level of those missiles under the control of Britain and France.

The plan was rejected by both Paris and London on the ground that it would institutionalize what they see as Soviet superiority. The French Government, whose missiles are not under North Atlantic Treaty Organization control, was especially insistent that its missiles would not be the subject of negotiations between other countries.

But Mr. Cheysson said that after his meeting, he believed that the United States was "the only partner that counts" for the Soviet union.

"That we want to be independent, that doesn't interest him," Mr. Cheysson said. "He wants to take into account our forces, but not our reasoning."

[From the New York Times, Feb. 22, 1983]

ON HEAT AND LIGHT

(By Tom Wicker)

During his last news conference, President Reagan was asked why he did not withdraw the nomination of Kenneth Adelman to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, since the Senate Foreign Relations Committee otherwise would reject the nomination.

"Well, either way I would lose then, wouldn't I?" Mr. Reagan replied. "And what's the difference whether I surrender or they beat me by one vote?"

There's a lot of difference. In the first place, withdrawing a nomination isn't surrender unless you call it that, and Mr. Reagan is the only one who's done so. A wise general knows when to retreat, in order to fight again another day; and Mr. Reagan's best course now is to come back another day, with another, stronger nominee.

If, on the other hand, he tries to carry out his threat to make the senators "feel the heat" if they won't "see the light," the most he can gain is an empty victory. If the Foreign Relations Committee rejects Mr. Adelman, it will be with Republican votes added to those of Democrats, and not the reasonable ground that whatever the nominee's ability, he lacks the specialized experience the ACDA job requires—particularly when two sets of Soviet-American negotiations are going forward in Geneva, one with a December deadline.

Mr. Reagan therefore would find it hard to charge that a floor fight was either partisan or obstructionist. As nearly as such conflicts ever do, this one would center on the merits of the nomination. Plainly, they are not great.

Even so, Mr. Reagan—if he can command the whole-hearted support of the majority leader, Howard Baker, on this issue—might win; but not by more than a few votes and not without a bitter, devisive struggle. Arms control, after all, is an emotional as well as an immensely important subject.

So the President ought to consider what kind of position he and Mr. Adelman would be in if the latter were confirmed by only a few votes after a long struggle. Mr. Adelman would take office seriously weakened and with a powerful Senate minority already opposed to him. That would not bode well for ACDA, already damaged by the forced resignation of Eugene Rostow and the political interference of Jesse Helms and other reactionary senators. Nor would it strengthen the hands of Mr. Reagan's negotiators in Geneva, or comfort allies that Vice President Bush, on his recent European trip, found restive about Mr. Reagan's inflexible stand—as some saw it—on arms control.

The President, moreover, could also lose a Senate fight over Mr. Adelman's nomination. That would surely be a more serious repudiation than a withdrawal of the Adelman nomination and the submission of another name. Since the Foreign Relations Committee's opposition has already established that little is to be gained by forcing Mr. Adelman's confirmation (if that proves possible), why risk a really damaging setback merely for Mr. Reagan to have his way?

Surely there are men compatible with Mr. Reagan's arms control views who would bring more specialized arms control experience to ACDA than can Kenneth Adelman—particularly when neither Secretary of State Shultz nor Judge Clark, the President's national security adviser, has such experience. Fred C. Ikle, for example, now a high official in the Defense Department, once headed the arms control agency under Presidents Nixon and Ford.

If Mr. Reagan substituted such a nomination, Mr. Adelman could go back to honorable service as deputy ambassador to the U.N., wounded no doubt but at least not having undergone what Senator Rudy Boschwitz accurately termed the "debilitating, demeaning experience" of a confirmation battle he might well lose. The new nominee, if wisely chosen, could be quickly confirmed and could take office without strong Senate opposition. Surely this would be a better signal, to Moscow and the allies alike, of the administration's commitment to and competence in arms control;

rather than a "surrender," such a course would improve Mr. Reagan's position both in the Senate and at Geneva.

At his news conference, however, the President insisted on backing Mr. Adelman to the hilt, because, he said, "I believe I had a right to my choice . . ." Sorry, but that's not what the Constitution says.

The Senate's power to "advise and consent"—or not to—on such nominations is as clear as the President's right to nominate. Though the Senate, with rare exceptions, usually gives a new President free rein in setting up his administration, and though it all too often gives no serious scrutiny to later nominees, the right of confirmation is, or should be, an important check on Presidential power. In the Adelman case, the Foreign Relations Committee is doing exactly what it's supposed to do (and what the Senate doesn't do often enough).

[From Newsday, 1983]

THE NAY-SAYER OF ARMS CONTROL

(By Roy Gutman)

WASHINGTON.—Critics call him a ruthless schemer who has thwarted one arms control negotiation after another under the Reagan administration. Admirers praise his grasp of the Soviet military threat, his intellectual honesty, his dedication to the cause.

It is hard to be indifferent about Richard Perle.

Perle, 41, holds a middle-ranking job as assistant secretary of defense for international security policy. But his influence goes beyond his title; he is probably the most powerful subcabinet official on arms control issues.

Perle's record the past two years is prodigious. Officials at the Pentagon, the State Department and the Arms Control Agency say he played the pivotal role in deciding the U.S. "zero-zero option" stance on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) at the Geneva talks, in shaping or delaying positions on lesser arms control issues and in the abortive effort to punish U.S. allies for helping build a new Soviet gas pipeline.

"He is intellectually without a peer," said Sen. Paul Tsongas (D-Mass.), an arms control supporter, of Perle's role in the administration. "You have people who are not well versed and not particularly bright, whose instinct is anti-Soviet. What Perle does is provide * * * a rather strident intellectual environment in which compromise and modifications and reasonability just seem to have no place."

Perle said of Tsongas' grasp of arms control issues: "I don't think he's thought very deeply about these matters."

Intellect alone does not explain his success. Perle has carefully selected his battles; he says he has worked within the bureaucratic framework set up by President Reagan. Most important, he appears to have kept the confidence of a powerful patron, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger.

The influence Perle has amassed reveals something of the inner workings of the Reagan administration. It also poses a challenge for Secretary of State George Shultz, whom Reagan put in charge of nuclear weapons talks last month after dismissing Eugene Rostow as head of the Arms Control Agency and nominating a relative neophyte, Kenneth Adelman, to replace him.

For more than a decade Perle has been as deeply involved in arms control as anyone in government; long ago he came to symbolize opposition to detente. As aide to Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) from 1969 to 1981 (Tsongas maintains that Perle "dominated" Jackson), he directed a series of titanic struggles against efforts by President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and their successors to reach agreements with the Soviet Union.

In 1972 Perle and Jackson secured passage of an amendment implicitly rebuking Nixon for negotiating numerically unequal limits in the SALT I strategic arms limitation treaty. In 1974 Perle helped engineer the Jackson-Vanik amendment that denied most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union. Moscow subsequently renounced a U.S.-Soviet trade accord, and the era of detente it was supposed to usher in was stillborn. Perle and Jackson worked in 1975 to help block President Gerald Ford's attempt to conclude a SALT II agreement with the Soviets. Taking on President Jimmy Carter in 1977, they rounded up 40 senators to vote against confirming his arms control chief, Paul Warnke. And in 1978 and 1979, through hearings and press leaks, they played a key role in organizing opposition to Carter's efforts to negotiate a SALT II Treaty, which he eventually withdrew.

Out of that background, Perle came to work for a President who was instinctually distrustful of negotiating with the Russians, was on record as disdaining the SALT II Treaty as "fatally flawed" and was committed to a major U.S. arms buildup.

Perle's current views are consistent with his past actions. "Cosmetic agreements" on arms control, he said in an interview, are "in the long run fatal for the democracies of the West. Democracies will not sacrifice to protect their security in the absence of a sense of danger. And every time we create the impression we and the Soviets are cooperating and moderating the competition, we diminish that sense of apprehension." Perle is "quite willing" to support accords, but only if they "genuinely reflect diminished danger." In practice, that means seeking big cuts instead of step-by-step reductions.

Critics say Perle's approach to arms control means no arms control. "Richard's career has been entirely negative," said Bob Sherman, a strategic arms expert working for Rep. Thomas Downey (D-Amityville). "He has never been a problem solver; he just points to problems * * * his and the administration's approach is to make sweeping, propagandistic proposals that they know won't be accepted and that they have no intention of being accepted."

But Perle has a ready audience in Weinberger, who is similarly predisposed and has little expertise on the subject. Many critics say Perle dominates Weinberger. "It's not terribly different from the charge which was made when I worked for Scoop Jackson," replied Perle. "There is another way of looking at it . . . that I went to work for Cap Weinberger, whose concept accorded with my own. And it does."

Perle's personality is a complex one. Tsongas calls him a "brooding . . . chilling presence, but Perle's public appearances leave many people charmed. Hill colleagues describe him as a Humphrey liberal on domestic issues. A committed backer of Israel, he is said to avoid the issue in office. Acknowledging his is typecast as a "true believer," he points out he has not fired staff aides who worked in the Carter administration.

Perle said he is "not happy" about the nickname he has acquired at the Pentagon, the "Prince of Darkness." "I think I start out a conversation with someone—who may not know me but has seen me so described—at a disadvantage," he said.

Born in New York City, Perle received a bachelor's degree in international relations at the University of California-Los Angeles and a master's degree at Princeton before studying at the London School of Economics. He is married and has a son.

Probably the best example of his effectiveness, according to officials involved in the discussions, was in drafting, promoting and, of late, defending the U.S. proposal at the INF talks in Geneva. Over the objections of the State Department and the Arms Control Agency, which wanted to aim for the "lowest possible level" of missiles, Perle persuaded Reagan in November, 1981, to go for the simpler sounding but ultimately more controversial "zero-zero option." Under it, the Soviet Union would dismantle 240 SS-20 intermediate range missiles and 350 older missiles in return for American nondeployment of 108 Pershing II and 464 cruise missiles in West Europe. The option is not simple because the Soviet Union has for years insisted that the European nuclear balance must take into account U.S. nuclear-capable bombers based in Europe or on aircraft carriers and French and British nuclear weapons.

Moscow rejected "zero-zero" and countered with a proposal to reduce its missile forces to a level related to the independent deterrents maintained by Britain and France.

Perle's second major accomplishment, the officials said, may have been in persuading Reagan to stick with "zero-zero" despite the Soviet counterproposal and the deep political split the issue is causing in West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands and Belgium, all slated to deploy the U.S. nuclear missiles.

Last summer he persuaded the administration not to accept an informal compromise worked out by U.S. and Soviet negotiators Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky to reduce the Soviets to 75 three-warhead SS-20s in exchange for U.S. agreement to cancel the Pershing IIs and reduce to 300 its one-warhead cruise missiles.

"It was pure Perle," said one administration official involved in the discussions. "He was on vacation. Everyone here was on board in favor of further explorations—State, the White House, ACDA, the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Returning two weeks later, Perle insisted that Weinberger ask for a re-examination of the issue. Rallying representatives of the Joint Chiefs to his view, he argued that the United States had to be free to deploy some Pershings. The upshot was a decision to modify the Nitze package to allow for a mix of Pershings and Cruise missiles.

Former arms control negotiator Raymond Garthoff said recently he had learned that before the talks resumed, word got to Moscow that Washington had rejected the compromise. A senior State Department official told Newsday no one was authorized to inform the soviets before Sept. 29 and there was no evidence anyone did. In any case, when Nitze offered to continue exploration of the proposal as modified, Kvitsinsky gave a flat no. Whatever the reasons, a promising avenue for talks appeared to have been closed.

The incident illustrates the operating method of a consummate tactician. But Perle has had his impact on other U.S.-Soviet arms issues, according to officials who were directly involved:

"The power of negativism in a bureaucracy that depends on consensus is enormous," said one former arms control officer. That is especially the case in the Reagan administration, which has downgraded the role of National Security Council to that of coordination rather than guiding policy discussions. As a result, most key arms control policy decisions are thrashed out at a lower level in meetings among interested agencies.

"Perle has taken under his wing everything that has to do with disarmament," said a former negotiator. "He has representatives on every inter-agency group. Because you have to get an agreement in that group, he's in a position of being the nay-sayer. And that's his disposition." A senior State Department official said: "It's much easier to block things than get them through."

On Capitol Hill, Perle was renowned for leaking material on arms control issues, in particular to conservative columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. Perle denies leaking since joining the administration. "I challenge anyone to identify a leak that could even plausibly have come from me," he said.

He does not deny being the nay-sayer on arms control. "I all too frequently am the only one who dissents," he said. "My colleagues [in the inter-agency groups] are very often professional civil servants who bear no particular sense of this administration." In Perle's view, compromise "with respect to your fundamental objective" is no virtue.

Perle has lost some battles. His campaign to block construction of the Soviet gas pipeline, which caused a serious rift in the NATO alliance, was brought to a halt at the hands of George Shultz. Perle still opposes Reagan's policy announced May 31 of not undercutting existing arms control accords "so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint."

"I argued at the time and continue to believe that it is unwise for us to say we will be bound by or we will abide by the SALT II agreement, although I have not recommended any particular action that would be inconsistent with it," he said.

Perle has no fear of a showdown with Shultz. He would welcome the chance to debate any issue before him. "The State Department could put up whomever they want," he said. Nor does he fear that in the mounting criticism of Reagan's arms control policies on Capitol Hill, he will become a "lightning rod" for administration opponents. "I think it's a worthy service to be a lightning rod," he said, "I've been one in the past. A lightning rod protects the houses that surrounded it."

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell points out to me that our colleague, Sam Stratton, is here with us this morning. We are pleased to welcome him.

If Mr. Ken Auletta would come forward. Mr. Auletta, you have volunteered to be sworn in.

Do you solemnly promise to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. AULETTA. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

If you have a statement of any kind, we would be prepared to hear that.

Mr. AULETTA. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have a very brief statement.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate your appearance this morning.

Mr. AULETTA. Thank you.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Do you have copies of your statement?

Mr. AULETTA. I do not. I just have this original copy.

STATEMENT OF KEN AULETTA, COLUMNIST, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. AULETTA. I appear before the committee with some trepidation. Like most journalists, I shy from becoming an actor in a drama reporters are entrusted to chronicle. I pass no judgment on Kenneth Adelman's qualifications for office. That is your responsibility, not mine.

As a citizen I, of course, have views on various matters. As a columnist for the New York Daily News I am permitted to express these. But I bring to this committee no special competance concerning Mr. Adelman's background.

What I am competent to answer are straightforward questions. First, did I interview Kenneth Adelman in May 1981? Second, did he say what I reported? The answer to both questions is equally simple: Yes.

When Mr. Adelman announced last Thursday that he had "no recollection" of having been interviewed by me, I released to the Associated Press and other news media the six pages of notes from that interview that I have today provided the committee. As you can see, a reporter's notebook is never neat or letter perfect. There are abbreviations and absent verbs and wiggly lines. But the notes clearly contain the words I have attributed to Mr. Adelman in print.

I should like to observe that this interview was conducted long before Mr. Adelman was nominated for the position under consideration today. I should also like to observe that this is not just a question of Mr. Adelman's word against that of a journalist, even though, in effect, Mr. Adelman has called me a liar, for the New York Telephone Co. has something to say on this matter.

My telephone records, which have also been provided to the committee, show that on May 20, 1981, at 11:07 a.m., I placed a call to Mr. Adelman at the Stanford Research Institute in Arlington, Va. The records reveal we spoke for 25 minutes, and the call cost me $8.64.

I also approach this committee hearing with some trepidation about the first amendment. I worry about setting a harmful precedent for other journalists who might be expected to testify before other bodies. For this reason, when invited I informed the committee staff director that I would not appear voluntarily, but would be willing to comply with a subpena.

Before summoning a journalist to testify, Congress or the courts should pause and weigh the consequences of such actions, as you have done today. This is a rare case. Attorney Floyd Abrams, who has considerable experience on first amendment issues volunteered to accompany me this morning and sits behind me today, reports that he recalls but one other comparable case, in which a journalist willingly testified after becoming embroiled in events about which he reported.

On that occasion, the reporter's source had recanted testimony in court that had been printed in the New York Times. In that case, as in this, the journalist decided that his own credibility and that of the press in general eclipsed his concerns about journalists becoming too easily summoned before tribunals and about becoming a witness to his own interviews.

Like most journalists, my reflexive reaction is to say to any tribunal that what I write speaks for itself. However, as a journalist this particular case reaches no first amendment barrier nor is there any question of protecting confidential sources, since the interview with Mr. Adelman was entirely on the record.

Therefore, as a citizen I am prepared to answer your questions, Senators. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Adelman had some good things to say about you in his public comments last week, that he respected you as a journalist. I had some good things to say about you when you voluntarily gave the statement out indicating that certain statements made to you by Ambassador Adelman were not incorporated in the story that you had written about him. I think was a noble gesture on your part—freely and voluntarily done.

I wonder, for our record here, could you indicate those statements which were pertinent to our proceedings and hearings that he did make to you that were not reported by you in the story?

Mr. AULETTA. I would be glad to, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I respect the fact that obviously you must be selective in writing a story, and I do not think that you left it out for any purpose other than the fact that it maybe did not fit in with the story. But you did feel it important to release it afterward, and we appreciate that.

Mr. AULETTA. Senator, I would be glad to answer your question on that. The piece that originally appeared on May 24, 1981, almost 21 months ago, quoted several people. It did not just rely on Mr. Adelman's statements to me, nor was it an exposition of Mr. Adelman's views.

What he did say, he said on two occasions in the notebook—and I will find you the exact quote—we are willing—I asked him whether his posture might not increase the chances of war on the page marked No. 4 in the notes, and at the very bottom Mr. Adelman said "We are willing to have a real reduction in nuclear weapons." And then, in one other case in the notes—I believe it is one other case—he also echoed similar views, that he was—I can, if you would like, try to find them.

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, are these the original notes?

Mr. AULETTA. These are my original notes.

Senator MATHIAS. These are your original notes taken at the time of your conversation?

Mr. AULETTA. Correct. I have provided a Xerox copy of these notes.

But he said in two cases in the interview, Senator, that he believed a meaningful reduction. I might add that the reason—the entire thrust, as you can see, I think, from these notes, where Mr. Adelman talked about "I would negotiate for political reasons and I think we should not emphasize arms negotiations because we have to emphasize the buildup in defense forces, and the political constituency one needs for that"—the thrust of the interview and of his comments was clearly on the latter, and not the former.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question in your mind that by your recollection and record that at a time when he was not being considered for this post he did clearly indicate that he was for real reductions and that that is, as you understand it, consistent with what the President's position has been right along—that he wants a real reduction?

Mr. AULETTA. He did say in the notes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that the President constantly has criticized SALT II—I have been with him when he has done so, before he was President—that he has criticized the treaty because it did not provide for any real reductions, as the START talks have? I think that helps clarify it.

Senator BIDEN. That is a good answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you want to reply to anything I have said?

Mr. AULETTA. No; I do not think I have to, Senator. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I went through your notes last night as carefully as I could, and I would only comfort you by saying that my handwriting is even worse. I cannot read it back sometimes myself. But I did stumble over one part of it, and that was the word "sham," which has been mentioned so frequently.

The word "sham" is written out and, as I look at it, with a magnifying glass, it actually shows underneath it "shame." And then there is a large "M" written over "ME", and it is made "sham." Now that is a quite a difference as to whether "I think it is a shame" or a "sham." Could you clarify that particular correction that has been made in your notes that you have provided to us?

Mr. AULETTA. If you go to the prior page in line six, Senator, you will see, for instance, that the sentence beginning "One is to," the word "stop" is written over with the word "let". This is a common practice among journalists, when you are taking very rapid notes, that you are drawing little arrows and writing over to get the word right.

I distinctly heard Mr. Adelman say to me the word "sham". I have no doubts about that, Senator. It does appear that the word "shame" is written. I would note for you, however, that——

The CHAIRMAN. Did you misunderstand him at first when you wrote "shame" instead of "sham"?

Mr. AULETTA. No. You often write and your pen gets ahead of your ears, basically, and what you do is you go back, either when he is on the next sentence—the person you are interviewing—or the end of the interview, and you go through your notes and you make sure you have it right, and that was done in this case.

He distinctly said the word "sham" to me. I might also point out to you, Senator, that the word—it is written in the same pen that the interview was conducted in, and there are several places in the book with words that are less volatile than the word "sham" where the cross-out and writing over is done.

I would also point out that—parenthetically—that even if Mr. Adelman has said to me "shame," the meaning would be similar, because it would be referring to the shame being that we have to negotiate, so that the point would be the same, but the word "sham" is such a distinct word and I particularly do remember it even now. But it was done at the time—the change.

The **Chairman**. On page 3 of your notes you indicate that Mr. Adelman states, concerning arms control, "I am skeptical of anything coming along." The next few lines are not legible to me. Then Mr. Adelman says, "My policy would be to do it for pol."—p-o-l-period—"reasons." Is this a correct reading of that point?

What does "pol." mean in your hierogliphics—policy?

Mr. **Auletta**. Political.

The **Chairman**. You always use that as political? All your notes uses pol. as political?

Mr. **Auletta**. P-o-l. And negotiations is n-e-g-o. But the previous line, if you would like to translate my hieroglyphics, Senator——

The **Chairman**. If you could, thank you.

Mr. **Auletta**. The previous line says, and this is my handwriting paraphrasing what he said—and you know it is a paraphrase because there are no quote marks around it—he said—he talked about he was skeptical about anything coming along—which is how his quote ends, and he said, and I paraphrase, except where we are dealing with lousy weaponry, and he mentioned specifically the ABM Treaty as an example.

This is on the page marked "3", Senator.

Senator **Biden**. Thank you.

Mr. **Auletta**. And then I asked him what would your policy be? And he said—and I quote directly—"My policy would be to do it for political reasons. I think it's a sham."

The **Chairman**. The last question that I have, because you did indicate that you placed a call to Mr. Adelman—it was not a person-to-person call was it? The record does not show that.

Mr. **Auletta**. Correct.

The **Chairman**. The record just shows that it was a call to Stanford Research Institute at that particular time. Mr. Adelman, for the record, so far has said he simply does not recall an interview with you on this particular subject.

Have you telephone records showing that you have called the Institute and talked to other people, or have you ever talked to anyone else at Stanford Research Institute? Is that the only call you have ever placed to that?

Mr. **Auletta**. I believe so, Senator, yes.

The **Chairman**. You believe it is.

Mr. **Auletta**. I might also add that on that point, Senator, that I had been at a couple of seminars with Mr. Adelman—off-the-record seminars—at the Lehrman Institute in New York on foreign policy questions, and we knew one another.

And since this interview almost 2 years ago I have done other interviews with Mr. Adelman, some of which I quoted him by name in the newspaper. In fact, one interview I interviewed his wife, Carol, and quoted her.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much. We thank you for your appearance here today.

Mr. **Auletta**. Thank you, Senator.

The **Chairman**. We will go on the 10-minute rule—I had not mentioned that—for the first round here. We hope that any that do not have questions can yield to others who do have questions.

Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. I yield my time to the Senator from California.

Senator CRANSTON. I thank you very much.

You have a phone bill that pertains to the call. Would you submit it for the record for the committee's records?

Mr. AULETTA. I believe the committee has it.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a copy of it, yes.

Senator CRANSTON. Did you consider that discussion with Mr. Adelman an interview?

Mr. AULETTA. Of course, yes.

Senator CRANSTON. Was anything said to suggest that it was not an on-the-record interview?

Mr. AULETTA. No, Senator.

Senator CRANSTON. You are sure about that?

Mr. AULETTA. Positive.

Senator CRANSTON. Mr. Auletta, is the copy of the notes you made available to this committee a true, correct, and complete copy of all notes you made with respect to the May 20, 1981, telephone call with Mr. Adelman?

Mr. AULETTA. Yes.

Senator CRANSTON. When did you write those notes?

Mr. AULETTA. The date of the phone call and, therefore, the date the notes were recorded is the morning of May 20, 1981. The column was written for that Sunday, May 24, 1981.

Senator CRANSTON. Did you subsequently make any revisions or additions to the notes?

Mr. AULETTA. No; except when I was taking the notes there was a constant—you will see there are little arrows, and this is almost like a course in Journalism 101, but in truth you are constantly making arrows. On page 1 there is an arrow with the word "world" written in, as I mentioned earlier, "stop" and "let" is written over.

So you are constantly going over your notes after the interview or in the course of the interview when there is a pause and the person you are inverviewing is saying something that you are not recording. You go back to a previous sentence.

Senator CRANSTON. Except with respect to that process, you made no changes?

Mr. AULETTA. None at all.

Senator CRANSTON. Did you make any other notes at approximately that time regarding the conversation, or are these all the notes you have?

Mr. AULETTA. These are my notes.

Senator CRANSTON. Did you make any tape or other recording with respect to that conversation at approximately that time?

Mr. AULETTA. I did not.

Senator CRANSTON. Did you have any occasion prior to January 1983 to show those notes to anyone or to discuss them with anyone as relating to an interview with Mr. Adelman?

Mr. AULETTA. Prior to January?

Senator CRANSTON. Yes.

Mr. AULETTA. In January, not prior to January 1983, I believe, but the notes—the first person I showed the notes to was syndicated columnist Richard Reeves, sometime, I believe, in January. We were, I believe, having lunch and we got to talking about a number of things and the name Adelman came up and I mentioned to Reeves that I had done an interview with Mr. Adelman back almost 2 years before, and it was all on the record, and he said some things that were critical of arms negotiation process.

And Reeves asked me whether I could see the notes. I said, let me review the notes and be sure that nothing was off the record in the interview. I went back and checked my notes, ascertained that it was all on the record, and Mr. Reeves was the first person that I can recall—in fact was certainly the first person—to look at those notes. And I believe it would have been in January.

Senator CRANSTON. Did no one other than Mr. Reeves see the notes prior to January 1983?

Mr. AULETTA. That is right. No one saw the notes until Thursday night when I was interviewed by ABC after Mr. Adelman held a press conference. ABC came to my apartment in New York and I showed them—Marilyn Berger of ABC the notes, and then the next day released them.

Senator CRANSTON. Was that February 17, last Thursday?

Mr. AULETTA. Yes; it was last Thursday and Friday.

Senator CRANSTON. I have had a lot of difficulty reading the Xerox copy of your notes, as I suspect Chairman Percy and others have had.

Mr. AULETTA. I sometimes do too, Senator.

Senator CRANSTON. I would like to ask that you work with the committee staff after the hearing to try to make a better Xerox for inclusion in the record. The Xerox is not very clear. And when you work with the staff, would you please identify the order of the pages, since only two are numbered, as far as I can see?

Mr. AULETTA. No; they are numbered. We made a better Xerox this morning in the chairman's office.

Senator CRANSTON. Let me make sure the staff is satisfied that they can read them.

I had intended to ask you about the correction of your notes re the word "shame" or "sham." Did you make the correction as you have described it, from "shame" to "sham" immediately after writing "shame" or after the phone call when you were reviewing the notes?

Mr. AULETTA. I would have made that "M" prominent as it is on page 3 of the notes either while Mr. Adelman was speaking, while we were still conducting the interview, in a pause period, or directly after the interview I would have reviewed the notes and made sure that I had—because, as you will notice, there are verbs missing and stuff, and you want to make sure as best you can that you can read the notes, and there are one or two places in the notes even today that I cannot make out a word. But I did not report those words.

Senator CRANSTON. But you are positive you would not have done it at any other time except when you were checking your notes shortly after the phone call?

Mr. AULETTA. I would not have, Senator, and I also distinctly recall the word "sham."

Senator CRANSTON. Is it your testimony today under oath that the statements in quotations in your May 24, 1981, column that you attribute to Mr. Adelman, as well as those in your six pages on notes, accurately reflect what he told you on May 20, 1981?

Mr. AULETTA. They do.

Senator CRANSTON. Besides the May 20, 1981 interview, have you at any other time ever heard Mr. Adelman make statements that are the same as or similar to those you attributed to him in your May 24, 1981 column or in your notes of the May 20 interview?

Mr. AULETTA. Senator, I wrote about this matter in a column last Sunday in the New York Daily News, and what I said in that column was that I had been at at least a couple of seminars on foreign policy questions with Mr. Adelman and was confident from having been exposed to his views that the views he expressed to me in this May 20 interview were consistent with what I heard in that interview.

Senator CRANSTON. Can you identify the dates and describe the circumstances?

Mr. AULETTA. I don't have the dates with me, Senator, but I am sure the Lehrman Institute, which keeps a record of attendance at their seminars, could probably dredge it from their records.

Senator CRANSTON. If you could procure them for our records for the committee.

Mr. AULETTA. I will try, but it may be that the Senate could retrieve them faster than I could.

Senator CRANSTON. Wouldn't you have business records of your own showing when you attended those conferences?

Mr. AULETTA. Yes, I could, but the problem I would have, I have attended many of their seminars. They would be able to tell because they have the attendance sheet whether Mr. Adelman appeared at the same one I did. I would have in my book all the seminars I attended, but I would not be able to tell whether he attended the same ones.

Senator CRANSTON. I would like to ask that the staff try to establish when that occurred subsequent to this point.

What was said by Mr. Adelman on those occasions that was similar to the statements in your column?

Mr. AULETTA. Senator, I am afraid that is a question, as I said in my column on Sunday, I could not address because these were off-the-record sessions. I feel it is relevant for me to suggest to you that I was not shocked by the interview, I was not surprised by the interview Mr. Adelman gave me on the 20th, having been exposed to his views.

I might also add, Senator, that in the interviews I do with other supporters of the—and this was at the time of the new Reagan administration, it was just several months into the new administration, both the interview with Carl Gershman, which actually leads the column, and the interview with Mr. Adelman and interview with others—there was no reticence.

Mr. Adelman at that time when I interviewed him was proud to point out to me as a journalist that he and many supporters of Ronald Reagan brought to this new administration a different set of assumptions than had operated in prior administrations. There was nothing defensive in the tone of Mr. Adelman's interview.

He was quite proud of the fact, and that is what the column was about, that in fact this was a group of people that now headed the American Government that had new assumptions, fresh assumptions from what had been what some might have considered a bipartisan consensus part of that.

Senator CRANSTON. Did you discuss with Mr. Adelman on May 20, 1981, that you were speaking to him in connection with an article that you were preparing?

Mr. AULETTA. Sure. I called him and introduced myself as Ken Auletta from the Daily News. We had met at seminars. He remembered that we had met at seminars.

Senator CRANSTON. So it was made very clear that you were speaking to him in connection with an article that you were working on?

Mr. AULETTA. Correct.

Senator CRANSTON. Did you offer to send him a copy of that article when it appeared?

Mr. AULETTA. I did. What happened was that Mr. Adelman at the interview asked me whether I could send him a copy of the piece. I took the address down, mailed the column. It was returned to me "Addressee Unknown" by the Post Office. I held—since I tend, much to the consternation of my wife, not to throw things out—I held that letter for him, and then I saw him probably 6 or 8 months later, did not have the letter with me which had the clipping, and mentioned to Mr. Adelman at the Lehrman Institute—it was another seminar—that I had sent him that and I'm sorry he didn't get it, but I forwarded that column to him.

He did not, in fairness to Mr. Adelman, he did not react one way or the other. We were about to begin the seminar.

Senator CRANSTON. But you had sent him a copy of the column you wrote?

Mr. AULETTA. I did, but he never received it.

Senator CRANSTON. Did you ever discuss that column with him after it appeared?

Mr. AULETTA. No.

Senator CRANSTON. You did make reference to it in that conversation with him that you had written it and tried to mail it to him but he hadn't received it?

Mr. AULETTA. Yes. I mentioned to him that I'm sorry he didn't get it, I had sent it to him.

Senator CRANSTON. So he then knew you had written a column?

Mr. AULETTA. Yes. I just have one pause on this point, Senator, which is that we were about to begin the seminar, and in fairness, I did not think that what I was saying registered on Mr. Adelman at that time. So that is why I, in writing about this incident, made nothing of that incident.

Senator CRANSTON. Would you please describe more fully your conversation which was a telephone interview with Mr. Adelman on December 16, 1982, regarding the UNICEF matter? That was also clearly a telephone interview which you intended to use for writing an article?

Mr. AULETTA. Yes. I called Mr. Adelman on that day. I had covered a UNICEF press conference at which they said that they believed that with medical and technological advances, you could reduce malnutrition deaths by half in the world, from 10 million to about 5 million children every year, and they laid out a program that was very low cost.

They were not haranguing the United States or suggesting that it was the responsibility solely of the United States. I called Mr.

Adelman, who I had interviewed before, as I said, and called him as the U.S. Representative at the United Nations, and we then did an interview.

He suggested at the end of the interview that I might want to speak with his wife Carol, who is a medical expert on malnutrition and had written a series of articles, including one that was coming out, I believe, in Policy Review. I did that as well.

Senator CRANSTON. Is there any reason that you would believe that Mr. Adelman would remember that conversation?

Mr. AULETTA. I believe so, and I believe yes because in the statement that Mr. Adelman released to the press last Thursday evening, he acknowledged that he knew me and that we had talked. So yes, I don't think there is any question about that.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Cranston.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Auletta, I sent for the original story. I just glanced at it before this became a political football bouncing around this committee. Let me ask you a few questions.

I am from the news media myself. Would you be willing to tell us whom you called? First of all, you called Mr. Adelman on May 20 at 11:07 a.m.; is that correct?

Mr. AULETTA. Correct, sir.

Senator HELMS. Would you be willing to say which Senator you called at 11:55 a.m. that same morning, unless you have that blocked out?

Mr. AULETTA. I have blocked that out, Senator, only because the phone number is changed. You could see the original, if you wish, in private.

Senator HELMS. I don't need to see the original. You are under oath and I will take your word for it. Which Senator did you call?

Mr. AULETTA. I don't know, Senator.

Senator HELMS. You have the same problem that Mr. Adelman had. You have a recollection problem; is that correct?

Mr. AULETTA. The only reason I do not have a recollection problem about Mr. Adelman, Senator, is that, as I have mentioned to Senator Percy, I have never spoken to anyone at the institute before or since except to call the other day to confirm that that was the correct phone number.

Senator HELMS. Now, I notice the headlines: "Auletta: Adelman Is a Liar." Is he a liar? Do you know for a fact that he is lying? Do you really know that he does not recall that interview?

Mr. AULETTA. Senator, with due respect, as a former member of the journalistic profession, you understand that I don't write headlines. I did not write that headline calling him a liar.

Senator HELMS. Do you apologize for the headline?

Mr. AULETTA. I don't apologize—I said in the piece——

Senator HELMS. Do you agree with it?

Mr. AULETTA. I said in the piece, Senator, last Sunday that I think it strains credibility to believe that Mr. Adelman does not recall an interview with me as a private citizen.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Auletta, you are engaging in the same sort of semantics that you accuse Mr. Adelman. Now, is he or is he not a liar? You are under oath.

Mr. AULETTA. I believe he is not telling the truth about remembering speaking to me.

Senator HELMS. On what do you base that?

Mr. AULETTA. I base that on the fact, Senator, that Kenneth Adelman was a private citizen when I interviewed him. He was not being beseiged by press telephone calls at that time.

Senator HELMS. How do you know that?

Mr. AULETTA. Because I know he was a private citizen.

Senator HELMS. Well, private citizens are besieged by telephone calls. How do you know that?

Mr. AULETTA. Well, when someone who you interview asks you if you will kindly send him a copy of the interview, I think it usually suggests to me, and it did in this case, Senator, that he was anxious to see what was written about him.

Senator HELMS. Well, let me suggest something to you: That you do not know that—you just said flatly that he was not being besieged by telephone calls.

Now, let's look at the second line of "Sham On You, Adelman." "A young right-wing intellectual affiliated with the Stanford Research Institute in Arlington." Did you mean "right wing" to be a pejorative?

Mr. AULETTA. No; I did not.

Senator HELMS. All right. Now, since that is not a pejorative, name me a Senator who is a left-wing Senator. [Laughter.]

[Senator Tsongas raises his hand.]

Senator HELMS. I said a Senator. Is Alan Cranston left wing or a right wing?

Mr. AULETTA. I could name you some Congressmen who I would probably characterize as left wing. I might have a harder time on the Senate side.

Senator HELMS. You don't think Senator Cranston is left wing?

Mr. AULETTA. From what I know about him, and I'm not an expert on the subject, but I would probably not categorize him that way. [Laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. How about Tsongas?

Senator HELMS. Would you repeat that? I didn't hear the last remark.

Mr. AULETTA. I didn't make it, Senator. I think one of your colleagues did.

Senator MATHIAS. Do you want to repeat it? We would appreciate it over here.

Senator BIDEN. Excuse me. I said to Senator Cranston, Alan, you made it.

Senator HELMS. I am sorry if I am raining on anybody's parade.

Senator BIDEN. I will yield you some of my time if you are short.

Senator HELMS. That is great. I may do that.

Would you say that this column, "Auletta: Adelman is a Liar," is objective or biased or what?

Mr. AULETTA. Senator, if I may ask you to make a distinction for me, are you talking about the column or the headline?

Senator HELMS. I am talking about this that you see very clearly, which I identified as "Auletta: Adelman is a Liar. Sham on You, Adelman." Now, what did you intend to do with that column?

Mr. AULETTA. I intended, hopefully, that 3 million people who read the Daily News would read it.

The CHAIRMAN. A lot more are going to read it now.

Mr. AULETTA. Senator, if I may.

Senator HELMS. No; you are not answering the question, and I think you know you are not answering the question. You were ripping this man apart. You made allegations which intrigue me as to your ability to verify them. You close by saying that he feigned amnesia.

Mr. AULETTA. I believe that to be the case, Senator.

Senator HELMS. You still have trouble with your recollection about the Senator you called roughly 50 minutes or 48 minutes after you talked to Mr. Adelman.

Mr. AULETTA. I have no recollection of who I called.

Senator HELMS. You have no idea. You are under oath.

Mr. AULETTA. I have none at all, Senator, no recollection whatsoever of that, Senator; but I do have a recollection, and I have a notebook to back up that recollection, that I spoke with Mr. Adelman. I would be glad to look through——

Senator HELMS. I don't doubt that you talked to Mr. Adelman, but I am mystified that you cannot recall an immediate call that you made to a Senator, 224—and then you conveniently blanked it out on this thing you published in the newspaper.

Mr. AULETTA. The newspaper, sir, if I may just say, the newspaper—and I am glad they did because I was negligent and I should have told them to do this—they blacked out all the other numbers, including my home phone number, and I am glad they did because it then does not intrude on someone else's privacy. I have the true number here. I would be glad to look up who it was I phoned and see if——

Senator HELMS. Maybe we can have your recollection be inspired just a little bit. Immediately after hanging up from your call to Mr. Adelman, you called Washington, D.C., a number, and it is sort of blurred, but it appears that you spoke for 1 minute. Do you remember who that was? Was that a personal call? You don't recall?

Mr. AULETTA. I assume it was a business call but I don't know whom.

Senator HELMS. You assume it was a business call. How about the next call to Washington, D.C., (202) 632—— and then it is blanked out?

Mr. AULETTA. The same answer, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. The numbers are not blanked out.

Senator HELMS. They are blanked out in the newspaper. Well, let's see now. Does anybody know whose number is 224-3121? [Laughter.]

Senator PELL. If the Senator will yield, I have instructed my staff to call that number.

Senator MATHIAS. That is the Capitol switchboard.

Senator PELL. 3121 is the Capitol switchboard. [Laughter.]

Senator HELMS. So you do not recall making a call to the Capitol switchboard, then? It is not the Capitol switchboard; it is the Senate switchboard. It is the Senate——

The CHAIRMAN. It is the Capitol.

Senator HELMS. 224 are Senate numbers.

Senator PELL. 3121 is the Capitol switchboard.

Senator HELMS. Well, what is 225, Senator?

Senator CRANSTON. 225 is the House.

Senator HELMS. The House. Of course, it was made to a Senator, and you don't recall making this call to the Senator?

Mr. AULETTA. Senator, if I may, I call the Congress of the United States with some frequency. I have called, as I said earlier, the Stanford Research Institute.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reserve the balance of my time, and I would like for Mr. Auletta to stay around so that those Senators who may wish to make inquiry of him could make inquiry after Mr. Adelman has testified. Would that be appropriate?

The CHAIRMAN. It would be appropriate for you to stay if you don't mind standing by. Thank you very much.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. I won't use all my time, Mr. Chairman.

I can understand how Senator Helms and, I suspect, Mr. Adelman are concerned about whether or not the issue of the recollection of the conversation is being deliberately misrepresented by Mr. Adelman or whether or not Mr. Adelman sincerely does not remember. To me that is not the critical issue, whether he does not remember.

I routinely ask a reporter to send me a copy of an article that they are going to write, even when it is from a University of St. Louis school paper. It is routine, and the mere fact that I asked for it does not in any way, at least in my case, imply that I am more likely or less likely to remember the conversation.

So for the sake of argument, I am prepared to believe Mr. Adelman doesn't remember. But my concern goes a little further.

You said to us that you have had subsequent conversions with Mr. Adelman on varied subjects, I assume on varied subjects——

Mr. AULETTA. Correct.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Since the infamous article that has raised all the concern in this committee. Now, are you at liberty to tell us whether or not in any of the conversations you have had with him, either at seminars or in articles you have written or specific interviews, whether there was anything that would lead you to believe that Mr. Adelman had changed his mind about the utility of arms control negotiations with the Soviets?

Mr. AULETTA. I couldn't answer that either way, Senator. The conversions, to recount them, subsequent to this May 20 interview, we have been since then at one, maybe two seminars together at the Lehrman Institute. I do not recall anything, I do not recall conversations that related to arms control.

One of them, I know, was in regard to Middle East policy, and the questions that this interview concerned were not relevant to that seminar. I distinctly recall the December 16 interview which related to the United Nations and UNICEF.

We happen to live one block away from each other and we both swim at the same swimming pool, and I have seen Mr. Adelman at the swimming pool on one or two occasions and have seen his children on more occasions, and the one other time. One of those times we stopped and chatted for a bit.

And the last time I saw Mr. Adelman, the last two times we spoke, once was at a—he called the week before last Mr. John Chancellor of NBC News to complain that Mr. Chancellor had used in one of his evening commentaries the "sham" quote. He called to say that he never said it, he did not talk to me, and if he talked to me, it was in a seminar, which was off the record—this according to Mr. Chancellor to me—and that I was somehow using quotes that were off the record in any case and misrepresenting his position.

Mr. Chancellor phoned me. I remember I was in Albany, N.Y. I phoned him back and he related what I just related to you. I called Mr. Adelman several times, first spoke to the spokesman at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and then Mr. Adelman himself.

He said that he would phone Mr. Chancellor to say that he had no recollection of talking to me but he was not at all raising questions about my ethics or journalistic ethics at all and he wanted that clear. He did call Mr. Chancellor to say that because he and Mr. Chancellor phoned me back to say that he had done so.

The last time I saw Mr. Adelman was a week ago Sunday. I was covering a conference on the Committee for a Free World, and he and his wife Carol were there, and in fact I was sitting at the table with a couple of people and they sat down at the same table and had a cup of coffee.

Senator BIDEN. For the record, is arms control or strategic questions the beat you cover? I mean are you well versed in the area? Are you viewed as someone—what beat do you cover?

Mr. AULETTA. Basically, Senator, I write a weekly column for the New York Daily News on governmental/political matters, and write longer pieces for the New Yorker magazine on a variety of matters. The first book I wrote was about the city of New York, called "The Streets Are Paved With Gold."

The second book I wrote was a collection of pieces, some on national politics, some on New York City and finances. The third book was a book on poverty in America. So the subjects are somewhat varied that I have written about, I do not consider arms control my best, nor do I consider myself an expert on the subject.

Senator BIDEN. Now, my recollection about the new administration's advent on the scene is not dissimilar to the way you characterized it earlier. I found it very unusual to find anyone associated with the new administration or wishing to be associated suggesting that the previous course of arms control negotiations followed by Democrat and Republican Presidents was a proper course.

I recall sitting in my office, sir, just several weeks before Mr. Nitze and later Mr. Rostow were put in the positions of moving to Europe to get negotiations underway and being told by each of them that they did not see negotiations in the offering for months, if not years.

So everyone I spoke to in this administration was saying something not dissimilar from what Mr. Adelman has alleged to have said in your article.

In your conversations with other people or interviews with other people who identified themselves as part of or as being associated with or sympathetic to the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, did you find their thoughts to be similar to those that Mr. Adelman has on arms control or dissimilar?

Mr. AULETTA. I did find them similar, and in that column, the original column, I quote actually, I think, more extensively than Mr. Adelman, I quote Mr. Carl Gershman, who was saying similar things, that basically they accepted a different set of assumptions, and I then outlined what those different set of assumptions are that they spoke of. That is my general impression.

Now like any administration, there are many different voices, and there are some people in the Reagan administration who at that time would not have agreed with some of those views, as I know Senator Helms has made that point publicly many times.

Senator BIDEN. I will yield the rest of my time to a member that wants it.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone? Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Auletta, I appreciate your initial statement because I, too, regret, really, that we are having this hearing. I think there probably are very real problems in terms of calling journalists before this committee or others unless the situation is indeed a very grave one, and in my judgment, this one is not.

You are here today because our distinguished colleague, Senator Cranston, felt that a column you had written a while back was very important and relevant to this nomination. That is his judgment, and he has indicated opposition to the nomination not only on the basis of your column but other writings, which is certainly his privilege.

What we have, I think, going after that initial commentary by our colleague and others, then, is Mr. Adelman's lack of recollection, which then led to calls to you in which you feel, quite properly, that you ought to defend the integrity of your craft. Mr. Adelman will be on after you defending once again the integrity of his statements.

There is a certain degree of titillation as everybody enjoys the contest and whether memory fails us and whether some peccadilloes are found.

Essentially, as I read the first column you wrote in the Daily News on May 24, 1981, your bottom line was that there were differences in the position the Reagan administration was taking. In fact you say that unlike the Carter administration, Reagan administration speaks with one voice, adopts one posture. They succeeded in scaring the Iranian Government into freeing the hostages and they have succeeded in making the Russians unsure of what the U.S. Government is up to.

Now, that could be good or bad. You indicated that some commentators on the scene felt that that was not a good idea, that conceivably, given the gravity of the world situation, this uncertainty was a problem. But nevertheless, you were attempting to characterize a number of points of view.

Now, the dilemma is that the word "sham" comes into it and other words of this variety which are now being characterized almost as if in and of themselves they would decide the issue of whether Mr. Adelman is qualified. You have indicated you are not making a judgment on that; you are here to defend, really, your role as a competent journalist, which I respect.

I go into all of this simply to say that the record before this committee is now fairly extensive, including, I think over 8 hours of testimony by Mr. Adelman as to what he thinks.

Unless the point being made by his detractors is that what he is saying here to the committee, what he has written in thousands of words, hundreds of articles is somehow all overtaken by remarks given to you, or not given to you, as the case may be, it is an extraordinary sort of assertion; that we are coming to this juncture of the road with the vote at 12:30 and still deliberating on it.

Let me just ask you this for the record. When you wrote on Sunday that what you wrote in your article "Sham: Adelman" you said it and meant it, you make the point that to issue a denial 21 months later after his views have been assailed by syndicated columnists Richard Reeves, John Chancellor of NBC News, and now by Republicans and Democrats led by Alan Cranston of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, risks a perjury conviction when Mr. Adelman testifies again before the committee this Thursday; I happen to like Mr. Adelman and hope he does not allow ambition and stubborn vanity to get him hauled off to jail.

Why did you write that?

Mr. AULETTA. Because, as I suggested to Senator Helms and as I said in my column, (a) I believe it does strain credibility to believe that Ken Adelman does not recall a phone conversation, and (b), and this is important as well, would deny that the views that are recorded in my notebook on May 20, 1981, do not accurately reflect his views at that time, because I believe they did and do at that time.

So my view is, as I also expressed in the column, that it became inconvenient for Mr. Adelman, for other reasons, to acknowledge that he said this. But I do believe that he can recall that conversation. Can I prove that? Of course not, Senator. I can't.

But I believe that commonsense will suggest that he would recall that conversation at a time when he was out of office, about to be appointed to a position in the Government, obviously and presumably, if like most prospective appointees, nervous that anything that might be said would be harmful to his prospective nomination. And a man, even though he presumably did not read—and I believe this to be true—the Daily News on Sundays from his home in the Washington area, had enough friends in Washington—I'm sorry, in New York City, where, after all, several months later he came to work alongside of many of these people at the United Nations, I find it hard to believe that he would not have heard about that column or had a copy sent by one of his associates in New York.

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate what you are saying, but the words you are using are "strains credibility," "find it hard to believe." That is fair enough as we deal in conjecture about human motivation. I suppose I was a bit taken aback by the thought, however, that this takes on a very legalistic framework, types of evidence really well beyond the ones that you purport to be able or anyone could bring to bear when talking about perjury and someone being hauled off to jail.

In other works, we are, I hope, still having a very serious dialog about disarmament policy, about the person who is going to be chiefly responsible for that in this country, and I fear that this is taking on a carnival atmosphere of conjecture and our giving thoughts about why somebody would do this type of thing.

Understandably, you felt provoked and wanted to defend your good name. I would just question the advisability of throwing that kind of terminology into the story.

Mr. AULETTA. Senator, I must say that I may be an innocent on these matters. However, when I stood up earlier and raised my right hand and swore to tell the truth, I just assume that if I don't tell you the truth today, that I am culpable of having committed perjury, and I assume the same rules apply. I know the same rules apply to Mr. Adelman.

And I do find it hard to believe that Ken Adelman—who as I said in that piece, I like, and my limited exposure to him has been pleasant, I find him intelligent and enjoyable to be with—I find it hard to believe that Ken will raise his right hand, as I did, and swear under oath that he cannot recollect that conversation and that the views reported are not his.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, though, if you would yield, it should be noted in this transcript already you have used the words "I do not recall" a number of times. I can understand why I would feel someone ought to remember a conversation with me, and you feel the same way; but so many times we just simply do not recall a situation, if it came at a harassed time or whatever it might have been.

Please continue.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Auletta, in the column that you wrote on the 20th of February 1983, you mentioned, "To their credit, such Reagan allies as the Wall Street Journal's editorial page and Norman Pederis, editor of Commentary Magazine," and then you noted, "which has published Adelman's work, have not flinched or sugar coated their words."

Has in fact Commentary Magazine ever published Adelman's work?

Mr. AULETTA. Yes, they have, sir.

Senator LUGAR. What time and place?

Mr. AULETTA. Over the past several years. I cannot give you citations, but Kenneth Adelman has appeared in Commentary. In fact, on his vita sheet he refers to having been published there as well as other publications.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. On his what sheet.?

Mr. AULETTA. On his biography.

Senator LUGAR. The reason I raise the question is that I have asked Mr. Adelman that question, and he indicates he has not been published in Commentary Magazine. This is why, you know, we are dealing in very small points, but at the same time I just wondered.

Mr. AULETTA. It may be, Senator, that I have misspoken on that point. I believe that Kenneth Adelman has written in Commentary Magazine. It may be that I have that wrong.

Senator LUGAR. On the 20th of February 1983——

Mr. AULETTA. I know he is published, Senator, extensively in various publications.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that is true, but you mentioned specifically——

Mr. AULETTA. I did, correct.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. This one and its editor.

Now, the Associated Press story dated from New York, on February 17 quoted you as saying that the "sham" statement, at least the quote that I have here, came out during an hour-long telephone interview with Adelman on May 24, 1981. This may again be unfortunate reporting by the AP, for after all, these are once again rather small items, but the telephone evidence you are using today alleges it was a 25-minute conversation on a different date.

How do you reconcile these interviews?

Mr. AULETTA. I can't. I think the AP reporter mistook the 24th when the column appeared for saying that I had done the interview on the 24th. Obviously, I couldn't have said that since the column appeared on that day, and I just assume it was an honest confusion of the two dates.

The 1 hour, there was a point at which I thought, and I may well have said to the AP reporter before I had seen my records that the conversation was about an hour. The phone records show that it was a 25-minute phone conversation.

Senator LUGAR. I agree, and obviously once again, memory of the situation is difficult. But since we are now dwelling in memories and recollections, it is irrelevant.

Mr. AULETTA. The only difference, Senator, I would suggest—and I think you are quite right and clearly have pointed to a couple of examples where my recollection may not be as precise as it might be. However, I think there is a difference between—I have not just my memory, I have six pages of notes, and unless one assumes I made up these pages in the method of a Janet Cooke, it seems to me it is very hard to explain how these notes got in a notebook sandwiched betwen other interviews done at that time.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Auletta, do you recollect having an interview with Mr. Adelman on May 20, 1981?

Mr. AULETTA. I do, sir.

Senator SARBANES. Now, the story that was written, that appeared in the Daily News on February 20 of this year, to which Senator Helms was making reference, or primarily to the headline, which I take it you did not write.

Mr. AULETTA. Did not.

Senator SARBANES. Was that story prompted by the comments that Mr. Adelman released with respect to your earlier story in the Daily News of May 24, 1981?

Mr. AULETTA. It was prompted by Mr. Adelman's press conference Thursday evening in New York, last Thursday evening, in which he released a statement to the press in which he said he does not recall making these statements. He offered some flowery words about me and then, in effect, in my judgment, accused me of not telling the truth.

I was called Thursday evening by Marilyn Berger of ABC News who was at the Adelman press conference and asked if she could come and interview me about this. That is where I first read the statement, when she came to interview me, and I responded basically to Kenneth Adelman's, in effect, accusation that I was not telling the truth as a journalist and as a man.

Senator SARBANES. In that statement, and I appreciate your explanation, he says, first of all, that you are a fine journalist with whom he has a good personal relationship and that your integrity and professionalism are not under question. Then in point No. 2 he says, first, that he has no recollection of ever granting you an interview, that he recalls participating in the seminar with you, and then also that he does not recall making any such statement at any time.

I take it that refers to the "sham" statement.

Mr. AULETTA. Well, that and, I think, some of the other statements that appeared in the piece, I assume. I don't think he was specific about the "sham."

Senator SARBANES. He says he denies that the alleged quotes reflected his opinions then or now. Leaving aside his opinions now, which is a different situation, in effect he is saying that you quoted him in a way then, following your interview which he does not recollect, that did not reflect his opinions.

You had this interview with him. Do you think that is an accurate statement by Mr. Adelman as to his views at that time?

Mr. AULETTA. Senator, that is why, because he said that, I felt that he was in effect accusing me of being a liar. These notes that I have are accurate. They accurately reflect what Mr. Adelman said to me on May 20, 1981.

Senator SARBANES. And that view that was reflected to you by Adelman at that time, did you have other reason through your contacts with Adelman or your exposure to him to think that those were his views?

Mr. AULETTA. Yes. As I wrote in my column last Sunday, I believe that they reflected, based on my exposure to him at several seminars, that they accurately reflected his view, and they certainly accurately reflected the views of other people who were associated with the Reagan administration at that time.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Auletta, this hearing has a greater importance than I thought it might have, not because you remember this or Mr. Adelman remembers that, but because a principle discovered by courts of law over the years that statements made against interest have a special probative value.

You said earlier today that in your conversations with Mr. Adelman, he took pride in the fact that the Reagan administration was bringing to Washington a different set of assumptions about arms control which were at variance with those of the established bipartisan consensus. Is that a fair paraphrase of what you said?

Mr. AULETTA. Yes, it is.

Senator MATHIAS. On what did you base the judgment?

Mr. AULETTA. I based it on, among other things, the interview I did with Kenneth Adelman.

Senator MATHIAS. Do you want to pick out the statements in your notes that you feel reflect that judgment?

Mr. AULETTA. I think maybe I could do that better by referring to the original piece, Senator. I refer to the fact—I will just go through it, if I may, and cite the evidence for that particular point of view.

The United States was—and Carl Gershman was quite happy about this, and I don't mean to characterize his attitude except to accurately report his attitude—that the United States was the sole nation to oppose the curb on dissemination of baby formulas.

Then to go on, I talked about the assumptions that were different in the Reagan administration, and I pointed out there were five key assumptions that appeared to be different than the assumptions commonly accepted in the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations.

I mentioned that they opposed détente and I said they tend to oppose, and I am quoting myself, tend to oppose arms control negotiations as well. I quote Mr. Adelman as saying that, "I can't think of any negotiations on security or weaponry that have done any good."

I also quote Mr. Adelman in the next paragraph as saying—and this, it seems to me, is the central point of those who took this view at that point in time, and again, I am not characterizing that point of view, I am trying to reflect accurately what its basic assumptions are, and I quote him at that time. He said, "One reason not to rush into negotiations is that in a democracy, these negotiations tend to discourage money for defense programs. The public says, why increase the military when we are negotiating with the Russians?"

Then Carl Gershman says, and I quote him, and he is the deputy at the United Nations under Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and he says, "We are not sort of begging for negotiations." Then I quote Mr. Edwin Meese, the Presidential counselor. I didn't quote him directly, I didn't interview him, but it was in the press that prior week, that he said the Reagan administration was not legally bound to abide by the SALT I or SALT II treaties.

I go on to say—would you like me to continue this, Senator?

Senator MATHIS. Yes.

Mr. AULETTA. OK. "Representing a common feeling within the Reagan administration, Adelman said the major reason to enter into arms negotiations is to placate"—these are my words—"is to placate our allies and American public opinion."

Now I quote him: "My policy would be to do it for political reasons. I think it's a sham." Then I continue in the original column and say that the stress of détente and arms negotiation is predicated on another, on a second jolt commandeered by the Reagan administration—which is what I called a "steely anti-Soviet posture".

Then I quote the President of the United States, a quote he had given the Wall Street Journal about the Soviet Union being behind all the unrest in the world, and I have the actual quote.

Senator MATHIAS. Your judgment, then, is that this is what Mr. Adelman intended; this is what Mr. Adelman was thinking on May 20, 1981, before he had been nominated to go to the United Nations and before he had been confirmed by the Senate for that post?

Mr. AULETTA. Correct, Senator.

Senator MATHIAS. Referring to the quotation, "I can't think of any negotiations on security or weaponry that have done any good." I see there is some mention in your notes of the ABM Treaty. Was that in reference to that particular quotation?

Mr. AULETTA. No. What he said, that the only—and this is a paraphrase, as I said earlier, it is not a direct quote from him but I am paraphrasing what he said, these are my words—he said the only treaty except for lousy weapons—ABM Treaty.

In other words, the only treaty he could think of that may have worked, but it was a meaningless treaty, he was saying, because the weapons were lousy, was the ABM Treaty.

Senator MATHIAS. On the same page of your notes, just above that ABM Treaty reference, the second reason is really a frank—would you read that?

Mr. AULETTA. I said: how did you feel about the negotiations? The first reason, he said, which I quoted earlier, is not to rush into it. We shouldn't rush into negotiation. I will read you the exact quote. "The reason not to rush into negotiations is the fear that these negotiations in a democracy tend to discourage money for defense programs. People say, why increase the military when we are negotiating with the Russians?"

Then I say the second reason, and then in quotes—this is Adelman speaking—"really no frank appraisal that these things do any good." I am adding "that" and a few verbs to it. Then he goes on, "I think that's a fair assessment."

Senator MATHIAS. And I notice you have that in quotes.

Mr. AULETTA. That is in quotes.

Senator MATHIAS. Why did you put those statements in quotes as opposed to other statements in your notes?

Mr. AULETTA. Because other things in this note I was not quoting him directly. I only have in quotes when I am actually quoting him.

Senator MATHIAS. You are sure that is exactly, precisely what Mr. Adelman said?

Mr. AULETTA. Or because I would be a stenographer if I took down everything that everyone I interviewed says. Not everything someone says is equally important.

Senator MATHIAS. But you set those statements out as being of special importance.

Mr. AULETTA. No, just that I—yes, I thought it was something that I might want to come back to and it may have some significance, obviously, in writing the piece. I have not reported everything he said in six pages of notes because they are not all equally relevant or important, nor does any journalist.

Senator MATHIAS. In your written notes you have a heading called "Successes."

Mr. AULETTA. On top of the page right under Kenneth Adelman's name. Is that correct, Senator?

Senator MATHIAS. On the page following the "sham" page.

Mr. AULETTA. Correct; I have it.

Senator MATHIAS. What does that refer to?

Mr. AULETTA. I asked him—successes is my question, and I asked him to describe what he thought the successes of the Reagan foreign policy to date had been. And in fairness, this again is just several months into the new administration, and he said—I paraphrase—uncertainty, which is a point of view that was reflected in the actual piece, that the Soviet Union was uncertain about what our reaction would be.

So the point that Ken Adelman would make at the time is that unlike the Carter administration, they might think twice before moving into Afghanistan because they were uncertain how a tougher administration might respond to that aggression.

Second, there is a little dash there, and this is in quotes, "for better or worse." I have under that the work "authoritarian," and what Ken was saying to me that day is that they have successfully—that is to say, the Reagan administration, which then he was not a part of but served on several transition teams-had successfully made a distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, a point that Ambassador Kirkpatrick had made in a Commentary magazine article before she joined the administration.

The third thing which I have a dash, he said there had been a radical—this is a paraphrase, not a direct quote. I am reflecting what he said, that there had been a radical change in personnel in the administration and he thought that was a significant accomplishment.

Senator MATHIAS. Some of those radicals are sitting right behind you.

Mr. AULETTA. I can't see behind me, Senator.

Then finally, with the last dash, he said, and this is a direct quote, "On these international issues, we are going to take a more national interest point of view. We are just going to look at it from our own national point of view." It then goes on.

But those he thought were the four significant, at that point after 4 months, the four significant accomplishments of the new administration.

Senator MATHIAS. I see my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias, thank you very much.

I would like to clarify a point that was raised just a little bit ago. The staff has checked the list of Adelman articles provided by him to the committee. There is no indication that any of his articles have been published in Commentary. The staff has also checked with Commentary, which says no Adelman article has ever been published in Commentary.

Mr. AULETTA. I apologize for that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tsongas.

Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Auletta, how did you get those thick notes sandwiched between the other stories in your notebook?

Mr. AULETTA. Should I invoke my first amendment privilege? These are obviously accurate. On the prior page there is a background interview, which is one of the reasons I am sensitive about letting go of the notebook, there is a background interview with somebody on the same subject, and on the page after Mr. Adelman's interview, Senator, there is my interview with Carl Gershman.

I can actually now tell, looking at my notes, who that first call to Washington was. It was to John Carbaugh, who is on Senator Helm's staff, and I did not get him. But I tried to reach him. He did not return my phone call. [Laugher.]

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you don't remember talking to John Carbaugh? I can remember every conversation with him, without notes. [Laughter.]

Mr. AULETTA. That is because I did not talk to him. He did not return my call, which is why it was a less than a minute conservation.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. That was the call before, you said?

Mr. AULETTA. No; I'm saying that Senator Helms asked me earlier who might that call after my Arlington, Va. call, who might my call to Washington in the Congress have been to, and when I look at my notes after the Adelman interview, I have John Carbaugh, legislative assistant to Helms. I called him but he never returned the call, and then my next interview is with Carl Gershman. So I assume that that is who that call directly after Adelman was to.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tsongas.

Senator TSONGAS. I am glad I asked such a penetrating question. I hope we tape this. We can send a copy of the transcript to Senator Helms for his edification.

The fact is, Mr. Chairman, I opposed the nominee long before I heard about your story, and I do not think my own view is that anybody in this committee is in a dissimilar situation, that everyone had made up his or her mind prior to your story ever being known.

So to suggest that we are some kind of a jury I think is simply erroneous; that we are acting here, as you can firgure out, as defense attorneys and as prosecutors. What we are doing, basically, is trying to focus on that information that pleases us, that reinforces the role that we are playing.

If there were people on this committee who were undecided prior to your story becoming known, that is a different story. That, in fact, is not the case. Those of us who are opposed to the nomination will focus on the issue of sham; those who are favor of it will look at other things and try to ignore the "sham" quotation. So let me state my own prejudices from the beginning.

It seems to me, having been both a prosecutor and a defense attorney in trying to be reasonably objective, it seems to me there are two things that are obvious. One, at the time of your story, you had no self-interest other than the story in May 1981. Clearly today Mr. Adelman does have a self-interest, and I think any juror or judge looking at that has to take that into account.

The second obvious conclusion is that there are, in fact, only two pieces of physical evidence. One is a telephone company's records, and the second is your notes. There is nothing else. On the major question of was there a conversation, as you noted in your article, the telephone company suggests that indeed there was, and there is no rebuttal of that evidence other than a statement, not "I never did it," but rather, "I don't recall." I have used the term "I don't recall" several times in my career. I will let it go at that.

So the question is not what this committee believes, because the issue is really what it wants to believe, as I am sure you have figured out by now. The question is what does the average objective commentator and citizen believe looking at that evidence.

It seems to me that whether you are talking about the United States or Europe, the conclusion is going to be that since you have no self-interest and Mr. Adelman does, since the only evidence we have, you have provided, that the burden would be on Mr. Adelman to disprove what you have said, and we will see whether he can do that subsequently.

But it seems to me that, given all of that, the issue before us, Mr. Chairman, is twofold. One, what is this committee about? What kind of tradition do we uphold? Should we be a committee that any administration worries about or they can simply send anyone up here? I am troubled by my own answer to that question.

But it seems to me the other issue for the administration is damage control. Your testimony, Mr. Auletta, has hurt this country because it is credible. All around the world, the longer this agony goes on, the longer is the calling into question of the U.S. commitment to arms control, whether you are talking about the German elections on March 6 or the sense of an Andropov that he can propagandize his way through this issue. These hearings hurt.

I would simply say that I would hope that Mr. Adelman, who is indeed a decent person, and I have met no one who would question that appraisal of his character, would understand that he is not serving the administration, he is not serving his country, and he is not serving the issue of arms control to tough it out.

I would hope that when things quiet down and there is less head and more light, that he will recognize, I think, a larger duty.

I have no questions because I have made up my mind. I will not go through the pretense of suggesting that I have not. I just wanted to get those statements on record. I have never in my life filibustered. I have a disdain for the process.

I feel very strongly about this issue and I feel that I am going to be dragged into a situation where I will be part of the process of hurting my own country, but I am not sure I have a choice. It is very painful for me and I do not take it lightly. I would hope that somehow it could be avoided. That was true long before you came on the scene. I can only say that I find your testimony very credible and it only reinforces my unhappiness as to where this committee and this Nation finds itself when it could have been avoided so easily.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Would you yield your remaining minute to me to just make a comment on your comments? In all the time I have served with you, you have never ever voted, from what I can see, from other than deep conviction. I feel that you respect the fact that others can come to different opinions and also vote from conviction.

In this particular case we do have not Mr. Adelman "toughing it out"; we have Mr. Adelman serving the President. The President has said, I want you in this job. The Secretary of State, a man we eminently respect, has said I want him in this job, as well as the Deputy Secretary. Both of them have said that with him in that job we will devote a good deal of time to this decisionmaking process and work with him as a team, and he has concurred with that.

Furthermore, former President Ford went out of his way to indicate his support. Former Secretary Kissinger went out of his way to indicate his strong support. We have had Don Rumsfeld go a long ways out of his way in the very heavy schedule he has because Ambassador Adelman worked for him for a period of time at the Defense Department.

We have had outstanding academicians like Dr. Goldman, my politician mentor 20 years ago, go way out of his way at the American Enterprise Institute to indicate his devotion to him. He shared an office with him for years. He feels he is an absolutely brilliant man.

My own conclusion is that I think if he is confirmed, this puts the administration in a position to really want to move forward. Phychologically this committee couldn't be in a better position because the ball is in their court to prove that their judgment is right. Already they are moving with considerable dispatch on two treaties that had no progress under the Carter administration whatsoever and have languished here for almost a decade now, and they are moving with dispatch with the Soviets to get those two treaties in such shape they can be presented for ratification.

So it is a question of judgment, and we each have to come to different judgments on it. But I respect yours. I hope that those who do support this nomination do so for reasons that we believe will serve the best interests of arms control in this administration.

Senator TSONGAS. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just one question. Does the chairman believe that we served President Reagan and our country when we voted down the LeFever nomination?

The CHAIRMAN. I did not believe it in the case of Dr. LeFever at all, as you well know, and that nomination was withdrawn. In this particular case the President has chosen to stand with his nominee. There have been I think, major advances in the direction that we all want to go: serious arms control and deep reductions and a cessation to the nuclear arms race.

Senator TSONGAS. Just to clear up the record, right after the LeFever vote in this committee, the administration reaffirmed its support for Dr. LeFever. It was Dr. LeFever who had the good sense to step down. I just point that out for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would agree with Senator Tsongas. In some ways I think everyone's mind has been fairly well made up, even though everyone has been very unsure and very troubled by this nomination.

But if this hearing at this point is to have any credibility, Mr. Auletta, I do think that we have to discern what indeed your article was saying and how it applies.

I would just like to point out in this piece, in this headline that has now become famous, that I assume regarding your thoughts on the whole incident, it could read either "Sham" or "Shame" in this headline. It could say "Sham on you, Adelman," or "Shame on you, Adelman."

Mr. AULETTA. I am not sure I—the headline is right, but the quote might not——

Senator KASSEBAUM. But as your own feelings about the incident, I would think either interpretation would be applicable.

Mr. AULETTA. It would.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would like to ask you then regarding this particular interpretation, when he said, "My policy would be to do it for political reasons," what is "it"?

Mr. AULETTA. Negotiate.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Negotiate on any arms control treaties?

Mr. AULETTA. Correct.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Could it not be interpreted that he would say, "I think this is a shame that it has to be for political reasons",

Mr. AULETTA. No.

Senator KASSEBAUM. You are clearly sure?

Mr. AULETTA. I am frankly absolutely certain of that, Senator.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Why did you interview Mr. Adelman?

Mr. AULETTA. Because I interviewed several people, and several people in that original column were quoted. But I had been exposed to Mr. Adelman at the Lehrman Institute at several of these foreign policy seminars, and he was one of the bright young men who had served on the transition team both, he told me at the time, the National Security Council and the State Department, had represented the President and Secretary of State Haig in the negotiations on the release of the hostages and was about to be appointed to a position in the Reagan administration.

He was clearly one of the comers.

Senator KASSEBAUM. You knew at that time he was under consideration for his U.N. appointment?

Mr. AULETTA. I didn't know what post he was under consideration for, but yes, I knew that he was under consideration for appointment.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And you were wanting to do a piece on arms control issues under the Reagan administration?

Mr. AULETTA. No; the piece I think was a little broader than that, Senator, in the sense that it attempted to in a column format to portray those four areas where the Reagan administration really had brought to bear a different set of assumptions than had been operative for the last 20 or so years in foreign policy, arms negotiations being one of those four.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And you picked largely Mr. Adelman because you knew him?

Mr. AULETTA. Actually, I think I quoted more extensively in that column Mr. Carl Gershman, who was then on the staff of U.N. Ambassador Kirkpatrick and whom I had also met at seminars and read his work. I was then in the process of doing a book on poverty, and I was familiar with his work in that area.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I just do not know the timing on this, but had anybody's name been put forward at that point for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency?

Mr. AULETTA. I don't remember who was up for that position or whether that position was filled at that time. But certainly, Kenneth Adelman's name was not bandied about.

Senator KASSEBAUM. No; but I thought maybe there were others who certainly had had an expertise in arms control that maybe I would have thought of before I would have thought of Ken Adelman.

Mr. AULETTA. When I called Mr. Adelman—in fact, you will notice from the notes—we began, my first question was to talk about successes of the Reagan administration. I was not certain where the interview, where he would take me in the interview.

It happens that in the course of that interview we spent a fair amount of time on the question of arms negotiations. But I did not know that when I phoned him for the interview. And in fact, the piece is not primarily about arms control that I wrote.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, it was said here this morning that he would be chiefly responsible for arms control policy. I am one who does not believe he will be chiefly responsible for arms control policy. I think he will be heading up the agency, and I think what is troubling to many of us is who will be responsible for arms control policy.

I think, through the course of these hearings, it certainly does send a message, as the chairman says, that this committee, which is terribly interested in arms control, and I believe the administration is too, will certainly put its best foot forward and press forward in a meaningful way, realizing that it is certainly under the gun.

Thank you.

Mr. AULETTA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I would like to inquire of other Senators that have not questioned Mr. Auletta how much time they would estimate that they would require. Senator Boschwitz, about how much time?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I am not sure, but I might use all of my 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. It might be 10 minutes. All right, Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. I will yield back a portion of my time. But I do want to announce that we will be holding the "yellow rain" hearings whenever this hearing is completed, even if it goes until this evening. And we have some witnesses who have come as far as Thailand. Some believe that "yellow rain" is being used in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia and some believe that it is not.

But for those witnesses who cannot make it today, we will reschedule that hearing for a later day. But even if I have to sit here through dinner, I will hear as many witnesses as possible whenever this is finished. I am in no way rushing this.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. You would need about what, about 5 minutes?

Senator PRESSLER. I plan to yield back most of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Say, 3 minutes then.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Chairman, I would like about 3 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Three minutes. Senator Cranston?

Senator **Cranston**. One or two minutes.

The **Chairman**. One or two, is that all?

Senator **Cranston**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. Senator Dodd.

Senator **Dodd**. I yield my time.

The **Chairman**. Senator Pell said he did not want any more time, and I do not want any more. Then we could move very rapidly forward.

Thank you very much.

Senator Cranston.

Senator **Cranston**. Mr. Auietta, there is something called refreshing your memory or refreshing your recollection. I would like to discuss that with you briefly in regard to your dialog with Senator Helms.

When your other phone call showed on that phone bill of May 20, 1981, what process did you go through in order to produce this bill as evidence of your indeed having called Mr. Adelman at 11:07 that day? That is, how do you know that was the Stanford Research Institute?

Mr. **Auletta**. Because what I did, Senator, was I checked, I went back to my notes—I knew I had my notes because, as I said earlier, I had shown them to syndicated columnist Richard Reeves—and I retrieved my notes. I then checked the date of the column and checked the phone records for that date. There was a call to Arlington, Va. I then went through and placed some calls, phoned the Stanford Research Institute and confirmed that that was their number. And I know that was it since I had never called them before or since.

Senator **Cranston**. You had no occasion to do the same thing with respect to the other phone numbers?

Mr. **Auletta**. I did not, no.

Senator **Cranston**. So that would explain why you now recall that you called the number where Mr. Adelman was to be found and did not recall the other numbers?

Mr. **Auletta**. Correct. But again, as I said to Senator Helms, I called the Congress of the United States with some frequency, so I would have a hard time recollecting. I suspect that one of those numbers that Senator Helms asked me about was to his staff assistant, since he is the next name in my notebook after Mr. Adelman.

Senator **Cranston**. So you have refreshed your memory on that point also.

Mr. **Auletta**. No; though I couldn't swear it with certainty, I remember leaving a message for him and also remember he never returned my phone call.

Senator **Cranston**. Thank you very much.

Senator **Mathias** [presiding]. Senator Boschwitz.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Mr. Auletta, in May 1981 you said that he was a private citizen. A little later, in response to Senator Kassebaum, you noted that you knew he was under consideration for an appointment. So while you said a little earlier that because he was a private citizen, he undoubtedly was not receiving many calls from reporters, it may well be that inasmuch as you knew he might get an appointment and other reporters knew, he may well have been receiving a number of calls.

Mr. AULETTA. I say in that original column, Senator, and I quote myself, "who was expected to join the new administration." It is possible. I do not know.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. So therefore, he was not necessarily a private citizen as one would normally consider a private citizen.

Mr. AULETTA. I assume, Senator, and I cannot prove this, but I would hazard a guess that Kenneth Adelman gets many more press calls today than even before he was nominated for his current post.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I am not asking you to hazard a guess about what happens today. You know, your recollection has been poor on a number of items throughout this testimony, and what I am asking you is that, inasmuch as you said in your column that Kenneth Adelman was the subject of some speculation with respect to an appointment, couldn't he have been receiving a number of press calls at that time.

It is not unusual, if I may hazard a guess, to use your terminology, it is not unusual to presume or assume that he might have received a number of calls at that time since he was not a private citizen in the terms that that was normally accepted. Is that a fair assumption?

Mr. AULETTA. I have no way of ascertaining the number of calls he was receiving from the press, Senator. And you could be correct.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, you earlier said that he was a private citizen and therefore you assume that he was not receiving many calls, therefore you could not believe that he had not seen this article, particularly inasmuch as he asked you to send it to him. However, if he was indeed under consideration for an appointment, as you stated apparently in your article, he may have been receiving a number of calls.

And that would not be an unfair assumption. Is that correct?

Mr. AULETTA. He might have been receiving, you may be correct.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. In your notes on page 4, which is unnumbered, up toward the top, the fourth line down, "I go into," would you read that, please?

Mr. AULETTA. Senator, I want to be sure I have my page 4. Just tell me where "I go into"——

Senator BOSCHWITZ. "I go into"— "People don't do well in negotiating security."

Mr. AULETTA. I don't have that on my page 4, Senator.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, after page 3. It must be the back of page 3. It follows page 3.

Mr. AULETTA. It follows page 3? Oh, I see it. It's the second paragraph. Right?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Right.

Mr. AULETTA. I will read you exactly what my notes say. Again, there will be some verbs missing. "I go into negotiations"—"nego" is negotiations—"willing give up great deal—a real reduction in nuclear weapons if Soviets willing to." That's how it exactly reads.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Now, if you will go over to page 4.

Senator MATHIAS. Before you leave that page, would you mind telling us what that squiggle is above the line you just read?

Mr. AULETTA. Crossing out a word. I was beginning a sentence "So." It looks like the word "So," and I just crossed it out. Again, that was done later after the interview to show that it didn't mean anything.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. On the botton of page 4 it says, "Increase chances of war." That must be a question; it was underlined. Would you read what is underneath that, please?

Mr. AULETTA. Bottom of page--oh, my question is to him, "Did not the"—let me give you the context, if I can give you the context so my question follows naturally.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Read what is underneath where it says, "Increase chances of war," please.

Mr. AULETTA. I asked him whether——

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Read what it says underneath where it says "Increase chances of war."

Mr. AULETTA. "We are willing have real reduction nuclear weapons. We are not willing to"—and I cannot make out that work, it looks like "react," but I can't be certain. Do you want me to go on, Senator?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Please.

Mr. AULETTA. "We are not willing to," uncertain words, "that love about." Basically, the interview, I stopped taking notes on the quote at this point.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. We hope——

Mr. AULETTA. The word looks like "love," to me, or "lone about."

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, keep reading if you will.

Mr. AULETTA. "We hope"—and again I have that trouble with that word, looks like "saved:", then there is a break. There is a space there, meaning that I did not record what he said next.

And then I continue, this is, "What assume security today"—this is Mr. Adelman's words—"would assume security today."

Senator BOSCHWITZ. "Assures."

Mr. AULETTA. Correct. "What assures security today is throughout history is military preparedness."

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Had you read some of the material that Mr. Adelman has written about SALT II?

Mr. AULETTA. I have read some, yes, I have, Senator.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Prior to this?

Mr. AULETTA. Probably, yes. I would suspect I had, sure.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Were you familiar with his viewpoints?

Mr. AULETTA. As I said, I have been at several seminars with him in which he talked about some of his views.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Were you familiar with his viewpoints as he had written them?

Mr. AULETTA. I was certainly familiar with his viewpoint about SALT II. I was certainly familiar with his viewpoint as regards the fact that we had to—we should not be emphasizing arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, we should be emphasizing a defense buildup in order to build the kind of political constituency at home to have that defense buildup.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, if you had read his writings about SALT II, you know that his criticism was that the cuts were not deep enough and that were not very meaningful. Twice in this interview he talked about, "We are willing to have real reductions of nuclear weapons," and then it goes on. And earlier he talked about, "I go into negotiations to give up a great deal real reduction in nuclear weapons if the Soviets were willing to." That is very consistent with what he wrote in the Wall Street Journal and his assessments of SALT II.

In other words, in your notes it is quite clear that he does not rule out by any means negotiations but rather that he would rule in negotiations but that they should be done for deeper cuts. And his criticism of SALT II is that they really did not slow down the arms race. Senator McGovern had that same criticism, I might say.

Why did you not mention that in your article and why did you only talk about the pejorative or the negative, that he was not interested in arms control, when twice within your interview, as recorded in your notes, he seems to be interested in real reductions? Why was that not mentioned?

Mr. AULETTA. That is a fair question, Senator. And this is a decision that every journalist faces when they do an interview with someone and they try to produce for the reader or the viewer an approximation of the truth.

Mr. Adelman, in the course of six pages of interview notes that I took, the emphasis of his remarks were clearly on such things as, for instance, and I quote, "The reason not to rush into negotiations." he means, "is a fear that these negotiations in a democracy can tend to discourage dollars for defense purposes."

He then said a second reason not to rush in, "Really no frank appraisal of these things do any good." He said, he continues, "I think that's a fair assessment."

And later on the same page, he said, "My policy would be to do it for political reasons," speaking of negotiations, "I think it's a sham." So the overwhelming evidence in the interview was that the thrust of Ken Adelman's position at this point in time was that to talk about negotiations would undermine the ability to have a defense buildup that he believed was necessary.

And therefore, when he talked about twice as, I might just say again that I have brought it to both Ken Adelman's attention that he had said this, and to the press' attention, but to have printed that in a very limited interview, it seems to me would be raising a hypothetical, and therefore what I would be doing is potentially misleading the reader more by including it than by excluding it.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Is not a different view of the interview the following: He was disappointed with SALT II, and he felt SALT II was a sham because it set no reasonable limits on arms and allowed armaments to grow? There are few instances in history of meaningful disarmament. He wanted to enter negotiations where there would be meaningful reductions.

And I think a reasonable case can be made for this view from your notes, and I am surprised that you did not in any way feel it necessary to talk about real reductions. How can you square in here that he says it's a "sham" but then on the other hand he says that, "We are willing to give up a great deal"? And later he says that, "We are willing to have real reductions of nuclear weapons," and then I cannot read your writing there at that point either.

So I would say that it is all a matter of viewpoint, an approach to the interviewer, at least as I see it. I might say that I had not read your recent article in the Daily News, and when I read, as Senator Lugar has pointed out—I will conclude; I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman—but when I read, as Senator Lugar has pointed out, some of the language that you use here "risks of perjury conviction", going to be hauled off to jail", "hypocrisy", "that this is a hypocrisy".

"The Wall Street Journal in a commentary, honestly belligerent and confrontational". He has not written in Commentary magazine because I also have that list of publications, and the publications in the whole area have been rather expansive. And it is interesting that you cannot remember reading them.

Mr. AULETTA. Senator, excuse me, I do remember, as I said earlier to you, that I have read some of his work.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. If you had read his work, then you would have seen that. Then you should have seen that the viewpoint he was expressing to you was consistent, that he was looking for deep reductions, that he was willing to negotiate for deep reductions, that indeed the other treaties had perhaps been a sham or had not been successful or had not been successful in reducing the arms race because they had not done just that.

That is what he has been saying in a number of articles. He said it again to you. Then didn't you pick out the more headline-type of language, which I point out to you, Mr. Auletta, you have done once again even after this, about hypocrisy and hauling off to jail and perjury convictions? No wonder that he did not read your articles when you use that kind of language. Why should he, if there isn't going to be responsible journalism involved?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much.

Mr. AULETTA. May I just say something on that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, of course.

Mr. AULETTA. Senator, I would suggest that there is a difference when you do an interview between the melody of the song someone is singing and the occasional lyric. The melody of Mr. Adelman's interview with me on that day was, let us deemphasize arms control and let us emphasize defense buildup. And an occasional lyric was that we have to have a real reduction in defense.

A journalist is faced with a choice, just as we are everyday in covering campaigns for office or whatever, of trying to decide what is the truth and how do you fairly represent it. I felt that the truth was fairly represented when I wrote—and this again was not a profile of Mr. Adelman; he just received relative short notice in that column—the truth of his position at that point in time was that he believed that it was important to emphasize arms buildup and the evil that the Soviet Union represented.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, you know, you talk about melody. One must go from one song to another. Yesterday was the birthday—I happen to be a fan of baroque—of George Fredrich Handel, and you can tell from one of his pieces to another that there is a certain continuation. And so I can tell from reading Mr. Adelman's earlier writings that there is indeed a continuation, that he is interested in deep arms control, even though, the melody of your interview with him as you interpreted it, was arms buildup rather than negotiations.

But I think that the melody is very consistent between his earlier writings, most of which I have read, and your interview. And I find it disappointing that despite the fact that he talks about, "I would go into negotiations, give up a great deal," and despite his statement that, "We are willing to have real reductions in nuclear weapons." You still tell me here that the real melody is that Mr. Adelman thinks arms control is a sham or that negotiations do no good whatsoever.

I just point out that there is a different approach and that there is a different melody, particularly when the melody is related to earlier things that he wrote.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. I do not have any questions. But I would say that I voted against delaying this matter to hold this hearing, because I think we should have voted on it as soon as possible. I must say I think we are all fascinated with the press, and I guess it is every politician's dream to have a writer with his notes and ask him why he included some things and not others.

But I do not think that a vote has changed here today. I am basing my decision on things that were said in the testimony, in the acutal testimony. We are sort of going in circles on some of these past articles.

But it is a fascinating process we are going through this morning. I think schools of journalism will probably benefit much from reading the report. Our reporters decide what to include in their stories, but I do not think it is going to affect anyone's vote here.

And I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you.

Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Auletta, what is your journalistic abbreviation for "policy"?

Mr. AULETTA. For "policy"?

Senator MURKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. AULETTA. Apparently based on this, I was writing out "policy," Senator. I do not have a code book, even a mental code book in my mind.

Senator MURKOWSKI. But when you wrote "pol" and you are writing short journalistic jargon, what does it say?

Mr. AULETTA. Well, basically, what this says, my interview with Adelman says, that when there were policy issues—it is written out, it appears when the word "pol," meaning politics," is used, it is "pol" period.

Senator MURKOWSKI. There is no question in your mind that there could not have been a mixup or reinterpretation of that?

Mr. AULETTA. No.

Senator MURKOWSKI. You do not use "pol" in your notes for policy?

Mr. AULETTA. No. In fact, the question where this quote, the "sham" quote, is referred to, my question, the word "policy" is written out "policy"? But I do not believe, Senator, that I abbreviate for "policy." It may be that I do. But it's "political."

Senator MURKOWSKI. You could have then in other notes used "pol" for "policy"?

Mr. AULETTA. I don't believe so.

Senator MURKOWSKI. We have not examined your notes, and I assume they would be available to the committee?

Mr. AULETTA. My notebook?

Senator MURKOWSKI. If we wanted to do research to determine whether there is a parallel there.

Mr. AULETTA. My entire notebook?

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, whatever.

Mr. AULETTA. I have made available, Senator, with due respect, the notes, the six pages of notes of my on-the-record interview with Mr. Adelman. I obviously, because there are interviews, in fact, on the prior page—there is a background interview which I am sure had I interviewed you, you would not want me to release your notes. I would not so release them.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, fortunately, we are not interviewing me today.

On the word "sham," did you acknowledge that you initialed the "M" over the word "sham" as addressed in your Xerox copy of your notes?

Mr. AULETTA. I did, Senator, and I acknowledge that in several places, and I pointed out several times. I had gone over a word that was unclear or there was the wrong word.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I have just gone over these notes in detail, and I cannot find any other relationship of an "M" made with that left-hand twirl other than over the word "sham," which I just find rather curious.

Your written words above for "ABM Treaty" show an entirely different type of writing of the initial "M." And I am no handwriting expert. But I found it curious that you have "M" on page—well, I do not know, there is not a number on the page, but it is probably page 6. There just happens to be no similarity.

Mr. AULETTA. I don't have a page 6, Senator. I don't have a page 6. It appears I start on a 1A page.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I do not have a numbered page A6 either, but it is about page 6. You can look through this, and I would ask other members of the committee to note the other areas where there is a capital "M." There is a distinct difference in the handwriting. I find no similarity at all. And I have pointed it out for the record because I find it rather curious. Usually, we have a uniformity in maintaining our handwriting, and this looks like it was structured by somebody that held a pencil upside down.

But you acknowledge that is your "M" over "sham"?

Mr. AULETTA. I not only acknowledge that, I also acknowledge, Senator, that my distinct recollection is Mr. Adelman used the word "sham."

Senator MURKOWSKI. You acknowledged one inconsistency in your report, and it was pointed out by the committee, with regard to the publication in Commentary magazine, which in your testimony you previously stated there had been articles by Mr. Adelman, and you have acknowledged that evidently that is not the case.

Mr. **Auletta**. Yes.

Senator **Murkowski**. To your knowledge, are there any other inaccuracies?

Mr. **Auletta**. In my article?

Senator **Murkowski**. Yes.

Mr. **Auletta**. The original article?

Senator **Murkowski**. The one we are referring to today.

Mr. **Auletta**. The May 24, 1981.

Senator **Murkowski**. May 20; this one.

Mr. **Auletta**. I am sorry, that is February. That is the article that appeared in the Daily News last Sunday.

Senator **Murkowski**. This is the New York Daily News, February 20.

Mr. **Auletta**. I am not aware of any, Senator.

Senator **Murkowski**. I have one more question, Mr. Chairman. Do you think that our arms limitation discussions are now or ever have been a sham and done for political reasons?

Mr. **Auletta**. Senator, as I have tried to suggest in my testimony, I really do not come here to pass judgment on Mr. Adelman's qualifications nor on the policy of this country in regard to arms negotiation.

Senator **Murkowski**. But you have an opinion as a citizen and observer and participant in the political system.

Mr. **Auletta**. And, in fact, my views, being a columnist, I am free to state those views. Some of my views were expressed in that column, the original column of May 24, 1981.

Senator **Murkowski**. Would you care to respond to the specific question? Do you think our arms limitation discussions are now or ever have been a sham and done for political reasons?

Mr. **Auletta**. I guess I would say no, I do not believe they have been a sham. That is not to say that I do not believe that there have been political statements made by, on the eve of an election, by officials promising a mutual breakthrough in negotiations, be it in Vietnam or arms negotiation, that may not have been made with an eye to political consequences.

Senator **Murkowski**. So you do not believe they are a sham, but some other people may? So you would have a difference of opinion there?

Mr. **Auletta**. No.

Senator **Murkowski**. As has been pointed out by some other members of the committee?

Mr. **Auletta**. If the question were, Senator, do I believe that—do I agree with Senator Moynihan's view as first expressed in the New Yorker magazine and then picked up, my understanding is that Presidential candidate Reagan called him after it appeared and said, I agree with your position that we ought to have meaningful arms reduction and that SALT II and SALT I——

Senator **Murkowski**. That is not the question I was referring to. I was asking what your opinion was, and you have answered the question.

Mr. **Auletta**. I do not believe we have had meaningful arms reduction.

Senator MURKOWSKI. But the question I asked is do you think arms limitation discussions are not or have been a sham done for political reasons, and you said no.

Mr. AULETTA. Basically, but I also made a distinction that it may be that there have been statements made in both Democratic and Republican administrations for political reasons.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I would assume you would grant that there is a lot of opinions as to whether or not in reality the interpretation is that they are a sham.

Mr. AULETTA. Sure. I quoted one person's opinion—Ken Adelman's—that it was a sham.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Murkowski. I thought we were finished questioning now, but I understand Senator Sarbanes has—No. We are finished questioning, then.

Will the room remain in order, please. We will excuse you, Mr. Auletta, and thank you very much indeed for your appearance. You will be staying? Yes, thank you. The committee is now ready to hear from Ambassador Adelman.

Ambassador Adelman, we welcome you back once again to this committee, and we would be pleased if you have any statement that you would like to make at this time.

AMBASSADOR ADELMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. You voluntarily stated that you offered to be sworn in. Would you mind standing and raising your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I do.

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH L. ADELMAN, DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Ambassador ADELMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before the committee to clear up the misunderstanding that has arisen, the so-called on-the-record statement made some 21 months ago attributed to me suggesting that arms control efforts have been a sham.

The facts are that Ken Auletta is a fine journalist with whom I have a good personal relationship. His integrity and professionalism are not under question. His article of May 1981 in the New York Daily News quotes me as calling arms control a sham. This has been repeated and recited by others.

I have no recollection of ever granting Mr. Auletta an interview. I do recall participating in a seminar with him at the Lehrman Institute and recall seeing him several times since then. I do not recall making any such statement at any time in my life.

The May 1981 article was not brought to my attention by Mr. Auletta or by anybody else for 21 months after its publication. I had no knowledge of its existence for those 21 months. Had I been shown the article, I would have denied that the alleged quotes reflected my opinions then or reflect my opinions now, because they do not.

Mr. Auletta has told me that his notes contain another alleged quote of mine, one saying that I support real arms control that provides for real reductions in weapons systems. This was not reported by Mr. Auletta at the time, by Mr. Reeves in his column of January 27, 1983, nor by Mr. John Chancellor in his February 3, 1983 commentary on the NBC Evening News.

Mr. Auletta's notes, according to him, contain alleged quotes which are contradictory—that I believe in real arms control which provides for reductions and I believe that arms control is a sham; I believe that the Reagan administration should not rush into any negotiations, but I believe the administration should begin arms control negotiations the day after President Reagan's inauguration. I would have sent someone to Helsinki for arms control negotiations, even though Helsinki is most noted for the agreement, as you know, Mr. Chairman, on human rights.

Mr. Auletta's notes thus contain a series of clearly disparate and inconsistent statements. More important, parts of those notes, widely quoted, do not reflect my views then or now. My statements, widely reported, are not consistent with my views.

My views were expressed in over 8 hours of hearings before this committee and in my public writings on these and related issues, notably in a full-length article in the August 28, 1978 Wall Street Journal, which treats arms control as exceedingly serious and which makes solid recommendations on how to improve the negotiations from the nonproductive SALT II results—recommendations which, by and large, have been incorporated in the Reagan administration's arms control proposals.

There is nothing in my writings, which have appeared in the most respected journals over a 3, 4, 5-year period, to substantiate the quotations attributed to me in those notes. My public record is sufficiently clear and voluminous to be judged on its own merits rather than on inconsistent and contradictory notes of an alleged interview which I never recall having given, contained in an article of which I was unaware for 21 months.

When these kinds of misunderstandings occur in public policy matters, it is important that they be cleared up. I hope I have done so here and I look forward to answering any further questions you or members of the committee may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Just a few quick questions.

Will you be a strong advocate for arms control?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that it is possible in the near future to move ahead, improving verification with the two treaties that have languished for years before this committee—the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe it is possible within the first term of the Reagan administration at the end of 1984 to have successfully concluded and negotiated and signed an arms control agreement that will provide for deep reductions at both INF and in START?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Pell?

Senator **Pell**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What we are dealing with here is not the general question of the suitability of Ambassador Adelman for the job. We have covered that in the previous hearings, and some of us feel particularly intensely and intently that whoever is in charge of ACDA should have passionate support for and have passionate feelings about arms control.

Some of us have been working in this field for a long time. I remember when I first ran for office in 1960 in my platform I said that we should set up a Bureau of Peace Affairs at the Department of State; and, as I have said before in this room, three of us, three Senators, went down to the White House in 1961 and persuaded the Kennedy administration to establish ACDA by statutory means, not just by Executive order.

So the feelings we have are intense. They do not affect the fact that you are a nice man. I like you and I think you are a thoroughly decent human being—just not the right man for the job. I think I would vote to support you for almost any other job in the Federal Government, but I do not feel this burning passion and strength of view in you that the Director should have. That is the general point I wish to make.

On the specific question being addressed in today's hearing, I have just one question that probably you may have already answered, but regarding the matter as to whether or not your version is accurate, have you looked up yourself to see where you were on May 20, 1981, in your own date book?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I do not keep a date book, Senator. I know what reviewing what I do have is my wife's travel record. She was a Foreign Service Officer at that time and she was in Morocco at that time working on child feeding programs for AID, so my premise would be that when she would be out of town I would be in town to take care of the kids.

Senator **Pell**. You presume you were probably here, and when you say in your statement that you have no recollection of the interview with Mr. Auletta, do you have any recollection of the telephone conversation, because I do not see how one could not talk for 20 minutes and not vaguely recall it.

Ambassador **Adelman**. I have no recollection of a telephone conversation with Mr. Auletta in May of 1981 at all.

Senator **Pell**. None at all?

Ambassador **Adelman**. None at all, Senator.

If I may get back to a point that you made on the passion for arms control, let me just save you time and not repeat what I have said for 8 hours and 10 minutes of testimony before you that I do. I take it very seriously.

Let me just also say to you that I do not think anybody not interested in this field would have written so consistently about the field. I know that you are familiar with many of my writings on this and may have seen an August 1978 article in the Wall Street Journal about what future could come from a SALT agreement. The Wall Street Journal just republished it last Friday.

The point of this is that anybody thinking the field is worthless or senseless or not very interesting or not very committed to it does not spend the time, the effort, the research and the commitment to think out what about the future. How can we make something that is not going very well into something that is going very well?

Like I say, this is something that is on the record, very clear, 4½ years ago. There are many other subjects on which I did not research and did not write, and I think it is entirely fair to say I was not interested enough to do the research and did not have the time or something. But on the future of arms control, that was something I was interested in. It was something I was committed to; it was something that I spent the time and effort to go after.

Senator PELL. I thank you and I would yield the balance of my time to the Senator from California.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell. I know that every Senator here is committed to wanting to get to a vote before lunch. Without objection, we will go on a 5-minute rule, but taking into account that so long as a Senator has a question that is pertinent they will not be cut off. But let's, for guidance at least, go on a 5-minute rule at this time.

Senator Helms?

Senator CRANSTON. Senator Pell yielded to me.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think he had any time left. We were not on a time schedule at that time.

Senator HELMS. I have no problem with letting Senator Cranston go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to yield your time to him?

Senator HELMS. No, sir. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. We had not established a time schedule.

Senator MATHIAS. Let's go in order.

Senator HELMS. Well, apparently Alan wants to go now, so I am perfectly willing.

Senator CRANSTON. I do not care. You go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's go in sequence, then.

Senator Helms?

Senator HELMS. Thank you very much. I just asked for a copy of your statement, Mr. Adelman, and they are getting it.

Did I understand you to say that you do not recall even having a conversation with Mr. Auletta?

Ambassador ADELMAN. In May 1981 over the telephone? I did have a conversation with him at the Lehrman Institute. There were sessions in March and February and in May and since that time.

Senator HELMS. I think the record ought to show, Mr. Chairman, that a good many responsible Americans held and expressed grave doubts about the arms control negotiations. We have a distinguished American who resigned in protest who is not the chief negotiator. The distinguished majority leader opposed SALT II, for example.

So I agree with Senator Lugar that we are chasing a rather skinny fox. We are trying to determine whether the reporter's notes were entirely accurate and now Mr. Adelman says that he does not even recall the conversation. The fact that you present a photostat of the telephone calls does not necessarily indicate that you had the call. That call could have been placed to somebody else, but I am not doubting Mr. Auletta's word nor yours.

Recollections vary. I cannot remember an interview I had 3 weeks ago or 3 days ago, there are so many of them.

Now the point was made by Mr. Auletta that you did not get many telephone calls when you were a private citizen. Is that correct?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, when I was on the transition team, one of the things that I was handling was the hostage negotiations. At the end I got plenty of phone conversations about the hostages. It was a topic that was of enormous importance in December and January, as you can well remember those times. It is interesting to think on those times. That was the single topic in everybody's mind before the inauguration.

And to say that the three of us in the State Department who were working with the President-elect and with the Secretary of State-designate were not flooded by people interested in what was happening on the negotiations would be a misconception.

Senator HELMS. Well, let's just assume for the purpose of discussion that there was this conversation involving you and Mr. Auletta and you just do not recall it. Have you said to anybody that you had doubts about the efficacy of previous arms control negotiations?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I have written extensively that I did not think SALT II was a real arms control package that reduced weapons, that increased stability, that saved money, that were thoroughly verifiable, and that was the statement that I have written, I have discussed and I feel strongly about.

Senator HELMS. Do you still hold those views?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; I do.

Senator HELMS. And the President knows what your views are?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; he does.

Senator HELMS. The fact is that SALT II—and I say this with all respect for my colleagues who favored it—was not a limitation treaty. It was an escalation treaty. I have not read all of your articles, but I think there is a great deal of validity.

But the point that is being raised here this morning is did you or did you not have a conversation with Mr. Auletta and, if you did, do you remember it, and I took some exception to this article—the headline which Mr. Auletta says he did not write—in which he calls you a liar. I do not know you well. I think this is about the third or fourth time that I have seen you, but while he did not write the headline he says plenty in there to indicate that he does not believe you are telling the truth.

Now let me ask you again. You do not recall having a conversation with Mr. Auletta?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That is correct.

Senator HELMS. And to the best of your recollection, and your knowledge, you have never stated that arms control negotiations for the purpose of reducing arms is a sham?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That is absolutely correct. That would go against everything that I have written.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, that is about all I have. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Sarbanes?

Senator **Sarbanes**. Mr. Adelman, what prompted you to make this statement of February 17, the one you have just read to the committee?

Ambassador **Adelman**. It had come to my attention, first by Richard Reeves the columnist, that there was the existence of the Ken Auletta article. I was very surprised by this and tried to find the article at the Library of Congress. I asked to look for it for 3 or 4 days; they could not find the article. We finally had somebody call the Daily News to get copy of the article.

I knew that the quotes there were not consistent with my views and I knew that there were questions about my nomination and that this would be a very serious issue.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Do you regard this article as being harmful to your nomination prospects?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I regard anybody believing that those are my views as being very harmful to my nomination.

Senator **Sarbanes**. You say in your statement that they were not your views then nor are they your views now. Have your views changed in any way over the years on the question of arms control?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Sarbanes, when I read the 4½-year-old article reprinted in the Wall Street Journal last Friday I thought to myself they are very consistent with what I believe now. Suggestions made for future arms control, the thrust of the article, is something I feel very comfortable with.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Did you think SALT II was a sham?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I thought SALT II was not an adequate arms control reduction proposal.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, did you think there was a sham operation going on with respect to SALT II?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Sarbanes, "sham" is not a word I use. It is not a word in my vocabulary. It is not a word in my normal life. You are asking me to apply a word that I just don't use to a situation.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, what is "Rafshooning the Armageddon?"

Ambassador **Adelman**. That is an article about the selling of SALT.

Senator **Sarbanes**. And would "Rafshooning the Armageddon" suggest that SALT II was a sham?

Ambassador **Adelman**. It is suggesting that the SALT Treaty was not an arms reduction treaty. It is suggesting—the whole point of the article is not so much on the merits of SALT II; it is on the way it is being sold, on the way that you Senators are being pressured to vote for the treaty.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Mr. Adelman, what concerns me is that there is a position you could have taken and stuck to, and one would have had to make their judgments on it accordingly. We are now in a situation where you deny altogether having this interview, as I understand it.

Ambassador **Adelman**. I deny remembering that I ever had that interview, yes, sir.

Senator **Sarbanes**. On the phone calls that were just asked about, your response dealt with December and January, on the hostage issue, as I understood it.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. I can understand that in that period, if you were involved with the hostages, you would have had a great many phone calls. This interview took place on May 20. Were you still being deluged with phone calls at that time?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I have worked in Washington since 1968. I know a good number of journalists. When they are writing stories or checking stories or writing editorials on an area that they thought I had something to contribute, they would frequently call me up.

Senator **Sarbanes**. After the committee's action last week, did you consider asking that your name be withdrawn from this post?

Ambassador **Adelman**. No; I did not, Senator.

Senator **Sarbanes**. You did not consider that at all?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Not at all.

Senator **Sarbanes**. You did not discuss that with the administration?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I did not even consider it, no.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Did you discuss it with the administration?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I learned quickly that the President had full confidence in me, which I deeply cherish. I learned quickly that the Secretary of State had deep confidence in me, which I very much cherish.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Now do you think that the Senate should attach importance to the fact that you are the person the President wants?

Ambassador **Adelman**. It's a very important thing, yes, sir.

Senator **Sarbanes**. An important consideration?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes; it is.

Senator **Sarbanes**. How do you square that response with this comment from "Rafshooning the Armageddon"—and I am now quoting you—"The spiel about not sinking the Presidency sounds good, but slithers over the fact that the Founding Fathers purposely drew up a Constitution making Senate treaty ratification quite difficult, requiring two-thirds, thereby giving the upper Chamber every opportunity to thwart Presidential schemes. The follow-the-leader price was quite fetching once upon a time, but it falls flat after a succession of incredibly bad Presidential judgments, even on matters of vital national security."

Ambassador **Adelman**. Are you asking me, is that a point, that the Senate has the ratification—the advice and consent?

Senator **Sarbanes**. If I understand you, you just told me that we should attach a great deal of weight to the President's desire here, but obviously in your article you asserted something quite different, that we ought to operate with a very free-ranging judgment.

Ambassador **Adelman**. I think my position is entirely consistent with the Constitution, that the Senate has a very high responsibility. As John McCloy quoted, I believe it was, Alexander Hamilton in the testimony that the chairman asked me to read, where he said about the Senate, "above all others you have the trust."

I am very comfortable with that.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, that is an important responsibility in the advice and consent function as well.

Ambassador **Adelman**. I think it is an important responsibility, yes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Did you consider simply saying "well, Auletta has written that article and there it is. These are my views today." Then you could come before us on that basis instead of involving yourself in a controversy over credibility—his or yours?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator, what I considered doing was to be absolutely honest with this committee and with the American people and I never considered doing anything else—an absolutely honest response to say I have no recollection of this. It is an absolutely honest response to say those views are not reflective of my views.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Is it not your view that one reason not to run into negotiations is that in a democracy such negotiations tend to discourage money for defense programs?

Ambassador **Adelman**. It has long been a worry of people who are looking at arms control that the euphoria of the arms control process itself leads to political pressures and realities which lowers the importance of defense and the efforts toward defense. That has been a very common kind of concern. It is a concern I share.

Senator **Sarbanes**. So that is your view?

Ambassador **Adelman**. That concern is true.

Senator **Sarbanes**. My time is up.

The **Chairman**. Without objection, Senator Sarbanes, if you have just a few other questions that could complete your part of the questioning, then why don't you go ahead?

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, I may come back.

The **Chairman**. All right. Senator Mathias?

Senator **Mathias**. Mr. Adelman, I do not think it is as important to make a comparative judgment on your memory and Mr. Auletta's as it is to probe your own state of mind today, and we are obliged to do that because the duties for which you are nominated shall be to serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary of State, the National Security Council, and the President on arms control and disarmament matters.

We may never come to a satisfactory conclusion about the use of this word "sham," and perhaps it is not so important whether it was ever said. It is important as to whether the concept was ever held by you. So let me ask you a couple of very quick questions and you can give yes and no answers.

Is the prohibition of the encryption of telemetry a good thing or a bad thing?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I think that is a good thing.

Senator **Mathias**. And is that true whether or not you have an accompanying reduction in the level of arms?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes.

Senator **Mathias**. Is onsite inspection a good thing or a bad thing?

Ambassador **Adelman**. It depends on the—as I said last time, it depends on the thing looking for verification. If you are talking about launchers in the SALT II discussions, you do not need onsite inspection. If you are talking about chemical weapons or other kinds of activities, you might.

Onsite inspection has a range of different meanings and different terms and different aspects to it.

Senator MATHIAS. I am addressing the question to you. Is onsite inspection a good thing in those cases where national technical means are not otherwise available?

Ambassador ADELMAN. If it is important, it is a very good thing, yes.

Senator MATHIAS. And would that be true whether or not it was accompanied by a reduction in the level of arms?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes.

Senator MATHIAS. Is the exchange of seismic data a good thing or a bad thing?

Ambassador ADELMAN. A good thing.

Senator MATHIAS. And is that true whether or not there is a reduction in the level of arms?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes.

Senator MATHIAS. Is the establishment of a data base and the exchange of information a good thing or a bad thing?

Ambassador ADELMAN. A good thing.

Senator MATHIAS. And is that true whether or not there is a reduction in the level of arms?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes, it is.

Senator MATHIAS. So there is a whole range of arms control steps that could be taken having nothing to do with a reduction in the level of arms?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes.

Senator MATHIAS. And they will contribute to the stability and to the preservation of peace without a reduction in the level of arms so that the question of whether or not there is a reduction in the level of arms is not the determinative and final question in matters of arms control?

Ambassador ADELMAN. It is not the only one. It is an important one.

Senator MATHIAS. It is not the only one.

Ambassador ADELMAN. It is an important one.

Senator MATHIAS. So an agreement could be reached that would be both positive and desirable but did not necessarily contain the element of reduction of arms?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That is correct.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Mathias.

Senator Cranston?

Senator CRANSTON. Let me say that although I know that most members of this committee may have made up their minds on this nomination that I do know that not all Members of the Senate have made up their minds on this nomination in the event that it reaches the Senate floor. Therefore, I think that the exercise that we are going through is an important responsibility for this committee to exercise.

Mr. Adelman, I would like to read quotes that have caused the most concern from the Auletta interview and then just ask you if you ever uttered those words to him, if you have ever said them or words like them to anyone else, or if you have ever made statements to that effect verbally or in writing at any time. If you want to deal with any one individually, please let me know.

He quotes you as saying: "One reason not to rush into negotiations is that in a democracy these negotiations tend to discourage money for defense programs. The public says 'why increase the military when we are negotiating with Russians'?"

Also: "I can't think of any negotiations on security or weaponry that have done any good."

Also: "Representing the common feeling within the Reagan adminstration," Adelman says, "the major reason to enter into arms negotiations is to placate our allies and American public opinion. My policy would be to do it for political reasons," he says: "but I think it is a sham."

Also: "Asked if the United States would not be deliberately disregarding European opinion if we conducted sham negotiations," you said: "Yes; we should be negotiating just for political reasons. I would have sent someone on January 21 to Helsinki for negotiations, very low key, and never mentioned it again. If anyone ever brings up that subject, you can say we have a guy over there."

So did you say that or any words to that effect to Mr. Auletta?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, there is, as I said in my statement, there is a conflicting and disparate category of statements that is made all the more confusing by an examination of the notes that have taken on a large importance.

For example, your last quote regarding sending somebody January 21, which is, of course, the day after the inauguration, when I say elsewhere in those notes in the supposed interview, which I have no recollection of, that we should not rush into something. So you have the January 21, the nonrushing.

But the last point you made on the January 21 to Helsinki comes immediately after a discussion of the law of the sea situation. My concern that euphoria over arms control leads to a lowering of consciousness on national security issues. Yes; I am concerned about that in my writings and it has been a concern that I have expressed over the years.

Senator CRANSTON. You have not really answered my question. Did you say anything like those quotes that I read to you to Mr. Auletta?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I have no recollection of saying anything like that to Mr. Auletta. Let me also say that I have no recollection of having a conversation with Mr. Auletta until recent times outside the Lehrman Institute. Let me say that we were together for two sessions at the Lehrman Institute in February and May before this time and the main participants in those discussions, who I have checked with, are certainly willing to say that there is nothing that I have said at those sessions or anywhere else that remotely resembles the most well-known quotes used in that interview.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, have you ever said anything to the effect of those quotes to anyone else, or have you written anything?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Which quotes do you mean?

Senator CRANSTON. The four that I read to you.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I am saying that on defense programs, I repeat myself—on the defense programs I have had concerns that increased euphoria on arms negotiations does lead to political processes that may diminish the attentiveness to defense.

Senator **Cranston**. So when he quotes you to that effect—"One reason not to run into negotiations is that in a democracy these negotiations tend to discourage money for defense programs. The public says, why increase the military when we are negotiating with the Russians"—that is not inconsistent with things you have said to other people?

Ambassador **Adelman**. That is not the way I would state them, but that is not inconsistent, just like it is not inconsistent to say I am for deep reductions in arms negotiations. That would be something that I consistently said for the last 4½ years. I have written. I feel it very strongly now. That is why I am so happy with the Reagan administration's arms control proposals.

Senator **Cranston**. So one of the four statements that I read to you as quotes is consistent with things you have said to others, but your position now, under oath, this morning is the same as your position at the New York press conference last Thursday. That is, you do not recall ever having made any of the other three statements to Mr. Auletta or to anyone else?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I never remember giving an interview to Ken Auletta. This came to my attention 21 months after the supposed interview. Had I seen the article that Mr. Auletta wrote—he never says in his article that it was from an interview—but had I seen that article I would have denied it at the time, Senator.

Senator **Cranston**. You stated in your New York press conference—"Most importantly, the parts of those notes widely quoted do not reflect my views then or now." You are now changing that statement and saying it does reflect your views?

Ambassador **Adelman**. No, I am not. The most widely quoted statement was the statement that John Chancellor made on the evening news and Lesley Stahl asked the President of the United States. Ken Adelman said arms control is a sham.

That is not my view; it has never been my view. That is why I stated it very carefully, Senator Cranston, that the most "widely quoted" portion of the interviews is not my view.

Senator **Cranston**. What you said was "the parts of those notes widely quoted do not reflect my views."

Ambassador **Adelman**. That was a very precise and accurate way to state it.

Senator **Cranston**. I guess it is a judgment of how widely quoted that was.

Ambassador **Adelman**. You had John Chancellor on the evening news, which is, I think, very widely quoted. You have Lesley Stahl standing up at a Presidential press conference. I think that is widely quoted.

Senator **Cranston**. I quoted it here, and I consider that widely quoting.

Ambassador **Adelman**. You quoted it here. That is a third wide quote.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Would the Senator yield for a moment?

Senator **Cranston**. Yes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. As I understand it, Mr. Adelman, you are making a very fine distinction in this statement. Obviously, your statement reflected a great deal of work and I want to be sure I understand it. I take it—"most importantly the parts of those notes widely quoted do not reflect my views then or now."—that you are drawing a distinction between the parts of the notes quoted that may have reflected your views and those you label "widely quote," which do not.

Is that correct?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Sarbanes, I noted in that statement that there are contradictory statements in one interview. I do not believe the most widely noted "sham" statement does not reflect my views at all.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Some of those others, which Senator Cranston has just quoted to you directly from the article, do reflect your views, is that correct?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Some of those have a consistency with my views—that is on deep reductions, on the need to watch for defense efforts in the same time of arms control—yes, that is consistent with my views.

Senator **Cranston**. My time has expired.

The **Chairman**. Senator Cranston, without objection—I do not object myself to your finishing up your questioning. Do you have any idea about how long it might take?

Senator **Cranston**. It really depends on the length of the answers. I could be done in 15 minutes.

The **Chairman**. It could even be 10 if the answers are shorter. I would suggest, would it be all right with my colleagues if Senator Cranston finished his——

Senator **Mathias**. Would the Senator yield for a single question that will require a one-work answer?

Senator **Cranston**. Of course.

Senator **Mathias**. In light of the answers you gave me a moment ago, Mr. Adelman, would you say that SALT II was a sham?

Ambassador **Adelman**. It is not a word I normally use.

Senator **Mathias**. I am asking you to use it now. Would you say SALT II was a sham—yes or no?

Ambassador **Adelman**. No; I do not think it was a good agreement. I would not call it a sham.

Senator **Mathias**. But it had some good things in it?

Ambassador **Adelman**. It had very good things in it.

Senator **Mathias**. Such as prohibition of encryption of telemetry, establishment of a data base and the exchange of information?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I agree with you. It was a difficult decision, and, as I explained to you last time, Senator Mathias, I was not one of these leading the parade against SALT II. I thought it was a tough decision. I thought on balance, because of the positive elements that you have just described, that on balance it was negative, but that was not to say it was a terrible agreement or anything.

Senator **Mathias**. Thank you, Senator Cranston.

The **Chairman**. Senator Cranston, would you yield for one point on the same thing?

Senator **Cranston**. Yes.

The Chairman. Ambassador Adelman, do you support and will you support the President's, the administration's, present position to observe, so long as the Soviets observe, the terms of SALT II?

Ambassador Adelman. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Senator Cranston?

Senator Pressler. Mr. Chairman, I think we should proceed on the time rule we are under.

The Chairman. If you would like—is there a consensus on that? We should stay on the time rule, then? All right, then.

Senator Cranston had finished his under the time rule. Senator Kassebaum?

Senator Kassebaum. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman, but I do not yield any time, either.

The Chairman. Senator Dodd?

Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions. I would be glad to yield to Senator Cranston, or anyone else who wishes additional time.

Subsequently, Senator Dodd provided the following statement for the hearing record with respect to the nomination of Kenneth Adelman to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:

> The Constitutional requirement with respect to nominations is abundantly clear: to be approved they require the advice and consent of the Senate. Often-times it's a thankless responsibility, but thankless or not, I and 99 others accepted it when we took the oath of office.
>
> Though I have been in the Senate but a brief period, I think it is fair to say that most nominations are treated routinely. And I would be the last to suggest that this routine treatment reflects favorably on the institution or on the manner in which it responds to the Constitutional mandate assigned to it.
>
> But for better or worse—and perhaps unfairly—the Adelman nomination is anything but routine. This is so because the Adelman nomination comes at a time when an aroused public is increasingly concerned about the seeming inability of our leaders to bring a halt to the nuclear arms race. Against this concern—this mounting concern—Mr. Adelman is perceived as one who is less than committed to pursuing meaningful arms control agreements. Rightly or wrongly, he is perceived as being part of the problem, rather than as part of the solution to it.
>
> Based on my full and lengthy review of the hearing transcripts, I must say in all candor that I share this perception of Mr. Aldelman's approach to arms control. Reading and re-reading those transcripts, I did not come away reassured. If anything, his noticeable timidity in responding to a variety of serious and legitimate questions about arms control only served to enhance this perception and cast further doubts on the wisdom of this nomination.
>
> Additionally, it is no secret that when it comes to arms control expertise at the highest levels within the Executive Branch, there is precious little to be had. Indeed—and with no disrespect intended—it is simply a fact of life that from the President to the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense to the National Security Advisor, the common denominator among them is their lack of first-hand, in-depth experience in the arms control field. Regrettably, the nomination of Kenneth Adelman to be Arms Control Director is all too consistent with this pattern.
>
> In keeping faith with my oath of office, in keeping faith with my constituency, and in keeping faith with those who fervently believe—as I do—in the urgent need for significant arms control agreements, I must in good conscience vote against this nomination.

The Chairman. Senator Tsongas, I had not noticed that you had returned. Would you care to either take time now, or you can yield it to Senator Cranston, if you wish?

Senator Tsongas. I only have a couple of questions, but I would like to wait a moment before I inquire. I would be happy to yield 5 minutes of my time to Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. You have only 5 minutes. Do you want to yield me 3?

The CHAIRMAN. We will come back for Senator Tsongas' questions.

Senator Cranston, you have 5 minutes.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

Let me ask you this: Did you ever use the word "sham" in the context of describing your views about arms control negotiations?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I can't recall ever using that word.

Senator CRANSTON. In his February 20, 1983, column and his testimony this morning, Mr. Auletta describes the phone interview with you on December 16, 1982—rather recently—about a United Nations matter. In your February 17 press statement you say that you have no recollection of ever—ever—having granted Mr. Auletta an interview.

Do you now recall such a phone conversation 2 months ago with Mr. Auletta?

Ambassador ADELMAN. The statement at the United Nations, as the statement today, said I wanted to clear up the misunderstanding which has arisen on the so-called on-the-record statement made some 21 months ago attributed to me suggesting that arms control efforts were a sham. That was put out front to tell everybody what the subject was that I was dealing with.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, let me read to you the direct quote from your statement; it is the sixth line of your statement in New York—"I have no recollection of ever granting Mr. Auletta an interview."

Ambassador ADELMAN. In terms of that statement and what I say in the first paragraph is the subject and what I said in my—not really press conference, but what I said in my statement, that I was addressing that issue. What I am doing is addressing that issue to talk about May 1981.

Senator CRANSTON. You do recall, then, the December 16 interview?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; on the UNICEF matter, as not having to do with arms control or anything else.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, that is not what you said here.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I was talking, Senator, here about the May 1981 Daily News article.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, let me read the whole paragraph. "His article of May 1981 in the New York Daily News quotes me as calling arms control 'a sham'. This has been repeated and recited by others. I have no recollection of ever granting Mr. Auletta an interview." You did not qualify that.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Cranston, the whole paragraph is about one subject. It is about, as it says, his article of May 1981, in the New York Daily News. That is what the whole statement is about. That is what the paragraph is about.

Senator CRANSTON. Let me try to understand your position a little bit more clearly.

You say in your February 17 press statement—the same document that I just read from—that Mr. Auletta is "a fine journalist whose integrity and professionalism are not under question." Do you today, under oath, deny making the statements I just read to you that Mr. Auletta attributes to you?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. Senator Cranston, I have said—and I will repeat it—that I have no recollection of ever granting a May 1981 interview to Ken Auletta.

Senator **CRANSTON**. Then you are not denying that you made the statements; you are just saying that you do not recall?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. That is what I have always said.

Senator **CRANSTON**. And you do not deny that the interview occurred, you just do not recall?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. That is what I have always said and I said that had I known about this article for 21 months then I would have handled it at the time, but I did not know about it and, as members of this committee have pointed out, this was something that supposedly took place 21 months ago and what you are asking me to do, Senator, is to prove a negative, to prove that something did not happen 2 years ago.

Senator **CRANSTON**. Well, let me take a different approach to it, then. If you do not deny that the interview took place or that the statements were made, then you will agree, do you not, that the interview may have occurred as Mr. Auletta contends and that you may indeed have said those things?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. I have no recollection of ever having such an interview, Senator.

Senator **CRANSTON**. I understand that. But you grant that since you do not recollect that perhaps it occurred?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. I have no recollection of ever having given an interview, Senator.

Are you asking me to remember? Are you asking me to say something that I have no recollection of?

Senator **CRANSTON**. Since you do not remember it and Mr. Auletta does remember it and has notes to that effect, perhaps his memory is more accurate than yours, with notes to help his memory.

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. I have no recollection of that interview, Senator Cranston, and I can keep saying that. What I do have, Senator Cranston, is 116 articles in the public record over 52 journals giving my views on foreign policy very clearly. And I know because of your interest in arms control throughout the years that you have been attentive to those kinds of articles and probably have read the August 1978 article in the Wall Street Journal and realize that in these 116 articles in 52 journals that I am pretty consistent on these issues. Statements that have gotten the highest publicity from the New York Daily News article are not consistent with those views at all.

Senator **CRANSTON**. Since you do not deny the quotations, and since you do not challenge Mr. Auletta's journalistic integrity or professionalism, wouldn't it be fair, then, for this committee to conclude that the quotations are accurate since Mr. Auletta has testified under oath before the committee and submitted notes to the committee that they are accurate?

Ambassador **ADELMAN**. Senator, I think it is an obligation and a very serious obligation of this committee to determine my views on arms control. I think that is a very important subject. When you look at the record over 5 years on my views on arms control they are very consistent. People talk about this May 1981 article as if I did not have any vested interest. Four and half years ago, writing an article in the Wall Street Journal, and 4 years ago writing in the American Spectator, writing in Foreign Affairs, writing in Foreign Policy and writing in the New York Times, and writing in the Washington Post, writing in Harper's, the New Republic—the best journals of the United States demonstrate my real interest in arms control.

If you are saying are my views clear on arms control, I think any responsible member of this committee would have to say yes, they are very clear.

Senator CRANSTON. You did indicate to the committee earlier that the allegations that you had made certain statements were damaging to you as a person nominated for this post. If you asked us not to believe Mr. Auletta, are you not in fact challenging his integrity as a journalist?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I am asking you, Senator, and I think that the voters, the American people, would ask you to consider this nomination a very important one. One of those considerations is the track record of the President's candidate, the President's relationship with the person, the Secretary of State's relationship with the person, certainly the person's views on arms control.

Now, if I had come from the Fiji Islands or someplace like that and never had expressed one word or one bit of knowledge or expertise or experience in this area, I can see that there would be a great deal of attention and a great deal of concern about a May 1981 kind of interview.

But for someone who has been in public policy and has written very freely about public policy for all those years, I would think that these are important considerations for a Senator to look at.

Senator CRANSTON. We are, of course, interested in your views, wherever they have been expressed, and it was originally some of your views expressed in your own writing that gave great concern to some of the members of this committee, including myself. For example, your remarks that predecessors in the office for which you have been nominated were hysterical, that they were obsessed—you mocked their efforts to "stave off Armageddon with visions of mushroom clouds dancing in their heads."

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Cranston, if you read that kind of paragraph, I would feel comfortable with that. The sense I was getting at in that article was that the selling of SALT, the way it was done—the idea of lobbying the American people so that they could lobby the Senate—I think was improper. I think, as the chairman wisely guided me to do, that I read John McCloy's testimony before this committee in 1979. That was exactly the point that he was making at that time and it is a point I believe today and I am entirely comfortable with that.

Senator CRANSTON. Let me say that it seems to me you are really trying to have it both ways in regard to your statements. We are trying to ascertain whether they did at any time reflect views that you held, views that have been attributed to you by Mr. Auletta.

You are trying to have it both ways because on the one hand you say you consider Mr. Auletta a very fine journalist. On the other hand you question the accuracy of his reporting.

I do not see how you can have it both ways. At the least, aren't you saying that Mr. Auletta's notes are not accurate?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Cranston, I do not go after a person's integrity. I think that is a very damaging thing to do and I am not the kind of person to go after a person's integrity.

Mr. **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Cranston.

Senator Pressler?

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you. Let me say that the Wall Street Journal article has been widely quoted and cited as an example of your interest and willingness in arms control, but in the second column there is a sentence that is kind of a bolt out of the blue.

In the paragraph it says, "The burial of SALT would resurrect U.S. strategic programs as, first and foremost, a matter of national security and not primarily one of arms control." And that would say to me that arms control is an issue of convenience more or less, that it is a very low priority. That seems to be the opposite of what the rest of the article is saying.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator, the point of the article is that arms control is very important. You don't write an article about a subject you think is very useless. The point of that article is—I think that sentence is a very comfortable one, that the U.S. strategic programs are first and foremost a matter of national security and not primarily ones of arms control.

Now do I think arms control contributes to our national security? Yes, I do. But I would vote, if I were a Senator, for a strategic program because it is in the interest of the defense of the United States.

Senator **Pressler**. But the first part of the sentence is, "The burial of SALT II would resurrect U.S. strategic programs." Well, we can argue circuitously, but I would read that to indicate, even in this article, the opposite—exactly the opposite—of what you are saying elsewhere in the article, and I would read it to indicate, if I were reading it without any background, that arms control is merely an issue of convenience.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Let me just say, Senator Pressler, I do not think the President of the United States would take a responsible position if he said that U.S. strategic programs are first and foremost a matter of arms control. I don't think we should build programs for bargaining chips or for arms control or for anything like that.

I would never say anything like that. They should be for U.S. defense interests.

Senator **Pressler**. The first part of the sentence was, "The burial of SALT."

Ambassador **Adelman**. Yes; it is talking about how the SALT II process was not a productive process. That's why the title is: "Can There Be a SALT III: Under What Conditions Could There Be a SALT III?"

Senator **Pressler**. My point is, to me that sentence contradicts many other things.

Let me also read from a brief exchange we had on the first day of your testimony, January 27.

"Senator PRESSLER. I am going to try and clarify some areas here that I do not feel are completely clear. First of all, do you support ratifications of the threshold test ban, and the peaceful nuclear explosions accord, and will you fight for ratification within the administration?

"Mr. Adelman said: "I have discussed this with several members of the committee. My views are that, like Chairman Percy, I think that it is a very positive element to sign the treaties to show that the United States follows up on the treaties negotiated by two Presidents of the United States.

"Senator PRESSLER. Do you support their ratification and would you fight for their ratification in the administration?

"Mr. ADELMAN. Yes.

"Senator PRESSLER. The answer is yes.

"Mr. ADELMAN. No, Senator. Let me say that I believe the verification provisions have to be tightened up. As you know, there is a factor of two.

"Senator PRESSLER. So you do not support them in their present form?

"Mr. ADELMAN. I think what we need to do is tighten up the verification provisions. I do not think that that is a burdensome or time-consuming element once we have adequate verification, because of the principle that you should not submit a treaty to the Senate that does not have adequate verification provisions.

"Senator PRESSLER. So you do not support them in their present form?

"Mr. ADELMAN. That is true."

I have supported the ratification of the TTB and PNE treaties in their current form. The TTB provides for data exchange and the PNE provides for onsite inspection. If we cannot get these two treaties agreed to, we probably cannot get any other arms control agreement.

We may talk about reductions and we may talk about lots of other things, but the PNE actually provides for limited onsite inspection. This is the very first time that the Soviets have signed accords that recognize the need for onsite inspection. We should not endanger these advances on verification by seeking a perfect accord at this time.

In reopening this issue, we could lose the precedent that these accords will provide our INF and START negotiators in Geneva and I do not know if you have anything new to say on that subject.

Ambassador ADELMAN. No.

Senator PRESSLER. Throughout the world arms control has become perhaps the foremost issue of our time and people are right in demanding action on arms control. Nuclear war obviously could be a disaster for all humanity.

My reasons for voting no on your nomination will not be anything personal. But, rather, it is based upon the testimony and particularly that piece of testimony where we had contradictory responses on those treaties and on the antisatellite negotiation question that is a great problem for me. I ask that my full statement on this nomination be printed in the hearing record.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Let me address it, then, Senator. That is a great problem. I don't believe there is a great contradiction here and I will try to clear up the issue.

The treaties, as everybody on this committee knows very well, were signed by President Ford and President Carter. They have very many good aspects about them, the kind of aspects that you are talking about. They also have detrimental aspects; namely that the verification provisions are loose, because there can be a blast of 150 kiloton that comes in to be verified at either 300 or at 75. To go from 75 to 300 in a verification measure covers a very large area.

Now, the President has decided and the Congress has decided in the ACDA legislation, that verification is a very important element in arms control treaties. Therefore, President Reagan decided that the body of the treaty is a good document; the verification provisions in the protocol, not in the body, needed tightening up.

He came to the conclusion that is my personal belief as well—that when you have a treaty that could be verified as showing a 75 kiloton blast or a 300 kiloton blast, that is too wide to allow to continue. He thought with very few modifications it would not take a great deal of time that we could have a treaty that would be based on solid verification that would, therefore, help relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union.

I, for one, believe that if we get into arms control agreements that are not verified like the Biological and Chemical Weapons Convention that you, Senator Pressler, are having a hearing on very shortly, that that kind of an agreement hurts the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Senator **Pressler**. But the PNE Treaty provides for onsite inspections. This is the first time the Soviets have signed an accord with an onsite provision. If we can't agree to that treaty, we will never get a treaty.

Ambassador **Adelman**. If you are saying, Senator Pressler, that these treaties have good elements about them or very good elements about them, I entirely agree. I think you are absolutely right.

Senator **Pressler**. Both Presidents Ford and Nixon strongly support them to this day.

Just one final point. One other confusing area to me is the space treaty, and let me say that from the standpoint of the concern that I have repeatedly voiced over the past 2 years, the need to immediately resume bilateral talks on antisatellite weapons, your replies were troubling.

You stated this is an appropriate issue for debate at the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. But only the Soviets currently possess and the United States will soon test ASAT weapons and only last summer the United States resisted efforts to create a space arms control working group in Geneva.

That also leaves me feeling that it is a very inconsistent position.

Ambassador **Adelman**. No; the position, I believe, Senator Pressler, is very consistent—the consistency is what will work, what can stop a future arms race in outer space. That is the important thing. How it is done, in this forum or that forum or the other forum is less important than having a mechanism to stop an arms race in outer space.

Now my position is to go for that which has the most promising results. If that is, at this time, in the CD because there has been a lot of preparatory work done in the CD working with our allies, 40 countries together, if that seems more productive I would go that route.

If that is what the Allies want to do—if that kind of way does not produce results, then I have no hesitation at all recommending to the President to try the bilateral way. Let's go for what works.

Senator PRESSLER. But the United States did resist an effort to set up the space working group last summer in Geneva, is that not correct?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That is correct. Is that our position now? No; that is not our position now.

Senator PRESSLER. That is not our position now?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No.

Senator PRESSLER. Would you recommend that we set up direct bilateral talks?

Ambassador ADELMAN. If the approach that we and our allies are on now does not prove fruitful, does not produce a treaty to stop an arms race in outer space, yes, I would have no hesitancy at all about recommending very vigorously that we go the bilateral route.

Do I think that we should now switch once we are working with our allies, once we have done the groundwork in the CD, once we have had the years of preparation and really done the staff work there and done working with the main NATO countries, and now all of a sudden switch on them? No; I think that we should not do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pressler, very much.

[Senator Pressler's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY PRESSLER

Here, in Europe, in Japan, and throughout the world, arms control has become perhaps the foremost issue of our time. People are right in demanding action on arms control. Nuclear war would be a disaster for all humanity. With long-range missiles and bombers, there are no safe havens from the consequences of a nuclear war.

President Reagan has made much progress over the past two years in moving towards significant and verifiable arms reductions. In both the INF talks and in START, the Soviets are somewhat more responsive in meeting some of our concerns. There is, however, still a long way to go before we and the Soviet Union will have resolved serious differences that today block the path towards first agreements in START and INF.

Thus, while not minimizing the difficulties ahead, given sufficient negotiating skill and a willingness to compromise—on both sides—we are at least half-way towards reducing the serious threat posed by nuclear weapons. President Reagan has the ideal qualifications to complete this important task. Just as Richard Nixon could open the door to China, it takes a realist like Ronald Reagan to produce a breakthrough in arms control with the hard-liners in the Kremlin. In this, he requires a core of wise and skillful advisers.

A few weeks ago, Eugene Rostow resigned as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. At that time, I indicated my disappointment with this turn of events, for it is unwise to change ACDA's leadership at midstream in both these important negotiations. Getting any new Director up to speed on these negotiations would be a formidable task, and it would slow the process of moving towards arms reductions at a critical point. This problem would exist even if a person with extensive arms control and negotiating experience were picked for the job.

There is another issue which this Administration faces in dealing with arms control. Aside from the efficient management of the arms control process, the ACDA Director should be actively involved in an important public affairs mission. We must realize that we are in a public opinion war with the Soviet Union.

In Europe, public opinion seems to side with the views of the men in the Kremlin that their missiles are somehow less threatening than are American missiles. This is why the Soviets are in a position to continue weapons deployments—deployments which are so far unmatched by the United States and NATO—while Moscow continues to profess only peaceful intentions towards the West.

It is difficult to believe that the United States is losing this battle overseas as well as here at home. The right and moral position is, and should be, ours. It is the Soviet Union's missiles that now threatens Europe, not those of the United States; it is the Soviet Union that has invaded Afghanistan and brought about suppression of human rights in Poland; and, it is the Soviet Union that is engaged in the use of inhumane and illegal chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.

We must be doing something wrong if the Soviets are allowed a free ride with world opinion and public opinion in the United States. In my view, the problem is one that relates as much to who speaks on the Administration's behalf as it is a problem of what Administration spokesman say.

The credibility of U.S. arms control policy is closely linked to the stature of the ACDA Director. In Europe, for instance, the ACDA Director is viewed as America's key arms control spokesman and is akin to a Cabinet-level official. In that position, we must have someone who can stand shoulder-to-shoulder with men of the high calibre of Secretary of State George Shultz. In addition, the ACDA Director must demonstrate a deep commitment to arms control, and he must have extensive knowledge of arms control issues, negotiations and the Soviet Union.

I am not sure that the testimony received here has reassured skeptics. From the standpoint of a concern that I have repeatedly voiced over the past 2 years—the need to immediately resume bilateral talks on anti-satellite weapons—Mr. Adelman's replies were especially troubling. This is not an appropriate issue for debate at the forty nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, as Mr. Adelman contends, since only the Soviets currently possess (and the United States will soon test) ASAT weapons. Moreover, it somewhat disingenuous for the nominee to suggest that we are actively negotiating ASATs in Geneva, when, only last summer, the United States resisted efforts to create a space arms control working group in Geneva.

With regard to two modest but nevertheless important arms control accords, the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties, I do not support the contention that these should be first renegotiated before they are submitted for ratification.

Strong verification measures are a central element for successful arms control arrangements. It is for this very reason that I have supported the ratification of these two signed treaties in their current form. The TTB provides for data-exchange, and the PNE provides for on-site inspection. This is the very first time that the Soviets have signed accords that recognize the need for on-site inspection. We should not endanger these advances on verification by seeking a perfect accord at this time. In reopening this issue, we could lose the precedents that these accords will provide our INF and START negotiators in Geneva.

The Administration does not accept this viewpoint, as Mr. Adelman has made clear to this Committee. But it is my view that the ACDA Director must be out in front of the Administration in pushing for arms control accords. There are more than enough officials in other departments who will certainly urge a policy of not proceeding with these and other arms control agreements. The ACDA Director, however, must be a strong and forceful advocate of significant arms control.

The Administration's arms control advocate, the Director of ACDA, must take a lead in urging that these accords be ratified and that verification enhancements be the subject of a separate negotiation which should immediately follow ratification. Half a loaf is occasionally better than no bread at all. By not ratifying these agreements, we do not gain any of the verification improvements already in the TTB and the PNE treaties. This is clearly a major source of the uncertainty that we face in verifying compliance at the present time.

The ACDA Director must have this long-term perspective, a view of arms control as an on-going and evolutionary process. Only then can we hope to rid the world of nuclear weapons in the long run. I am, therefore, disappointed with the perspective that the nominee brings to this important issue.

On these and other issues, I am unconvinced that the nominee will be the forceful voice for arms control that is demanded by the ACDA Statute. For these reasons, I must regrettably vote against this nominee.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that two editorials which appeared in leading South Dakota daily newspapers on this nomination be printed in the hearing record.

[From the Daily Republic, Feb. 19, 1983]

OPINION—PRESSLER STAND ON ADELMAN COMMENDABLE

The administration's bid to get confirmation for Kenneth Adelman in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee got a setback dealt from Sen. Larry Pressler this week.

Adelman is the nominee to be the president's arm negotiator, but the senate panel didn't see Reagan's choice as a sound one.

We believe Pressler and Sen. Mac Mathias took a courageous position on the nominee who didn't show many moments of brilliance during his senate confirmation hearings.

The key issue was Adelman's stance toward arms control, something he really never left committee members who want some sort of pact, at ease with.

In addition, his apparent lack of understanding of some of the questions asked of him on issues that should be relevant to the position he is to assume were disappointing.

We applaud Pressler for standing up to the president in a case where he believed the nominee was not qualified for the job.

When a person nominated to deal with arms control isn't certain about his stance on the subject.

Pressler has been vocally supportive of a move to pass a resolution opposing a space arms race, but Adelman, on this count, didn't take a position.

The pressure from President Reagan, Vice President Bush and Sec. of State Shultz was all there for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to feel, but the resistence by Republicans and Democrats alike to that lobby is commendable.

Reagan has surrounded himself with the likes of unqualified administrators like Ray Donovan, James Watt, his EPA personnel and a few more. It is time, some resistence was applied.

[From the Brookings (South Dakota) Register, Feb. 18, 1983]

ADELMAN NOT EVERYONE'S CHOICE

President Reagan addressed a variety of subjects during a news conference Wednesday night, including his choice for a U.S. arms negotiator.

His nomination of Kenneth Adelman has been put on hold by the Senate. The president said repudiation of the nomination would hurt this country's efforts to establish arms control policies throughout the world.

One reporter asked the president if by the denial of the nomination, wasn't this just a way of stating the Senate did not agree with the choice (rather than that the committee was voting against the president personally.)

The president replied that either way he would lose, and that was something he did not intend to do. He still intends to pressure the Senate to accept Adelman as the best person for the job.

There are many times when a president makes a popular (or unpopular) nomination for a high federal position. And the public has the right to expect its leaders in Congress to vote the way they believe best represents the concerns of the constituents.

The vote of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was 15 to 2, which means that several Republicans voted against Adelman. When votes are closer, it is an indication that there are some doubts in the nominee's ability, but these may be answered by further testimony or discussion.

The vote margin in this instance was not close. The position of arms negotiator is extremely important to our country. While the president says that Adelman has the experience, apparently it is not enough to warrant acceptance.

It may be in the best interests of this country for the president to reconsider his nomination, and come up with a different choice. We need arms control, but to have effective negotiations we need a spokesman who has the confidence of both the president and the Congress.

Adelman apparently has only the president's confidence.

The CHAIRMAN. I had to cut you off because it was your suggestion that we cut off at 5 minutes.

Senator PRESSLER. I didn't object.

Senator Dodd?

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, I have indicated that I would be glad to yield my time on the questioning. I have read the entire transcript of the previous meetings and based on your decision this morning that we limit questioning to those areas that have not been raised before, I would defer to Senator Cranston or anyone else who desires more time.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

Senator Cranston?

Senator **Pell**. Senator Cranston, would you yield for one moment?

Senator **Cranston**. Certainly.

Senator **Pell**. Just to follow up on Senator Pressler's question, my recollection is refreshed. A few days back I asked you in a hearing whether you would support the resolution of mine that the North Atlantic Assembly passed, for the NATO nations to conduct in cooperation with the United States a comprehensive analysis on the ways in which verifiable agreements governing weapons in space, antisatellite programs and peaceful cooperation in space would contribute to security and to press for negotiations leading to agreements and principally a limitation on the deployment of offensive weapons in space.

I bring this up following Senator Pressler's line of similar questioning, and I would like to ask you if in the days that have intervened have you had a chance to refresh your memory with this and would you support it?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I have not read that since we had that hearing—but it seems to me that the Allies working together for analysis of this problem, which I think is your operative phrasing there, Senator Pell, yes, I would fully support that. I believe we have been doing that in the U.N., where I have participated very heavily in that pursuit.

We worked very closely with our allies on outer space matters—very closely.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Thank you.

Senator Cranston?

Senator **Cranston**. Mr. Adelman, it seems to me that your testimony today leads to the conclusion, in your view, that we should not give credence to Mr. Auletta's notes, so I would like to ask how you think they came into existence. Were they fabricated?

Ambassador **Adelman**. I think, Senator, that you have an obligation to determine my views. I think that my views are put forth in 116 articles in 52 journals. I do not think there is any scarcity of material about what I believe in on arms control.

Senator **Cranston**. But there is a surplus of material on that you believe.

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Cranston, if you are getting me to question the integrity and the professionalism of another individual, I am not going to do it. I am not the kind of a person to go after the integrity of another individual.

Senator **Cranston**. We remain with a mystery on our hands about those notes, from your point of view, versus his testimony, but under oath.

Let me go over again the question I was trying to get an answer to a bit ago. Since Mr. Auletta testified firmly and without equivocation, under oath, that the interview with you occurred, that the statements he attributed to you were said by you to him, and that they fully expressed the views that you had articulated in that interview, and since he produced notes and phone records to substantiate his testimony and his May 24 article, and since you will not, under oath, deny the quotes and the interview—that is, challenge him on these points—how can the committee do other than conclude that the interview occurred and that the quotes are indeed accurate?

Ambassador ADELMAN. You can do two things, Senator. One is you can look at the notes and decide on their reliability and internal consistency. Two, you can think of those parts of the notes that say one thing and another thing and judge them against a very solid body of literature that encompasses my articles and 8½ hours of testimony.

Senator CRANSTON. When did you first learn about the May 24, 1981, column by Mr. Auletta? What day?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Sunday, January 23, the day before the January 27 article by Richard Reeves. I was at home and I was not taking any calls from the press. A call came in which my wife received. When she hung up and she said that Mr. Reeves, a columnist, had quotations from an article written by Ken Auletta in May 1981 I had no idea what he was talking about.

What was the alleged quote? What was the citation? What was the whole thing? At that time we got the quotes from Richard Reeves, who had the honor and the decency of calling me up to check this. I very much appreciate his courtesy. I then called the spokesman for ACDA to issue a statement right then and there and to say that I have no recollection of that. Those were not my views then and they are not my views now. I wanted to kill the story and nip it in the bud. That is why on Sunday afternoon we issued that statement.

Let me say again that Richard Reeves had the decency of including my denials right in his article. Senator, had I been asked about this issue over 8 hours of hearing, I would have given the answer without having it become a national issue.

Senator CRANSTON. When did you first have a conversation with Mr. Auletta about the column?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I was disturbed because of the John Chancellor commentary on February 3 and I got in touch with John Chancellor on the fifth or sixth, whatever, and I then talked to Ken Auletta about the matter.

Senator CRANSTON. You had no earlier conversation with him about it?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No.

Senator CRANSTON. At any time did Mr. Auletta ever tell you that he would send you a copy of an interveiw that he had had with you?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No; because I do not remember him ever mentioning an interview to me. That was one of the shocking parts on that Sunday when Richard Reeves called, I was totally unaware of it and I knew that I had seen Ken Auletta in the Lehrman Institute before that time, but also I had seen him after that time, and the fact that he had never mentioned that the interview had come up, was, I thought, a very unusual fact. But it is true.

Senator **Cranston**. He testified this morning that he had tried to send it to you, that he discussed the fact that he had it, that he had the wrong adddress and that he mentioned to you again that he would try to send it to you again and perhaps asked for your address. But he did grant maybe he didn't get your attention when he was saying that.

Ambassador **Adelman**. I didn't move in that period. My address had been the same for 5 years or 4 years. It had not been a question of my moving around. An address is very easy to get.

Senator **Cranston**. Let me get to just one final point and then I will be done. On the issue of credibility that I raised in my opening remarks this morning, you will recall that Senator Tsongas cited 16 examples of ways in which he believed you were evasive or uninformed in your response to basic arms control questions posed to you in the first hearing.

In an effort to clarify the record—and it is for that purpose—I would like to explore with you again certain apparent inconsistencies in your previous testimony. The first relates to your qualifications for this job. You asserted in the first day's transcript that you handled the arms control issues at the U.N. and stated you were "a participant in a lot of the National Security Council's deliberations on these issues."

In the second day's hearing you said, "I have seen the President deal with these arms control issues for the past 2 years, not on a day-to-day basis but on a periodic basis at NSC meetings."

It was noted by Chairman Percy in opening the first day of hearings that you "represented Ambassador Kirkpatrick in National Security Council meetings on START and INF." At the second day of hearings you stated that you were, "troubled by the impression created in last week's testimony that you were somehow unfamiliar with the issues in the fields to which you have devoted your entire adult life."

Despite these assertions about your experience, when I asked you whether the President's most significant arms reduction proposal of 1982 to deploy MX in the Dense Pack mode would violate SALT II, you said, "I do not know, I would have to look at that."

And when Senator Pell asked about whether START can be verified, you responded, "I do not know, Senator, because I have not had the opportunity to look at the classified information on exactly what our START proposals are, what kind of measures we are proposing on verification, and it is very cumbersome."

Also, when I asked you whether you believed the Soviets are violating SALT II terms or not violating them, you said, "Senator, this is not an area that I have looked into. It is not an area that I am knowledgeable about at all."

Wouldn't you agree that someone who has devoted his entire adult life to arms control issues should have been able to answer the questions posed on that first day?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Cranston, let me say that everything which I have said before is consistent when you repeat it, even if you take a little bit here and a little bit there. I did participate at the NSC meetings on START and INF. I did handle the issues at the U.N.

I am not asserting, nor would any human being assert, that I know everything there is to know about arms control in every aspect. We have not had an NSC meeting that I have ever attended on violations on SALT II. We have not had an NSC meeting that I have ever attended on the consistency between MX and Dense Pack. These are not issues that would come up in the U.N. The issues in the U.N. were "yellow rain," and other space issues. There is a whole variety of issues at the U.N.

I have devoted my entire adult life to foreign affairs, and national security issues, which include arms control. I was disturbed, and I am disturbed, by the view that I am a novice in this field, that I do not have experience, that I don't have any intelligence in this area.

Now the converse of that is not true. I do not know everything there is to know about the technicalities of these issues, and I would never deceive you by saying I, if confirmed as Director of ACDA, I will continue to learn a great deal more about this subject.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, it seems to me, (a) that you have not devoted your entire adult life to the subject of arms control.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Foreign affairs and national security issues, including arms control.

Senator CRANSTON. One of the questions we asked you—it is certainly not something that was a U.N. issue but it is certainly a key issue to anyone studying arms control and interested in arms control—and that is whether or not the Russians are cheating on SALT. And I was startled that you did not have a view on that.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Cranston, I will bet you there are Ph. D. dissertations being written now on Soviet conformity to SALT II. That is a subject that is very complex. It is a subject that if I were teaching arms control in California or wherever, I would say that it is an absolutely proper kind of endeavor for a Ph. D. student to write a 300-page dissertation, because it is a tough, very serious one and a very complicated and detailed question.

It is not a simple question that anybody can answer who has not really delved into the subject. I know that over the years you can look at the literature, as I am sure you have, being interested in arms control, and find a variety of different opinions and a variety of different information on the subject.

Senator CRANSTON. I am sure it is a tough one for somebody who has not delved into it. It seems to me in light of your initial inability to respond to those questions that it is fair to conclude either that your experience and qualifications regarding arms control issues have been very seriously overstated, or that you are being evasive and somewhat less than candid in your testimony on the first day.

That concludes my questioning.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cranston, very much.

Senator Murkowski?

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Adelman. I would like to hear your reflections on how the controversy over your nomination would affect your ability to promote arms control agreements with the Soviets if your nomination is approved.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator, I think that the most important qualifications for a Director of ACDA are the relationship with the President and with the Secretary of State. I feel very comfortable about both relationships.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Do you feel your credibility in dealing and negotiating with the Soviets would be or has been irreparably crippled?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator I think that over the last 18 months at the U.N. I have negotiated a great deal of material with the soviet representative, probably a lot more than I would as ACDA Director. The ACDA Director in the present setup is not one of the active negotiators.

Senator MURKOWSKI. But this controversy then, in your opinion, does not inhibit you in any way in your ability to feel confident that you speak for the President, the administration, and our Nation in this regard?

Ambassador ADELMAN. It does not call into question my belief that because of the competence of the President and Secretary of State, combined with my background and knowledge in this field, and my own deep desire for an arms control agreement with real reductions, greater stability, and verification based in equality, that I can be a very good Director of ACDA.

I have no doubts about that at all, Senator.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Do you feel your credibility will be damaged even if your nomination is approved by a narrow margin in the Senate?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think my credibility is very solid. I feel very comfortable after rereading my testimony. I felt very comfortable looking at the statement issued Thursday in the U.N. in light of Mr. Auletta's statements since that time, in light of this morning. I am just feeling very comfortable that my credibility is just not under question.

Senator MURKOWSKI. You have expressed your support for real reductions in arms levels and it is often recognized that past agreements have not truly achieved this goal. Do you think that perhaps these efforts failed because of political reasons, and might it be your opinion that the efforts have been a sham to date?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I think that they have failed because we have not tried hard enough.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Your answer is yes or no?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That they have failed because of political reasons?

Senator MURKOWSKI. Political reasons, or have the efforts in effect been a sham to date?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I don't believe that they have been a sham.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Your answer would be no?

Ambassador ADELMAN. That they are not a sham.

Senator MURKOWSKI. That is correct?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So you would agree, then, with the testimony of Mr. Auletta, who was asked the same question and he responded no as well?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Do I believe arms control in the past has been a sham? I don't believe so.

Senator **Murkowski**. You do agree, then, with the question I asked Mr. Auletta.

Mr. Chairman, in view of the very extensive examination by the committee and the staff of the numerous articles that have been written, it would appear to me that we very possibly have a difference of interpretation between honorable people and I think all of us would agree that that situation can occur, and the very fact that our President, our Secretary of State, and many other outstanding American leaders have spoken on your behalf, I think, brings to focus an observation that the hearing today has examined, if you will, an article written by a journalist.

There is already one acknowledged inaccuracy in that article which has been pointed out by the professional staff, that in fact Mr. Adelman did not publish articles in Commentary magazine. That points out to me that the journalist in question obviously did not check out totally the accuracy of his information in the story. That again brings to light the realism that honorable differences of interpretation can occur and I think it warrants this committee to examine perhaps in more detail the extensive, or reexamine the extensive articles and journals in comparison with what is before us today and that is the examination of one particular article by a journalist.

So I commend you for your dedication and your ability and willingness to make yourself available as a public servant to this country, and I just hope that this extensive hearing does not inhibit others to make the same sacrifice. I am afraid it might.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

I would like to advise the members of the committee that the majority leader has assured the chairman that there will be ample time on the floor during the debate on Ambassador Adelman's nomination to debate the entire issue of arms control and to debate in addition his qualifications for that.

If there are further questions that pertain to Mr. Adelman's qualifications, we would certainly be happy to have them now, but, if not, I would presume that we are ready, then, to recess—is there a further question at this time?

Senator **Tsongas**. I have yet to inquire, Mr. Chairman. I have not asked any questions yet.

The **Chairman**. I am so sorry. I had forgotten that we had overlooked you.

Senator Tsongas.

Senator **Tsongas**. Mr. Adelman, let me say that this has to be a very painful and uncomfortable position for you to be in, and I would not want to trade places with you. I am sure that your family does not enjoy this any more than you do. I think we are reasonably sensitive to that, but that is part of public life and I think a lot of us have understood that.

You were very outspoken and I have read a lot of your writings and in one case you are referring to Senator Culver, and a speech that he gave, you referred to it "speaking with a Janice Joplin-like whooping sound." That is tough language. And you described his position: "in what has to be the most sickening description this side of Guyana," If that is consistent, then you do not pull your punches.

I was even more amazed to find the Wall Street Journal piece in which you referred to President Reagan as "intellectually simple." Now that is not pulling any—you didn't say that?

Ambassador ADELMAN. No. Let me be very clear on that. [Laughter.]

Let me be clear on both. I objected, Senator Tsongas, in a way that a bureaucrat would not object, in the selling of SALT and this kind of language. I thought that Senator Culver's remarks about the alternative to SALT being an Armageddon was just improper.

On the article on the White House and President Reagan that I wrote before any involvement with the administration or the President's nomination. The point of the article is that a President has to have certain qualities. The qualities that came to mind with President Reagan is his ability to get to the core of an issue, to see it, and to not get fuzzed up with all kinds of intellectually confusing elements was the same kind that I thought made more outstanding Presidents, like Lincoln and Truman and everything else.

And—you don't have that article, obviously. If you read that article right now, that is another article that was written 2½ years ago that I think would ring pretty true today.

Senator TSONGAS. Well, let me read it. This is the beginning: "When all is said and done, Ronald Reagan is a simple man. That he is psychologically simple relieves most Americans who are weary of the inner turmoils——

Senator BOSCHWITZ. What article is this?

Senator TSONGAS. The Wall Street Journal of July 10, 1980.

"Simplicity does not rule out success in White House" is the title. "That he is psychologically simple relieves most Americans who are weary of the inner turmoils and outward mysteries of a Lyndon Johnson or a Richard Nixon. That he is intellectually simple unsettles many Americans.

"Before running for President, Ronald Reagan created no seminal work of political theory as did Thomas Jefferson, or on political process, as did Woodrow Wilson. But lack of intellectual trailblazing does not preclude a successful Presidency."

And you make the argument about there have been those—I have two other questions after this, if I may.

Ambassador ADELMAN. No; but it does justice to a piece to read the whole piece. It's a short piece.

Senator TSONGAS. "Nor does its presence assure on, according to both theory and history.

"Theoretically, there are different types of intelligence, among them knowledge and judgment. The first involves a nimble handling and delivery of data: here Reagan has stumbled." Has he read this?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I have no idea. [Laughter.]

Go on; it's a good piece.

Senator TSONGAS. I expect he will tomorrow.

"The second involves handling of ideas and convictions, fitting them into the broad cultural and historical context; here Reagan has run smoothly.

"Facts don't always accompany sound judgment, and to know more is not necessarily to understand more. Robert McNamara, to take an obvious example, dazzled Senators and Representatives alike with his recitation of facts and figures galore. Still his record is blemished by faulty judgment spanning from the Edsel and TF-X to the Vietnam war and U.S. strategic policy. Many aspects of knowledge, it seems, contribute negligibly to wisdom.

"Historically, some superb Presidents lacked intellectual complexity. The erudite Dean Acheson called Harry Truman 'simple' as a man and 'great' as a President—few today would quibble with either characterization and consider the two quite compatible. To quote his memoirs, 'Present at the Creation': 'No one can decide and act who is beset by second thoughts, self-doubt, and that most enfeebling of emotions, regret. With the President a decision made was done with and he went on to another.'

"Acheson also acclaimed Truman's mind as 'uncluttered with abstractions'. Historian Walter Weyl, in contrast, lamented how Woodrow Wilson's more brilliant mind was so cluttered Wilson failed at Versailles. Weyl wrote, since he 'seems to see the world in abstractions. To him, railroad cars are not railroad cars but a gray, generalized thing called 'transportation.' To him, morals and laws are not created out of the rub and wear of men and societies but are things innate, uncreated, immutable, absolute.'

Though an emotionally deep person, Abraham Lincoln was railed at for being intellectually shallow."

Ambassador ADELMAN. Keep going, you are doing great.

Senator TSONGAS. Would you consider the Gettysburg Address intellectually shallow?

Ambassador ADELMAN. Go on, finish the article and we will discuss it. I would love to discuss it.

Senator TSONGAS. "In his summer of '62 editorial, 'The Prayer of Twenty Millions,' the learned Horace Greeley lashed out at Lincoln. The President missed the logic of a complicated, simultaneous attack on the rebellion and its root cause, slavery. Lincoln wrote back plainly: 'My paramount objective of the struggle is to save the Union and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slaves, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it. And if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that.' Such was Lincoln's simple policy as President, though he reiterated his 'oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.'

"Historically, the converse also holds. Intellectually keen men have floundered, as President. Thomas Jefferson, scribe of the Declaration of Independence and Virginia constitution came on hard times in the White House. Mounting foreign failures and domestic criticism caused him to sigh 'Never did a prisoner released from his chains feel such relief as I' as he slithered from the capital weeks before his successor's inauguration.

"That successor, James Madison, was even better endowed with intellect, as the 'Federalist Papers' prove, and even less adept in office. Shrill cries for his resignation and for secession—by States in the North and South—accompanied his inglorious departure from office. To glance at the modern Presidency——

I have been requested to do this, Mr. Chairman. I have been reading since the second grade. I am prepared to keep on going, but I do not want that to be taken out of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boschwitz?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I will yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator TSONGAS. The 5 minutes are going to be taken up. Let me read the last two paragraphs, which I think, as most editorials do, you put it at the beginning, you put it at the end, you make the point, and I would request the time for the other two points I would like to make.

"Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Grant, Cleveland, and Nixon had positively dreadful second terms compared to their first. Others were only slightly worse second-termers—Monroe, Wilson—or remained at about the same level—Jackson, Eisenhower. Hence to expect any longer a better second term for any President would be—as Dr. Johnson once equipped about second marriages—a triumph of hope over experience."

Ambassador ADELMAN. Senator Tsongas, if I am not mistaken, you are confusing two different articles there. One is on the ability to be President and other on the second term.

Senator TSONGAS. Let me finish the last paragraph.

Ambassador ADELMAN. You are leading up to that point with one article and now your conclusion is a totally different article.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. No, no. It is the same piece.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Oh, from the Wall Street Journal.

Senator TSONGAS. I mean, I can understand that you would not want to comment about a second term doesn't mean it is going to get any better.

"Where does all this leave the American voter? Perplexed, as is customary from readings of history. Perplexed, but at least unburdened with the conventional wisdom that simplicity dooms a leader, that intellectual acuity destines one to greatness, or that experience before or during the Presidency assures adroit leadership of the Nation's affairs."

Ambassador ADELMAN. Yes; I am very comfortable with that article. I think what you look for in a President, like you and I discussed last time, was judgment and good sense and to know the important issues and to go to the nub of the matter, and I think that the way Truman and Lincoln did it are very successful ways.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Boschwitz?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I will yield some time to the Senator from Massachusetts. I must say that I agree with him that at the request of the witness he was reading the article and I do not think all that time should be charged against him. It is a good article, though.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tsongas, how much more time would you need?

Senator TSONGAS. I only have two points to make, Mr. Chairman, that will take me 3 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I will yield to you 3 minutes.

Senator TSONGAS. I appreciate the chairman's forebearance under the circumstances.

Let's put your position in the position of a German voter in watching these hearings. You have Mr. Auletta who says I remember it distinctly, and this is what he said. You have yourself, who says that I don't remember saying that.

Mr. Auletta, who obviously has no self-interest since he is merely a reporter, that you clearly have a self-interest in getting through these hearings. Mr. Auletta, by telephone, transcripts and his notes, you have no contrary evidence.

If you were a German voter, would you believe that those statements attributed to you by Mr. Auletta are in fact true?

Ambassador **Adelman**. If I were a German voter looking at this issue very responsibly, I would do just what I think a U.S. Senator should do. I would look at this case study in itself and ask are the notes consistent, including all the issues that came up this morning—and we needn't go through that again. But then, look; is this somebody who has written on the subject before? Is this someone who has expressed views before? Are these views consistent with the President's views? Was there any self-interest involved in August 1978 when he wrote the article for the Wall Street Journal?

Was there any self-interest involved when he wrote "Rafshooning the Armageddon" in the summer of 1979? I would look at the solid body of evidence on this.

Senator **Tsongas**. I wish them well.

One final point. This is a very difficult situation for everyone. You came to the first hearing with a strategy. The strategy very obviously was: don't say anything controversial. And the irony is, by being so good at it you were controversial.

The strategy for the second session was to be substantive, which you did, and I think recouped much of the lost ground. We have to assume there is a strategy for this session as well, and I think you have been very good at articulating that. But it is a strategy. There is not a history of answers. There is a history of strategy. When you have Mr. Auletta sitting there, who has no such history, that also gets weighed in the balance.

What I am getting to is this: These hearings have been a lot more provocative than anyone anticipated. I was not even at the morning session. As I told you in my office, I have no real interest in badgering you, but you have become a symbol. I think you are very decent. No one dislikes you, even those who call in and try to undermine you. Everyone agrees you are very bright and would be a quality appointment in virtually everything else.

But history has not developed a situation where you have become a symbol and however you may strategize to us in terms of the international framework and domestic politics, that symbolism exists. The major beneficiary of that symbolism, the Soviets; people who have been most hurt by it, the President.

My question to you is why are you persisting? Why not do the President a favor and recognize that this has been an unfortunate circumstance, that your career in other ways has been commendable? Why not let him appoint someone who would not be controversial and give him the running room that you believe he needs to conclude an arms control treaty?

Ambassador **Adelman**. Senator Tsongas, the President has expressed and feels a great deal of confidence in me, and I cherish that very much. The Secretary of State has expressed and feels a great deal of confidence in me, and I cherish that very much. I have no doubt in my mind that I could do a very good job as Director of ACDA.

Senator TSONGAS. And you believe that by persisting you are serving their interests?

Ambassador ADELMAN. I believe that by persisting the President and the Secretary of State and arms control are well served, yes, I do.

Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate your indulgence.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I will be very brief, Mr. Chairman. I find commenting on my friend Senator Tsongas' remarks that it is unfortunate that if the strategy of the first hearing was what is was—and I am not quite sure to whom that should be assessed, whatever blame is involved—but clearly if Ambassador Adelman had come to us in the first hearing as he came in the second hearing, there would not have been a third hearing or a second hearing, for that matter.

And I came to the first hearing with some doubts and I came also not having read what Mr. Adelman had written and was distressed with the first hearing and the answers that were given at that time.

Since that time, I have read everything that Ambassador Adelman has written about SALT and read a lot of his other things as well. You are a very prolific writer, I want to tell you.

Ambassador ADELMAN. I did not send you the simplicity one. I missed the one that Senator Tsongas just read.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I have that. I thought it was a good article and I had read about half of it and then felt it did not really apply very much to SALT, strategic arms, but I thought it was a good one and it gave me a great sense of your understanding of history and your knowledge of history. I thought it was a pretty good article.

But I have read what he has written and I think that currently Ambassador Adelman reflects the President's viewpoint that deep reductions in arms are necessary and that preceding arms agreements did not achieve that at all and indeed allowed there to be a continuing arms buildup.

I must tell you, Mr. Chairman, I am in accord with that viewpoint, and since the first hearing I have met and talked to Mr. Adelman, in addition to reading his materials, and, therefore, will vote for him—I had initially intended not to—will vote for him without hesitation, and I have talked to a large number of people, well respected, in the arms community and in the international community. I have not talked to his predecessor, Mr. Rostow, but Mr. Rostow, it should be made clear, sought Mr. Adelman as his deputy.

And I have asked people to review with me the backgrounds of some of the other Directors of ACDA and I find that Mr. Adelman is more qualified than several of them. So I think that he reflects the President's policy and reflects also a policy that I am very comfortable with. He is a prolific writer, and has a clarity of writing.

Sometimes he uses words, I will agree, that, perhaps in retrospect, he would not have used, but nevertheless I think, Mr. Chairman, that Ambassador Adelman will make a strong negotiator and I think that that is indicated.

I talked to him about the same thing that Senator Tsongas talked to me about. We all feel that a negotiator in the area of arms control has to be tough minded and perhaps there is some positives to be found in this rather arduous proceeding, and that is we have a tough-minded negotiator coming onboard.

I trust he will be confirmed by the Senate, and I believe he will, and that this is a man who represents the view of the President. You have to be tough minded to negotiate with those fellows—with the Russians. They are very tough minded in response.

So, Mr. Chairman, it is more of a statement than a question, but having read a great deal of what Ambassador Adelman has written, having talked to very many people, keeping in mind that Gene Rostow wanted him as deputy, and for good cause, I will be pleased to support the President's nominee.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Boschwitz.

Senator Mathias?

Senator **Mathias**. Mr. Adelman, have you ever been to Nagasaki or Hiroshima?

Ambassador **Adelman**. No, Senator.

Senator **Mathias**. Whether or not you are confirmed and enter into the duties of Director of ACDA, I would recommend that you go there. Such a trip would give you a new sense of the meaning of the word "Armageddon."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much. In accordance with requests now on both sides—minority and majority—we will recess this hearing for approximately 5 minutes. We will go into executive session in the office immediately behind the hearing room and return to this room and promptly and immediately vote.

Senator **Pressler**. Mr. Chairman, the yellow rain hearing is now scheduled for 2:30, to all the eager people who are now dying to know.

[The committee stood in recess.]

The **Chairman**. The committee will come to order, please.

I would like to propose a motion for consideration of the committee, that the committee report to the Senate the nomination of Kenneth L. Adelman to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency favorably, with the recommendation that he be confirmed by the Senate.

Is there a second to that?

Senator **Baker**. I second the motion.

The **Chairman**. The motion has been seconded. The clerk will call the role.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Baker.

Senator **Baker**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Helms.

Senator **Helms**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Lugar.

Senator **Lugar**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Mathias.

Senator **Mathias**. No.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mrs. Kassebaum.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Boschwitz.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. No.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Murkowski.

Senator **Murkowski**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Pell.

Senator **Pell**. No.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Biden.

Senator **Biden**. No.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Glenn.

Senator **Glenn**. No.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Sarbanes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. No.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Zorinsky.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Tsongas.

Senator **Tsongas**. No.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Cranston.

Senator **Cranston**. No.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Dodd.

Senator **Dodd**. No.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Aye.

The ayes are 8; the nays are 9. The motion is not approved.

The Chair will recognize Senator Baker for the purpose of making a second motion.

Senator **Baker**. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee report to the Senate the nomination of Kenneth L. Adelman to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency unfavorably.

The **Chairman**. And would that include a report then to the Senate with both minority and majority views?

I will second that motion.

Senator Tsongas.

Senator **Tsongas**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to state that I will do all that I can to defeat this nominee on the floor, including all the techniques that I have learned at the knee of Senator Helms lo these many years. If I thought we could have balled it up in the committee, I would have voted to do that.

It seems, since we do not have the votes for that, I believe that there are other committee considerations that you and Senator Baker have raised, and for that reason I will vote for the motion.

Senator **Lugar**. Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Senator Lugar.

Senator **Lugar**. Mr. Chairman, there are several of us who favored the nomination of Kenneth Adelman who, as a matter of fact, do not like the terminology of the current motion, but I simply want to explain I will vote in favor of the motion of Senator Baker to discharge this nomination with an unfavorable recommendation and with reports because I think it is important that the committee discharge its duties to advise and consent, having made a judgment to get that nomination to the floor.

The **Chairman**. Are there others?

Senator **Zorinsky**. Mr. Chairman, I feel the same explanation could be made for me, and I would like to reiterate what Senator Lugar has said.

The **Chairman**. Others who wish to speak?

Senator **Biden**. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think it would be better had we not had to have a vote in the first place, as you know from the last time we met, but I am going to vote to get it to the floor.

The **Chairman**. I thank you, my colleagues. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Baker.

Senator **Baker**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Helms.

Senator **Helms**. Pass.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Lugar.

Senator **Lugar**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Mathias.

Senator **Mathias**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mrs. Kassebaum.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Boschwitz.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. No.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Murkowski.

Senator **Murkowski**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Pell.

Senator **Pell**. No.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Biden.

Senator **Biden**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Glenn.

Senator **Glenn**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Sarbanes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Zorinsky.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Tsongas.

Senator **Tsongas**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Cranston.

Senator **Cranston**. No.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Dodd.

Senator **Dodd**. Aye.

Mr. **Keaney**. Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Aye.

[Senator Helms turned to the chief clerk and indicated that he wished to be recorded as voting "Aye."]

The ayes being 14 and the nays being 3, the motion is carried. There being no further business, the meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:38 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

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